Home Democracy HR811/S1487 2003-4 Key Documents Find my representatives New York About/Contact

March, 2005 through 2007

Does technology belong in our elections? If so, in what form? For what purpose? The international standard for legitimate elections is simple: everyone gets to watch the casting, storage, handling, and counting of votes. In other words, citizen oversight. Experts and computers can't guarantee that elections are honest, but observers can.

before March 2005: Maryland Lessons Learned 2004 , Nov-Dec 2004 , 2003-2004
2005: March , April , May , June , July , August , September , October , November , December
2006: January , February , March , April , May , June , July , August , September , October , November , December
2007: January , February , March , April , May , June , July , August , September , October , November , December
2008: January , February
2009: January , February , March , July , August , September

Don't Miss: HR811/S1487 , Photos , Fraud

Stay informed:
Voting News Blog
Voice of the Voters Radio

Best Web Sites: VotersUnite.org , BlackBoxVoting.org , VerifiedVoting.org , Voice of the Voters Radio , VoteTrustUSA.org
Why democracy and honest government matters--Global Incidents Map

Best Unanswerable Question: "Public servants" are continuing to use electronic voting systems after it has become clear that they don't work reliably. Why aren't there legal consequences for their dereliction of duty and malfeasance?

Best Quote: If we keep applying the values of business rather than the values of democracy, don't be surprised if we end up with an election system that cares only about profit. --Paul Lehto, 6/8/07


=== Fraud ===

Deliver the Vote
Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, an American Political Tradition--1742-2004, by Tracy Campbell, 2005, published in New York by Carroll & Graf.
18-page condensation of Deliver the Vote, by James Allison

1934, one chapter with details including court transcripts
Election Administration in the United States, 1934, by Joseph P. Harris, Ph.D., available at http://vote.nist.gov/election_admin.htm

The Deepening Criminal Cover-Up of Ohio's Stolen 2004 Election Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, CommonDreams, Aug. 4, 2007

Confessions of a Republican Operative
How to Rig an Election: Confessions of a Republican Operative, By Steven Rosenfeld, AlterNet, Jan. 17, 2008


=== Photos ===

1. Dumpster Voting Device. see Ridiculous UK E-Voting Trial Ends in Disaster, BlogWired, Aug. 6, 2007

2. Votes for Women, Now Count'em. Full page flyer

3. US House of Representatives, Jan. 15, 2008


=== September 2009 ===

Stephen Colbert Defines "Paper Ballot"

The Word - Let Freedom Ka-Ching, Colbert Nation, Sept. 15, 2009. Corporations do everything people do except breathe, die and go to jail for dumping 1.3 million pounds of PCBs in the Hudson River. (06:11)

ES&S buys Diebold

Antitrust Complaint by BlackBoxVoting.org to US Dept of Justice, Sept. 25, 2009.
copy of Complaint on BlackBoxVoting.org website

Antitrust Concerns Swirl Around Sale of Diebold Voting Machines, Sept. 14, 2009. Wired, by Kim Zetter. Sen. Schumer asks DOJ to investigate.
US Computerized Voting Market Concentration, The US uses this index to determine whether mergers are equitable to society. By BlackBoxVoting.org
Explantion of Market Concentration Index from wikipedia.org
US Map Pre-merger, from BlackBoxVoting.org
US Map Post-merger, from BlackBoxVoting.org
% of US Electronic Voting Market Share, BlackBoxVoting.org
The Business of Voting Machines, New York Times, Editorial, Sept. 10, 2009
Comment by WheresThePaper.org:
. . . It is unfortunate that the New York Times still doesn't understand that elections are about votes, not software. The only way to get election integrity is to enable observers to watch procedures with votes. Computers prevent that.
. . . It is very nice for people to read and test software, and enjoy business competition, high quality, low cost, and consumer choice and bargaining power, as the New York Times says. But even with all that, computers still prevent observers from seeing and understanding the handling of votes, and there goes citizen oversight of our elections.
. . . Open-source software is a placebo, because no one knows what software is in an evote computer during an election. Hasn't the New York Times noticed the legal and public relations contortions that vendors go through to prevent anyone from examining their equipment after all those "glitches?" Almost all evote computers have wireless communication, and many are loaded with "updates" just before elections. Even New York law, which bans communications capability in evote computers, fails to provide for inspection. California found illegal software in many of their evote computers.
. . . Paper records of each voter's choices are a placebo too, even voter-marked paper ballots, unless they are secured and counted under continuous observation. Here in NY, 97% of our future paper ballots will remain uncounted except by computers. Our law requires only 3% hand-count by people--after as many as 15 days out of public observation.
Diebold Selling US Voting Machine Unit, New York Times, Sept. 3, 2009
ES&S Acquires Premier Election Solutions. This is just wrong on so many levels , Lani Brown, OpEdNews, Sept. 3, 2009
Diebold sells Premiere Election Solutions to competitor ES&S, RawStory, Sept. 3, 2009
History: Senator Hagel Admits Owning Voting Machine Company , Scoop, by Bev Harris, Jan. 31, 2003
Comment by WheresThePaper.org:
. . . Remember the basics? Regardless of technology, election integrity results from openly-conducted procedures that all stakeholders can observe and understand, sufficient to attest that procedures were honest and fairly conducted.
. . . When vote-handling and vote-counting are done in secret behind closed doors, citizens need to object. We need to demand to exercise oversight of election procedures. But no one can exercise oversight if election procedures are inside a computer, and that's why the election integrity movement arose after HAVA encouraged the states to buy electronic voting equipment.
. . . If ES&S acquires Diebold/Premier, one privately-held company will control what we citizens cannot observe. Dictators have bragged about this kind of situation--Anastasio Samoza said "You won the vote, but I won the count." New York City's Boss Tweed said "If I count the votes, what are you going to do about it?" Indeed, the big question is, what are we going to do about computerization of our elections which has effectively shut out all observers, and the fact that one company may soon control our vote?

New York Problems

Right place, wrong ballot: Problems in the 40th CD -- UPDATED, NY Daily News, Sept. 15, 2009

Queens Democratic voters, some are dead, NY Post, Sept. 15, 2009


=== August 2009 ===

Bev Harris of BlackBoxVoting.org on Process Concealment

Process Concealment, BlackBoxVoting.org, Aug. 23, 2009


Diebold Quietly Patches Security Flaw in Vote Counting Software, Wired, Aug. 12, 2009
Diebold Financial Picture, Aug. 2009


=== July 2009 ===

Honduras: Computerized Election Results With No Election, July 2009
Honduras: Human Rights Crisis Threatens As Repression Increases, Amnesty International, August, 2009


=== March 2009 ===

German High Court Decision on E-Voting
Decision, March 3, 2009.
Decision on German web site


=== February 2009 ===

New York
Lever Machines and HAVA, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, Feb. 9, 2009
Do Lever Machines Provide a Better Voting System for Democracy, NYVV and LWV NYS, Feb. 9, 2009
Dutchess County Resolution to Keep Lever Machines


=== January 2009 ===

LWVUS Audit Report
Report on Election Auditing, League of Women Voters of the US, January 2009


=== February 2008 ===

Brooke McEldowney Cartoon, Feb. 23, 2008


=== January 2008 ===

GOP Figure Contracted to Deliver E-Voting Machines in Maryland, Wired, Kim Zetter, Jan. 16, 2008

DRE, OpScan, and Ballot-Marker Videos
Diebold AccuVote TSX, 7 minutes, California
Encoding the Voter Access Card for the Diebold AccuVote TSX, 8 minutes 29 seconds, California
Diebold AccuVote TSX, 7 minutes 6 seconds, Pasadena, California
Diebold AccuVote TSX , Ohio
Hart Intercivic OpScan, 3 minutes 12 secondsa Model 100/ Automark, Ohio
Diebold TSx, Ohio
Diebold OS, Ohio
ES&S iVotronic, Ohio
Hart eScan and eSlate, Ohio
Microvote, Tennessee

New Jersey
New Jersey's Post-Election Audit Bill: Fact & Friction, Howard Stanislevic, Jan. 4, 2008

Super Tuesday Primary
Super Tuesday is February 5. States conducting primaries are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah and West Virginia.
Potential trouble areas: Arkansas which has had past problems in their primaries with ES&S supplying paper ballots on time and without errors.
California which will have problems due to Bowen's actions though many of the problems will be locally manufactured just to prove Bowen wrong.
Colorado which is in a state of flux and will be a problem through November.
Illinois which had problems with ES&S delivering paper ballots and memory cards on time.
West Virginia which again has had problems getting ballots and memory cards from ES&S.

Ohio Election Official Profits from Contract
Franklin County, OH Election Official Pleads Guilty to 'Profiting from Contracts for Voting Machines', but he says he's "very sorry" so his 6-months jail sentence was suspended. Jan. 3, 2008

Paperless Primary States
List of states and primary date, Jan. 21, 2008

Secretary of state retreats from some voting changes, Brunner still wants to replace touch screen machines in 57 counties. Dayton Daily News, Jan. 19, 2008
Central counting of votes waived, Brunner still pushing shift from touch screens to scanned paper ballots. Ohio.com, Jan. 19, 2008

LHS repairs machines during elections--are they also "fixing" them?
Who Counts in New Hampshire? And, are Diebold memory cards forgetful? Pokey Anderson interviews Dori Smith, Aired January 13, 2008
CT Voters Count, archive for January, 2008
Diebold Voting Machine Failures Found Across State During New Hampshire Primary, Bradblog, Jan. 12, 2008
Voting Machine Failures During the 2008 Presidential Primary Race, Mark Crispin Miller, Jan. 12, 2008

NH Primary
Index of Bradblog coverage, Bradblog, Jan. 16, 2008
Send Lawyers, Peace and Money': New Hampshire Election Contests Get Technical, Testy Before They Even Begin, Bradblog, Jan. 15, 2008
Dori Smith interview by Pokey Anderson, Jan. 13, 2008
Eternal Vigilance: Not Just for Founding Fathers Anymore, Bradblog, Jan. 14, 2008
Diebold Voting Machine Failures Found Across State During New Hampshire Primary, Bradblog, Jan. 12, 2008
NH Recount Press Release, Secretary of State William M. Gardner, Jan. 11, 2008
NH Municipalities which use the Diebold Accuvote Voting Machine, New Hampshire Secretary of State, as of Nov. 26, 2007
New Hampshire Democratic Primary – Were Votes Counted Accurately?, pdf, Jan. 14, 2008
New Hampshire Democratic Primary – Were Votes Counted Accurately?, Jan. 14, 2008
Experts Question Clinton's New Hampshire Primary Win, By Steven Rosenfeld, Alternet, Jan. 11, 2008
Candidates Push for a N.H. Recount, New York Times, Jan. 11, 2008
New Hampshire to Recount Ballots in Light of Controversy, By Kim Zetter, Jan. 11, 2008
We need to eliminate secret vote counting, not a recount, Democracy for NH, Jan. 11, 2008
Bo Lipari's Blog, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, Jan. 12, 2008
Pre-election "house calls" in NH, Mark Crispin Miller Blog, Jan. 12, 2008
Mark Lindeman, Bard College, Jan. 11, 2008
Kucinich Seeks NH Dem Vote Recount, New York Times, Jan. 10, 2008
Clinton's Win Enriches Bettors Facing 100-to-1 Odds, Bloomberg, Jan. 9, 2008
Chris Matthews: Raw EXIT POLL Data 'Indicated Significant Victory' for Obama in NH, 'Was Ahead an Average of 8 Points, Even in Our Own Exit Polls' Bradblog, Jan. 10, 2008
Tribune Media: MSM Failed to Note 'Hackable Diebold Red Flags' in New Hampshire Primary Results, Syndicated Columnist Robert Koehler Writes 'Possibility of Tainted Results, a Prospect Most of Media Can't Bear,' Notes Problems With NH's Diebold Machines 'Remain Unsolved'. Bradblog, Jan. 9, 2008
NH Data
BostonNow discussion
BlackBoxVoting Investigates: New England voting machine firm executive has criminal record, Democracy for NH, Jan. 9, 2008
NH Primary: Pre-Election Polls Wildly Different Than Results Announced for Clinton/Obama, Bradblog, Jan. 8, 2008
Reports of 'Voter Fraud' in Dixville Notch, Dem Ballots Unavailable to Voters, Both Debunked by The BRAD BLOG, Jan. 8, 2008
The Cat That Controls New Hampshire Election Programming, ChimpsterNation quotes Black Box Voting, Jan. 8, 2008
YouTube video from Black Box Voting: LHS Associate President John Silvestro challenges Finnish computer security expert Harri Hursti during testimony in NH after Hursti's hack of a Diebold optical-scan machine in late 2005 in Leon County, FL.
The Surprising Democratic Primary Results in New Hampshire, compiled by Pokey Anderson, Jan. 9, 2008, OpEd News
New Hampshire Democratic Primary, Poll data
New Hampshire primary 1988: Allegations of voting machine election fraud, Margie Burns blog, Jan. 9, 2008

New Holt Bill
HR 5036, Jan. 17, 2008
A Quick Fix for Electronic Voting, New York Times, Jan. 16, 2008
Proposed new Holt bill was introduced Jan 17, 2008, and will be HR 5036.
Rep. Rush Holt to Push for Paper Ballots and Vote Count Audits for 2008, By Steven Rosenfeld, AlterNet. Dec. 27, 2007.
WheresThePaper's Points: This bill is
1. not an amendment to HAVA.
2. pertains only to jurisdictions that used paperless DREs in 2006.
3. pertains only to federal races.
4. authorizes money:
. . . a. $500 Million to replace paperless DREs. States wanting to replace paperless DREs would get funding for opscans and ballot marking devices and related supplies and equipment.
. . . b. $100 Million to reimburse states for conducting spot-checks, called "audits" at least 3% of precincts.
5. Needs improvements:
. . . a. Observers. Require citizens to be able to observe all ballot handling and counting, not just the spot-check "audit." As written, citizens only get to watch the audit. If the public can view/film the ballots as they are recounted on election night in the poll site, there would be less pressure to pin all our hopes for election integrity on pathetic spot-checks (aka "audits") that take place after ballots have been unobserved and subject to tampering.
. . . b. Machine Malfunction. Require machines to be taken out of service in case of malfunction, which must be defined as vote-switching, machine refusal to accept a vote, discrepancy between screen and VVPAT, missing races or candidates on the screen or VVPAT, etc. As written, voters must convince a poll worker that a machine is malfunctioning, or poll workers must decide whether a machine is malfunctioning.
. . . c. "Audits." Replace the fixed-percentage 3% spot-checks with real audits all ballot-handling of the chain of custody and a variable-percentage audit that yields a fixed high rate of confidence. In the case of paperless DREs, what will be spot-checked?
. . . d. Cost and the EAC. Replace the concept of "reasonable costs" approved by the EAC with approval by NIST or GAO or some other body.
. . . e. Money for Studies. Replace the $3million for study of ballot read-back technology with study of procedures and equipment that to facilitate observability and citizen oversight.

PEW Grants to Election Officials and Academics
The Pew Center on the States and the JEHT Foundation Award $2.5 Million to Improve U.S. Elections, Jan. 16, 2008
Who got what

Uncounted, The Movie
web site

NY Times
Can You Count on Voting Machines?, New York Times, Jan. 6, 2008
NYT Magazine Covers E-Voting, Daily Kos provides evidence that the NY Times ignored.

Who's Who in Evoting? Kudzu Effect
The Kudzu Effect: The Voting-Industrial Complex chokes our democracy, by Sheri Myers, Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, Jan. 6, 2007

Common Cause pushes Vote By Mail
Getting it Straight for 2008: What We Know About Vote by Mail Elections, and How to Conduct Them Well . Common Cause supports another way to conceal how ballots are handled and prevent citizen oversight. Are vote selling and coercion real issues with VBM? January, 2007


=== December 2007 ===

Election Software Lost in Transit, Wired blog, Kim Zetter, Dec. 19, 2007. San Diego County registrar of voters, Deborah Seiler, is a former sales representative for Diebold Election Systems.
San Diego's Diebold Election Software 'Lost In Transit', BradBlog, Dec. 19, 2007

New Ohio Voting Report: "The 2004 Election Was Stolen... Finally We Have Irrefutable Confirmation, Democracy Now! interview with Harvey Wasserman Dec. 17, 2007
Study: Voting Systems Vulnerable, Jennifer Brunner, Ohio Secretary of State, Dec. 14, 2007
Project Everest Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards and Testing, Dec. 14, 2007
Brunner declares Ohio's voting systems vulnerable, All counties should use paper ballots counted at a central location, secretary of state says, Columbus Dispatch, Dec. 14, 2007
Ohio Elections Official Calls Machines Flawed, New York Times, Dec. 15, 2007
Larry Norden, Brennan Center on Brunner's recommendations, Dec. 17, 2007
Everest: Ohio's Voting System Report, by Dan Tokaji, Dec. 15, 2007

Maryland Cost Analysis, SAVEourVotes.org, December, 2007

NC Bribery
Bribery of a North Carolina Election Director, December, 2007

Justice's voting chief steps down amid controversy, McClatchy Washington Bureau, Dec. 14, 2007

Colorado Voter Group, blog of Dec. 20, 2007: Board says, "do not certify any of the voting equipment".
PoliticsWest, The Denver Post, Dec. 19, 2007
ES&S letter
Report on ES&S
Hart InterCivic letter
Report on Hart
Premier (formerly Diebold) letter
Report on Premier (formerly Diebold)
Sequoia letter
Report on Sequoia
Security Testing Review, Colorado Evoting Systems, Cyber, Dec. 17, 2007. This document lists election activists as "threat agents" but persons with "trusted insider" access, such as election judges, state employees and contractors who certify voting systems and install software and firmware were not evaluated as threat agents. Page 6: "these people would be responsible for certifying the voting systems and installing trusted build software and firmware. They have no motive in particular and their actions would be classified as 'mistakes'. This group is not being evaluated due to the trusted and highly skilled nature of the group."

Election Integrity Concerns in the Iowa Democratic and Republican Caucuses, Bradblog, Dec. 31, 2007

Kansas GOP Chair Brags of Vote 'Caging' Efforts, Successes, End of Year Letter Describes Plan to Identify, Challenge Voters in 2008, Bradblog, Dec. 27, 2007

Heller Documents posted at BBV
Steven Heller is the whistle-blower who revealed Diebold secrets, Black Box Voting, Dec. 3, 2007
Stephen Heller: Felonious Punk No More The 'Diebold Whistleblower' Sees His Charges Reduced to a Misdemeanor, But Unlike Republicans Who Have Committed Far More Serious Crimes, Heller Continues to Pay. Reflections on Selective Criminal Punishment in Bush's America. Bradblog, Guest Blogged by Stephen Heller, Dec. 2, 2007

Need Tenn. citizens to make phone calls ASAP, Gathering To Save Our Democracy, December, 2007


=== November 2007 ===

ACLU Policy #322b on Electronic Voting Systems, October, 2007
Comments on Policy, November, 2007
Suggested revised Policy Statement, Dec. 11, 2007

CA Secy of State Bowen sues ES&S
Press Release, Nov. 19, 2007
Statement of Findings

Product Recall
In November 2006, Two Machines 'Smoked' - Only One Was Recalled, One Caused no Problems; the Other Impacted a High-Profile Local Election. Blogged by Ellen Theisen of VotersUnite.org, Bradblog, Nov. 16, 2007

CT and FL
Diebold Optical-Scan Failures Reported in Florida May be Affecting Connecticut As Well, Bradblog, Nov. 20, 2007

Salt Lake Officials Urging Voters to NOT Come to Polls in Wake of Disastrous Move to Touch-Screen Voting, Bradblog, Nov. 29, 2007

Military and Overseas Voters
Press Release, The Century Foundation, Nov. 29, 2007
Issue Brief, Bringing Voting Rights to Overseas and Military Voters, The Century Foundation, Nov. 29, 2007

Black Box Voting Moonshine Reports
BBV Moonshine Elections Series, Part 1
BBV Moonshine Elections Series, Part 2
BBV Moonshine Elections Series, Part 3
Original investigative reports by BBV on local corruption in the election industry.

VVSG compromise secret ballot
Getting in Touch with the Inner VVSG, Nov. 7, 2007.

Dutch voting machine humor
The adventures of citizen Michael C. Robertson.

Disabled Voters
$45,588 Per E-Vote for Disabled Voters in Marin County, California, Bradblog, Nov. 24, 2007

Testers for CA Secretary of State Finds LA County's ES&S E-Voting System Vulnerable to Hacking, Fraud and Manipulation, Bradblog, Nov. 25, 2007

South Carolina
Gone in a Minute, Nov. 27, 2007

Voter-marked paper ballot and optical scanner video
Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) voter training video, AccuVote-OS precinct scanner.
Documentation Assessment of the Diebold Voting Systems, California Top to Bottom Review.
. . . Section 2.5 (page 13) Election Office Optical Scanning: Central Count Tabulation (AV-OS): The AccuVote-OS (also known as the AV-OS) is the same hardware scanner that is used for the precinct count optical scanning but it has a different embedded software (“firmware”) installed. Its configuration allows it to be linked with a number of other AV-OS units via a network whereby voting data can be sent into the GEMS server from many scanners concurrently scanning ballot batches. Firmware version 2.0.12 designates the machine is configured for ‘central count” as opposed to “precinct count.” Central count AV-OS is often used to count absentee ballots as well as provisional and damaged but “remade” paper ballots at county election headquarters or another centralized location.
. . . Unlike the precinct count AV-OS, the AV-OS central count units’ operation is largely controlled by GEMS. While the units scan ballots and interpret the ballot marks, the AV-OS central count uploads the voting data to GEMS and does not tabulate or keep any record of votes on the unit. The central count AV-OS memory card needs no ballot definitions and only has some technical information regarding the particular scanner so that it can be individually tracked as it scans ballots. It can be used with or without an automatic ballot feeder called the AccuFeed.
. . . Information on the Bell & Howell AccuFeed is at: http://pdf.superwarehouse.com/specs/BELLAG.pdf or http://winocular.com/Scanners/Bell___Howell/AccufeedOptions.htm
. . . Photo of a similar Bell & Howell high speed scanner is at http://www.scantastik.com/hardware/bell_howell/images/spectrum_small.jpg and http://www.scantastik.com/high-speed-scanners.htm
. . .. . . Accuvote OS Product Information.

EDS acquires Saber
EDS Agrees to Acquire Saber Corporation, a Leading Provider of U.S. State and Local Government Software and Solutions. Nov. 13, 2007. Concentration of government databases into a few powerful, private vendors is a concern. Suppliers don't need access to live data, but the government does nothing to stop it.

Provisional Ballots Report
A Fallible 'Fail-Safe', An Analysis of Provisional Balloting Problems in the 2006 Election, Demos, 2007.

Flu Shots Contain Mercury
Americans Dumbed Down by Flu Shots?, Organic Consumers, November, 2007.

9,800 votes left in Denver, Denver Post, Nov. 7, 2007.
Colorado Group proposed 2008 Elections Framework
Colorado Group Press Release for 2008 Elections Framework, Nov. 19, 2007
Voter group wants state to switch to paper ballots, Nov. 20, 2007

Cuyahoga Board of Elections gets secretary of state's OK to reprint paper records for recounts, Nov. 27, 2007. Vendors and politicos use poor quality printers to pull end run around VOTER-VERIFIED paper trails.
20 percent of election printouts were unreadable, Nov. 28, 2007.
Cuyahoga's electronic system falters even in low-key poll, Nov. 7, 2007.
Recounts Possible For 9 Races In Cuyahoga County Election, Nov. 18, 2007.

History of Vote Machines to 1890
University of Virginia Scholar Traces Voting Technology Controversy to the 1890s, Nov. 7, 2007.

ACM Risks of Evoting
Inside risks: Risks of e-voting, Communications of the ACM, November, 2007. Important article by Matt Bishop and David Wagner.

50-State Lawsuit
Lawsuit asks states to hand-count votes, Times Argus, Nov. 10, 2007

New Jersey
Atlantic City: Voting Problems, New York Times, Nov. 8, 2007

Political Scientists study voter confidence
Political Scientists Examine Voter Confidence in Electoral Administration, Make Recommendations, Press Release, Nov. 5, 2007

Sequoia has new owners
U.S. Voting Technology Leader Sequoia Voting Systems Announces New Corporate Ownership, Sequoia Press Release, Nov. 8, 2007
Congresswoman Maloney on Sequoia Sale, Nov. 8, 2007
Without examination of the terms of the financing provided by Smartmatic, it is impossible to determine whether the management of the US company is indeed independent of Smartmatic’s control.

San Francisco sues ES&S
San Francisco Voting Machines Vendor in Breach of Contract allege City Attorney Dennis Herrera and Elections Department Diector John Arntz, San Francisco Sentinel, Nov. 7, 2007
San Francisco seeks reimbursement for election problems, Signs On San Diego, by Rachel Konrad, Nov. 7, 2007.
Press Release and legal papers, Nov. 7, 2007
SF sues its elections vendor, SFBG Politics, San Francisco Bay Guardian Online.
Counting San Francisco Ballots will take a record amount of time, SF Gate, Nov. 7, 2007. GREAT ELECTION PHOTOS.

Movie -- Uncounted
YouTube trailer for movie

California Auditing Requirements
Secretary of State Bowen's requirements, Nov. 8, 2007.

EAC Kicks Off Voting System Reports Clearinghouse, Nov. 8, 2007. It's only 5 years late, after VotersUnite has done their work for them for years.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission Working Hard to Fail and Succeeding at It!, Federal Oversight Agency Continues Refusal to Notify Election Administrators About Known Failures in E-Voting Systems. Bradblog Nov. 13, 2007

Nov 6, 2007 Election
Election Day 'Glitches' 'Hiccups' 'Snags' and 'Snafus' Return, BradBlog, Nov. 7, 2007

Holt Bill to Count Provisional Ballots
Press Release, Nov. 9, 2007

Democratic Elections Defined
Democracy 1-2-3, by Teresa Hommel, Nov. 5, 2007

Hand-count manual
Manual, 2007
Observations of Hand Counting, July, 2007

New York Times In Defense of Voting Rights
Editorial, Nov. 5, 2007

New Federal Bill in US Senate
Sen. Bill Nelson introduces Holt-lookalike but bans DREs as of 2012, Nov. 1, 2007
Text of new bill

New Documentary, UNCOUNTED: The New Math of American Elections
UNCOUNTED: The New Math of American Elections, Release Date is Nov. 6, 2007

Should Voting Machine Vendors be sued?
Should Voting Machine Makers Be Sued Like Big Tobacco?, AlterNet, Steven Rosenfeld, Nov. 2, 2007

Joyce McCloy article
Vote-counting done correctly is her goal, Journal Now, Raleigh, NC, Nov. 4, 2007

EAC Brownbag Lunch, Guidelines
EAC Vice-Chair Rodriguez to Host First Brownbag Lunch Discussion, Nov. 9, 2007
EAC Seeks Public Comment on TGDC's Recommended Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, 120-day comment period, announced on Oct. 31, 2007
EAC Issues Six Quick Start Management Guides for Election Officials, Nov. 1, 2007. An interesting quote in "Acceptance Testing" is: Acceptance tests must be conducted either by or under the strict control of the jurisdiction’s election official. Under no circumstance should acceptance tests be conducted by a vendor.
Next Public Meeting is Nov. 13, 2007

TIME: The 'Stampede Away from Touch-Screen', Nov. 4, 2007

Diebold Flaws
Diebold/Premier Admits Memory Card Failure On Popular Optical-Scan Voting Machines, With Elections Impending Next Week, Company Downplays, Hides Failure Rate! Will The U.S. Elections Assistance Commission Take Action? Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.Org, Nov. 4, 2007
Diebold vendor LHS testifies about Diebold Defects, Oct. 7, 2007

Judge Lets Texas Election Stand, Despite 2-Vote Margin and Voters Who Testified They Were Given Wrong 'Ballot' on E-Vote Machines, Mayor Calls for 'Paper Ballots'; County Clerk Lies About Federal Law to Support the Continued Use of Her Democracy-Busting DRE Voting System. Nov. 2, 2007
Harris County, With Witnesses in Room, Houston Election Officials Alter Vote Tallies in Last Week's Elections, Bradblog, Nov. 16, 2007
Texas: Voting System Allows "Adjustments", VoteTrustUSA, Nov. 20

Voting group plans to appeal ruling Appeals court struck down extra audits; state Supreme Court is next, Herald Tribune, Nov. 2, 2007
Florida Second District Court of Appeal, Decision on case 2D06-4339, Oct. 31, 2007
Decision, 32 pages
Survey contradicts Diebold's Failure Rate Claim, Daytona Beach News Journal, Nov. 3, 2007

$12.6 million contract for new S.F. voting system is revived, SF Gate, Nov. 2, 2007
Sebastian Kunz Reports: Smashing Diebold Voting Machine in San Francisco, YouTube, Oct. 31, 2007
Photos--Smashing Diebold Voting Machine in San Francisco, Alec Bash's Photos – Diebold Touch Screen Voting Machine on Trial, Oct. 31, 2007
Pushing paper ballot envelope, Monterey Herald, Nov. 4, 2007

San Francisco
139-page Voter Information Book, San Francisco, Nov. 2007

New Hampshire, LHS
Smashing secret vote counting in San Francisco, giving away the vote in New Hampshire, Nov. 2, 2007
NH Ballot Law Commission approved defective vote counting technology in 2006
Ruling nullifies voter data law, Libertarians win suit over unequal access, Nov. 28, 2007

Auditing Conference
Brennan Center and Verified Voting learn old lesson the hard way , David Webber, Nov. 4, 2007

Assessment of IRV in San Francisco, 2005 election
Burlington VT IRV paper ballot that was counted by optical scan, with 99.9% accuracy, and used no extra paper.
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV): Administrative Implementation Options and Cost March 7, 2007. Report to the Vermont General Assembly by the Vermont Office of the Secretary of State.


=== October 2007 ===

2007 Post Election Audit Summit
Materials from the conference Oct. 25-27, 2007
Post-Election Auditing: A View From The "Summit by Howard Stanislevic

EAC seeks Comments on VVSG
Tell the Feds What You Think of E-Voting Machines -- Updated Kim Zetter, Oct. 31, 2007

Nevy Absentee Voting
States work to make absentee voting easier for military personnel. Navy Times, Oct. 31, 2007

New Zealand
Local government tipped to lead on electronic voting, Christchurch City Council electoral officer Max Robertson sees online voting as a distinct possibility for the next local body elections, a year earlier. ComputerWorld New Zealand, Oct. 29, 2007

California NAACP
Paul Lehto announces CA NAACP support for Resolution on Rights for Open and Honest Elections and against Corporate Secret Vote Counting, Oct. 30, 2007

Warning about Cybercriminals
Cybercriminals Could Steal Elections, Security Researcher Warns, InformationWeek, Oct. 10, 2007
Hackers Could Skew US Elections, NewScientistTech, Oct. 9, 2007

2008 Election
Will the GOP election theft machine do it again in 2008?, OpEdNews, Fitrakis and Wasserman, Oct. 21, 2007
Who Will Rule Us After the Next 9/11?, The reality of NSPD-51 is almost as bad as the paranoia. The Spectator: Scrutinizing Culture, by Ron Rosenbaum, Oct. 19, 2007

FL-13: GAO Finds Prior Tests Do NOT Offer 'Reasonable Assurance' That Touchscreen Machines Were Not at Fault in Sarasota's November 2006 Election, Report Released Today Says More Testing Needed of ES&S Voting Machines to Determine Cause of Massive, Still Unexplained Undervote. One Year Later and Republican in Disputed Election Still Sitting and Voting in Congress. Bradblog, Oct. 2, 2007 Voting Machines Giving Florida New Headache, New York Times, Oct 13, 2007. Includes photo of Rosemarie Myerson who did influential cost studies showing the lower cost of optical scanners.
Broward County buys a Pig in a Poke, OpEdNews, Ellen Brodsky, Oct. 9, 2007
New York Times, Oct 13, 2007. Includes photo of Rosemarie Myerson

DOJ, John Tanner
Conyers Issues Statement on News Reports Questioning DoJ's 2004 Presidential Election 'Investigation' in Ohio, BradBlog, Oct 12, 2007
DoJ's John 'Minorities Die First' Tanner to Testify to House Judiciary Sub-Committee, as Washington Post Picks up BRAD BLOG Story on His Recent Controversial Comments, BradBlog, Oct 12, 2007
Bush's Legacy on Voting Rights: A Story from Ohio, By Paul Kiel, TPM, Oct. 12, 2007
DoJ voting chief ‘poisoned the well’ for Ohio ‘04 probe, Think Progress, Oct 12, 2007
VIDEO EXCLUSIVE: DoJ Voting Rights Chief Says 'It's a Shame' Elderly May be Disenfranchised by Photo ID Laws, But Minority Voters 'Don't Become Elderly, They Die First', BradBlog, Oct. 8, 2007


=== September 2007 ===

New Hampshire
Computer Security Expert Bruce O'Dell: Testimony to NH Legislature, Sept. 5, 2007

Utah's electronic touch-screen voting machines fail the voters, The Spectrum, by Kathy Dopp, Sept. 9, 2007

New Jersey
AG: State will miss e-voting machine deadline, Newsday, Sept. 13, 2007

Texas Republican Author of Disenfranchising Photo ID Law Captured on Camera Voting Multiple Times on Same Issue, Bradblog, Oct. 1, 2007

Riverside County CA
Riverside County, CA Board of Supes to Sequoia Voting Systems: 'Drop Dead', Board Members Threaten 'Not Another Dime' For Company That Has Failed Them to the Tune of $27 Million So Far. BradBlog, Sept. 20, 2007

Election Theft
Landslide Denied: Exit Polls vs. Vote Count 2006, Demographic Validity of the National Exit Poll and the Corruption of the Official Vote Count, by Jonathan Simon, JD, and Bruce O’Dell, Election Defense Alliance, September, 2007
Fingerprints Of Election Theft: Were Competitive Contests Targeted?, Comparison Between Exit Poll and Vote Count Disparities in Competitive vs. Noncompetitive Contests in Election 2006, by Jonathan Simon, JD, Bruce O’Dell, Dale Tavris, PhD, Josh Mitteldorf, PhD, Election Defense Alliance
Rove, Gonzales and election fraud, Greg Palast on Brasscheck TV, September, 2007

House Members from a Variety of States Ask Senate Committee to Deny FCC Position to Partisan Hack from Justice Department, Posted by Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz representing the 27th District of Texas, undated, from September, 2007

Cartoon Humor
Congress Considers Legislation Requiring a Voting Machine Paper Trail, Dwane Powell, Sept. 19, 2007
Electronic Voting Machine, Take a Chance, Steve Greenberg, Aug. 11, 2007
Are you SURE you want a permanent paper trail that can verify that you actually voted for some of these people?, Bruce Beattie, Feb. 6, 2007

Republicans Block Voting Machine Testing in Ohio, DailyKos, Sept. 18, 2007

Alameda County CA Election Voided
Judge Voids Election Because of E-Voting Snafus, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Sept. 28, 2007
Judge voids results of Berkeley measure on medical pot, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 28, 2007

Open Voting Solutions
Do Paper Trails fail to secure e-Voting, Open Voting Solutions, September, 2007

Bowen Conference Call
CA Secretary of State Debra Bowen Conference Call & Transcript, Sept. 20, 2007

Late Absentee Ballots
Absentee Ballots Arrive Late In Summit, Ohio. Sept. 13, 2007

Voter Registration Purge
Purge of voter rolls could swing 2008 election, Jason Rhyne, Sept. 12, 2007

US Senate Judiciary Committee
State Officials' Opposition Could Jeopardize Voting "Paper Trail" Measure
Senate Panel Approves Voter Intimidation Measure
, Sept. 6, 2007.

Nedap, called Liberty in New York
Dutch Commission Deals Blow To Electronic Voting, SlashDot, Sept. 28, 2007.

San Francisco
S.F. supervisors blamed for blocking new voting system, Sept. 21, 2007.
Newsom implies that buying Sequoia would mean San Francisco would "get it right." But Secretary of State Bowen's Top-to-Bottom Review uncovered many problems with Sequoia's system.

WeThePeople Complaint
We The People Foundation
Lawsuit against voting machines and computers, Sept. 2007
Who are these people?
Judge keeps straw poll's computerized voting machines, Des Moines Register, Aug. 11, 2007, mentions four of the plaintiffs.

Memphis Early Voting Trouble
Mayor Herenton Wants Early Voting Stopped due to irregularities targetting elderly voters (the machines are Diebold touchscreens). September 19, 2007. But Shelby County Election Commission Chair Myra Stiles says "we're comfortable with the fact that we tested those machines and there is nothing wrong with the way the machines are recording the votes. Apparently it's an issue of public education. If people press in the wrong area they're going to get the wrong result."
Mayor Wants Early Voting Stopped, Commercial Appeal, Sept. 18, 2007

Pokey Anderson
Are Elections Very Important?, September 2007.

Voice of the Voters, Transcript, Matt Blaze
Matt Blaze interviewed by Mary Ann Gould, Sept. 5, 2007. He was leader of the Sequoia source code review team for California's Top to Bottom Electronic Voting Investigation.

Bruce O'Dell
Computer Security Expert Bruce O'Dell: Testimony to NH Legislature, Sept. 9, 2007

New Jersey-defective machines
State must come up with plan to replace 10,000 voting machines, Star Ledger, NJ.com, Sept. 5, 2007

Ohio: high cost, fear of vendor retaliation, fear of machine testing
County chiefs rant over voting machines, Crain's Cleveland Business, Sept. 6, 2007. "We can't make Diebold angry because we are dependent on their support."
Why doesn't the GOP want Ohio's voting machines tested?, by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, The Free Press, Sept. 11, 2007.

Hagel Quits
Hagel Is Calling It Quits, Omaha World-Herald, Sept. 8, 2007

Why is this Democratic Congress so Conservative?
Democratic House Officials Recruited Wealthy Conservatives, By Matt Renner, Truthout, Sept. 6, 2007

New York Times: "Ban DREs", Newsweek: Why aren't electeds standing up for our elections?
A Chance to Make Votes Count, Editorial, New York Times, Sept. 6, 2007
Securing (Or Not) Your Right to Vote, Steven Levy, Newsweek, Sept. 10, 2007
A Damaging Paper Chase In Voting, Opinion piece against paper. Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2007

Nedap edits their Wikipedia Entry
Dutch computer voting machine company caught editing Wikipedia entry, International Herald Tribune, Sept. 5, 2007

HR811 vote was scheduled for Sept. 5, 2007, but didn't happen
What happened? Click here

Florida Ethics
Ritter's Vote Still Raising Eyebrows, Miami Herald, Sept. 1, 2007.

Scotland Blames Machines for Machine Malfunction!
Voting machines ditch ballots in Scotland, Computer says no to tens of thousands of votes, The Register, Sept. 3, 2007. Most shocking: they did not blame the voters or poll workers! They did not say it was simply a warm and fuzzy glitch! They did not say they were sure the outcome was not affected!

EAC to Consider Process for Adopting Regulations Under National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Sept. 4, 2007.

Solutions to Election Tampering Remain Elusive, Scholars Say, Chronicle of Higher Education, Sept. 4, 2007.

Brief segment: Gov. O'Malley pledges funding for paper ballots after activist Mike Berla poses the challenge. MP3, Sept. 6, 2007. www.saveourvotes.org
Full show

Bev Harris investigates election fraud in rural counties
Moonshine Elections Series, Part 1, by Black Box Voting.org, Sept. 6, 2007

Hand Count
Hands-on Elections: A complete handbook, by Nancy Tobi, Sept. 8, 2007
Short version


=== August 2007 ===

AAPD Questions Presidential Candidates for 2008
Excellent list of questions, and candidates' replies, Aug. 4, 2007

Citizens Refuse to Give Up
Allegheny County panel still reviewing voting machines By Ann Belser, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 27, 2007

Hand Count
Estimate time and cost to hand count paper ballots
No Leaky Buckets, XLS spreadsheet to estimate costs
How To Forecast Labor, Cost and Time For Hand-Counting Paper Ballots By Dave Berman, 8/12/07. You have to go down to paragraph 5 to click on "spreadsheet tool" for the Excel spreadsheet, which is easy to use. This flexible and powerful forecast tool allows you to experiment and quickly determine cost/labor/time needs based on varying assumptions.
also on DailyKos
Is it constitutional to outsource the state's vote counting?, Nancy Tobi, Concord Monitor, Aug. 15, 2007

Election Technology Council
Election Technology Council makes top appointments, Houston Business Journal, Aug. 13, 2007.

Wikipedia Edited by Diebold, etc.
See Who's Editing Wikipedia - Diebold, the CIA, a Campaign, Wired, By John Borland, Aug. 14, 2007.

Election Records Destroyed by Ohio Counties
2004 ballots not preserved, despite Federal Court order. Aug. 12, 2007. Election administrators flout the law and get away with it.

Avi Rubin, The Virus Did It
Evidence of a virus could destroy credibility of an election, Aug. 26, 2007

Tova Wang, EAC Report
A Rigged Report on U.S. Voting?, By Tova Andrea Wang, Washington Post, Aug. 30, 2007
A Useful Study of the Arguments for "Voter Fraud": Credit the Election Assistance Commission, by Bob Bauer, Aug. 30, 2007

Californa, Hearing on ES&S AutoMark
Hearing Notice for Sept. 20 Hearing for ES&S AutoMark California Secretary of State, Aug. 9, 2007

EAC tells ES&S they failed to notify about Manila factory
EAC Notice to ES&S for Non-compliance, Aug. 14, 2007 The EAC asks ES&S why ES&S failed to divulge that they build machines in the Philippines, after Dan Rather exposes them.
ES&S responds to EAC, Aug. 22, 2007
EAC replies to ES&S response re Phillipine manufacturing plant, Aug. 24, 2007
ES&S Pouts, Stamps Foot, Complies Anyway, After Minor Spanking by the EAC, John Gideon, OpEdNews, Aug. 27, 2007

Diebold Struggling To Sell Voting Machine Unit, Reuters, Aug. 16, 2007
Premier Election Solutions (Can't sell it? Just rename it)
Diebold Election Systems to become Premier Election Solutions, Aug. 16, 2007
Diebold Stock Falls as Company Fraud is Exposed Aug. 14, 2007, Column Bradblog.Com
KeyBanc Downgrades Diebold on Concerns With Voting Machines Business Aug. 13, 2007, Biz.Yahoo

Colorado demands info from voting machine vendors and can't get it! Denver Business Journal, Aug. 29, 2007
Paper Nightmares, Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 31, 2007

How federal certification works
EAC for Dummies: How the White House has designs on your elections, Nancy Tobi, August, 2007
EAC Certification Quick Start Management Guide, August, 2007
EAC issues Voting System Certification Guide, August 15, 2007
EAC Testing and Certification Updates, August 14, 2007
AVS gets caught lying the first time they present a system for ITA testing. They said they had made no hardware changes since their environmental testing in 2006. But they had changed their motherboard.
iBeta Quality Assurance letter to EAC re AVS WINware 2.0.4 voting system
Electronic voting machines might be out for some Nov. races PennLive, Aug. 15, 2007
EAC reply to iBeta Quality Assurance re AVS WINware 2.0.4 voting system
EAC letter to Advanced Voting Solutions (AVS) for written clarification

Voter Confidence Poll and phony reports about it
Field Poll on Voter Confidence, Aug. 23, 2007
Greatest chance of accurate counting:
32% paper ballots,
31% punch-card voting
31% touch-screen voting
63% paper-based voting systems
One way to conceal the results of a poll is to divide people who feel similarly into two or more groups, so that neither group gets the majority of "votes." Here, nearly 2/3 of voters thought paper-based voting was more accurate, but you have to read page 2 of the report to see that.
Election Technology Council false report about the poll
Kim Zetter blog on reports, Aug. 23, 2007

Dan Rather
Dan Rather Reports "The Trouble with Touch Screens" raised the question whether US voting systems companies have engaged in commercial fraud by knowingly delivering defective products to jurisdictions throughout the country. Can he wake up America to the danger of outsourcing election functions to private vendors? VoterAction challenged Congress to investigate the increasing influence and control that private companies have on how we conduct elections and to determine whether certain companies have committed crimes under federal and state anti-fraud statutes.
Dan Rather, archived program, large screen
Dan Rather, archived program on ES&S touchscreens and Sequoia punch card ballots
Dan Rather, Transcript of the report, Aug. 14, 2007
Dan Rather DVD available
VoterAction calls for Congressional investigation
Petition for Congressional investigation
Take more actions: Demand Congressional investigation and DRE ban
Dan Rather Investigates Voting Machines -- Uncovers New Surprises About ES&S Touch-Screens, Blog.Wired, Kim Zetter, 8/13/07
ES&S Failed to Disclose Manila Manufacturer to Fed Agency -- UPDATED, Blog.Wired, Kim Zetter, 8/14/07
ES&S Discloses Full List of Manufacturers, Blog.Wired, Kim Zetter, 8/27/07
Sequoia Voting Systems Responsible for 2000 Presidential Debacle?, Blog.Wired, Kim Zetter, 8/15/07
Sequoia Fails to Answer Questions Raised in Dan Rather Report, Blogged by John Gideon, 8/28/07
'Rather Reports' on vote-count fiascos, by Frazier Moore, AP Television Writer, Boston.com, Aug 13, 2007
TV report questions Westmoreland, Allegheny voting machines, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Aug 15, 2007
EAC Spanks ES&S For Failure to Disclose Philippine Factory; Advanced Voting Solutions Also Caught In Deception, Aug 14, 2007
Dan Rather Interviewed on CNN The Situation Room, Aug 14, 2007
Origin of voting machines traced to Philippines, Aug 29, 2007
Announcement of Dan Rather Report on Irregularities in Touch-Screen Voting Machines, Aug 14, 2007

E-Voting Certification Gets Security Completely Backward Bruce Schneier, Wired, Aug. 9, 2007

Can Congress secure the 2008 elections? Voice of the Voters with Dennis Kucinich and Dr. Matt Blaze who led part of the CA Top-To-Bottom Review.

Kentucky -- We want same protections as CA
Attorney General Stumbo Demands Voter Protections, Office of the Attorney General, Aug. 8, 2007

California -- Tangible Ballot Initiative
The Vote: California Tangible Ballots Initiative Enters Circulation, Government Technology, Aug. 9, 2007

California -- Connie McCormack Retires
Statement by Connie McCormack Announcing Retirement as LA County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, undated, first noticed in August, 2007
Bio of Connie McCormack

California -- Editorial
Paper ballots necessary to preserve democracy, by Ken Karan, North County Times, August 12, 2007

California -- Secy of State Debra Bowen Top-To-Bottom Review
Among their many findings, these reports show that Diebold never corrected the vulnerabilities in their GEMS system that were reported in 2004 by Maryland's RABA study.
Bowen Press Release, Aug. 3, 2007
Overview of Red Team Reports by Matt Bishop, Principle Investigator, Univ. of CA, Davis
Transcript of Hearing, Secretary of State Debra Bowen, July 30, 2007
Video of Hearing, Secretary of State Debra Bowen, July 30, 2007, first 20 minutes may not have audio. Look for the listing for: "073007 TCC Info-Hearing Secretary of State's Top to Bottom Review of CA Voting System"
Decertification/Recertification Decisions Issued August 3, 2007, by Secretary of State Debra Bowen
Report of the Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group
Homepage of Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group
Accessibility Review Report for CA Top-to_Bottom Voting System Review
Secretary Bowen's clever insight, Avi Rubin's Blog, Aug. 7, 2007
More Uncertified Voting Systems in California, Joseph Hall Blog, Aug. 22, 2007
Response to Election Officials & Others Who Encourage Voters to Trust , by UtahCountVotes, Aug. 28, 2007
Automark Statement, Aug. 24, 2007
California Restricts Voting Machines, New York Times, Aug. 5, 2007
Bowen emerges from shadows with dramatic decision, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 5, 2007
State decides to secure electronic voting machines, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 2007
Banning vote machines stirs pot; Lack of paper trail worries other states, Sign on San Diego, Aug. 12, 2007
After outburst, Tuteur owes Bowen an apology, Napa Valley Register, Aug. 14, 2007
Paper Ballots for CA! - Secretary of State announces de-certification/re-certification plans for e-voting systems, Debra Bowen Announces DRE (Touch-Screen) Machines to be Used Only One Per Polling Place for Disabled Voters with 100% Manual Count of Paper Trails! Bradblog, Aug. 4, 2007
California Finds DREs Easily Hackable, as House Dems and PFAW Strike Deal to Use Them Anyway, Bradblog, July 29, 2007
Save Our Votes Press Release, CA Decertifies E-Voting Systems, Aug. 4, 2007
California's SecState report released: All tested machines vulnerable to hacking, VerifiedVoting.org, updated through July 31, 2007
CA: Secretary of State Debra Bowen Issues Landmark Restrictions on the use of Electronic Voting Systems, Restrictions apply starting with February 5 Primary Election. VerifiedVoting.org, Aug. 3, 2007
CA Secy of State Debra Bowen Decertifies Diebold, Hart InterCivic and Sequoia Voting Systems--Late Submitted ES&S System "InkaVote Plus" Used in Los Angeles to be Reviewed, California Progress Report, Aug. 4, 2007
Voting systems hacked in test, Sacramento Bee, July 28, 2007
Three news reports, vendors and officials complain, July and August, 2007
California voting systems code review now released, Matt Blaze, www.crypto.com/blog, Aug. 2, 2007
Security Problem Excuse Bingo
Rules of the Bingo game
Even More Trouble For E-Voting Firms: Source Code Review Finds All Sorts Of Scary Vulnerabilities, TechDirt, Aug. 3, 2007, with comment by a Canadian.
NPR, Listen to "Hackers Test California Voting Machines"
Diebold on CA Top-to-Bottom Review, Aug. 4, 2007
Hart InterCivic on CA Top-To-Bottom Review, July 30, 2007
Sequoia on CA Top-to-Bottom Review, July 30, 2007
Touch vote machine ban hurts counties, slanted report from the San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 5, 2007
Congress is from Venus; Californians are from Mars , Posted by Howard Stanislevic, Aug. 5, 2007
Secretary of State Bowen, political cartoon, San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 1, 2007
Time to review NH Ballot Law Commission approval of Diebold optical scanners, Nancy Tobi, August 6, 2007
CA moves to lock down e-voting systems, Computerworld, Aug. 4, 2007
Study: Hackers Could Change E-Voting Machine Results, TechNewsWorld, July 30, 2007. Includes Avi Rubin comment "I had expected them to find problems -- but to be able to replace firmware in all three systems is nothing short of an utter takeover of machines, and that shouldn't be possible."
Senate to Hold Hearing on Security of Voting Machines, Blog Wired, July 31, 2007
If you vote will it count? Can't tell without paper, Daytona Beach News Journal Online, Aug. 1, 2007
E-voting machine vendors, election officials slam review, Inside Bay Area, July 31, 2007
Elections officials blast vote-hacking research, The fight over electronic balloting's security also has activists clamoring to ban the new technology. Sacramento Bee, July 31, 2007

BradBlog visits Diebold
A Visit to Diebold Elections Systems, Inc., in Allen, Texas, Bradblog, Aug. 7, 2007

Ohio Counties Destroy 2004 Vote Records
The Deepening Criminal Cover-Up of Ohio's Stolen 2004 Election Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, CommonDreams, Aug. 4, 2007
In Violation of Federal Law, Ohio's 2004 Presidential Election Records Are Destroyed or Missing, Alternet, July 30, 2007

GOP and CA Electoral College Votes
GOP eyes California's electoral pie, Strategists push a 2008 ballot initiative that would slice up the state's 55 votes for president, based on congressional districts. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 6, 2007
Votescam, New Yorker, Aug. 6, 2007

OpEdNews compendium of voting-related articles

Diebold humor never dies, just remember that it applies to all the other vendors too.
Dilbert on Open Source

TGDC Plenary Teleconference
. . . We will webcast the August 17, 2007 Technical Guidelines Development Committee plenary teleconference. You will be able to access the web cast in real time at: http://origin.eastbaymedia.com/~nist/html/tgdc-0707/
. . . The web cast will also be accessible in archival mode. This public meeting was originally scheduled for July 3, 2007 but was re-scheduled to August to allow NIST staff to complete open technical issues. The purpose of the August 17, 2007 TGDC teleconference is to review the final draft of the next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).
. . . The draft VVSG document under consideration and all other meeting support material will be at http://vote.nist.gov web site on August 13, 2007.
Report on HAVA Spending by States
EAC Releases HAVA Spending Report, July 31, 2007

Voting Systems Seeking Certification
EAC Applications for Voting System Testing-2007

UK Election Disaster with Dominion
Ridiculous UK E-Voting Trial Ends in Disaster, BlogWired, Aug. 6, 2007
E-voting comedy of errors in Shakespeare's Stratford, the Inquirer, Aug. 3, 2007
Stratford Statutory Evaluation Report

PBS covers "voter caging"
Voter Caging & Housing Works, PBS, Aug. 6, 2007

Ron Paul vs. Mitt Romney in Iowa
Romney Leadership Team Member Overseeing Straw Poll, Ron Paul blog, Aug. 9, 2007
Straw Poll Results ... Still Waiting ... And Waiting, Washington Post, Aug. 11, 2007
Bizarre "Audits" At GOP Straw Poll, Aug. 11, 2007

Florida, Voting Machine Study
Software Review and Security Analysis of Diebold Voting Machine Software, SAIT, Aug. 10, 2007

Vote Buying and Selling
Supervisor among latest Benton voter fraud arrests, Daily Journal, NE Mississippi, Aug. 25, 2007

Surveillance Cameras
"Ring of Steel" Surveillance Cameras coming to New York, CNN, Aug. 3, 2007


=== July 2007 ===

EAC report to Congress, how much states spent of their HAVA funds, July, 2007
EAC web page on funds

Senate to Hold Hearing on Security of Voting Machines, Blog Wired, July 31, 2007

Open Source, Open Voting Solutions OVS
A Publicly Owned and Controlled Voting System Ensuring Transparency and Oversight by the People -- or Nothing, OpEdNews, July 30, 2007
Open Source Voting, presentation by Arthur M. Keller, Pd.D. and David Mertz, Ph.D. at OSCON Open Source Convention, July 23-27, 2007 in Portland, Oregon.
Police Blotter: Defendant wins breathalyzer source code, CNET News, Aug. 9, 2007. Defendant's attorney said the source code was necessary because "for all we know, it's a random number generator." Voting integrity activists should use that argument.

Paul Lehto
Defending the Freedoms of July 4, 1776: America's Hope for the World, July 4, 2007

Doug Lewis
Testimony to U.S. Senate Rules and Administration Committee, July 25, 2007
Response to Doug Lewis Testimony of July 25, 2007 by Teresa Hommel
WheresThePaper opinion -- this testimony is important because it states clearly the direction of arguments that will be made in the next year, and the way issues will be framed. Activists for election integrity need to clearly understand what's wrong with Lewis's arguments.

All Your Votes Belong to Vendors
Voting Machine Vendors Warn Congress About H.R. 811's Dangerous and Unrealistic Timeframes, Posted by the Ranking Republican, July 17, 2007, The vendors are threatening a denial of service in the sense that, now that jurisdictions have bought voting equipment from them, they are refusing to update the equipment. Vendors claim it would take 54 months to install a VVPAT printer. If the VVPAT were audited, that might reveal that the machines don't work and are easily corrupted. The lobbyists remind Congress that they are lobbyists (are they saying "we have money and this is what we want"?).
Voting Machine Companies to Congress - ALL YOUR VOTES BELONG TO US, by ncvoter, March 29, 2007
12 page testimony from Election Technology Council

Computers not needed for handicap Access
Handicapped Access to Mark-Sense Ballots, Douglas W. Jones, U. of Iowa, patented design for non-computerized device for voters with disabilities to mark and verify a paper ballot.

SAFE Audits
Percentage-based versus SAFE Vote Tabulation Auditing: A Graphic Comparison , July 26th, 2007

California Secretary of State Debra Bowen Top-to-bottom Review
More links
Reports released July 27, 2007
Transcript of Hearing, Secretary of State Debra Bowen, July 30, 2007
Scientists' Tests Hack Into Electronic Voting Machines in California and Elsewhere, New York Times, July 28, 2007
Points to make in your letter to the editor:
1. Is it a coincidence that as soon as we develop technology to protect paper ballots from fraud, we start recording our votes with computers, which prevent any one from detecting fraud?
2. Some advocates for the disabled may claim that federal law requires them to be able to vote without any help from poll workers, but this is false. The law requires voters to be able to cast a secret vote, and for poll sites to be accessible.
. . . The law does not require every voter to be able to deposit a ballot into a ballot box without personal assistance. This would be unreasonable.
. . . We have a variety of ballot-marking devices that enable voters with disabilities to mark a paper ballot in secrecy, and a variety of "ballot sleeves" that fully protect the secrecy of votes on those ballots. Regardless of who carries the ballot to the optical scanner and inserts it, the secret vote can remain secret.
. . . The accessibility issue should not be used politically to support the use of electronic touchscreen voting machines, when voter-marked paper ballots and optical scanner systems give every voter a more secure vote.
3. There is no way a paper trail lets voters "verify that their ballots had been correctly cast" unless the paper trail is counted for initial tallies as well as recounts. If the electronic record of the vote is counted for initial tallies, then the paper trail is a placebo.
4. One reason "that no machine was known to have been hacked in an election" is that vendors use their trade secret claims to prevent anyone from examining the systems and collecting the evidence.
5. No computer system is secure from insider tampering in the field of elections or anywhere else.

Florida, Voting Machine Study
Software Review and Security Analysis of Diebold Voting Machine Software, SAIT, Aug. 10, 2007
Study: Fla. Voting Machines Can Be Hacked, Miami Herald, July 31, 2007
Software Review and Security Analysis of Diebold Software, July 27, 2007
Secretary Browning's letter to Diebold, July 31, 2007
Statement by Matt Bishop
Study: Fla. Voting Machines Still Flawed, Washington Post, July 31, 2007
The Plot Thickens for Electronic Voting, Sci-Tech Today, Aug. 2, 2007
Florida voting machines show problems, TG Daily, July 31, 2007

Senate Rules Committee hearing on S1487
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, July 25, 2007, testimony
Comment on upcoming hearing, Mary Ann Gould
Recorded audio coverage in segments
Recorded audio coverage--one big MP3 file 43MB

Relationship of Diebold and National Federation for the Blind, BlackBoxVoting, June 16, 2004

Congress can't fix HAVA mess
WheresThePaper.org opposes use of DREs and believes their widespread use is a HAVA-created mess.
Congress puts off fixing touch-screen voting, Farhad Manjoo, July 21, 2007
Holt Paper-Trail Election Bill Dead? -- UPDATE: Not Dead Yet, Kim Zetter, July 18, 2007
Overhaul Plan for Vote System Will Be Delayed, New York Times, July 20, 2007
Accessibility Isn't Only Hurdle in Voting System Overhaul, New York Times, July 20, 2007, By Christopher Drew
There is more than enough time to fix US democracy - open letter to Sen. Feinstein OpEdNews, July 22, 2007, By by Alastair Thompson
Question: Does Senator Hagel still own part of ES&S? Is it a conflict of interest for him to participate in writing election reform legislation after he was a stakeholder in the company?

Hand Count Paper Ballots
On-site observations of the hand-counting of paper ballots and recommendations for the general election of 2008, Sheila Parks, July 18, 2007
We're Counting the Votes, And You Can Too! Watch citizens hand-counting votes on paper ballots! (requires Windows Media Player)
Paper Ballot Election Administration Basics, Nancy Tobi, Election Defense Alliance, July 19,2007
Hand Counting Paper Ballots, Anthony Stevens, Assistant Secretary of State, New Hampshire
New Hampshire Poll Worker Training Disability Access
New Hampshire Reconciliation Hand-counting, Bud Fitch, Deputy Attorney General
New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual, 2006-2007
New Hampshire Hand Count in Lyndeborough, Part 1, YouTube

Ballot-marking methods

New Jersey studies on VVPAT printers
NJ Institute of Technology Reports, web page of Division of Elections
Avante Vote-Trakker
Sequoia AVC Advantage
Sequoia Advantage, Addendum
Sequoia objects! July 20, 2007 Letter To NJ

Pennsylvania and ES&S, Warrantee Cost
County Says Voting Machine Warranty Too Costly, CitizensVoice, July 18, 2007. (Contract in haste, repent in leisure)

Sequoia new optical scanner
page 1-2
page 3
page 4 and 6
page 5

San Francisco may use HCPB in November
Hands may replace digits in November vote count, California secretary of state refused to certify San Francisco's ES&S machines in a fourth 'one-time' administrative certification. Examiner, July 18, 2007

EAC Seeks Voter Input
Statement of EAC Vice-Chair Rosemary E. Rodriguez EAC Seeks Input from Voters and Advocacy Groups, July 9, 2007

Riverside County CA
Report from Blue Ribbon Panel in Riverside County, California By Avi Rubin, July 13, 2007

Web page on HR811 and S1487
Connecting the Dots? Rush Holt, HR 811, and Avante International By Rebecca Mercuri, July 13, 2007
Time Running Out For Voting Reform, New York Times, July 31, 2007

Contractual Barriers to Transparency in Electronic Voting
Analysis of 55 Contracts, Joe Hall, 2007

Escrow version control, ES&S in Los Angeles, InkaVote
Discrepancies Reported in Versions of LA County E-Voting System Source Code as Submitted and Escrowed by ES&S. Letter Obtained by BRAD BLOG to Voting Machine Company Confirms Potential Violations Of California Election Law as Revealed During CA SoS Bowen's 'Top-to-Bottom Review' of E-Voting Systems. Matter May Have Far Reaching, National Consequences Concerning the Effectiveness of Escrowing Secret Vote-Counting Software. BradBlog, by John Gideon and Brad Friedman, July 10, 2007

Alameda County must rehold election
California Judge To Rule County Must Rehold Election After Diebold Touch-Screen Election Records Destroyed by County Officials, Judge to Nullify Election Results of 2004 Alameda County Ballot Measure, According to Tentative Ruling. County Had Refused to Allow Public Examination of Electronic Votes and Audit Logs on Diebold Voting Systems After 'Numerous Machine Malfunctions' in Medical Marijuana Election.
Bradblog, by John Gideon of VotersUnite, July 12, 2007

Tova Wang gag order reversed
Expert Hired to Write Voter Fraud Study Now Allowed to Speak About It, Commission's Burying, Altering of Her Report, Bradblog, by John Gideon of VotersUnite, July 12, 2007
On July 13, 2007, he U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations issued Senate Report 110-129, which recommended passage of the "Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bill, 2008" (H.R. 2829). The bill makes appropriations for financial services and general government for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008. In the report's section on the Election Assistance Commission:
"Research Products- The Committee directs that no Federal funds shall be used in a way that would bar the public release of final research presented to the Commission for its consideration. While the Commission may determine how to respond to research performed with Federal funds, any use of research paid for from the public funds shall be made available without substantive edits. The Commission shall review and produce its own reports without partisan influence or bias, and shall not unduly limit the rights of Federally-funded researchers to speak freely about the research following the conclusion of the contract."

DREs cause long waiting lines
Why Computerized Voting Machines Cause Long Lines and Disenfranchise Voters, William Edelstein, July 8, 2007

Internet voting spreads
Lithuania, Scientific American, July 8, 2007
Markham (Canada) voters can now cast their eballot, InterGovWorld, Oct. 26, 2006
Democratic Party Rules for 2008, Aug. 21, 2006
Michigan, Feb. 9, 2004
Hawaii, Feb. 20, 2007
Wikipedia, Feb. 20, 2007


=== June 2007 ===

Letter from Harriotte Hurie Ranvig to Sen. Kennedy, June 27, 2007

Election Fraud
Election Fraud in America: Don't worry about Paper Ballots--The Problem is Secret Procedures and Lack of Observers! by Teresa Hommel, www.WheresThePaper.org, June 28, 2007

Observers Report, E-voting Elections in England and Scotland
Open Rights Group Election Report highlights problems with voting technology used, June 20, 2007.
Executive Summary
Election Report

The Sack of Washington, Vanity Fair, June, 2007, Excerpted from Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America, by Cullen Murphy, to be published this month by Houghton Mifflin.
E-voting Vendors Commonly Refuse to Promise That Their Voting Machines Work, by Paul Lehto.

Voters Fail to Notice Vote-Flipping, by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org, on BradBlog, June 13, 2007.

Hans van Spakovksy
Who Is Hans von Spakovksy?, CivilRights.org, June 12, 2007
Another Sorry Ascension, New York Times Editorial, June 14, 2007.

Election 2004: The Urban Legend
Scoop American Coup II presents Election 2004: The Urban Legend, by Michael Collins, June 13, 2007
Sludge Report #177 – Bigger Than Watergate II, aka Election 2004 vs George On The Block & the White Ghosts of NYC, Scoop, Column by C. D. Sludge, June 13, 2007

Hack and Stack
Sleuthing Stolen Election 2004: John Brakey and the "Hack and Stack", OpEdNews, By David L. Griscom, Ph.D.


=== May 2007 ===

How Long does it take to change voting systems?
How Long does it take to change voting systems?, VerifiedVoting.org, May 9, 2007

The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be Changed Without Detection. Everett, S. P. (2007). Doctoral dissertation, Rice University, Houston, TX. See especially, discussions on page 77 and 103.
. . . Results indicate that over 60% of voters do not notice if their votes as shown on the review screen are different than how they were selected. Entire races can be added or removed from ballots and voter’s candidate selections can be flipped and the majority of users do not notice. ... The result is that malicious software installed on a DRE could steal votes right in front of voters with a low probability of being detected.
p. 115 [PDF page]
. . . The most striking result of Study 3 was that only 37% of participants noticed the vote flipping that occurred on their review screens. For each participant, the candidate choices for 1, 2, or 8 races had been changed and most voters did not detect this.
p. 122 [PDF page]
. . . The third study, which used a large sample size and participants who were representative of voters in general, showed that age had a negative direct impact on whether voters would notice the change. It is easy to obtain demographic information such as the average age of registered voters in a precinct. Because age is an important factor in whether voters will detect changes, malicious software attacks could be targeted to precincts with high numbers of older voters. This would mean that the vote flipping attacks could be executed selectively with a very low probably of detection.
. . . Sarasota County had more than 18,000 undervotes in the 2006 FL-13 congressional contest. Sarasota County has over 30% of voters who are 65 and over, and has the 6th highest number of those voters in the country.
. . . Votes can be stolen electronically without flipping them on the review screen, but this study flipped votes in three contests, right on the review screen, and only 37% of voters demographically representative of the voting population discovered it.

Peering Through Chinks
Peering Through Chinks in the Armor of High-Tech Elections, Pokey Anderson, May 27, 2007

Greg Palast, Caging Lists
The Goods on Goodling and the Keys to the Kingdom, By Greg Palast, BradBlog.com, Thursday 24 May 2007. The no-longer "missing" Rove emails reveal the cagey scheme to steal 2008.

Pacific NW Elections Conference
June 26-19, Portland OR, vendors and election officials

NYT praises Florida
Trust in Paper, New York Times, May 5, 2007.
Florida Acts To Eliminate Touch-Screen Voting System, New York Times, May 3, 2007.

American Center for Voting Rights Disappears
The Fraudulent Fraud Squad, The incredible, disappearing American Center for Voting Rights, by Richard L. Hasen, Slate, May 18, 2007.

CBTU Resolution for Paper Ballot Systems
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, New York City Chapter, Resolution Supporting Voter-Marked Paper Ballot Voting Systems, passed May 19, 2007.

EAC Spanish Glossary
released May 17, 2007

Gov. O’Malley Signs Paper Records Bill Into Law, requiring a durable paper record. It would allow DREs with VVPAT or paper ballots with optical scanners. Implementation is required by 2010, contingent on funding prior to fiscal year 2009. Audit provisions are needed.

Secretary of State Project
Support Secretaries of state who will protect voter rights

Voter Rage
Creative Use of a Hammer, BlackBoxVoting.org, May 11, 2007

California Tests
E-voting Machine Tests Face Delay, Inside Bay Area, May 15, 2007

Americans with Disabilities Call for Accessible and Secure Election Systems
statement and 41 signers, VoterAction, May 3, 2007

Slammer Worm in Sarasota
Worm Attacked Voter Database In Sarasota in October, 2006, ComputerWorld, May 16, 2007
The database server was connected to the Internet.
If they had thought the disaster would have affected the election, they would have handled things differently.
Kathy Dent didn't include this in her post election report.
Sarasota County Incident Report, Oct. 24, 2006
Worms and the Internet, comment by Howard Stanislevic, May 16, 2007

Florida Voters Coalition and Council of the Blind
Strategic Alliance formed, May 16, 2007
Go All the Way Florida

NY Times Supports Holt bill
New York Times editorial supporting Holt Bill, May 16, 2007

PRLDEF position statement
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Statement of Concern Regarding H.R. 811 and the Problems of Electronic Voting Technologies and Electronic Ballots, May, 2007

Cuyahoga Audit
Critique of the "Collaborative Public Audit" of Cuyahoga County Ohio's November 2006 Election, Kathy Dopp, May 7, 2007

Congressional Field Hearing in NYC, May 7: Certification and Testing of Electronic Voting Systems
Electronic Voting May Be Ready by Fall '08, Official Says, New York Times, May 8, 2007. The big question is, did this reporter attend the hearing? He missed the main news of the day--experts agreed that NASED certification was meaningless, but decided that the shoddy equipment should continue to be used because... because... we've gone too far to turn back?
Voting Flaws, New York 1 News, May 7, 2007.
Hearing Notice.
Statement by Rep. Carolyn Maloney.
Douglas Kellner, Co-Chair of NY State Board of Elections.
John Washburn, VoteTrustUSA Voting System Technical Advisor.
David Wagner, Ph.D., Computer Science Division, University of CA, Berkeley.
Testimony on Voting System Testing and Cerification from VoteTrustUSA.
Distributed at hearing: Michael Shamos Testimony to EAC, Oct. 26, 2006, on DRAFT Procedureal Manual for Voting System Testing and Certification Program. Statements by persons not called as witnesses
John Gideon, Co-Director, VotersUnite.org.
Teresa Hommel, creator of WheresThePaper.org.

Technical Guidelines Development Committee
The Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) will hold its next plenary meeting on May 21-22, 2007 at NIST's Gaithersburg campus. The Committee will review a near-final draft of the next iteration of the voluntary voting systems guidelines (VVSG). The meeting will be webcast and the link will be provided shortly at http://vote.nist.gov.
If you plan to attend in person, please register by May 14, 2007 on line at: http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/confpage/070521.htm.

Florida gets federal money for new machines
Federal funds pave way to voting paper trail, Miami Herald, May 1, 2007

David Jefferson rebuts Election Center
document, 2005

Movie, 1 min, 36 seconds
Electronic McVoting


=== April 2007 ===

Voter Errors
Center for American Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland
Promise and Performance of E Voting Systems Workshop, April 23, 2007
Voter Accuracy: Voter Abilities to Cast their Votes as Intended
The voter-marked optical scan ballot had an error rate probably because the write-in option required voters to both fill in the write-in bubble, AND write the name of the candidate. Nevertheless, the voter-marked optical scan ballot had the lowest undervote rate of any voting system used in the 2004 Presidential election: CalTech Voter Residual Vote Rates

Election Fraud
Did Bush Commit Election Fraud? Gonzales Story - Smoking Gun #1, Scoop, April 23, 2007.

State law bans NEW DREs, VoteTrustUSA, April 15, 2007.

Counted As Cast
web site with useful links.

Dept of Justice strategy to disenfranchise
DOJ strategy: Limit voting in swing states, Political appointees allegedly skewed rulings to influence outcome of elections Sacramento Bee Editorial, April 22, 2007.

Pacific NW Elections conference
June 26-29, 2007, Jantzen Beach, Portland OR.

EAC lists certified equipment and labs
EAC’s Voting System Certification Program.

Florida video
excellent 51-second video.

GAO Report
All Levels of Government Are Needed To Address E-Vote Challenges, Government Accountability Office, April 18, 2007. The report contatins testimony before the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
. . . "The integrity of voting systems -- which is but one variable in a successful election process equation -- depends on effective system life cycle management, which includes systems definition, development, acquisition, operations, testing and management. It also depends on measuring actual voting system performance in terms of security, reliability, ease of use and cost effectiveness, so that any needed corrective actions can be taken. Unless voting systems are properly managed throughout their life cycle, this one facet of the election process can significantly undermine the integrity of the whole.
. . . "Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems," continued Hite, "citing vague or incomplete standards, weak security controls, system design flaws, incorrect system configuration, poor security management and inadequate security testing, among other issues. Many of these security and reliability concerns are legitimate and thus merit the combined and focused attention of federal, state, and local authorities responsible for election administration."
. . . Unfortunately, the author, Hite, in testimony before the Oversight Committee, referred to the "problem" of decentralized elections as leading to fraud and incompetence at the state levels, and in his report he concludes that the EAC must be strengthened to fulfill its mandate.

Remote sensing of computer screen content
Content of one computer screen can be seen on another computer through walls with some new technology, April 20, 2007.

Rove's missing emails and 2004 election
Are Rove's missing e-mails the smoking guns of the stolen 2004 election?, by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, The Free Press, April 25, 2007
The GOP's cyber election hit squad, by Steven Rosenfeld and Bob Fitrakis, The Free Press, April 22, 2007

US Attorneys and "voter fraud"
Did Bush Commit Election Fraud?, Michael Collins, Scoop, April 23, 2007

EAC silences writer/researcher
Tova Andrea Wang, Co-Author of Bi-Partisan 'Voter Fraud and Voter Intimidation Report' for the Election Assistance Commission, Calls for an End to the Censorship in Wake of EAC's Altering of Her Report, Bradblog, April 26, 2007
Tova Andrea Wang's statement
Draft report which was changed EAC Under Fire, Long Overdue Congressional Scrutiny, Bradblog, April 23, 2007

History of American Election Administration
Election Administration in the United States, 1934, by Joseph P. Harris, Ph.D.

Lynn Landes
Voting security web page, The case for a return to total transparency in voting - open voting!

Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA), Chair of House Admin Committee, dies of cancer
Millender-McDonald's Death Leaves Chair Open. Congressional Quarterly, April 23, 2007
Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald dies. The Hill, April 22, 2007
Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-Calif.) has been diagnosed with cancer. She will take a leave of absence from Congress until May 25. Rep. Millender-McDonald is chairwoman of the House Administration Committee where HR811 is under consideration. The Hill, April 18, 2007

PA Court Decision
PA Court Recognizes PA Voters' Right to Reliable, Secure Voting Machines, PR Newswire, April 12, 2007
Opinion by Judge Friedman, April 12, 2007
The Pennsylvania court held that voters have a right under the commonweath's constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines "that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized" through voter verification or independent audit.
Court rejects state's protests to voting machine suit, Electronic machines have security, accuracy flaws, activists claim. Morning Call, April 15, 2007.

Citizens need to be able to sue to enforce election integrity
Pending Election Reform in Congress Doesn't Give Citizens Right to Sue, By Steven Rosenfeld, AlterNet. Posted April 13, 2007.

Cleveland Ohio Audit of 2006 finds flaws, Diebold claims to own vote data
Audit Finds Many Faults in Cleveland's '06 Voting, New York Times, April 20, 2007.
Cuyahoga Report, April 18, 2007 (2.8MB PDF)
The audit was done by representatives of major political parties, the League of Women Voters and two citizens' groups. Meanwhile, the 4 members of the Board of Elections and the county's election director, Michael Vu, have resigned or been forced out of office. Michael Vu was immediately hired as Director of Elections in San Diego, CA.
Ohio Audit Says Diebold Vote Database May Have Been Corrupted, Kim Zetter, BlogWired, April 19, 2007
Center for Election Integrity at Cleveland State University.
Bennett Quits Elections Panel, The Plain Dealer, April 12, 2007
San Diego County hires Vu as assistant registrar, North County Times (San Diego), April 11, 2007
Electionline News Analysis: The Coming Paper-Trail Debacle?, Aug. 17, 2006
Two Election Workers Convicted in '04 Tally, Plain Dealer, January 25, 2007
Ohio Election Portends Trouble, by Kim Zetter, Wired, October 31, 2006

PFAW lies to support Holt bill HR811
People for the American Way Misleads Americans on Holt Election Reform Bill and My Position on It, Bradblog, April 9, 2007.
To send your objections to PFAW, send email to pfaw@pfaw.org

Voter Fraud
Panel Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud, New York Times, April 11, 2007.
EAC responds.
Administration tried to curb election turnout in key states, Campaign against alleged voter fraud sought to bolster the GOP, Baltimore Sun, April 19, 2007

American Blackout
"American Blackout", a documentary by Ian Inaba, review by Joan Brunwasser, OpEdNews, April 10, 2007

Sequoia pats itself on the back
because no visible problems occurred--OK, they're fast, but has anyone checked the accuracy of these computers yet?

Removing Barriers to Voter Verified Paper Ballots, Ballot on Demand to Increase Flexibility of Paper Ballot Voting, by Joyce McCloy, NC Coalition for Verified Voting
Automated Election Services, a company in New Mexico.

Opposition To Electronic Voting System Grows In France, New York Times-Europe, April 4, 2007

Oklahoma made its own OpScan
Upgrades Sought In State Election System For 2008 Presidential Race, KOTV, AP, November 26, 2006.
Testimony of Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, before the EAC, June 3, 2004.
Voice of the Voters Radio Show, Interview with Clingman of February 14, 2007, Announcement,
radio interview, version 1 , version 2

Maryland Senate passes paper ballot bill, Avi Rubin's Blog, April 6, 2007.


=== March 2007 ===

Holt HR 6414 of 2006
So 2008 is history -- ALREADY? I don't think so, and here's why, Howard Stanislevik, March 20, 2007.

Diebold sues Massachusetts
Firm sues Mass. over contract for voting machines for disabled, Telegram, March 25, 2007.

Florida, Jennings/Buchanan Race
ES&S fears were listed in a letter seeking to limit the state audit, Terms of 'Independent' State Run Audit, Source Code Review Dictated by Voting Machine Company to Florida State Election Director Prior to Tests of Failed Touch-Screen Voting Systems from Contested Jennings/Buchanan Election! Bradblog.
State audit team replies to questions surrounding newly discovered ES&S 'Source Code Review Agreement' sent to state certification chief. Bradblog.
ES&S Memo Points to Known Problem with Florida Voting Machine, Informed Consent, March 22, 2007
Source Says Second ES&S Letter Tried to Dictate What Florida Test Reports Could Say, Informed Consent, March 23, 2007

Jim Crow
The New Face of Jim Crow: Voter Suppression in America, PFAW

Hacking Democracy
Hacking Democracy DVD released, March 27, 2007

Sarasota, Florida, Privatization looks like this
Terms Of Vote Review Disputed, St. Petersburg Times March 27, 2007

Expanded Election Reform Legislation introduced, statement supporting S804/HR1381.

Hearings in Congress on Voting Systems
Testimony on March 15, 20, and 23, VoteTrustUSA

Testimony of Pamela Smith, President, VerifiedVoting.org Before the Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections U.S. House of Representatives March 20, 2007

New Jersey
Suit Prompts New Jersey to Reinvent Voting System, New York Times, March 20, 2007

Federal Legislation on Voting Machines
Who is Supporting and Who is Opposing Current Election Reform Legislation?, OpEdNews, by Kathy Dopp, March 25, 2007

Count Every Vote Act introduced by Senator Hillary Clinton (NY) and Representative Stephanie Tubbs Jones (OH), S804/HR1381 builds on the Help America Vote Act to further protect voting rights and improve administration of Federal elections. The bill would establish a national Federal write-in absentee ballot; require same-day registration in all 50 states; allow voters to verify their vote prior to casting a ballot either through written, pictorial, audio or electronic verification; ban internet connections to Election Mgmt System servers; make the VVPAT the ballot of record for all audits and recounts in federal elections.

HR 811
Return to paper ballots could be on horizon, Sacramento Bee, March 23, 2007

HR6414 of 2006
Bill would enable citizens to observe elections

Florida, Gov. Crist
Crist: Get rid of touch screens , The governor tells Congress that he will push for optical-scan ballots in Florida.St. Petersburg Times, March 24, 2007

VVPAT Failures in NC
Trouble Report, May and November, 2006: Paper jams, screen freezes, programming errors, Panel would not charge, Screen freeze, Out of calibration, Printer folding edge of paper, Flash error/CRC error, Power shut down, Printer frozen/power issue, Half of screen missing, "Locked up", CJ could not open panel, Battery low, Printer door won't lock, Corrupted flashcard - message, Precinct workers could not change paper roll, RTAL not found - message, Panel beeping, screen frozen, Chirping, but dead, 4 panels had printers not working, No response on 3 machines, Broken leg, Panel fell/release latch won't work, Panel would not accept Master PEB, Ballot will not display, Goes directly to Party Select when Master, ADA programmed wrong, Paper roll on backwards, Can't make selections when press screen, ADA problem, audio tried - blank screen, Time setting is off by 1 hour.

GAO Report
All Levels of Government Are Needed to Address Electronic Voting System Challenges, Highlights of GA0-07-576T

EAC has failed its mission
Testimony of Ellen Theisen on EAC performance, March 13, 2007

New York City Council unanimously passes Paper Ballot/Optical Scanner Resolution, Wed. March 14
Resolution 131-A on City Council website
Res. 131-A Hearing and Vote History on City Council website.
Resolution 131-A copy (in case City Council website is down)
Quotes of organizations supporting Resolution 131-A
Photos of the press conference on the steps of City hall
more info

Disability Issues
AutoMark Questionnaire, League of Women Voters, Minnesota, Feb. 21, 2007
ACLU of Massachusetts, March 5, 2007
Blind and Disabled Voter Advocates, Groups call for 'Immediate Ban' of DRE Voting Systems!, Bradblog, March 5, 2007
Differently Enabled Call For Both Accessibility And Security, IEET, March 17, 2007

27 pages of DRE failures
Electronic Voting: a Failed Experiment, VotersUnite.org, March 8, 2007

Briefing Packet, Why Minorities benefit from PBOS
Materials List

Howard Stanislevic

EDS Report--Machines in Use
October, 2006.

Avi Rubin says DREs should not be used
written testimony, March 7, 2007. From Avi Rubin's blog of March 7, 2007: "Finally, I was asked if I thought that a DRE with a paper trail was an adequate voting system. I replied that when I first studied the Diebold DRE in 2003, I felt that a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) provided enough assurance. But, I continued, after four years of studying the issue, I now believe that a DRE with a VVPAT is not a reasonable voting system. The only system that I know of that achieves software independence as defined by NIST, is economically viable and readily available is paper ballots with ballot marking machines for accessibility and precinct optical scanners for counting - coupled with random audits. That is how we should be conducting elections in the US, in my opinion."
reported by VoteTrustUSA

Sarasota 18,000 votes
Voting Machine Maker Warned of 'Issue', Herald Tribune, March 8, 2007

North Dakota Vote Centers
State Elections Trending To Voting Centers, Bismarck Tribune (North Dakota), March 15, 2007

VerifiedVoting appoints Pam Smith as President
press release, March 8, 2007

Senator Hillary Clinton's new bill
here, but note it is posted on the website of LCCR, long-time proponent of paperless electronic voting.

Machines can't make people honest
VVPAT can work, but it can't make people honest. People can always make sure the VVPAT doesn't work.
1. Vendors use printers with high failure rates 2. Boards of Elections send the machines out on election day with no paper 3. No instruction to voters telling them to verify -- not on the DRE screen, in the voting booth, or on the sign-in table, or via public notice 4. Election officials who mislead the voters by telling them that the VVPAT is for BOE use only 5. Election workers disable printer by putting the paper in backwards 6. The paper jams, and voters are made to use the machines anyway with no VVPAT

Diebold to be sold?
Diebold Weighs Strategy for Voting Unit, AP, Mar. 4, 2007


=== February 2007 ===

NIST Voting Program Activities Update
NIST Voting Program Activities Update, Power Point, Feb. 21, 2007.
One EAC self-declared goal as of its Standards Board meeting of February 2007 is to create "completely paperless verifiable voting systems." (Page 7)

Thoughts on Mandatory Audits by the Brennan Center and others, Feb. 1, 2007.

Undervote Rate Plummets with Paper Ballots and Optical Scanners
2004 and 2006 New Mexico Undervote Rates Plummet in Minority Precincts when Paper Ballots are Used, Feb. 25, 2007
Press Release.

Maryland, Joyce Thomann Testimony
Testimony of Joyce E. Thomann On Behalf of members of the Maryland Federation of Republican Women, the Republican Women of Anne Arundel County, And herself as a Maryland Resident and Registered Voter, Re: Senate Bill 392 February 22, 2007, Before the Senate, Education, and Environmental Affairs Committee.

Good point!
Optical scan is best, Letter to the Editor by Collin Lynch, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Feb. 28, 2007.
"In 2000 fewer than 5 percent of the voters in Sarasota, Fla., lost their votes due to hanging chads. In 2006 15 percent of Sarasota voters lost their votes due to iVotronics [DREs]."

Florida Shifting To Voting System With Paper Trail, New York Times, Feb. 2, 2007.
Testimony to Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, By Lowell Finley, Deputy Secretary of State of California, Voting Systems Technology and Policy, Feb. 9, 2007
Panel Cites Voter Error, Not Software, in Loss of Votes, NY Times, Feb. 24, 2007. These "experts" looked at a piece of software sent to them by Ciber, criticised last month for not being able to keep track of versions of software. What are the chances that the software these "experts" looked at was the same software used during the election?

Voter Confidence comes from Poll Workers, not Machines
Study: Poll workers, not machines, build voter confidence, Plain Dealer, Feb. 21, 2007

HR 811, the new Holt bill
Web page on HR 811 and related resources
Graphic--HR 811 with and without amendments
Letter to PFAW -- don't twist the facts and stop supporting DREs!
Text of HR 811 with 39 comments by Teresa Hommel
Essential Revisions to HR 811. VoterAction, VotersUnite, and other groups and some individuals commend the ban on wireless communications, requirements for disclosed source code and hand audits, and the mandate that testing labs be contractually independent from vendors, but call for needed amendments.
Critical changes are needed to Holt HR811 by Kathy Dopp, uscountvotes.org, 2/9/07.
Beware of the Bandwagon -- A concise list of problems with Holt Bill HR 811 by Bev Harris, BlackBoxVoting.org, 2/10/07
Committee on House Administration Opens Historic Meeting with Ambitious Agenda, Feb. 16, 2007.
Olde Fashioned Legal Loopholes Allow Rigging of Hi-Tech Elections, By Howard Stanislevic and John Washburn, January 30, 2007
Progressive Democrats of America seek to amend HR811

NJ and Sequoia
N.J. Voting Machines Face Twin Challenge, New Jersey Star-Ledger, Feb. 11, 2007. A lawyer calls them uncertified. A professor calls them easy to rig.
Sequoia Responds to Questions Regarding Voting System Security: Election Security Encompasses the Equipment, People, Processes & Voting Technology. Feb. 13, 2007.

North Carolina timeline for implementation of new systems
North Carolina Voting System Implementation Timeline, from NCVoter.org

Open Source Software, San Francisco
City: No e-voting deal without software details, Examiner, Feb. 15, 2007

Promise of accessible voting for voters with disabilities still unfulfilled, new report finds
Press release, from VoterAction.org
Report, by Noel Runyan, Feb. 14, 2007, published by VoterAction.org and Demos


=== January 2007 ===

EAC reveals why Ciber is not certified
EAC Assessment Report, CIBER & Wyle, July 17-22, 2006. By some estimates Ciber certified 70% of electronic voting equipment in the United States.
Bradblog on Tom Wilkey: Banned Voting Machine Test Lab Given More Time to Fix Problems by Friendly Director of U.S. Election Assistance Commission, EAC Exec. Dir. Tom Wilkey Lends CIBER 'Test' Lab a Hand, As 'Confidential' Secrets about Their Failures Continue to Ooze Out. Feb. 9, 2007

Ciber: Lab that certifies voting equipment barred from approving new machines!
Testing the Testers, New York Times Editorial, Jan. 8, 2007
U.S. Bars Lab From Testing Electronic Voting, New York Times, Jan. 4, 2007
The Daily Voting News and Election Integrity News reported these problems in October, 2006:
Independent Review Reveals Flaws In Voting System Testing Process, Key voting system standards missing from test plans. By Howard Stanislevic, VoteTrustUSA, October 23, 2006
CIBER Security Master Test Plan Review By NYSTEC, Sept. 27, 2006
CIBER Chairman Sells Shares, Businessweek, Dec. 21, 2006. What did he know and when did he know it?
Bradblog on Ciber, Jan. 4, 2007
Insider trading stock sell-off by Ciber execs during EAC secrecy over voting machine test lab ban, OpEd News, Jan. 23, 2006.
EAC Interim Lab Accreditation Update web page.

Touchscreen Costs
Charges for Touch-Screen Machines going up, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 13, 2007.

Black Box Voting: HAVA supporters
The Road To Boondoggle Is Paved With Good Intentions, Jan. 31, 2007.

California Hack, Riverside County
California County Official Who Dared 'Hackers' to Manipulate Voting System Gets Desperate!, Sends Letter to Outgoing CA Sec. of State Attempting to Create New Conditions for Hack Test! Computer Security Experts Deride! Bradblog, Jan. 5, 2007

E-Voting Failures in Nov. 2006, Report by VotersUnite.Org, VoteTrustUSA, Voter Action, and Pollworkers for Democracy, January 2007

Liberty Systems, aka Nedap
Nedap problems, Dutch computer technologists report on their investigation of Nedap voting machines, sold under the name Liberty in the USA.

NY Times praises activists including WheresThePaper.org
The Good News (Really) About Voting Machines, Times Select Talking Points, Jan. 10, 2007.

Ohio, Cleveland, Convicted election workers
Two Election Workers Convicted in '04 Tally, Plain Dealer, January 25, 2007


=== December 2006 ===

NFB works against interests of the Blind
Nonprofit Criticizes Historic Court Victory for Blind, BeyondChron, December 1, 2006.
National Federation of Blind Aligns with Bush Administration Appeal of Landmark Currency Ruling, BeyondChron, December 13, 2006.

Florida Editorial -- Drop Touch-Screens!
Drop touch-screens, Our position: It's time to pull the plug on the failed experiment of electronic voting. Orlando Sentinel, December 24, 2006.

NIST Drafts prepared for the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC)
NIST draft "VVPR Issues and STS Recommendatins for the TGDC"
NIST draft "Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007: STS Recommendations for the TGDC"
These drafts were prepared for discussion at the Dec. 4-5 meeting of the TGDC.
NIST White Paper Recommends That New Standards Should Require "Software Independent" Voting Systems, Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, November 29, 2006. Other Recommendations Include Banning of Wireless Devices, Volume Testing, Software SetupValidation, and Open-Ended Vulnerability Testing
. . . The draft calls for "software independence," which means that it should not be necessary to rely on the accuracy of the software in order to verify the election.
. . . The draft suggests that the 2007 standards mandate a VVPAT for all new machines, and points out that optical scanners and ballot printing systems all produce VVPATs, as do DREs with VVPATs.
. . . The draft observes that there have been problems with some of the DREs that have been retrofitted with VVPATs, but it points out that the problems are with the retrofit, not with the notion of a VVPAT.
. . . The draft says no DRE without VVPAT should be approved in the new standards.
It also says DREs already in use, whether paperless or VVPAT, would be grandfathered and not banned. The recommendations, if adopted, would only apply to new equipment.
. . . While the draft makes many of the same claims activists have made for the superiority of paper based systems, it does not say that DRE+VVPAT is not acceptable. It says that they fit in the category of "software independence", along with precinct scanners. The draft uses good examples of why scanners are an excellent "software independent" solution. . . . The draft holds out the possibility that even higher-tech, non-paper-based systems may be possible to develop. Such systems would not transparent to non-technical voters as a paper ballot is.

Summit Ponders Printing Ballots, Akron Ohio Beacon Journal, Dec. 12, 2006
New Voting Machines - The Gift That Keeps On Costing, John Gideon, VotersUnite.org, Dec. 9, 2006

Comment on Florida Voting System Standards by Rebecca Mercuri, Dec. 14, 2006

Pennsylvania bedlam
Voters Complain Of Machine Glitches by Pennlive.com, Patriot-News, Dec. 24, 2006

Voting machine firm denies tax, bribery allegations, A Boca Raton company owned by Venezuelans denied allegations it evaded U.S. taxes and paid a bribe to secure a contract in Venezuela to supply electronic voting machines. The Miami Herald, Dec. 2, 2006.
Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney's Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006
Potential Buyers Can Cast Lot With Sequoia Voting Systems, Inside Bay Area, Dec. 22, 2006
Smartmatic to Shed U.S. Unit, End Probe Into Venezuelan Links, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 2006

Minnesota Performs First Post-Election Review Electionline, Dec. 14, 2006

Are you nuts if you think the machine flipped your vote on Nov. 7? Though solid evidence is hard to pin down, complaints abound about voting machines, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 10, 2006


=== November 2006 ===

Howard Stanislevic
Electronic Vote Counting: Where Did We Go Wrong?

Lost votes on Spanish ballots
Limited Parallel Testing Program, Findings: Votes lost when cast on Spanish ballots, pages 24-27.

America Heroine Shows "Can Do" Spirit
Missing Votes Validate Touch-screen Critics' Claims, Sun Herald (Florida), Nov. 26, 2006

Diebold voting machine business should go--Analysts, Reuters, Nov. 6, 2006

ES&S -- the Midas Touch in Reverse, Ellen Theisen, Nov. 6, 2006

Electionline report
The 2006 Election, November, 2006

Exit Polls
TV Networks Exercise Caution With Exit Poll, Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2006

Georgia Paper Trail Survey
University of Georgia survey of voters' opinions on VVPAT, 11/06

New Jersey, Sequoia problem
"Software glitch" results in recount, Ocean County Observer, 11/10/06

Oklahoma testimony before EAC
delivered June 3, 2006, mentions owning and operating their own statewide system using scanners. They want to keep using it. "The primary strength of the Oklahoma Election Management System is the design. It integrates our statewide voter database with voting devices and training of all election personnel, from State and County Election Board Secretaries and staff to local precinct officials. The State Election Board owns and maintains the hardware and software which runs the system and the State maintains all equipment. "

Phone Numbers for Election Problems
1-888-SAV-VOTE for voting machine and legal issues
1-866-OUR-VOTE for general election questions, reports of election incidents of any kind, operated by PFAW, LCCR, EFF, and others. Reports will feed directly into the EIRS database. A person at one of a dozen or more phone banks will take the report, and the voter will be directed to legal assistance at VoterAction or others as necessary.
1-866-VEY-VOTA for Spanish - organized by NALEO.

Network of Citizens
Your country needs you! The current state of our election systems and processes has thrown this country into an electoral crisis. It is up to We the People to work proactively to restore integrity to our elections so we can once again have confidence in our democratic republican form of government. Many citizen activist groups across the country are answering this call and are coordinating on a variety of election protection activities. Visit the following websites to find out what activities are being planned and how YOU can help or get involved:
Video the Vote
Verified Voting
Network of Citizens
Velvet Revolution Strike Force
Pollworkers for Democracy

Observers of Manual Recounts
Observing Manual Counts - A Checklist and Questionnaire
Prepared by the California Voter Foundation
California's manual count law

Polling Places Turn To Paper After Glitches
CNN, Nov. 7, 2006
Election Success Cost Extra $17 Per Voter Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 9, 2006

Two Hazleton area voters file complaint about new machines
Times Leader, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Nov. 9, 2006

SAIC Maryland Diebold Report
Complete, unredacted version of Sept. 2, 2003, 197 pages including suggested edits and changes made by an unknown person, available as five separate PDF files:
Section 1, 3MB
Section 2, 8MB
Section 3, 8MB
Section 4, 6MB
Section 5, 2MB

Sequoia and the Yellow Button
Just Push the Yellow Button and Vote as Many Times as You Want on Sequoia Touch-Screen Voting Machines!
New Vulnerability Discovered on Touch-Screen Systems Made by One of Country's Largest Voting Machine Companies Will Affect Elections in Dozens of States!
California's Secretary of State Bruce McPherson Denies Knowledge of Vulnerability Well After His Office Had Been Notified

Metro Wants More Voting Machines, Tennessean.com, Nov. 9, 2006

Theory about honest elections
Keeping the Voting Clean, New York Times, Nov. 11, 2006
A New Breed of Watchdog, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6, 2006
Get Ready For The Glitches, Time, Nov. 6, 2006

Watch The Vote
WatchTheVote.org, a project of VoterAction.org


=== October 2006 ===

EDS Report--Machines in Use
October, 2006.

Alameda County CA, Vulnerability of Sequoia Voting Systems
Vulnerability Assessment of Sequoia Voting Systems for Registrar of Voters, by Pacific Design Engineering, Oct. 4, 2006
Critique of the Alameda County Report, "Remarkably positive spin on remarkably negative results," by Douglas W. Jones, University of Iowa.

Democrats say 2004 election data was altered, The Anchorage Daily News, Oct. 5, 2006

Chicago, Sequoia problems from the March 2006 Primary are still a problem
Election Called A Mess, Chicago Tribune, April 14, 2006.
(One of the saddest aspects of electronic voting is how it forces probably decent election officials to defend bad performance by electronic voting equipment and to lie to reassure the public. The article says that NONE of the election judges (poll workers) questioned thought the machines counted the votes accurately, while Langdon Neal, chairman of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, asserts without any evidence that the votes were counted accurately. Of course, he doesn't say Which Votes.)
Problems due to bad design blamed on pollworkers and not fixed yet 7 months later (October 19, 2006)
Voting glitches feared on Nov. 7, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 19, 2006.
(The Chicago system obviously has such a bad design that no one can work with it, and it does not actually work, yet everyone blames the people who can't get it to work. This happens when people are over-awed or intimidated by technology, and lose their common sense perspective and also forget to "keep it simple.")

Election Forensics Plan
pdf format
editable ppt format
info needed for open records requests
Recommendations for candidates, short pdf
Diebold Reports to ask for
To make an open records requests for records that reveal precinct-level votes by type (absentee, mail-in, overseas, military, election day, election day-provisional, early, etc., as appropriate for the jurisdiction) for each candidate:
In Diebold voting systems the GEMS server creates a standard report in pdf format called "Statement Of Votes Cast" (SOVC) report that, if run jurisdiction-wide for all counters and all races, provides all the detailed vote count data that is needed for forensic election data analysis, which is being routinely released now in most states.
Mathematical tools for ensuring election outcome integrity
Detailed Exit poll analysis
Election Integrity audits

Election Protection
ElectionDefenseAlliance has national working groups on Registration & Voting Systems, Election Monitoring, Election Data Analysis, Election Day Rapid Response, Investigations, Litigation, Legislation, Media & Publicity, Communications, Public Education, Volunteer Recruitment & Training, Organizational Liaison, Events Production, Fundraising, Electoral Integrity Candidacies. If you have expertise in one of these areas, please join!
VerifiedVoting.org's Election Transparency Project provides six questionnaires to guide you in collecting crucial information about how elections are run in your county, and a web form to report your findings. Choose the project that interests you most - it will only take a few hours.
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law needs attorneys, law students, and paralegals to staff the national hotline before Election Day in Washington, DC and on Election Day in Washington, DC, New York City, San Francisco, CA and at local call centers throughout the country.

House Administration Committee Hearing
Verified Voting Testimony

Liberty System Hacked in Holland
NEDAP (Liberty Systems) Voting Machines Hacked By Warren Stewart, Oct. 5, 2006

Maryland, Diebold Poll Books
Maryland: Diebold E-Poll Book Modifications Come Into Question, By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org, Oct. 15, 2006

Election Day could be full of problems, Central Ohio Farmers' Advance, Oct. 6, 2006
Diebold vote count records, Cuyahoga County Election Science Institute and Election Data Services obtained the detailed data for all four Diebold records, and none of them matched the others. The ESI Cuyahogo study showed:
DRE memory card vs. DRE archive: 26% of vote centers had one or more vote differences
Paper summary vs. paper roll ballots: 16.2% of vote centers had one or more vote differences
Paper summary vs. DRE memory card: 72% of vote centers had one or more vote differences (42% of centers had discrepancies of more than 25 votes)
Paper summary vs. DRE archive: 64% of vote centers had one or more vote differences (46% of discrepancies were more than 25 votes)
Paper roll ballots vs. the DRE memory card: 78% of vote centers had one or more vote differences (36% of discrepancies were over 25 votes)
Paper roll ballot count vs. the DRE archive: 76% of vote centers had one or more vote differences (40% of discrepancies were over 25 votes)

Pollworker Recruitment
Poll Worker Recruitment Drive Attracts Volunteers With a Reform Agenda BY DRU SEFTON, c.2006 Newhouse News Service, Oct. 6, 2006

Votes for Women, Now Count'em!

Rebecca Mercuri and Irene Goldman's report on examination of Sequoia WinEDS 3.1.073 Oct. 5, 2006

Statewide Voter Registration Databases
The Next Voting Debacle? IEEE Spectrum Online, Oct 2006 Issue

Documented Election Law and Security Violations in Shelby County, Tennessee Submitted by Jim March, Oct. 6, 2006
2006 GEMS election database for Shelby County, TN

Texas, voter per machine ratio
Researchers blast voting machine strategy, Devices are bought, placed haphazardly, Ohio professor says. The Austin (Texas) American-Statesman, Oct. 21, 2006


=== September 2006 ===

Rep. Rush Holt on dishonest report on Nukes in Iran
US Iran report branded dishonest. The UN nuclear watchdog has protested to the US government over a report on Iran's nuclear programme, calling it "erroneous" and "misleading". BBC, Sept. 14, 2006.
The then-Republican controlled HPSCI issued a half-baked "intelligence" assessments. Rush opposed the release of the partisan, non-peer-reviewed documents. He made his position about the U.S. attacking Iran quite clear: Holt: Intelligence Gaps Mean Threats of War against Iran are Reckless, Sept. 19, 2006

The Election Integrity Audit, by Kathy Dopp, President of US Count Votes, and Frank Stenger, PhD Mathematics, University of Utah.

Cost of Evoting
Lou Dobbs on cost of evoting, Bradblog, Sept. 20, 2006

Diebold, Brazil
E-Voting Raises New Questions in Brazil, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 2006

Diebold, hacked by Edward Felten of Princeton
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine, Executive Summary, one-page summary by Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten.
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine by Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten. Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University. Includes: Full research paper , Executive summary , Frequently asked questions , Our reply to Diebold's response , Princeton e-voting studies , and Demonstration Video (10 min.)
Don't trust vunerable Diebold voting machines, use absentee ballots USA Today, Sept. 29, 2006
AccuVote--that's an oxymoron, right? Good Morning Silicon Valley, Sept. 14, 2006
"Hotel Minibar" Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines by Ed Felten, Monday September 18, 2006
Diebold rebuts Princeton study, September 14, 2006
Felton on voting machine keys, Avi Rubin blog, September 18, 2006

Democrats Blast Ehrlich's Absentee-Voting Initiative, Governor May Attempt to Ban Electronic Voting. Washington Post, September 22, 2006
Mr. Ehrlich's Paper Chase, The governor's 'solutions' address the wrong election problem. Editorial, Washington Post, September 22, 2006
Maryland wins Election Lemon Award
We're No. 1, Gazette.Net (Maryland Community Newspapers Online), Sept. 29, 2006

New York, film
BOUGHT AND SOLD--Electronic Voting in New York, Link to ebay site for purchasing DVD which shows interviews with vendors intercut with facts that refute vendors' claims.


=== August 2006 ===

How to Hack the Diebold TX
movie with Marty Kaplan, using photos and information from www.OpenVotingFoundation.org

Jim March Papers
Two papers showing that the Windows CE operating system used on Diebold voting machines was certified as Commercial Off The Shelf Software (COTS) when there is, in fact, no COTS version of Windows CE. This means that Diebold has custom-built software code for the voting machines that was never inspected in the certification process. This research highlights a lack of regulation and oversight within the voting system certification process affecting all electronic voting systems.
March documents facts suggesting the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) attempted to cover up the facts documented in his comprehensive report on Windows CE.
http://www.equalccw.com/dieboldsinsandsecrecy.pdf (Approx. 9 MB)
March's paper which details Diebold's history of misconduct and cover-ups.


=== July 2006 ===

Even a Remote Chance?, Pokey Anderson, July 2006, on remote communications in voting systems.

Black Box Voting's Declaration of Independence, by Jody Holder, July 4, 2006
Unredacted Hursti II Report, Diebold TSx Evaluation, Security Alert: May 11, 2006, released in full on July 2, 2006.
Unredacted Hursti II Supplement, Supplement to report, released in full on July 2, 2006.

Georgia Lawsuit
Georgia Lawsuit Filed Over Evoting Questionability, Atlanta Progressive News, July 13, 2006
Lawsuit targets accuracy of electronic voting machines, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 14, 2006
Activists Sue to Block Electronic Voting, Washington Post, July 13, 2006
Groups file lawsuit challenging Georgia electronic voting, Ledger Enquirer, July 13, 2006

Mock Election
What is a Public Mock Election?, by Teresa Hommel, July 4, 2006
as published by VoteTrustUSA
Appendix E of the Brennan Center Full Report has descriptions of testing, including Mock Elections.

Election Observers, Pollwatchers -- Access to polling places for independent pollwatchers
In order to plan Election Integrity pollwatching, activists need to prepare now. Here is what you need to know:
1. What is the law? Is pollwatching limited to political parties? Or only to major political parties? What about independent non-partisan citizen groups?
2. Do you need to make arrangements in advance?
3. What is the process for being allowed to pollwatch?
4. Is there a deadline to apply?
5. How do you find out when important activities are taking place that you might want to observe: L&A testing, ballot counting, election boards canvassing the votes, central tabulation/accumulation, posting of results?
6. Are there any space limitations or other logistical issues that pollwatchers might face -- restroom access, needing to stand for long periods due to no chairs available, requirements that keep observers too far away for meaningful viewing?
7. What is the policy about use of cell phones, cameras, audio taping. video taping in the polling place?

San Diego CA Busby-Bilbray Race
DNC's Voting Rights Institute Issues Statement Calling for "Manual Count" of All Ballots in Busby/Bilbray Election BradBlog.com on Truthout.org, July 14, 2006. Announcement comes as DNC Chair Howard Dean is set to address activists at election integrity convention in San Diego.

Candidate wants his middle name on the ballot to be "None of the Above" MSNBC, July 21, 2006.

Vote Suit, Put it on paper! The Austin Chronicle, July 14, 2006. The article includes testimony by Dan Wallach, one of the original examiners of Diebold source code, and the reasoning of DRE proponents.


=== June 2006 ===

Brennan Center Report, June 27, 2006
Press Release
Full Report, 162 pages ("reduced" PDF version)
Executive Summary, 32 pages
About the Task Force
The Real Scoop on Security of Evoting, July 25, 2006, Eric Lazarus, principal investigator, says what the report really means.

Federal Certification
Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group, Inc. - New Information about Paul Craft and Kate McGregor By Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition, June 23, 2006

OpScan in Use
work in progress, list as of 6/24/06

USENIX workshop on E-Voting
Vancouver, Canada, August 1, 2006, first USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology (EVT) workshop. EVT seeks to bring together researchers from a variety of disciplines, ranging from computer science and human factors experts through political scientists, legal experts, election administrators, and voting equipment vendors. The workshop format will emphasize questions and answers for the papers as well as discussion among the participants. Attendance at the workshop will be open to the public, but speakers and presentations will be by invitation only. EVT will be co-located with the 15th USENIX Security Symposium (Security '06), July 31-August 4, 2006.

Ballot Programming Errors
Vote-Switching Software Provided by Vendors, a partial list -- 51 ballot programming flaws reported in the news. These were detected; how many were not?

Bev Harris, BlackBoxVoting.org
A new way to use optical scan voting machines: make images of all ballots and make them available to the public on a CD.

Emergency Injunction Filed over Questionable use, Placement of Diebold tabulators, uncertified software on computers in Los Angeles County counting room Blogged by Brad on 6/5/2006 @ 4:04pm PT...
Results of Close Busby/Bilbray U.S. House Special Election in Doubt!
Race to Replace Randy 'Duke' Cunningham in San Diego Was Run on Hackable Diebold Voting Machines, Kept Unsecured at Poll Worker Houses Overnight Before the Election!
Take Your Democracy Back! by Brad Friedman, Jun 16, 2006

update and documents, June, 2006

Editorials, General reporting
More E-Voting Concerns Surface With State Primaries Underway, Truthout, June 17, 2006
A Vote of No Confidence, Democracy left to languish in living rooms, garages, By Robert C. Koehler, Tribune Media Services, June 15, 2006
Election Security 2006, by Steven Hill, TomPaine.commonsense, June 5, 2006

Equipment in use
VotersUnite map

Florida Fair Elections Coalition Challenges Uncertified Voting Machines, June 1, 2006 FFEC filed a complaint with the Florida Attorney General challenging the delivery of uncertified voting machines to four Florida counties.
Applicable law

Glitches, aka failure/malfunction of equipment
Greg Palast show a tally tape missing Kerry/Edwards. Hard to win an election when your name and votes don't show up on the tally tape.

League of Women Voters
Caucus address by Teresa Hommel at LWV national convention, June 10, 2006.
Resolution passed June 12 requiring voting systems to have a voter-verifiable paper ballot/record.
LWV Report of Convention 2006 Action
Mary G. Wilson is new national president, June 15, 2006.
League Denounces Erosion of Checks and Balances, June 12, 2006.

Lamone Finds a Firm that will approve Diebold paperless voting, June 2, 2006
Maryland Campaign Contributions

NASS Summer Conference
July 9-12, Santa Fe NM Joint conference of the National Association of Secretaries of State and Election Officials and staff. Nonprofit activists/staff may attend for $450 which includes all the meals and entertainment.

Senate Prohibits E-Voting, June 1, 2006

Noe pleads guilty to federal charges, Coin dealer illegally routed thousands to Bush Columbus Dispatch, June 1, 2006. "Federal prosecutors said they also plan to seek additional penalties because of the potential loss of public confidence in the presidential-election process."

iVotronic machines printed zero tapes all day
VotePA-Allegheny Report on Irregularities in the May 16 Primary Election, June 5, 2006

Robert F. Kennedy Jr
Was the 2004 Election Stolen? Republicans prevented more than 350,000 voters in Ohio from casting ballots or having their votes counted -- enough to have put John Kerry in the White House. By Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Rollingstone.com
Salon.com rebuttal by Farhad Manjoo.
Comment by WheresThePaper: No one seems to get the point that democracy and legitimacy of elections require everyone to be able witness all procedures, and know what is going on. What we had was questions that could not be answered, and election observers thrown out of Boards of Elections during the canvass. There's fraud, and then there's chaos. We had chaos. We did not have a legitimate election, which requires an open process.
Salon.com gets it all wrong by Bob Fitrakis

Ballot Firm's Ties to Venezuela Criticized, Some American officials worry that Sequoia Voting Systems' foreign link could compromise the integrity of the U.S. election process. Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2006
Purchase agreement between Sequoia and Alameda County CA, June 2, 2006
Alameda County Board of Supervisors, minutes, June 8, 2006

Utah, Diebold
Diebold's reassurances are not enough, Machine politics, Tribune Editorial. The Salt Lake Tribune, June 3, 2006.


=== May 2006 ===

New York Times
Block the Vote, New York Times, Editorial, May 30, 2006. These three techniques - discouraging registration drives, purging eligible voters and imposing unreasonable ID requirements - keep showing up. ...many of these rules seem motivated by a partisan desire to suppress the vote...

NASED certification
NASED Certifies Voting Systems They Know Must Be Modified And No Longer Be Certified, By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, May 26, 2006

Washington Post
Debating the Bugs of High-Tech Voting, Test of Software in Machines Renews Security Concerns. The Washington Post, May 30, 2006.

Poll Workers Guide
Testimonial Letters

Computer Insecurity
Personal data stolen on millions of US veterans, Yahoo! News, May 22, 2006

Phillips County Election Woes Continue, The Helena Daily World, May 25, 2006.
"...the paper ballots inside the Ivotronic machine, and those stored in the Supervisor Personal Election Ballot, failed to match..."
Arkansas Will Review Election Systems, Government Technology, May 26, 2006
2 counties' machine woes delaying final vote tally, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 27, 2006
The trials of voting, Arkansas News, May 28, 2006.
'Homemade' paper ballots utilized in White County, Arkansas, Searcy Daily Citizen, May 30, 2006.

VoteTrustUSA Press Release on Sequoia foreign ownership May 31, 2006
Sequoia replies about their ownership, May 11, 2006

Arizona Lawsuit from VoterAction.org.

Colorado Lawsuit Threatened over Evoting, Denver Post, May 31, 2006

Minnesota--2 new laws
Working group bill, in Section 11 at bottom of page
Audit Bill, in Section 2

County board rejects Diebold voting machines, Voting machine grant is rejected. Wausau Wisconsin Daily Herald, May 17, 2006

Photos: Sequoia Full-face Pushbutton Advantage DREs
Warehouse in Crowley, Louisiana from Acadia Parish Clerk of Court website.
Sequoia, unknown location

Invisible Ballots Project, Various Articles
Joan Brunwasser, 21 Articles, and www.CountEveryVote.BlogSpot.com
Joan Brunwasser of Citizens for Election Reform is a citizen activist working hard to restore and preserve free and fair elections. Her main focus is distributing "Invisible Ballots" through her lending library project. Since mid September, 2005, she loaned the DVD to 'borrowers' in 34 states, DC, Canada, Holland, England, Ireland and Japan. She had hoped to hit 100 before December 31, 2005 and accomplished that goal on December 23. By now she has enlisted 465 individuals and groups in her project and is looking for new contacts. She is the Voting Integrity Editor for Op Ed News and can be reached at CountEveryVote@gmail.com.

Federal Certification Sham Exemptions for inspection of COTS were perpetuated by the IEEE and EAC, and improvement to the Reliability specifications was blocked so that the standards allow 1 in 11 DREs and Scanners to fail on Election Day, and the Voting System Standards have no requirement for independent verification of e-voting system tallies ...
NASED Certifies Voting Systems They Know Must Be Modified And No Longer Be Certified, By John Gideon, votersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, May 26, 2006
Something Old Is Something New in Voting Machine Snafus, By Vince Lipsio, Rebecca Mercuri, and Beth Feehan for VoteTrustUSA May 19, 2006
DRE Reliability Standards: An Open Letter to the Election Assistance Commission , By VoteTrustUSA and VotersUnite.org, April 18, 2006

Florida: Wrong Voter ID Cards, Broward County
Mailroom glitch sends voters' registration cards to wrong people in Broward, By Scott Wyman, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, May 26, 2006.
Glitch Leaves Some Broward Residents With Wrong Voting ID Card, NBC6, May 25, 2006.
Voting Machines Lack State Approval, Orlando Sentinel, May 12, 2006.
No 'Verify,' No Trust, By Stephen Goldstein, Sun Sentinel, May 10, 2006.

Washington State, Voter Registration
Thousands of voters could be improperly kept off the rolls, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 25, 2006.
Brennan Center litigation Washington Association of Churches et. al. v. Reed
seeks to block implementation of state law that bars citizens from voting unless the Secretary of State first succeeds in matching their names, driver’s license or Social Security numbers, and birth dates from their voter registration forms with records kept in other government databases.

Overview Powerpoint
Dr. Justin Moore presentation in North Carolina

Will Your Vote Count in 2006? By Steven Levy, Newsweek, May 29, 2006 Issue

Privacy Issues
Ordering Pizza in the year 2010, ACLU

County In Good And Bad Company, Riverside County, May 30, 2006.
"Neither plans to post its precinct-level results after next week's election.... Dunmore says the Sequoia touch-screens simply don't have a secure mechanism for compiling votes from all five or 10 machines at a single polling place. Furthermore, the printers attached to the sides of the voting machines likely won't have enough paper to print results from the dozens of races that are counted on each of the individual machines, Dunmore said."
In other words, the computers aren't secure so if the county doesn't post the poll-site results, no one will know if they have been altered?
Internet Ad Seeks Temp Workers to Privately Shuttle Hackable Voting Machines for California's Upcoming Primary Elections, Bradblog, May 23, 2006

Federal Voting System Standards
Gaping Hole in HAVA Voting System Standards Widened in 2005 By Howard Stanislevic, VoteTrustUSA E-Voting Education Project, May 21, 2006

Photo ID amendment
McConnell Amendment to require Photo ID to vote electionline.org reports that Sen. Mitch McConnell is readying an amandment to the immigration reform bill currently under consideration that would amend HAVA and require that all voters present photo ID for voting in any federal election, effective 2008.

Voting Rights Activists Call for Secretary of State Cox to Step Down, By Defenders of Democracy, May 26, 2006

Voting Machines A Touchy Topic Centre Daily, May 24, 2006.
Hundreds of Voting Machines Break Down in Philly! May 16 Primary Elections in PA Run Into Big Trouble... Paper Ballots Being Passed Out, 'We're Dead' Says One Official. Bradblog, May 16, 2006
What went wrong at the polls? Hundreds of malfunctions were reported on primary day. The city commissioners promised a thorough inquiry. Philadelphia Inquirer, May 18, 2006.

Conyers for Congress

How the vote got messed up, Lorain kept election schedule; Cuyahoga problems snowballed. Plain Dealer, May 31, 2006. This report has startling news -- the machines were modified by wiring them directly into "elections computers" (tabulating devices?) and one county had 2,000 different ballot styles. By connecting the equipment to tabulators, tampering done at the tabulator can affect the precinct data as well, concealing any evidence of the tampering.
Do Not Allow Ohio 2004 Election Documents to be Thrown Out: As Ohio Goes, So Goes The Nation! An Urgent Call To Action from Paddy Shaffer. May 15, 2006.

Questions for Election Officials
Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University: "Ask your election officials: Are you following e-voting issues in the news?" Nieman Watchdog, May 9, 2006.
Bradblog, Questions the Media Should Ask of All Elections Officials, May 10, 2006

Money Trail
The Money Pit: Diebold vs. America, By Denis Wright, Online Journal, May 11, 2006.

Sequoia Press Release Re Ownership, Businesswire, May 11, 2006.
Voting Machines Glitches Tally Up, Rocky Mountain News, May 8, 2006

Wall Street Journal
Reversing Course on Electronic Voting, Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2006.
Letters to the Editor
The Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty Street
New York NY 10281
Fax: (212) 416 - 2255
Email: wsj.ltrs@wsj.com
"Despite common charges that the machines lack adequate security, no cases have emerged proving that a hacker or an insider has or could electronically manipulate the vote."
Letters to the editor are needed to point out that Harri Hursti just hacked the system in Utah. Since no electronic election has ever been audited, there is not proof that any electronic election has ever been accurate.

Maryland responds to Diebold Crisis with Tamper Tape
Worries mount about voting machine security, Critic says new software problem is so bad that he won't detail the vulnerability. The Gazette, May 17, 2006.

Diebold Crisis
Diebold Voting Systems Critically Flawed, Securityfocus, May 12, 2006. No American at the federal or state level with responsibility for certification of systems could find this problem. It took a rural county auditor and clerk, Bruce Funk, to ask BlackBoxVoting.org for help, and Finnish security expert Harri Hursti to do it. Why should any American trust electronic machines with their vote? Federal and state certification is meaningless if software can be modified later.
BlackBoxVoting.org's Diebold TSx Evaluation, May 11, 2006
BlackBoxVoting.org: 3-level security flaws found in Diebold touch-screens, May 11, 2006
Voting Glitch Said To Be 'Dangerous' Inside Bay Area, May 11, 2006
New Fears Of Security Risks In Electronic Voting Systems, New York Times, May 12, 2006. David Bear, a spokesman for Diebold, trots out the "saint and sinner" argument: "For there to be a problem here, you're basically assuming a premise where you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in and introduce a piece of software," he said. "I don't believe these evil elections people exist." Activists for paper ballots hear arguments all the time about how people will cheat with paper ballots, but if we get computerized voting everyone will be a saint. Note that David Bear doesn't mention all the vendor technicians who will have full access to the systems as they "assist" their clients. Should we assume that they are all saints too?
Put 3 facts together --
1. Certification standards allow 9.2% of machines to fail in a 15-hour election day.
DRE Reliability: Failure by Design? by Howard Stanislevic, Feb. 22, 2006.
2. The machines facilitate different software to be loaded with ease.
3. System failure is a classic opportunity for gaining access to critical systems (during which different software can be loaded), similar to a fire alarm at a bank creating an opportunity for a robbery.
Federal and state testing has not worked. Proposals for better testing have been put forth by technologists, but the fact remains that computers are the wrong technology for elections in a democracy, because ordinary citizens cannot witness procedures conducted inside a computer, and computer security is impossible to control, and the basic premise that testing can guarantee accurate processing later is false.
more about Diebold, from NCvoter

Train Wreck
Diebold Disasters Leading to Self-Destruction As ES&S Continues to Meltdown and Miss One Contractual Obligation After Another By John Gideon, www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org, May 15, 2006 E-VOTE TRAIN WRECK 2006: Another Week, Another Wild -- and Unfortunate -- Ride..., by John Gideon, Executive Director, VotersUnite.Org and Information Manager, VoteTrustUSA.Org, May 7, 2006.
Electronic Voting Switch Threatens Mass Confusion, The Financial Times, May 1, 2006.

North Carolina
Voter Advocacy group urges voters to verify their vote, The Voter Verified Paper Ballot protects your vote - make use of it! May, 2006.
I Was a Roving Tech for ES&S, Two days in the field with ES&S OpScans.
State Board of Elections Member opposed Voter Verified Paper Ballots, in January 2005.

Diebold, Utah
Diebold Developments, here, there, everywhere: Utah, Pennsylvania, CA, May 7, 2006.
Newly Discovered Diebold Threat Described as 'Major National Security Risk'!, Bradblog, May 5, 2006. Voting Systems in Question Were Used Last Week in Ohio Primary, Soon in Pennsylvania, So 'Serious' Few Details Are Being Released. All Diebold Touch-Screen Machines, In All States, Said to be Affected by 'Horrifying' Vulnerability, Systems 'Sequestered' in PA.
short version of Bradblog creatd by Kathy Dopp.

Touch screen voting machines 'untrustworthy'?', By Dennis Wagner, The Arizona Republic, May. 10, 2006.

Secretary Land introduces accessible equipment for voters with disabilities, Press Release, May 2, 2006, about AutoMARK.


=== April 2006 ===

Survey: 56% prefer paper ballots
Survey by Gonzales Research & Marketing Strategies, “Maryland’s leader in public opinion polling” Maryland Poll, April 2006. Voting technology question is about in the middle of the document.

Train Wreck
E-VOTING 2006: The Approaching Train Wreck Our Elections are Now Officially 'A National Disaster in the Making,' By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, April 10, 2006
The Approaching 2006 E-Voting 'Train Wreck' Continues On Course, A Lot of American Democracy Can Unravel in Just One Week's Time As We Continue to Connect the Dots the Media is Failing To ...
By John Gideon, VotersUnite and VoteTrustUSA, April 16, 2006
ES&S Meltdown, Bradblog, April 27, 2006.

Traveling Poll Site
Pre-election Voting An Early Hit, The Desert Sun (Palm Springs, CA), April 4, 2006.

Blackwell Held Shares In Election-Machine Maker (Diebold), WCPO-TV, April 3, 2006.

Texas Counties at Mercy of ES&S, By Veronica L. Castro, Texas Coalition for Voting Integrity, April 1, 2006.

Evoting Comes To Italy As Do Conspiracy Theories, International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2006.

Paper Ballots
They can't deliver paper ballots? Or they want to stop the move to paper ballots?
Guest Blogged by John Gideon, Former Voting Machine Vendor CEO Speaks Out Against The Industry,
Warns That 'None of the Vendors Have a System That Voters Can Trust'
Paper Ballot Printing Problems Stop Early Voting In Several States
April 7, 2006.

Survey: Disabled Prefer Absentee Ballots, Daily Star, Otsego NY, April 10, 2006.

Hand Counted Paper Ballots in 2008, by Sheila Parks, April 10, 2006, Tikkun
also in OpEdNews

North Carolina
Diebold Info
Changes in equipment for 2006 -- changes to Optical Scan: 75 of 100 counties now use op scan as their primary voting system.
Verify Your Vote flyer , pdf format , Word doc format

Song, They Lost My Vote
Gary and Ellen Bukstel sing.

Seven Counties Dismissed From California Voters Lawsuit to Block Use or Purchase of Electronic Voting Machines, Voter Action, April 26, 2006

California, Voter Registration
Debra Bowen Press Release, 3/30/06, Bowen notes irony as Secretary of State declares April "California Voter Education & Participation Month" at the same time he's preventing eligible Californians from registering to vote
Debra Bowen Press Release, 4/6/06, Bowen fights Secretary of State who Announces It's In The "Best Interests of Voters" To Readopt His Regulations That Have Prevented Tens of Thousands of People From Registering To Vote
Debra Bowen Press Release, 4/19/06, Legal opinion concludes the roadblock is the Secretary of State
Debra Bowen Press Release, 4/19/06, After three weeks, the Secretary of State responds to Bowen's call to fix the regulations that have prevented thousands of eligible Californians from registering to vote
New Electronic Voter Registration Database Rejects 43% of New Los Angeles Voter Applications! 26% Rejected State-Wide in California!,
Applications That Don't Match EXACTLY With DMV Records are Automatically Dumped by New System!
California's League of Women Voters Sends Letter of Objection to Secretary of State
Bradblog, 3/29/06.

HAVA Funding
HAVA funding, EAC web site

57m e-voting system a 'dead duck', Irish Examiner, April 28, 2006. Ireland gives up on Liberty voting systems.

MicroVote and ES&S Negligence Places Indiana Primaries in Jeopardy By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, April 20, 2006. Uncertified Software and the Potential for "Vote Volatility" Threaten the Integrity of Primaries Less Than Two Weeks Away.
State yet to approve May 2 vote software, 9 area counties ponder paper ballots. Journal Gazette, Fort Wayne, April 19, 2006.
ES&S Fails to Show for Election Board Meeting, Wish-TV News 8, April 7, 2006.

Oregon: Secretary of State Sues ES&S By Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury, April 20, 2006. Also, Full Lawsuit in PDF Format Oregon has filed a lawsuit against Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S), for breach of contract for failure to deliver the electronic voting machines that would allow people with disabilities to vote privately and independently.
Oregon Complaint against ES&S, April 19, 2006.

Problems in Penn. with voting firm used here, Chicago Sun Times, April 7, 2006.
Election Called A Mess, Chicago Tribune, April 14, 2006.
1. The county plans to hold a mock election to test the equipment due to extensive problems in their March primary.
2. One of the saddest aspects of electronic voting is how it turns probably decent election officials into public liars. Note below, none of the election judges thought the machines counted the votes accurately, while Langdon Neal, chairman of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, repeats the unsupported assertion that the votes were counted accurately. Of course, he doesn't say What Votes.
Quote from article:
. . . Fueled by concerns about "poor management and organizational incompetence," Maureen Murphy, vice chair of the county GOP and a member of the county Board of Review, said she has met with about 200 suburban election judges who detailed a litany of problems from the March 21 primary.
. . . Among the issues, she said, were a touch-screen voting machine that "blew up like an M80" and had to be unplugged; machines showing votes that hadn't been cast; and machines not working at all. In one meeting she asked about 125 judges how many of them were confident that every vote at their polling place had been counted, and no hands went up, she said.
. . .
. . . "Our performance wasn't up to par," Neal said. "But everything I've seen indicates the votes were counted accurately."

Voting Integrity Alliance of Tampa Bay Press Release: An audit will be held on Sequoia machines that failed during an election on March 7, 2006.
Sort of Fixed, April 15, 2006. Good news (or is it bad news?), Diebold will sell DREs to Ion Sancho.
Letter from information quality management practitioners to Sue Cobb, Secy of State, Florida
Mr. Johnson also sent her the Overview of Information Production Process Details Reported in the NCQA's Baseline Assessment Tool.
NCQA is the National Committee for Quality Assurance.

Ray Martinez, former EAC Commissioner
Election reform plan proposed, Official cites eroding faith in process, NJ.com, April 9, 2006
EAC Commissioner Martinez Resigns By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, April 10, 2006. Commissioner Met With Election Activists On Saturday

Diebold, by BlackBoxVoting.org
Diebold Tries Out Various Explanations For Defects, Tries To Get Rid Of Another County Elections Official BlackBoxVoting.org, April 28, 2006

Chances Dim for Paper Ballots for 2006 Elections ABC Channel 7 WJLA, April 6, 2006
Common Sense in Maryland, New York Times, March 23, 2006
Maryland Senate Democrats Defeat Verifiable Elections, By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, April 11, 2006

Online Voting Fails
Washington Quarter Poll Resumes After Computer Mischief Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 11, 2006

Voting System Configuration
Configuration Management and Voting Systems By John Washburn, VoteTrustUSA Voting Technology Task Force, April 14, 2006. This paper is directed to any person involved in the testing, certification, qualification, approval or purchase of election voting equipment. The paper covers why the esoteric field of configuration management (version control) is intimately and inextricably linked to the testing, certification, qualification, approval, purchase, delivery and auditing of election voting equipment. The paper describes:
What is configuration management
Why configuration management of software is difficult
What is a physical configuration audit document
What is minimum information which should be included in a physical configuration audit document
How to use a physical configuration audit document to decide if your system is correct.

My Rationale For Filing An ADA Complaint Against the State of Florida, By A. J. Devies, President, (Handicapped Adults of Volusia County), April 04, 2006. Touch-screen voting machines are not accessible to the majority of people with disabilities. "I feel it is my responsibility to stand against those organizations and governmental entities who would deny not just disabled people, but ALL people, the right to a fair, secure, transparent, accountable, re-countable and accessible method of voting in the State of Florida.

Ohio Voter Education
Realistic demo of iVotronic DRE, if you play with it for a while, it will switch your vote or freeze up.
comments by "voters"
demo of the audio ballot
how-to-vote PSA video

Lawsuit Filed Over Electronic Voting Machines, KDKA, April 12, 2006
Allegheny County Complaint
Pennsylvania: Lawsuit Filed In Allegheny County Seeks To Stop Purchase of iVotronics By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, April 12, 2006.
Pages 15-16 of the complaint says: (Kim is Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice)
"...the Department of Justice, acting through Defendant Kim, has threatened Pennsylvania with legal action if Pennsylvania’s counties (including Allegheny County) do not immediately adopt new voting systems which supposedly comply with HAVA, and abandon the use of lever systems. On February 21, 2006, Defendant Kim wrote to the Chief Counsel for Defendant Cortés, stating his intention to sue the Secretary, among others, if every Pennsylvania county did not shift to new voting machines by the May 16 primary. Mr. Kim’s letter also threatened to seek the return of approximately $23 million in federal funds which Pennsylvania had received under HAVA (a sum which includes the approximately $12 million to be used by Allegheny County).
"This threat by Defendant Kim prompted the Secretary, Defendant Cortés, to instruct all Pennsylvania Boards of Election, including Allegheny County’s, to replace their lever systems prior to the May 16 primary. "

Common Cause
Let's Get It Straight by 2008! Barbara Burt of Common Cause, April 11, 2006.

Letter to Governor Huntsman , March 28, 2006.
Letter to General Counsel to Utah Governor Huntsman re fraud.
Utah has no equipment to audit or hand-count its Diebold paper ballot records, April 15, 2006.

Hand Counted Paper Ballots in 2008 By Sheila Parks, Tikkun. April 10, 2006


=== March 2006 ===

Saved By Vote-PAD?, Low-tech disabled-accessible voting device pursued despite Diebold certification. Humboldt Sentinel, March 24, 2006

Paper Trail Voting Machines Split Disabled Advocacy Groups , University of Maryland Philip Merrill College of Journalism, March 8, 2006.

New Hampshire
Voting machines removed in Grafton, Union Leader, March 16, 2006.

Do You Know How Your Vote Will Be Counted?, By Warren Stewart, Washington Spectator, March 1, 2006.

Photos: Diebold, Bruce Funk, Harri Hursti
Irrefutable Photographic Evidence of Diebold Touchscreen TSx Voting Machine Flaws, March 18, 2006, from UtahCountVotes.org

Is the Mainstream Media Finally Getting Half the Rigged Voting Machine Story?, March 30, 2006, Columbus Free Press (Ohio) by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman
Touch-Screen Voting Isn't The Right Answer, March 31, 2006, Baltimore Sun, by John Schneider

California, Diebold
The Truth About Diebold, What A Recent Report of California Computer Scientists Tells Us About The Vulberability of Diebold's Voting Machines. By Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition, March 30, 2006
Disabled Test Voting Equipment, The Union, March 30, 2006.

Letter defending evoting with secret software, The ITAA (Information Technology Association of America) is an industrial consortium that includes Microsoft and other big companies that oppose the use of open source software for elections, etc.

Bucks County PA
When the Electronic Voting Buy Comes to MY County, Betrayed, outraged, that the worst, most corruption-prone Vote system is Foisted upon my own community, by Rob Kall, www.opednews.com, March 16, 2006

California Lawsuit
Voter Group Sues to Ban Touch-Screen System, It's called vulnerable to hackers seeking to change results March 22, 2006, San Francisco Chronicle, by John Wildermuth

Electionline Assists In Covering Up Election Meltdown In Texas By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, March 16, 2006
Is Electionline’s 2006 Report Biased In Favor of DREs? By Wanda Warren Berry, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, March 14, 2006
Electionline lists Election Center's Doug Lewis as an advisor
Election Center: The Fox Guarding the Henhouse Updated
by Joyce McCloy, NC Coalition for Verified Voting, January 15, 2006. The Election Center Wants To "Improve" Democracy -- And The Profit Margins Of Their Corporate Sponsors.

Oregon Procedures for Vote by Mail
Vote by Mail book, 137 pages When a ballot will not run through the scanner, or if it jams in the scanner, the votes are manually copied onto a fresh paper ballot so no votes are lost due to equipment problems (page 79-80 of the Oregon Vote By Mail Handbook)

Voter Registration Database
Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration, Brennan Center report finds new state voter registration databases--required under HAVA---could bar millions from the polls. March 24, 2006

Voting Systems Batch Test Results – Reliability, By John Gideon and Howard Stanislevic March 15, 2006

Hart InterCivic Whistleblower Warned of Texas, Ohio E-Voting 'Fraud' Concerns in 2004!, Bradblog, March 13, 2006

Do You Know How Your Vote Will Be Counted? By Warren Stewart, Washington Spectator, March 1, 2006

Past lists of NASED qualified systems

Katherine Harris Caught Up in Bribery Scandal, AOL news, March 3, 2006.

Human error slows vote count, Vote counting suffers a two-hour delay because of a technician's mistake. (When in doubt, blame people. Never blame the computer!)
State: Absentee vote count 'will not be a problem' in elections, Herald Tribune, Sarasota Florida, March 4, 2006. Entries in the state voter registration database before the election began appeared to indicate that 23,000 voters had already voted.

Donna Brazile on Women Voters, March 30, 2006.

Maryland InfoSentry Report, March 29, 2006. "There is no assertion in this report that the AutoMARK is not secure. The issue is that the computerized voting device and its attendant software do not appear to have been subjected to the same level independent, third-party, publicly available security assessments, source code review, and functional examination as has the Diebold system now in place in Maryland. From a systems security perspective, the proposed change presents a double standard. The State is proposing to convert from a computer system that various Federal and third-party security assessments have studied, found fit for its purpose, and made reasonable recommendations for continuous improvement to another computer system about which the State has received few, if any, third-party security assessments, independent security source code reviews, or audits."

Illinois: Chi-Town E-Voting Meltdown, 414 Memory Cartridges Missing In Chicago and Cook County. By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, March 23, 2006

Forget Dubai -- worry about Smartmatic instead, Miami Herald, March 27, 2006.

Sequoia in Chicago and Pennsylvania
Chicago Ballot Chaos, April 5, 2006. Note the presence of Venezuelan and British employees in Chicago's counting procedure. Smartmatic does not own 100% of Sequoia -- a company connected to the Carlyle Group still has a minority interest.
More glitches trigger halt in testing of new county voting machines, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, March 30, 2006.
Minor glitch found in Allegheny County voting machines. March 29, 2006. This article minimizes the problem and glamorizes Shamos. In fact, the problem with Sequoia Advantage DREs in Pennsylvania was similar to recent problems in Cook County Illinois, but the article repeats common misrepresentations -- failures are called "glitches", errors are "minor" ("wouldn't have affected the outcome of the election"), and there is no discussion of the potential impact of the problem (cast votes disappeared and cannot be retrieved). Shamos' test used only 12 votes, which is too few for a real test, but even then the cards carrying the vote totals were corrupted.
Sequoia E-Vote Systems Found 'Hackable' in PA, Testing Shut Down After Machine Failures! 'Software Clearly Unstable,' Says Testing Official Who 'Transformed Handful of Votes into Thousands...in an Instant'! Ten-Year Old E-Voting Systems from NV Planned for First Time Use in PA This Year, Bradblog, March 30, 2006.
Shamos used Notepad to alter a file, and with it the Sequoia tallies. This is similar to Bev Harris' revelation about Diebold GEMS software, where you can open any file -- results, candidates, audit log, etc -- in MS-Access and edit it. GEMS generates and edits these files using native Windows APIs, rather than going through a database abstraction layer (such as ODBC). Despite Chicago Glitches, Officials Here Are Confident in Voting Machines, March 28, 2006.
Week later, almost all ballots counted Chicago Tribune, March 28, 2006
Aldermen mad about election Daily Southtown, March 28, 2006
Aldermen: No payments to machine company Chicago Sun-Times, March 28, 2006
Chicago election commission may withhold payments to voting machine vendor WQAD, March 28, 2006
City Could Withhold Payment to Voting Machine Maker ABC 7 Chicago, March 27, 2006
City County Rip Voting Machine Firm Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 2006

Primary Voting Machine Troubles Raise Concerns For '06, USA Today, March 27, 2006.
Deconstruction of USA Today article showing how it reports the news in a way that says:
voters and pollworkers' education is the problem
this is new technology and it will get better by Fall 2006
nothing is wrong with the machines themselves (even "glitches" were "caused by voters")
those with concerns based on facts just have "Fears"
those fears concern the future, and don't have anything to do with facts that have actually occurred.
A rule of thumb is that for each visible failure/error of a large computer system, you have perhaps 100 failures/errors that will only be found upon auditing (if banks operated like Board of Elections, you'd get statements that were perfectly formatted but the numbers would be wrong--as long as you don't check the numbers or try to balance your account, you'd never notice the errors). As vendors "fix" their visible problems, the lack of auditing means that we will have voting systems that appear to work but are still full of errors that don't show unless you audit/verify.

Go Away: You Can't Vote, NY Times Editorial urging NY to follow the law and enable felons to vote after they have served their sentence. March 25, 2006.

Faith-Based Voting, Rober Koehler, March 30, 2006.

Portable Storage Devices Pose IT Security Risk Computerworld, March 27, 2006. Small, easily concealed USB "flash drives" can be used with adapter plugs that will allow a USB flash drive to connect to a serial or modem port instantly. On the Diebold voting systems, especially the newest generation TSx, both a serial and modem port are available to anyone. Security mitigation for the TSx requires only covering one of the memory card ports with security tape.

Theory - Equipment Failure
DRE Reliability: Failure by Design? By Howard Stanislevic, Research Consultant, VoteTrustUSA E-Voter Education Project, March 16, 2006.

How Many Voters Will Use Different Technologies
Punch Cards Out, Paper Trails In Infozine, March 28, 2006. Reluctant recognition of paper ballots as legitimate voting technology, subtle propaganda suggesting that the real solution is DREs. Style is important too -- men's lapels will be narrower, women's skirts will be shorter, and paper trails will be in -- maybe for this year only.

Vote by Telephone
Phone Voting Ready For Disabled Voters Union Leader, NH, March 28, 2006

Comments on the ITAA's letter opposing California Assembly Bill 2097 by Bob Kibrick, Legislative Analyst, VerifiedVoting.org, March 26, 2006.

Punch Cards Out, Paper Trails In By Eric Kelderman, March 27, 2006. Estimate: more than half of counties in the USA will use paper ballots counted by a scanner in fall, 2006.

The Intersect between the Disability Paradign Shift and Activism in the Republican Party by Ollie Cantos.
Arming The Republican Activist in Getting out the Disability Vote: Steps for Educating the Community About the True Republican Record on Disability Issues by Olegario "Ollie" D. Cantos VII, Charter Member, Republican National Committee.

United Spinal Association statement on accessible voting, praises the AutoMark but notes that some voters would require assistance to handle their paper ballot. Note that the comparable assistance voters would need to handle their DRE voter-access-card is not mentioned. Yet this card must be inserted with the correct "orientation" meaning right-side-up and with the right leading edge. Moreover, a blind person would require assistance to find the slot.

Ion Sancho, Florida
Election Whistle Blower Stymied By Vendors, Washington Post, March 26, 2006.
Ion Sancho Icon: The Risks of Integrity By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, March 26, 2006

Florida Attorney General Subpoenas Voting Machine Companies
Press Release, March 29, 2006.
Diebold Subpoena
Election Systems & Software Subpoena
Sequoia Subpoena

New Yorkers for Verified Voting
Should we question optical scanners in light of recent news about grading errors with SAT tests? by NYVV.org.
Is Electionline's 2006 Report Biased toward DREs? by NYVV.org.

New ID System May Block Voters, Los Angeles Times, March 29, 2006

North Carolina
Statement of Andrew G. Silver of the North Carolina Coalition for Verified Voting before the North Carolina house Ethics Committee on March 24, 2006.

Brad Blog, March 22, 2006. "Tarrant County saw some 100,000 votes added incorrectly to the election totals on Hart InterCivic and ES&S voting machines on Election Day....
Court-At-Law Recount Suspended, San Angelo Standard Times, March 21, 2006.
HAVA's "manual audit capacity" requirement has been politically interpreted by vendors, some election officials, the US Dept. of Justice, etc., to allow post-election printing of ballot images. Since post-election printouts are not verified by voters, no one knows if they contain the votes that were cast. In this election, Hart InterCivic DREs produced the wrong number of ballots -- as much as 20% different from the number of voters. With paper ballots marked directly by voters, whether by pen or by an accessible ballot marking device, they wouldn't have to print out the ballot images separately, in the back room, and they wouldn't have to "determine whether or how to retrieve the remaining printouts."
Jefferson County Recounts Votes; Same Winners, Different Numbers, KBTV Channel 4, March 13, 2006. "...election officials noticed a discrepancy during a manual count of precincts randomly selected..."
Vote Spike Blamed On Program Snafu, Fort Worth Star Telegram March 9, 2006

Bet on a Bet Not on a Ballot, Washington Post, March 16, 2006.
Stop the Election Day Cheating - Or it Will Spread Further, Miami Herald, March 15, 2006
Reframing the Election Fraud Debate By David Dill, verifiedvoting.org, March 9, 2006

Testimony of Teresa Hommel before the Ways and Means Committe of the Suffolk County Legislature, March 9, 2006.

Does the EAC Really Care If Voting Machines Are Accessible? By AJ Devies, Handicapped Voters of Volusia County (HAVOC), March 10, 2006. A Conversation With Brian Hancock, Election Assistance Commission's ITA Secretariat.

Maryland House Passes Paper Ballot Bill, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 10, 2006.
Maryland House Approves Paper Ballots, Washington Post, Mar. 10, 2006.
Montgomery County had 41% failure rate with voter access card encoders in a 2002 school election, but in 2004 they only had 30 out of 1200 encorders fail on election day.
Problems with Diebold
Lamone expresses concern

An Appearance of Guilt Ernest Partridge, Co-Editor, The Crisis Papers, March 7, 2006.

Florida: Ion Sancho Fights Back By Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition, March 8, 2006. Ion Sancho, besieged Supervisor of Elections in Leon County, Florida, initiated legal proceedings today against Diebold Election Systems for breach of contract.

Maryland Governor Ehrlich supports a paper ballot and criticises Lamone. Feb. 15, 2006.
Ehrlich letter of March 6
Fiscal and Policy Note, House Bill 244, Election Law-Voting Systems-Voter-Verified Paper Records
Bill text, hb 244

E-vote Pioneer Will Return To Paper Ballots, and the Vote-PAD! March 7, 2006.

Ion Sancho, Florida
Election Official Hammered For Telling The Truth, March 7, 2006, Miami Herald, about Ion Sancho.

Voter Registration Databases
Brennan Center report on statewide voter registration databases. "Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration" is a national survey and policy report on voter registration procedures and new statewide voter registration databases in each state. Because the report is based in part on surveys of state officials, and because states are still working on their databases, the policies of individual states are subject to change.)
The report shows that while some states plan to use the databases to facilitate the registration process, in other states the databases will become a hurdle for voters, with the potential to disenfranchise thousands of eligible new registrants. A few states intend to bar registrants whose application information cannot be matched to information in other state databases. Such a policy not only conflicts with HAVA, but is also likely to disenfranchise more than 20% of eligible new registrants.

ACM Recommends Integrity, Security, Usability in E-Voting, Cites Risks of Computer-based Systems. Sept. 27, 2004.
Statewide Databases of Registered Voters:
Study Of Accuracy, Privacy, Usability, Security, and Reliability Issues
commissioned by the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery. February 2006. Entry in USACM blog

Florida Technical Advisory March 3, 2006.
. . . The Florida Bureau of Voting Systems Certification issued their Advisory after reviewing the State of California's Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board's Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter and Ciber Laboratory's Source Code Review and Functional Testing reports.
. . . The Florida advisory never mentions the Hursti hack, however, which was conducted in Leon County, Florida, even though this hack was the reason for the California report.
. . . Florida's Division of Elections admits that all electronic voting machines are vulnerable to malicious attack, but fails to offer workable solutions. The advisory "applies to all voting systems deployed in Florida," which means Diebold, ES&S and Sequoia. Instead of mitigating the problem by using paper ballots and mandatory audits, they imagine they can prevent stolen elections through security procedures. Meanwhile Florida has no standards for chain-of-custody of paper ballots -- can they keep track of thousands of memory cards? Changing passwords set by vendors can't increase security because the vendors run the elections in many jurisdictions, so they will simply have new passwords.

Gov. Bill Richardson of NM Open Letter to State Officials on paper ballots/optical scanners. He signed his state bill on March 2, 2006.
John Gideon on NM.

Ohio Voting Machine Support Costly Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, March 5, 2006.


=== February 2006 ===

Voter Registration, Identity Theft
Indiana's New Voter Registration System May Crash, WISHTV, Indiana, Feb 27, 2006
The mention of web settings makes it apparent that the counties connect to Indiana's statewide voter registration database via the internet. Not only does this expose the counties' work to corruption, the statewide database is also exposed to data corruption, theft, and denial of service attacks. The counties' computers that contain election management programming could also be at risk.

2-1-06: Voting system examiners blocked from telling what they know?

Why did J. Kenneth Blackwell seek, then hide, his association with super-rich extremists and e-voting magnates? By Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, Online Journal Guest Writers, Mar 14, 2006
Secy of State Blackwell Directive to County Boards: Key card management No matter how often the vendor-issued password is changed, a select group that always includes the vendor will have it. The directive doesn't address memory cards/interpreted code problems, or the fact that the port in back of Diebold machines allows the memory card to be altered without physical access to the card. Security procedures look fine on paper for people who don't know the technology they are regulating. In practice, obscure procedures for obscure reasons are only effective if the people implementing them are already scrupulously honest.
State Tries To Allay Fears On Voting Machine Security The Columbus Dispatch, March 2, 2006

Did 308,000 cancelled Ohio voter registrations put Bush back in the White House? by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, The Free Press, February 28, 2006

Watchdog Group Questions 2004 Fla Vote YahooNews, Feb. 23, 2006. Sequoia machines logged about 100,000 errors, including memory failures. Hard drives crashed, some machines apparently had to be rebooted over and over, and 1,475 re-calibrations were performed on Election Day on more than 4,300 units, Bev Harris said.

America For Sale
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter's new 118-page report shows the connection between Republican corruption scandals, the party's fealty to business lobbyists, and actual poor policy outcomes.

GA verified voting bill

CA: VerifiedVoting.org responds to Diebold conditional certification
Secy of State Bruce McPherson cites security analysis by UC Berkeley computer scientists.
by Robert Kibrick, VerifiedVoting.org Legislative Analyst, and Pamela Smith, Nationwide Coordinator, Feb. 22, 2006.

DRE Reliability: Failure by Design? by Howard Stanislevic, Feb. 22, 2006.

NIST announcment of March 29, 2006 TGDC meeting held on the NIST campus. The meeting will be web cast live and also will be available in archive format.
pre-register on line.
Summary of the October 7, 2005 Threat Analysis Workshop

Maryland Governor Ehrlich supports a paper ballot and criticises Lamone. Feb. 15, 2006.
Ehrlich letter of March 6

Clint Curtis For Congress. Whistle-blower takes on Congressman Feeney whom he says asked him to write software to falsify vote machines.

Votescam, 40-year history of US election fraud.

Open Source Code Bill, introduced in the California State Assembly by Assembly Member Jackie Goldberg, Feb. 17, 2006.
Fact Sheet from the Open Voting Consortium.

USACM study on voter registration databases Feb. 16, 2006. providing technical guidance on implementing HAVA's required statewide voter registration databases: how to provide accuracy, privacy, usability, security, and reliability for these databases.
USACM blog

DOJ letter to Connecticut, Feb. 2, 2006.

Election officials fear '06 season of the glitch, By Jim Drinkard, USA TODAY, 2/5/2006

Security Analysis of Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter, California, Feb. 14, 2006

PA Appeals Court Decision to Require Voters to Approve New Vote Systems, Times Leader, Feb. 15, 2006.

Fact Checking The Opponents of Paper Ballots In New Mexico, By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA, Feb. 12, 2006.

California Holds Hearing on Open Source Software in Election Systems, Government Technology, Feb. 8, 2006.

Are Chicago and Cook County Wasting $25 Million on Inferior, Non-Compliant Voting Technology?, Op Ed News, Feb. 14, 2006.

Counting Mark-Sense Ballots, Relating Technology, the Law and Common Sense
Part of the Voting and Elections web pages by Douglas W. Jones The University of Iowa, Department of Computer Science. Copyright © 2002, minor revisions 2003.

Sequoia, Snohomish County, And The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting Machines , By Paul Lehto, Feb. 11, 2006. Alerting the Sentinels of Democracy - Election Fraud Evidence and Litigation in Washington State.

Testing Election Software Effectively, By John Washburn, VoteTrustUSA Voting Technology Task Force, Feb. 2, 2006.

US Developing Massive Data-Collection System; Could Troll News, Blogs, E-mail, Feb. 9, 2006.

EDS report, Voting systems in use
Voting Systems in Use, 2006 EDS, Election Data Services, Feb. 6, 2006. 69 million voters will use Optical Scan Ballots in 2006.
69 million will use Electronic Equipment.

Carlisle Ohio Plans Revote On Fire and EMS levy, Middletown Journal, Feb. 5, 2006

Letter from Goldberg to Bowen on Open Source Software in CA, Feb. 7, 2006

Testing Election Software Effectively, A Proposal for Effective Testing of Election Software. By John Washburn, VoteTrustUSA Voting Technology Task Force, Feb. 2, 2006.

New Voting Machines A Crazy Idea, Post-Gazette of Pittsburgh, PA. Feb. 1, 2006.


=== January 2006 ===

Voting 2.0, Will Your E-Vote Count? By Cheryl Gerber, Chronogram 01.2006.

Voting System Results Still Out, Questions about the reliability of electronic ballots combine with changing regulations to fuel confusion and debate over technology. Los Angeles Times, January 3, 2006

E-voting Machine Screen. Election Center: The Fox Guarding the Henhouse Updated
by Joyce McCloy, NC Coalition for Verified Voting, January 15, 2006. The Election Center Wants To "Improve" Democracy -- And The Profit Margins Of Their Corporate Sponsors.

Dept of Justice
Politics Alleged In Voting Cases, Washington Post, Jan. 23. 2006.

Black Box Voting
ES&S and Sequoia May Be at Risk for Hursti-Style Hack, BlackBoxVoting.org, Jan. 3. 2006.

Open Source in Wisconsin
Electronic voting machines must be open-sourced, Wisconsin Technology Network, January 4, 2006.

Glenn Newkirk, InfoSENTRY, from North Carolina Voter, Jan. 26, 2006.

Law Journal, HAVA and Asian Voters, January, 2006. (9 MB)

Homeland Security Contracts For Vast New Detention Camps, PacificNews, Jan 31, 2006.

Lynn Landes' Voting Systems Lawsuit Reaches US Supreme Court, Yahoo news, Jan 30, 2006.
Legal papers

Doug Jones' Report on Arizona's Maricopa County Optical Scanners.
Arizona: Computer Scientist Releases Report on Maricopa County Voting Machine Problems by Warren Stewart, Jan. 12, 2006. Dr. Douglas Jones Questions the Quality of State and Federal Oversight of Voting Technology.

Election Theft Emergency By Terrence McNally, AlterNet, January 27, 2006. Mark Crispin Miller talks about how the right stole the 2004 presidential election - and how they'll do it again unless we stop them.

2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey
2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey
87% had "incidents," 64% lost money (shows severity of incident), 44% had intrusions by insiders. Can any Board of Elections beat these odds?
FBI Press Release
FBI: 87% of companies get hacked YahooNews, Jan. 20, 2006.

Election Officials in Arizona Refuse to Answer Senate Questions Or, How I Spent My Afternoon in the Theater of the Absurd. By Michael Shelby, Arizona Citizens for Election Reform, Jan. 19, 2006.

The Harri Hursti Hack and its Importance to our Nation By Susan Pynchon, Florida Coalition for Fair Elections, January 19, 2006. "I was one of ten people present at the 'hack' of the Leon County, Florida voting system, which took place on Tuesday, December 13, 2005 around 4:30 in the afternoon at the county elections warehouse." So begins one of the best stories of the year, and one of the most important.
Replaceabe Media on Optical Scan by Harri Hursti with Eric Lazarus, NIST report. Diebold Response to Leon County Test. Diebold Response to Leon County Test.

Lawsuit Aimed At Electronic Voting in Bucks County PA. Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 18, 2006
Activists Sue To Block Replacement Of Lever Voting Machines, PennLive.com, Jan. 17, 2006.

Diebold claims it has many offices, but they do not exist.

Paper Ballots Back On Track, Free New Mexican, Jan. 12, 2006. The full AP story on Governor Richardson’s announcement and its relationship to the Voter Action lawsuit in New Mexico.
Making Every Vote Count by Bill Richardson, March 2, 2006

EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. . . On December 13, 2005, the U.S Election Assistance Commission (EAC) unanimously adopted the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which significantly increase security requirements for voting systems and expand access, including opportunities to vote privately and independently, for individuals with disabilities.
. . The guidelines will take effect in December 2007 (24 months), at which time voting systems will no longer be tested against the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS) developed by the Federal Election Commission. All previous versions of national standards will become obsolete at that time.

Poll Finds Few Captivated By Washington Lobbyist Scandal, USA Today, Jan. 11, 2006. This is relevant to the idea that democracy requies an informed, engaged citizenry.

New Mexico: Richardson Calls For Paper Ballots Statewide, By Warren Stewart, Director of Legislative Issues and Policy, VoteTrustUSA Jan. 12, 2006. Governor Proposes Legislation Requiring Paper Based System In Every County.

US Dept. of Justice Threatens To Sue New York State over HAVA non-compliance, NY Times, Jan. 12, 2006.
US Dept. of Justice letter of Jan. 10, 2006
Response from the League of Women Voters of New York State and New Yorkers for Verified Voting, Jan. 12, 2006.
Department of Justice Threatens To Sue New York State By Warren Stewart, Director of Legilative Issues and Policy, VoteTrustUSA, Jan. 12, 2006.
BradBlog, Jan. 12, 2006: DoJ Threatens to Sue NY State and Board of Elections for Lack of HAVA Compliance! Even While the Feds Own Inability to Meet HAVA Reqiurements Continues. Additional reporting by John Gideon.

Accessibility For All Voters - Has It Arrived?, By Pokey Anderson, for VoteTrustUSA. January 11, 2006. An Interview with Dottie Neely, Advocate for the Blind

Rep. Bob Ney of Ohio's Connection To Electoral Fraud, Blogged by Brad on 1/10/06. The Dots Connect Between Abramoff, Ohio 2004 Election Smokescreen and Ney's Former Staffer Revealed to be on Diebold's Payroll While Working for White House Law Firm All the While as HAVA -- America's 'Election Reform' Bill -- is Used for Political Payoff in the Bargain...

Senator tied to 'New Times' inquiry is facing criticism Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 5, 2006.
Did Phoenix's New Times Buy A Subpoena? Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 4, 2006.

North Carolina
Per-County Cost Comparison, North Carolina, January 2006. By a Duke Computer Science grad student who is a member of National Committee for Voting Integrity.
Voting Machine Dirt and Then Some, The North Carolina Conservative, January 2, 2006.

Latest Episode Of Elections Circus -- Corporate "Sponsorship" of polling places, Sun Sentinel, Jan. 9, 2006.

Harris Miller, A Diebold Lobbyist, Runs for the U.S. Senate...as a Democrat!, Bradblog, Jan. 8, 2006.

No-Bid EAC Contracts for work on Voting System Standards go to vendors with close ties to EAC, Jan. 9, 2006. EPIC.org.

New EAC chairman, Jan. 4, 2006. Election Assistance Commissioners Paul DeGregorio and Ray Martinez III are now chairman and vice chairman of the EAC for 2006.

Battlefield Florida, A Chat with Lance deHaven-Smith, "Al Gore really did beat George W. Bush in 2000. Six years on, this is still a problem?" from Research In Review, Florida State University, Fall/Winter 2005.

Cheshire MA Rejects Voting Mandate For Machines, Jan. 4, 2006

Symantec and Hart InterCivic, Jan. 2006

=== December 2005 ===

NASED Certified Systems
List as of 12/22/05
List as of 11/18/05
Florida Voting Systems Info
Division of Elections, Florida Dept. of State

North Carolina
Don't Buy From Diebold, The Daily Dispatch, Dec. 17, 2005. By Warrenton County Republican Chair, Mike Wilburt.

Coalescing Evidence of Massive Voter Registration Fraud in Ohio 2004, Democratic Underground, December 30, 2005.

Colorado, Boulder County Draft RFP for voting systems
CAMBER citizen response
CAMBER Open Records Request intended to reveal how the RFP was developed, how public comments will be evaluated and incorporated.
CAMBER comment: The RFP is massive in scope and conflicts with most of the requirements expressed by citizens over the past couple of years. Linda Salas, Boulder County Clerk, allowed only 2 business days for public comment. Community leaders objected strongly to the Clerk and to the County Commissioners. In response to the outpouring of public criticism, the two day comment period has been extended by an additional 4 business days to January 4th. CAMBER recommends that the RFP be replaced by a more prudent proposal, after it has won the people's endorsement.

A Ban On Electronic Voting Machines, Albuquerque Tribune, 12/31/05. Note that the article gives a false impression of the cost of voting technology. It reports without clarification: "Herrera said the touch-screen machines run about $3,500 each. The Automark system - which requires a choice between two approved optical devices - cost about $10,000 for all of its components, Herrera said." The article failed to mention that one touch-screen machine for $3,500 handles a small number of voters per day -- depending on model perhaps as many as 200. Hand-marked paper ballots along with one Automark and one optical scanner for $10,000 handles as many as 2000-3000 voters. Thus, to serve a given number of voters, the purchase cost of paper ballots, Automarks and Optical Scanners is much less than touch-screens. Because fewer programmable devices are required, all transition and continuing costs are also proportionally lower.

State Quiet On Voting Machines Letter to the Editor from Debra Bowen, CA State Senator, Dec. 31 2005.

What’s All the Fuss About Diebold in FL & CA? Dec. 31 2005. Scoop: Opinion by John Washburn.

Hart InterCivic Paper Audit Trail demonstrated in Orange County, CA, 12/7/2005. The system is not listed as federally qualified in the most recent NASED list.

The Worst and Best in Election Reform, 2005 (Because There Was More Bad than Good), Tova Andrea Wang, The Century Foundation, 12/27/2005
It is depressing to see that major organizations still don't understand that evoting machines cannot support democracy because they conceal what needs to be observable by non-technical election observers. All election systems can be corrupted, but evoting systems conceal the evidence and prevent detection. The best approach is to use simple low-tech voting technology so that the largest number of ordinary citizens can participate and observe effectively. We should oppose turning elections over to technical experts whose work cannot be overseen by multi-partisan elections staff and ordinary non-technical election observers.

Monroe County PA Refuses to pay for New Voting Machines, Morning Call, 12/26/05

Ex-Bucks County PA Officials Stump for Voting Machines with Paper Trail, Morning Call, 12/27/05

"Threats to Voting Systems" papers presented to NIST, (National Institute of Standards and Technology). NIST is supposed to advise the EAC, but was de-funded during part of the time they were supposed to be advising.

Polling irregularities -- High-tech voting hasn't served CA well, LA Daily News, 12/27/05

Democracy Strikes Back! As Diebold Goes Down for the Count..., Brad Friedman, 12.29.2005. EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF DIEBOLD EVENTS.

Middletown Press State Supreme Court Rules Re-vote Needed, Middletown Press (Connecticut), 12/22/05.
Defective machine prompts high court to void Middletown election, Hartford Courant, 12/22/05.
Holy selective enforcement and judicial remedy, Batman! Can you imagine the chaos if jurisdictions had to hold a new election every time an electronic voting machine was broken? Note the possible political effects of this decision, or were they the causes of this decision? Read both accounts, and note different the slanting of the reporting.
Dover To Rerun School Election, Patriot News (Pennsylvania), 12/30/05.

County Borrows Voting Machines to comply with legal requirement for voter verified printout, 12/30/05.

Pennsylvania Dept of State Exam Results, Diebold TSx, OpScan, and GEMS Dec. 22, 2005.
Issue 1: "Qualification Testing" versus "qualified"
. . Page 2 states "The Department has received confirmation from Ciber, Inc. and Wyle Laboratories, Inc., federally recognized independent testing authorities (ITAs), that the System's hardware and software have successfully completed qualification tsting...." They then list GEMS 1.18.25 as part of the system. Yet a check of the latest NASED list of qualified voting systems does NOT include one that uses GEMS 1.18.25.
. . Passing "qualification testing" is not the same as being "qualified". The same assurance about "qualification testing" was given to the California Secretary of State in October 2003, yet as late as April 2004 the voting system had still not been "qualified".
. . Pennsylvania should not have certified the AccuVote TSx.
. . Two questions for Pennsylvania:
. . 1. Have the proposed voting systems received a "qualification number"?
. . 2. Has GEMS 1.18.25 itself received a "qualification number"?
Issue 2: VVPAT continuous roll paper
. . The PA Secretary of State refused to certify both the central-count and precinct-count optical scanner systems. These same systems are used in California, especially in counties where the TSx was de-certified for use.
. . Page 5 states that printing the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) on "continuous roll" paper (aka reel-to-reel) canot be certified in PA because it might compromise the secret ballot. On this issue the Secretaries of State of PA and CA, given almost identical Constitutional requirements for a secret ballot, came to opposite conclusions.

Fake voting rights activists and groups linked to White House By Bob Fitrakis, The Free Press, December 30, 2005. Top level Republican operatives with ties to the White House, Senate Majority Leader William Frist and the Republican National Committee (RNC) not only engaged in the suppression of poor and minority voters in the 2004 Ohio presidential election but they spun the election irregularities into a story linking blacks to cocaine and voter fraud. Bush allies in Ohio are now using this myth of voter fraud to pass a repressive "election reform" bill.

Fixing Elections for Fun and Profit Dec. 19, 2005. Information Technologist and recommends paper ballots. "Trustworthy vote counting is not a Republican or a Democratic issue. It's essential to any free country. The sloppy code and ludicrous back doors found in some computerized election equipment should be a wake-up call for all Americans -- and an object lesson to businesses everywhere in how not to outsource programming."

Voters Seek Order Barring Purchase of More Touchscreen Voting Machines in New Mexico.

Voting machine maker leaves N.C., Dec. 23, 2005. Local reporting. Officials fear Diebold's move will hurt efforts to replace machines.
Voting Machine Law Burdens Counties, Dec. 23, 2005. Local reporting. Officials say not enough time, money to buy new equipment. Election officials focus on the law, ignore problems with on the machines.
Diebold pulls out of North Carolina! (Again! And For Now...), Sends Letter to State Announcing Intention to Withdraw in Light of State Law Requirement for Submission of Source Code!
Said to be happy to help state change their law, however!
Blogged by Brad on 12/22/2005.
Diebold withdraws as N.C. voting equipment vendor; only one left The Dispatch, Lexington, N.C., AP State News, 12/22/05.

Diebold loses St. Louis, BradBlog, 12/22/05.

19 States to misss HAVA deadline, Yahoo News, Dec. 21, 2005.

California Activists Call the Cops on Diebold December 25, 2005, by Michael Collins. Movement for legal action against officials who allowed unauthorized software changes to voting machines starts in Northern California. Strong local support.

BlackBoxVoting analyses Diebold double-bind:
. . The FEC 2002 standards prohibit "interpreted code." The Hursti memory card attack, demonstrated in Leon County Florida, manipulated the voting system by passing code through the Diebold INTERPRETER.
. . California has just issued a demand to Diebold to send its system back to federal testing labs for a formal examination of the accubasic code and, specifically, the INTERPRETER.
. . California's move forces Diebold and the federal testing labs into a trap:
. . The Diebold system, both touch-screens and optical scans, cannot be certified in California at this time.
---- If Diebold submits the code for their interpreter to the Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) this will force the ITAs to either recommend code that explicitly violates FEC standards (placing an unsupportable burden of liability on Wyle Laboratories and Ciber)
---- The ITAs will have to remove the federal testing labs' recommendation for all Diebold products using the noncompliant code, effectively stripping Diebold of its federal certification.
. . Diebold is in a difficult position:
---- Diebold can refuse to submit its code to the ITAs, thereby losing the state of California with the resulting domino effect
---- Diebold can submit its code and watch as the federal authorities move to strip it of its authorization to sell its products.
FYI -- NASED 2002 certification is based on FEC guidlines, which say: "Self-modifying, dynamically loaded, or interpreted code is prohibited, except under the security provisions outlined in section 6.4.e."
6.4.e says, "Unauthorized operations include modification of compiled or interpreted code."

Open Letter to North Carolina County Leaders and Officials from Joseph Waymack, Dec. 19, 2005.

Bush picks controversial nominees for FEC Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2005.

Hackers Break Into Computer-Security Firm's Customer Database Washington Post, Dec. 19, 2005.

Virginia Attorney general votes get second look, Statewide hand-count to be finished in 2 days. Recount will be the first of a Virginia statewide election since the 1989 governor's race. Roanoke Times, December 19, 2005.

Alaskan Democrats question vote results LONG GONE ELECTION: Tabulation method, reliability of machines are doubted. Anchorage Daily News, December 20, 2005.

Regional officials vow confidence in vote machines, Lompoc Record, Dec. 23, 2005. Why election officials should not have anything to do with computers -- they are not competent to evaluate them or respond appropriately to reports of trouble.

ES&S Troubles:
California Demands Repairs To Software For ES&S Voting Machines, New York Times, December 25, 2005. Troubles with ES&S in California.
Errors Lead CA Officials To Warn Voting Machine Company, Miami Herald, Dec. 23, 2005.
CA Sec. of State Threatened Decertification for ES&S After Failures in Recent Election!, Letter from SoS to Voting Machine Co. Warns of Numerous Problems Discovered on Touch-Screen, Optical Scan Machines! State Senator Outraged, Comments to BRAD BLOG, Calls for Full Release of Information by State!...And Releases Statement on Related Matters... Blogged by Brad on 12/23/2005.
Errors Lead CA Officials To Warn ES&S, Monterey Herald, December 23, 2005. Troubles with ES&S in California.
Diebold Hack Hints at Wider Flaws with other vendors' products. By Kim Zetter Kim Zetter, Wired News, 2005-12-21.

Diebold's Many Troubles
The Business of Voting, New York Times, December 18, 2005.
Letters to the Editor in response to the above article, New York Times, Dec. 25, 2005.
Class action lawsuit filed against Diebold alleging that Diebold issued false statements about the Company's business, products, financial results and prospects causing the Company's stock to trade at artificially inflated levels. Houston Chronicle, Dec. 19, 2005.
A law firm investigates Diebold ERISA violations, Houston Chronicle, Dec. 20, 2005.
California Sec. of State Refuses to Re-Certify Diebold Voting Machines! (For Now...) SoS: 'Unresolved significant security concerns', 'Source Code Never Ever Reviewed' State 'Punts' Issue Back to Feds for Further Testing, State Senator Objects -- Complete Letter from SoS, Senator Bowen's Full Statement... Blogged by Brad on 12/20/2005.


The North Carolina Association of County Commissioners put ES&S and Diebold's price list on their home page. Diebold

DREs and the MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure), 10% failure rate, Dec. 17, 2005

Two Florida Counties, one using Diebold optical scan machines, and another using Diebold DREs have scrapped Diebold and decided to switch to ES&S optical scan voting machines and the AutoMARK ballot-marking device. ES&S voting machines are independently auditable; its optical scan machines are easier for election officials to use; and they use a more secure operating system.
Leon County, FL to Dump Diebold After Undetectable Hack Reverses Test Election!, Blogged by Brad on 12/14/2005.
Volusia County, FL Dumps Diebold Too! Blogged by Brad on 12/16/2005.
Leon County - New tests fuel doubts about vote machines, Dec. 15, 2005.
Leon County - Elections supervisor: Some Diebold voting machines can be hacked, Dec. 15, 2005.
Leon County - County says electronic voting machines can be hacked Dec. 15, 2005.

David C. Kimball of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, has Papers and Links on Voting Technology and Election Reform.

Warning Bell in Ohio by Tova Andrea Wang, The Century Foundation, 12/6/2005. A federal court in Ohio has just issued a decision that has potentially enormous significance for elections all over the country. In The League of Women Voters et al. v. Blackwell, a federal judge denied a motion to dismiss by the Governor and Secretary of State. Instead, he ruled that if the League and other voting rights organizations can demonstrate there were "systemic breakdowns" in the election system that led to widely disparate levels of voting access throughout the state in 2004 (and for over three decades before that), the state likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

Undated ES&S price list for optical scan equipment, downloaded from http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/hava/docs/ES&SFPCBF_pricing.pdf

Staff Opinions Banned In Voting Rights Cases Criticism of Justice Dept.'s Rights Division Grows. By Dan Eggen, Washington Post Staff Writer, Saturday, December 10, 2005; A03.

Voting Machines Under Scrutiny, States Face a Jan. 1 Deadline to Meet Reliability Standards. Washington Post, December 7, 2005; page A23. By Brian Bergstein, Associated Press.

Election Integrity News from VoteTrustUSA, Dec. 5, 2005.

Uncertainty clouds future of e-vote tests Despite movement toward new standards for machines, change may be years away/ By Ian Hoffman, Staff Writer, Inside Bay Area. Michael Shamos on federally-certified electronic voting systems: "There's stuff in there that's so horrible, I can't understand it." A recent Maryland study of 6 voting systems found that all six voting systems did not record 3-4% of the votes (most elections are decided under that percentage). One of the leading promoters of electronic voting estimates that approximately 10% of voting systems are failing on election day. In the latest California testing it was revealed that as simple an act as accidentally sliding one's finger on the touchscreen could cause the machine to crash (one in five did crash during the test).

Diebold insider alleges company plagued by technical woes, Diebold defends 'sterling' record, by Miriam Raftery, The Raw Story, 12/6/05.

California voting summit shuts out voting reform advocates; Panels appear stacked with electronic voting proponents , by Miriam Raftery, The Raw Story, 12/1/05.

Optical Scanners Fail. 12/4/05. 10 counties in Colorado have either Sequoia or ES&S Optech Eagle III-P precinct based optical scanners. The machines failed in the last election and the state had all ballots hand-counted. Two races ended up with results changes. These machines may now be decertified for use in the state.

Department of Justice Bush Appointees Overrule their Own Voting Rights Act Attorneys to Approve Texas Redistricting Plan. Conyers Calls for Investigation of DOJ Voting Section and Voting Rights Act Preclearance Procedures.

With Nowhere Left to Hide, Diebold Pulls Out of North Carolina Dec. 22, 2005. Following a flurry of litigation that found EFF fighting both alongside and against the state Board of Elections, Diebold on Thursday withdrew from the North Carolina procurement process, ceding the state’s voting machine business to rival ES&S.
North Carolina Illegally Certifies Diebold E-voting System. Board of Elections Ignores Rules to Escrow Code, Identify Programmers. Dec. 2, 2005. Raleigh, North Carolina - The North Carolina Board of Elections certified Diebold Election Systems to sell electronic voting equipment in the state yesterday, despite Diebold's repeated admission that it could not comply with North Carolina's tough election law. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) believes that this raises important questions about the Board of Elections' procedures as well as the integrity of Diebold's bid for certification.
Diedold's Immaculate Conception-Certification.

New Ohio legislation suppresses voters, voter registration, and recounts: "With new legislation, Ohio Republicans plan holiday burial for American Democracy" by Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman, December 6, 2005, Freepress.org. "HB3's most publicized provision will require positive identification before casting a vote. But it also opens voter registration activists to partisan prosecution, exempts electronic voting machines from public scrutiny, quintuples the cost of citizen-requested statewide recounts and makes it illegal to challenge a presidential vote count or, indeed, any federal election result in Ohio. When added to the recently passed HB1, which allows campaign financing to be dominated by the wealthy and by corporations, and along with a Rovian wish list of GOP attacks on the ballot box, democracy in Ohio could be all but over."

Don't give in to state's dawdling for Diebold Daytona Beach News Journal supports defiance of state pressures.

State's eye on vote scanners, Secretary of State Gigi Dennis might seek new machines in 10 counties after hand recounts changed two results last month. 12/04/2005.

Allegations have been made that at least one DRE scrolls more easily or faster forward (down the ticket) than backward (back to the top of the ballot). This makes it time-consuming and difficult to verify the ballot after votes have been entered, and could result in undetected vote switching. This is especially dangerous in a state that allows straight-party voting, like Pennsylvania, where the entire ballot might be altered by the machine logic if the straight-party option has been used.

A growing list of foreign-owned companies count American votes:
Liberty - NEDAP - Netherland owned
Sequoia - Smartmatic - Venezuelan owned
Unisyn Ink-a-Vote - Malaysian owned through International Lottery & Totalizator Inc. (The Ink-a-Vote is used in Los Angeles Co. and marketed by ES&S who recently signed an exclusive agreement with ILTI to manufacture and market a Precinct Ballot Tabulator.)

Mandate on voting machines still riles officials in region, Litchfield County Times, CT., 12/29/05.

Vote Fraud Hurts All West Virginians, Charleston Daily Mail, 12/30/05.

"Kerry's decision not to fight has left millions of Americans wondering if their democratic birthright has been stolen--along with the last two presidential elections."

=== November 2005 ===

California County Voting Systems for Nov. 2005 Special Statewide Election

Certification Test for Diebold, CA document, Nov. 11, 2005. Page 7, item 13 clearly states the .ABO are pesent on memory cards for both the OS (optical scanner) and TS (touch screen). This is only the excutive summary. There is a full report also by Steven V Freeman.
Comment by WheresThePaper.org: The use of computers in elections undermines democracy because it shifts the focus from voting, votes, ballots, and tallies to this technical mumbo jumbo that few election officials or voters understand.

Liberty Election Systems Troubles
The Irish Times reports a suggestion for how to get rid of Ireland's Liberty machines. "Will the Minister find some place, such as Zimbabwe or Florida, which may need the assistance these machines could provide? The machines could be sold as a job lot, and we could at least cut our losses."
Overview of Liberty machines in Ireland (where they are known by the name "Nedap") Ireland canceled the use of Nedap voting machines after an independent commission said the secrecy and accuracy of the voting could not be guaranteed.
One of Liberty's claims to New York election commissioners who know so little about computers that they can barely send an email is that Liberty systems are more secure than their competitors because "they use FIRMWARE, not SOFTWARE" so their systems cannot be corrupted. If firmware could prevent insider tampering and outside hacking, that would be wonderful. Unfortunately, it is not true.
NEDAP in Europe . Click on a country, some have good information. The voting machine being marketed is the Power Vote. (A free translation website http://www.worldlingo.com )

Scrap the "Secret" Ballot - Return to Open Voting. By Lynn Landes, 11/4/05. From the Ukraine to the United States, many voters no longer believe that their votes are counted correctly. And that's regardless of whether paper ballots or voting machines are used. The problem is the "secret" ballot. The entire voting process should be 100% transparent. To that end, I am proposing a protocol for Open Voting with Total Transparency.

BlackBoxVoting documents it: two testing labs certify defective voting machines. The Huntsville, Alabama small offshoot office of Ciber Labs, run by Shawn Southworth, and the Wyle Labs office which has been supervised by Jim Dearman) are responsible for repeatedly certifying defective voting machines that violate Federal Election Commission standards. November 17, 2005.

Rosemarie Myerson's cost survey as of Dec. 1, 2005
Rosemarie Myerson's updated cost survey, 67 Florida counties.
Article on Myersons's report at VoteTrustUSA
Report on Diebold Blended system

Poll Workers in Dover NJ May Be Voted Out Over Irregularities, Nov. 11, 2005.

Ballots Didn't Allow Straight Party Vote, GeorgetownTimes, Nov. 10, 2005.

All of Tuesday's Votes Still Not Counted, Jersey Journal, Nov. 11, 2005. Comedy of errors but the public is assured that the outcomes were not affected.

Minnesota to use ES&S op scan and Automark statewide, ES&S Press Release, Nov. 3, 2005.

Pennsylvania Dept. of State web site carries misinformation from private group against verifiable elections.

2004 Election Day Survey on EAC web site.
Table of Contents
Contains info on how many counties used each type of equipment.
Paper 1,734
Lever 394
Electronic 608
Punch Card 260
Optical Scan 2,541
Multiple Systems 123
Unknown 908
Section 9 on equipment usage

Best Practices Toolkit for election administration, revised, is now available from the EAC. November 30, 2005.

Poll Workers get pancake breakfast after election instead of training before Toledo Blade, 11/18/05.

Black Box Voting Advice -- How To Observe on Election Day November, 2005.

California: Is Los Angeles County Above the Law? November 06, 2005. Officials in the nation's largest county are trying to misinterpret the state's mandatory random audit provision. According to an email from Conny McCormack, Registrar/Recorder of Los Angeles County, she has asserted that “early voted ballots on DREs…are not required to be a part of the 1% manual tally.”

Schwartzenegger Hits Snag At Polling Place LA Times, 11/8/05.

Voters Report Problems With Voting Machines In Roanoke County Virginia WDBJ7, 11/7/05.

Florida Improperly Certified the Diebold TSX By Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition, November 28, 2005.
Florida Fair Elections Coalition's preliminary review of documents obtained in a Freedom of Information Act request to Florida's Division of Elections reveals that the state improperly certified the Diebold "paperless" TSX voting machine and improperly certified Diebold's so-called "blended" system.

Clint Curtis and Congressman Tom Feeney from Florida District 24, the continuing drama. Tom Feeney was incoming Speaker of the House in Florida and lobbyist and corporate attorney for Yang Enterprises in Oviedo, Florida in September/October of 2000 when he asked Clint Curtis to create a prototype vote flipping program that would
a) run on a touchscreen,
b) not require third party intervention, and
c) leave no trace.
Video of Clint Curtis testimony before Congress on December 13, 2004

Diebold machines face crucial test By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER, Inside Bay Area, 11/28/2005. Certain corn scanners, used to record moisture levels in corn, use the same memory cards as Diebold Election Systems' optical scanning machines for ballots and can easily modify them. That makes corn scanners a tool for vote hacking.

Confusion, Misreporting Surround Reports on CA Sec. of State Diebold Voting Machine 'Hack' Test!. Mainstream Media Reports Indicating Scheduled Attempt to 'Hack' Voting Machines Appear to Be Incorrect. State, Activists Still Negotiating Paramaters, Scheduling of Test as State and Federal Deadlines Draw Near.
Blogged by Brad on 11/27/2005, With Additional Reporting by John Gideon.
BlackBoxVoting's report on correspondence with Secy of State
California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson asks Black Box Voting to do a test, but tells the press he's asked Finnish security expert Harri Hursti to do it, before he formally invites Hursti or obtains any agreement from Hursti to do the test;
- He gives Black Box Voting a Nov. 30 deadline, then tells the press he has no idea where the Nov. 30 date came from.
- He asks Black Box Voting to confirm they intend to do the test, they confirm, and then never hear from his office again.
- The participants in the test learn by reading in the newspaper that the test has been delayed (18 hours before it is scheduled to begin).
- In a related matter, while on the radio McPherson's office could not answer the simplest of questions about what transpired at a Nov. 21 Diebold hearing.
Voting-machine report, up on CALIF Secy of State website (Diebold)

Florida Notice of new Polling Place Procedures Manual
Florida Polling Place Procedures Manual

Ohio's Diebold Debacle: New machines call election results into question, by Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman, OpEdNews, November 25, 2005.
Poll Shock, Off by 40 points, newspaper's predictions may be disturbingly accurate. By Robert C. Koehler, Tribune Media Services, November 24, 2005.
Democracy Breakin': Ohio's Electric Boogaloo, Nov. 19, 2005.

Democracy in America Has Officially Become a Privatized Circus, Blogged by Brad on 11/23/2005.

Mitnick: It's a new breed of hackers By Joris Evers, CNET News.com, November 4, 2005

New Mexico: Voting Reform is getting Costly, but Automark is the people's choice. The article says that meeting state and federal requirements would cost between $14 and $34 million, but coyly does not say which systems cost least. Probably that is the paper ballot-opscan-Automark option.

Calling all librarians, library users, and book reviewers: The publishers of Rep. Conyers' Preserving Democracy: What Went Wrong in Ohio can't get it into public libraries because trade journals didn't review it, so the libraries don't 'know about' it. Librarians, please buy it. Library users, please ask for it. Reviewers, please review it.

=== October 2005 ===

Sequoia Voting Systems Should Not Be Certified by the Illinois State Board of Elections, October 16, 2005.

Report on California Public "Volume Test" of 96 Diebold Machines, Oct. 11, 2005.

Evoting Experts Call For Revised Security Guidelines, Oct. 3, 2005. "There used to be no gap between the process of voting and people's understanding of voting," said Deirdre Mulligan, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Law and a member of the ACCURATE team. "Now, the advances of technology have taken a process that was meaningful and transparent and understood by everyone, and turned it into a black box that only a regulator can understand." The ten researchers also said that "current voting systems are not designed with security in mind and current testing procedures mistakenly focus on voting functionality, not system security."

Early Voting and [loss of] Ballot Secrecy

The National Association of Counties wrote a letter to members of Congress on October 20 asking for HAVA deadlines to be extended to give time for counties to comply. A bill had already been introduced on June 30, 2005, HR 3163, "To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to delay for 48 months the deadlines by which States must comply with the election administration requirements of title III of such Act."

Hart Intercivic Scanners fail in Boulder CO Daily Times, Oct. 8, 2005.

Tom Feeney, Alleged Election Rigging Conspirator, Op/Eds Against 'Voter Fraud'.< Blogged by Brad on 10/29/2005.

Elections, Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, Report to Congressional Requesters from the United States Government Accountability Office, September 2005.
Press Release: Davis, Waxman, Sensenbrenner, Conyers, Boehlert, and Gordon React to GAO Report on Security Problems With Electronic Voting Systems.
pdf The GAO report confirms many of the security and usage issues with DREs that activists have been talking about.

Cost Comparison of Florida Counties shows DRE counties spend 40% more annually to run elections than counties using Paper Ballots and Optical Scanners.

Florida Election Reform Conference, Nov. 12-13, in Orlando.

Vote-PAD, Voting-on-Paper Assistive Device.
This is an accessible ballot-marking device that is NOT computerized, a simple non-computerized device that enables voters with manual strength/dexterity disabilities to vote privately and independently using the same paper ballot marked by other voters with a pen or pencil.

NIST conference, Threat Analyses & Papers, Oct 7, 2005

National Summit to Save US Elections - Day 1, Oct. 3, 2005
National Summit to Save US Elections - Days 2-3, Oct. 5, 2005

The Threat to American Democracy Remarks by Al Gore to a conference organized by "We Media" in New York, October 5, 2005.

Not news, but a helpful book. Doing Democracy

=== September 2005 ===

Blind voters don’t see eye to eye with election officials, 9/2005, Greensboro, NC.

America's Next Election Nightmare, by Andrew Gumbel, Sept. 27, 2005.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 act establishes the Election Assistance Commission and some sub-committees. One of these committees is the Technical Guidelines Development Committee which has requested public comments on their Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
CAMBER has submitted our comments to the guidelines. This two volume document is not useable, and will cost the nation much time and money. The document should be totally replaced.

Officials Don't Want To Verify Vote, Ian Hoffman, Inside Bay Area, 9/27/05. Elections officials across California are waging 11th-hour opposition to using paper records for verifying electronic ballots, partly arguing that the printouts -- as well as the electronic voting machines themselves -- are vulnerable to fraudulent programming.
Writing to the governor recently, the California Association of Clerks and Elections Officials suggested that fully computerized, touchscreen voting machines, known as Direct Electronic Recording devices or DREs, should not be checked by recounts.

Software bugs delay voter registration system in Wisconsin. Duluth Superior, Sept. 20, 2005.
Clean up voter list mess Madison.com, Sept. 28, 2005.

New Voting Machines Coming to Hanover County Virgina. Report includes assessment of costs and reasons for selecting paper ballot, optical scanner, and Automark equipment.

"Election officials across the United States are increasingly looking to electronic voting systems as a way to administer elections more efficiently, but skeptics have raised concerns about the security and reliability of these systems. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT ELECTRONIC VOTING, new from the National Academies' National Research Council, offers a set of questions that policy-makers and the public should ask to help ensure that the technologies implemented are secure, reliable, efficient, and easy to use." The report was chaired by DICK THORNBURGH, former governor of Pennsylvania, and RICHARD F. CELESTE, former governor of Ohio, and was released on September 13, 2005.
Contact: Herb Lin, Senior Scientist and Study Director, CSTB, National Academies, 202-334-3191. HLin @ nas.edu
Press release
Full report
Read it one page at a time here

Public Comment on the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Submitted to the US EAC, Sept. 30, 2005 by ACCURATE, A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections.

EAC Advisory 2005-005, why lever machines may not meet HAVA requiremnts, Sept. 8, 2005. No comparable advisory has set forth why DREs do not meet HAVA requirements. This advisory was released less than two weeks after John Gideon's Lever Machines Don’t Have To Be Replaced According to The EAC was published on 8/28/05.
It is clearly a political decision to assert that levers cannot be manually audited, but that the internal "tapes" on a paperless DRE can be manually audited.

9/30/05 -- Black Box Voting (This is a long entry)
You can use the file below for presentations just as is, or for guidelines on developing your own communications. You can quickly flip from page to page. The presentation is in three sections: Why voting is so important, how to evaluate the real risks, and factors in local and national election manipulation.

If you have questions about the information in the presentation, just post your questions here, and we’ll provide one-on-one answers to help you and others (who probably have the same questions):

Note that the Carter-Baker panel shifted the "frame" of elections integrity. They want to "restore voter confidence" -- but they don’t make much effort to repair the flaws themselves. Here is our quick, point-by-point rebuttal to the Carter-Baker Report:
Jimmy Carter and James Baker write their story in the New York Times, Sept. 23, 2005.

We are often asked “what can citizens DO to repair our broken election system?” Black Box Voting is investing in real solutions to help repair our elections process. We are not waiting for new laws to be passed, new voting machines to be invented, or public officials to change their ways.

. . Working with expert Harri Hursti, Black Box Voting is distributing the new “Votascope” program. It’s free. It’s open source. Anyone can use it to find out if their local election is ailing. (This is not a complete solution by any means. Right now, the Votascope program will help with absentee votes and mail-in votes. Recounts are also often done on this kind of machine.)
Here’s how it works:
. . Harri Hursti discovered that some voting machines automatically create a file that you can obtain using the Freedom of Information Act (“Public Records Requests”).
. . This type of voting machine takes photos of each ballot, which it keeps in a file automatically. You can get these ballot photos with public records requests.
. . Of course, elections have a lot of ballots. The July 26 San Diego election, for example, had about 250,000 ballots, about 75,000 of which went through the kind of voting machine that takes and keeps digital photos. The recent school election in Marin County, California was all mail-in, and had about 15,750 ballots go through this kind of voting machine. It would take a long time for you to count all those ballots.
. . The Votascope program counts the ballots for you, using precise “open source” programming.
. . Of course, it will come with instructions. It can do many diagnostics. For example, you will be able to diagnose various election ailments with Votascope.
. . Example: One way to tamper with an election is to set the machine to reject or accept more votes. The Votascope program can catch this manipulation.
. . Votascope can also find machines that are poorly maintained, or show you if a ballot design favored one candidate over another.
. . Votascope will be available for free downloads at Black Box Voting beginning in mid-October, in time for the Nov. 8 elections this year! The photo files it uses to count ballots are ALREADY in voting machines; you can get them on CD or DVD; the laws you need to get them are ALREADY on the books.
. . The first edition of the Votascope program counts Diebold ballot images. Later editions will count images from Hart Intercivic and, if possible, ES&S.
. . With your help, we can soon find out how healthy (or unwell) our elections are. Here is more information on the new Votascope checkup program for voting machines:

. . How did we get into this mess with voting machines? Who made the decision to privatize our elections?
. . The Election Center and R. Doug Lewis are of interest, because this entity and this individual organized elections officials and propagandized the introduction of voting machines in the United States. The Election Center and R. Doug Lewis were involved in consolidating election officials under the National Association of State Elections Directors (NASED) and overseeing the Independent Testing Labs (ITAs) that certified the current crop of tamper-friendly voting systems.
. . We wanted to know who started The Election Center (a private organization) and who hired R. Doug Lewis. In a recent trip to Washington D.C., we obtained copies of microfiche documents that provide this information. Here they are:
. . These documents show the names of all directors in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1997. R. Doug Lewis was appointed director of The Election Center in 1994, so the individuals in 1993 and 1994 would presumably be those people who hired him.
. . R. Doug Lewis's resume does not seem to check out. He claims he was an “assistant to the president in the White House” but he doesn’t say which president. He says he ran the Texas Democratic Party and the Kansas Democratic Party, but we can find no evidence of this and no one with those parties seems to remember him.
. . Because we have not yet been able to confirm who he is or his whereabouts prior to the mid-1980s, we are continuing to examine his background and the role he has played in U.S. elections. We do know that he sold used computers in the late 1980s, before taking over The Election Center, taking over training of election officials, and pushing voting machines into every corner of the U.S.
END 9/30/05 -- Black Box Voting (This is a long entry)

Rebecca Mercuri Comment

Comment by Rebecca Mercuri on VVSG, 9/30/05

New Mexico

Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters,
New Mexico canvass data shows higher undervote rates in minority precincts where pushbutton DREs were used.
Paper ballots tabulated by optical scan systems had nearly identical presidential undervote rates for all ethnicities, but where the Danaher Shouptronic and Sequoia Advantage pushbutton paperless electronic voting machines were used:
-- Hispanic precincts averaged more than 3% higher presidential UV rates than Anglo precincts
-- Native American precincts averaged more than 5.5% higher presidential UV rates than Anglo precincts.

Just as information about the loss of Hispanic and Native American votes in the Nov. 2004 presidential race becomes public, the EAC publishes a Survey that shows that these voters tend to be not interested in voting for president.

But VoterAction.org is discovering evidence that misuse of computerized voting machines accounts for the irregularities.

Diebold Troubles

Diebold Analysts Question Reasons Behind Shake-up, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 25, 2005.
Diebold Insider Speaks!,
Diebold Stock Plummets! Down 15.5% at Today's Close! President/COO Quits! CEO Walden O'Dell Takes Over!.
More Trouble for Diebold, This Time in Georgia..., Blogged by Brad, 9/27/2000.
CERT Cyber Security Bulletin about the back door on Diebold GEMS tabulator that allows for vote count changes:
"A vulnerability exists due to an undocumented backdoor account, which could a local or remote authenticated malicious user modify votes. No workaround or patch available at time of publishing. We are not aware of any exploits for this vulnerability."

Carter-Baker Commission

Carter-Baker Commission Report, Sept. 19, 2005. The 21-member Commission offers 87 recommendations.
another link.

Reaction to the Carter-Baker report:
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, By Warren Stewart, Director of Legislative Issues and Policy, VoterTrustUSA, Sept. 19, 2005. Don't Let Congress Use the Carter-Baker Report to Make Vote Verification Meaningless
John Conyers replies.
Reform Now for the Future, 9/29/05, by Andrew Gumbel, author of Steal This Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in America.
Congressman Rush Holt's reaction
Critique of Carter-Baker Election Reform Report from The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity: Today the Carter-Baker Commission on Election Reform identified five important "pillars" to guide political leaders seeking to fix an electoral system sorely in need of repair. Ultimately, however, the Commission’s report is a "bait-and-switch" for voters seeking real reform because of the Commission’s failure to advance policy changes that will significantly address many of the voting irregularities experienced in the 2004 election.
What Baker-Carter Got Right, Rob Richie and Steven Hill, September 27, 2005.
Carter-Baker Dissent. This new web site came into being because the C-B commission chose not to allow discussion of dissenting views within the report itself. Tom Daschle and Spencer Overton dissented to the Voter ID recommendations. Mr. Overton put up this site.
Democrats.com suggests using Social Security numbers as voter ID.


Playing Games With Voting Rights NY Times Editorial, Sept. 14, 2005. Ex-felons voting rights in Pennsylvania.

Running on the Right to Vote By William Rivers Pitt truthout.org, Sept. 22, 2005.

Certification of voting systems is now handled through the EAC. List as of 9/2/05 Vendors are expected to rush now to get their products qualified to the 2002 standards before January 1, 2006. After that date those same systems will no longer be able to meet the 2002 standards because at that time HAVA requires that all systems meet Section 2.2.7 accessibility standards. There may be a lot of 'grandfathering' of systems that are already qualified. The EAC should make a new category of "2002 Qualified but Not HAVA Compliant".

ITA Approved Systems 1-03 to 11-03
Updated List of ITA Approved Systems from 12-03 to 7-05. Note that on this list (which is not up-to-date at this time), it shows voting systems. According to the ITA Secretariat, Brian Hancock, and a note at the bottom of the first of the links (above) the ITAs only certify systems and not parts of systems.

Censored!, by Camille T. Taiara, Sept. 7-13, 2005, San Francisco Bay Guardian.

Election Assessment Hearing, June 29, 2005 Preliminary Report of Findings: Voice of Election Customer Summaries. Sept. 22, 2005. http://www.electionassessment.org

Boulder County Election Plan Fundamentally Flawed Sept. 21, 2005, by Al Kolwicz, CAMBER.

VoteFiler Sept. 29, 2005.

How to collect data to monitor elections from Kathy Dopp, USCountsVotes.org, 9/28/05.

=== August 2005 ===

Money from Vendors to Election Center
Remaking the Rules, Private voting-equipment companies play part in reforming county elections. Real Change News, August 17, 2005

What experts are telling judges about technology?
Experts compile tech guidelines for judges, San Luis Obispo, 8/3/05.

Can HAVA money be spent on non-compliant equipment?
Washington Secretary of State certifies equipment that is not HAVA compliant, 8/3/05.

Lever Machines Don’t Have To Be Replaced According to The EAC, By John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, August 28, 2005.

EAC Testimony on Voting System Standards by John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA.org, August 21, 2005.

Diebold machines fail mock election test in CA, State says Diebold failures in massive mock election could translate to problems at polls. By Ian Hoffman, Inside Bay Area, July 29, 2005. "There was a failure rate of about 10 percent, and that's not good enough..." E-voting Machines Rejected After State Tests By John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA.org August 3, 2005. On July 29, 2005 newspapers in California were reporting that the Diebold TSx voting machines had failed in a mock election test. The papers reported a 10% failure rate on a voting system that had just been federally qualified only 2 months previously.

Diebold AccuVote TSx with AccuView Printer by John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, August 26, 2005.

How can w Ensure Accurate Election Results via Independent Audits & Election Data Monitoring?
Look up your own county election official's mailing address here:

Don't Prettify Our History By Paul Krugman, New York Times August 22, 2005.

All I Did Was Say They Can't Run a Fair Election by Andrew Gumbel, August 30, 2005, The Independent (UK): 'He caters to a British sensibility that sees us as an errant colony run by a gang of thugs'

Manual Audit Requirements Introduction, Aug. 20, 2005.
Manual Audit Requirements in various state laws where voter-verified paper records are used.
Sample VVPB and Audit Legislation.

Former Unisys official will be head of both Sequoia and Smartmatic, Aug. 26, 2005.

NASED list of certified voting systems

PR Week (subscription required), August 25, 2005: "Diebold Election Systems (DES) has hired Ogilvy PR to burnish the company's image and the benefits of electronic voting in California," reports PR Week. The state decertified one of DES' e-voting machines last year, and now the company wants to ensure that their "story is told" and that voters "understand the technology," said Ogilvy's Michael Law, who heads DES' California work. Ogilvy is researching public perceptions of DES and developing messages "about the ease of electronic voting, particularly for voters who do not speak English, as well as for handicapped voters." O'Dwyer's reports that DES' California PR is part of a national campaign headed by former Democratic National Committee chair Joe Andrew. Andrew has been praised for his "grassroots organizing" and "golden rolodex" of CEOs and labor leaders. Other PR firms DES has employed include Public Strategies and Compliance Research Group.
info about Joe Andrew
Joe Andrew, member of New Democratic Network's Advisory Board
Email or call Mr.Andrews and ask him not to work for Diebold,
a company that needs to put its effort into making better equipment and making its paper trail work, rather than a PR campaign.
Phone calls are most effective, & remember to be polite but firm.
Washington DC Office
Phone: 202/408-5210
Also, contact the NDN and ask them why one of their most
prominent advisors is working for Diebold.
e-mail at info@ndnpac.org or call at (202) 544-9200.
Diebold hires top Dem for PR blitz, Former party chairman make the case for voting to California, Ian Hoffman, 8/20/05.

The Election Center: The Fox Guarding the Hen House By Joyce McCloy, Coordinator, N.C. Coalition for Verifiable Voting August 26, 2005.

What to observe in pre-election testing
Testing Voting Systems Also, find out about communications capability including wireless connectivity. A test script that runs electronically will be set up in advance to work correctly, so have actual persons cast actual ballots and test each possible ballot position and combination.

Threats to Voting Systems. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will host a workshop to allow the U.S. election community to participate in developing an analysis of threats to voting systems, October 7, 2005, in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The goal of the workshop is to solicit and gather threat analysis material and to gather critical analysis of the collected threats, the plausibility of various scenarios, assumptions made, and what lessons can be learned as a result of the analysis. Participants in the workshop are encouraged to submit a position paper to the conference by September 30, 2005.

Lawsuit in Tennsessee claims that paperless ballots violate the Tennessee Constitution.

HAVA and the Rush to Poor Judgment by Vicky Karp.

National Summit To Save Our Elections, conference in Portland, Oregon, Sept. 30 thru Oct. 2.

Steal This Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in America (Paperback) by Andrew Gumbel. In a riveting and frightening account, Gumbel, U.S. correspondent for Britain's Independent, traces election fraud in America from the 18th century to the present, spotlighting the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, vote buying in the Gilded Age and the history of black disenfranchisement in the post-Reconstruction South. The last 100 pages are devoted to the elections of 2000 and 2004. Gumbel rehearses the Florida mess and argues that those who care about voting rights should be terrified by Justice Scalia's argument in Bush v. Gore that the Constitution doesn't per se guarantee a right of suffrage. Gumbel shows that the confusion (at best) and cheating (at worst) that went on in Florida are not unusual, describing numerous county and state elections plagued with problems: registered voters purged from the rolls; queues at polling places so long that would-be voters gave up; and confusing ballots.

Citizens Request Recount in San Diego Mayoral Race, alleging fraud by Diebold vote-tabulating equipment. By Miriam Raftery, rawstory.com. Aug. 18, 2005.

Comparison of Testing Costs, PBOS versus DRE by John Washburn, Aug. 17, 2005.

Why no Internet Connection by John Washburn.

How to Count Thousands of Paper Ballots by Hand by John Washburn. Regarding cheating with the weighing scales, it is possible that someone would stick a heavy piece of metal into the stack of paper ballots before they are weighed. That's the same problem as the guy with a piece of lead under his fingernail who makes stray marks on the ballots for his party's opponent. My question is, why don't people used due diligence to detect and prevent it? Why aren't the ballot-handler's hands checked before they start work? Why doesn't someone look through the ballots to find any sheet of metal? It is a political decision to "not look." There's no technology that can't be tampered with. There are technologies that are easy to protect (paper) and others that are impossible to protect (computers).

Venezuela - Electoral Musings: How about those null votes!.

Media, Politics, and Apathy: The Specter of Voter Fraud by Steven Carbo, Director of Demo's Democracry Program.

Exactly What You Don't Want: Your Elections on Diebold's Server, Consumer Report from BlackBoxVoting.org, Aug. 8, 2005.

Utah's Lt. Gov. Gary Herbert misinforms his counties.

Kathy Dopp's report on NASED's summer conference, Aug 12-14, in Beverly Hills, CA.

Kimble: 'Mother of security holes' in state voting system August 11, 2005. This article is about optical scanners in Arizona. The most amazing thing is that comparable articles about the possibility of computer fraud with DREs rarely get into the mainstream press -- yet VotersUnite.org has published 120 pages of documented failures of such systems. The big difference between OpScan and DREs is that we have a real paper ballot for recounting with OpScan. With DREs the voters never see their own legal ballot which exists only in the electrons of the computer's internal circuits. If people wanted election integrity, they would push for paper ballots and hand counts. That would require citizen involvement, but the direction of elections these days is to "professionalize" them and shut citizens out of traditional roles as workers and observers.

The National Science Foundation announced will spend $7.5 million over five years for a new project called A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections (ACCURATE). Accurate will be based at Johns Hopkins University, and its director will be Aviel D. Rubin, a professor of computer science at Hopkins who in 2003 revealed security flaws in voting systems made by Diebold Election Systems.
NSF announcement.
NSF awards related to voting.
The problem with a project like this is that when you get a bunch of computer scientists together to deal with voting, they will of course come up with a computerized solution. Perhaps the funding will actually require that. But no computerized voting allows the non-technical citizen voter to see their own ballot and mark it directly, and no computerized voting allows the non-technical citizen observer to observe the storage, handling, and counting of votes. It shuts citizens out, and forces a "trust" election, which means the election lacks legitimacy regardless of whether or not computerized fraud occurs.
David Dill of VerifiedVoting.org: "ACCURATE is an multi-institution, interdisciplinary, academic research project on trustworthy computing. The research will focus on voting as a example of an application where trust is a critical issue (we expect that the results will be more widely applicable). It does not replace any existing organization; our goal is to help fill an existing gap by discovering new technology and new knowledge about trust and computing technology, including perspectives from computer science, psychology, and law. The grant can only be used for academic research, and most of it will go to student support." The whole article is at http://verify.stanford.edu/dill/accurate-essay.html

Sharona Merel's overview -- the place of evoting in the big picture.

Ohio election chief can't certify how federal money was spent By Wayne Madsen, Online Journal Contributing Writer, Aug. 19,2005

Accupoll Operations Could Trouble Voters, By Christopher Carey of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 08/13/2005.

The Gorilla in the Room Must Be Dealt With, Lack of Election Reform Threatens to Make All Progress Irrelevant, by Anthony Wade, www.opednews.com, August 6, 2005.

Bad guys web site.

Diebold hires top Dem for PR blitz, Former party chairman make the case for voting to California, 08/20/2005, By Ian Hoffman, Staff Writer, Inside Bay Area.
Mr. Andrew's bio.

What They Did Last Fall By Paul Krugman, The New York Times Opinion, August 19, 2005.

From Black Box to Pandora's Box, speech by Joan Krawitz, VoteTrustUSA, August 8, 2005, delivered at the Voting Rights and Electoral Reform Strategy Session in Atlanta, GA.

Jesse Jackson and the Keep the Vote Alive March and Rally in Atlanta, August 6.

A Firewall for Democracy by Andrew Gumbell, Aug 4, 2005, Los Angeles Times.

Utah counties risk losing their federal HAVA funds if they purchase voting systems that do not meet federal standards for HAVA funding.

Letter to Jurisdictions with Paper Ballot Systems -- Keep them!

Is the Federal Process for Qualifying Voting Systems Broken? by John Gideon, Information Manager, www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org, August 17, 2005.

Phony GOP 'Voting Rights' Group Delivers Onslaught of Disinfo Today! BradBlog, 8/2/05.
Indicted GOP Moneyman Tied To ACVR, Phony GOP 'Voting Rights' Group!. The DNC Finally Fights Back at the Republican Run 'American Center for Voting Rights' Hoax!

Election Fraud Continues in the US , New Data Shows Widespread Vote Manipulations in 2004, By Peter Phillips, August 13, 2005, CommonDreams.org.

Project Censored The news that didn't make the News, website about the November, 2004 election.

Cashing In On Chaos? By Warren Stewart and Ellen Theisen, VoteTrustUSA, August 7, 2005.

=== July 2005 ===

The Black Box Report by Harri Hursti.
Security Alert: July 4, 2005, Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design

Diebold Machines Fail Mock Election in CA, see more about this event in August section above.

How Can We Ensure the Accuracy of Vote Counts?, July 4, 2005, by Kathy Dopp, Utah Count Votes.

Audio links to Thom Hartmann and Paul Lehto's presentation in Portland, July 16, on "The Corporate Takeover of America's Elections."
Thom Hartmann...about 33 minutes
Paul Lehto....about 32 minutes

General Assembly of North Carolina, Legislative Fiscal Note, voting equipment replacement, cost comparison of optical scan, DRE, and mixed optical scan and DRE.
Session Law 2005-323, Senate Bill 223 General Assembly of North Carolina, Session 2005

Ohio Voters File Historic Lawsuit Against State Charging Unconstitutional Administration of Elections, July 28, 2005.

EAC Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists

Which Voting Machines Are More Accessible? by Heleni Thayre, July 19, 2005.

Century Foundation report notes flaws with evoting, offers excellent guidance to state election officials on what to watch out for, but can't bring themselves to recommend VVPB. discussionby AScribe, The Public Interest Newswire.

Jim March of BBV gets arrested trying to observe vote count and explains his action

None dare call it stolen summarized by Mary Anne Saucier. None Dare Call It Stolen, HARPERS, August 7, 2005, By Mark Crispin Miller.

Dramatic new charges deepen link between Ohio's "Coingate," Voinovich mob connections, and the theft of the 2004 election by Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman, The Free Press, July 29, 2005.

PA Voting System Examination Schedule and Certification Status Information, and other Pennsylvania certification woes include the fact that if vendors have to submit equipment to be certified, they can prevent use of paper ballots, optical scanners, and Automark ballot-marking machines by simply not submitting them for certification.

The audit of voter-verified records in Nevada, 2004.

The New EAC Advisory and What It Means by John Gideon of www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org, July 21, 2005.
EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system is compliant with Section 301(a), a gap analysis between 2002 Voting System Standards and the requirements of HAVA Section 301(a).
(5) Accessibility of the voting system to the voter includes accessibility to all equipment needed to cast and count ballots. Many jurisdictions use a paper ballot voting system that requires the voter to submit his or her own ballot after casting for purposes of ballot counting. Where such voting systems are in use, such jurisdictions must to the extent reasonably and technologically possible afford a disabled voter the same ability to submit his or her own ballot, in a private and independent manner, as is afforded a non-disabled voter. In this example, visually disabled voters must be allowed to submit the ballot independently, as the disability is one that is capable of being accommodated, and technology and practice provide a means that can be used to allow the visually disabled voter to submit a ballot with the same degree of privacy and independence afforded to a sighted voter (e.g., a privacy sleeve).
This analysis clearly allows use of optical-scan voting systems and describes how a system such as the AutoMARK can be made to be accessible, (e.g. a privacy sleeve). This does not say that paper ballot voting systems cannot be used.
(7) Section 301(a)(3)(B) contemplates that an accessible voting system can include a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities. This advisory should not be read to preclude the innovation and use of accessible voting systems other than DREs for purposes of meeting this requirement.

The following line is quoted from page 141, Section E-5, of the 1990 FEC Voting System Standards:
"Voter confirmation does not, however, guarantee that the voter choices are correctly recorded and updated in memory registers."
The FEC 2002 or 2005 Voting System Standards appear to have dropped this bit of reality, but in fact what they knew then is still true today!
--submitted by Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition

On March 17, 2003, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to Alabama Secretary of State Nancy Worley stating:
"The Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") set up under HAVA will eventually issue voluntary voting guidelines and guidance as to what constitutes an accessible voting system. Until that guidance is adopted, the voluntary guidance of the Federal Election Commission on Voting System Standards can be used to determine the accessibility of voting machines. (These can be found at www.fec.gov/pages/vss/vss.html at section 2.2.7 of the Voluntary System Standards)."
The letter can be found at http://web.archive.org/web/20030423214900/http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/states_ltr.htm
Section 2.2.7 is now at http://www.eac.gov/election_resources/v1/v1s2.doc see page 2-12.
Section states:
DRE voting systems shall provide, as part of their configuration, the capability to provide access to voters with a broad range of disabilities. This capability shall:
e. For electronic image displays, permit the voter to:
1) Adjust the contrast settings;
2) Adjust color settings, when color is used; and
3) Adjust the size of the text so that the height of capital letters varies over a range of 3 to 6.3 millimeters;

The currently qualified Diebold TSx does not permit the voter to adjust the contrast setting, nor does it allow the voter to adjust the size of the text. It may not have the feature of adjusting the color setting.
Therefore, according to the opinion of the DoJ, it isn't accessible.

Accessible Voting Systems Vendor Fair Survey Results. Evaluation took place on April 4, 2005, and the survey was conducted by the Oregon Secretary of State.

The Case Against Diebold and Florida's Division of Elections A Report by Florida Fair Elections Coalition (In Support of Volusia County Council's Decision to Reject the Diebold "Blended" Voting System) July 9, 2005.

Is there any way to end the love affair with DREs?
Most don't have more than 2 or 3 of the 11 disabled accessibility features shown at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6028
They aren't cost effective: (scroll half way down page) http://www.ncvoter.net/affordable.html
They have a higher undervote rate than optical scanners: North Carolina Study indicating that optical scan machines have the most consistent and lowest undervote rates of the various technologies used this past election. 2004 report http://www.cs.duke.edu/~justin/voting/totals.html
DREs in New Mexico dropped votes 5 times as often as optical scanners did: Nov 2004 http://www.votersunite.org/info/newmexicophantomvotes.asp
Florida study indicating that DREs had 8 times as many undervotes as optical scanners: July 2004. http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=26
Just how effective and "worth it" is a voter-verified paper ballot, especially if it's only used by a small number of voters? Very effective: http://www.cs.duke.edu/~justin/voting/paper_effectiveness.html
DREs add, subtract, and even lose votes: http://www.ncvoter.net/news.html

Is this funny? Not really, it is another demonstration of how electronic election fraud can be accomplished.
Don't like what you see?
Votes not cast for the right candidate?
No problem, just log on, then "White Out the Vote" with this handy dandy Online Digital Ballot editor - works well with any sort of digital ballot image.
This gadget will be the wave of the future.
Think of the possibilities when used in conjunction with votes recorded by "alternative vote verification systems".

Voting Machine Accuracy vs. Verifiability by John Gideon, July 5, 2005. Insight into the Opinion of Those Who Write the Voting System Standards

Problems with Optical Scan equipment in Yakima County, WA.

Sherole Eaton of Hocking County, Ohio, battles for her job after attempts to fire her due to her whistleblowing in the Triad Affair.
Hocking County, OH Barred from Replacing Recount Whistleblower Sherole Eaton
Fired Ohio Election Board staffer defiant over "retribution" May 25, 2005.
Was Hocking County Board of Elections member illegally appointed? May 25, 2005.
Ohio Recount Stirs Trouble by Kim Zetter, Wired News, Dec. 20, 2004.

Open Letter to John Tanner, Chief, Voting Section, U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Section in response to his June 29, 2005 letter to Nick A. Soulas, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Civil Division, Franklin County. By Bob Fitrakis.

Ask your county election director a question -- will they be attending the Election Center's Annual National Conference? Election Center pictures.

How Can We Ensure the Accuracy of Vote Counts?, a working paper by Kathy Dopp of UScountsvotes.net, July 4, 2005. Although the paper is specific to Utah, any state that has or is contemplating purchas of Diebold or Sequoia touch-screen voting machines can make use of this paper's outline and some of its content. Appropriate for city and county attorneys, city councils, county councils or commissioners and election officials, and press.
Press Release - Comprehensive Report on Voting Equipment Selection.

=== June 2005 ===

DNC Report:
Democracy at Risk: The 2004 Election in Ohio.
Report from the Voting Rights Institute of the Democratic Party. June 22, 2005.
Section XII, Recommendations for Future Action, page 3 paragraph 11:
11. Jurisdictions should be encouraged to use precinct-tabulated optical scan systems with a computer assisted device at each precinct, in preference to touchscreen ("direct recording equipment" or "DRE") machines.
[The computer assisted device would be the Vote-PAD, Automark, or other accessible ballot-marking device that enables voters with disabilities or minority languages to mark their paper ballot privately and independently.]
The BradBlog comments on this report.

Democracy Values, a one-page flyer.

Senate Rules Committee Testimony of David Dill, By David Dill, Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University, and Founder of the Verified Voting Foundation and VerifiedVoting.org, Before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, June 21, 2005, Hearing on Voter Verification in the Federal Election Process.
Transcripts and audio of the hearing testimony and Q&A.

Voting system costs from VerifiedVoting.org.

Democracy At Risk: The 2004 Election in Ohio

Letter from Linda Lamone, President of NASED, to the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, April 17, 2005.

Jim Dickson touts 6 vendors

Activists greet Tennessee election officials and begin a dialog.

Guess Who's Going to Hollywood? (Your election commissioners? By John Gideon, VotersUnite! and VoteTrustUSA, June 18, 2005.

Corporate Control of the Election Process By John Gideon, June 15, 2005.

Cost analysis by Mike Fischer of Yale.

What percentage of "surprise random audits" would be effective in finding problems? Demo by Ellen Theisen of VotersUnite.org.

Is HAVA Being Abused? Part 1, June 1, 2005
Is HAVA Being Abused? Part 2, June 2, 2005
By John Gideon and Ellen Theisen of VotersUnite.org
NASED is bending its own policies to quickly certify vendors via the 1990 standards rather than the 2002 standards. This allows vendors to say they are certified in time to get sales before the HAVA deadlines.

Bob Fitrakis. The political scientist and newspaper editor on how, in plain view, the Ohio presidential election was rigged, By DEAN KUIPERS. 06-16-05.

Victory in Volusia County, Florida, June 6, 2005.

Optical scan machines hacked in Florida, article by the BlackBoxVoting.org Team, June 3, 2005.

Preliminary Analysis of E-voting Problems Highlights Need for Heightened Standards and Testing, NRC Whitepaper by Deirdre Mulligan and Joseph Lorenzo Hall. Undated, before or during June, 2005.

=== May 2005 ===

My Right-Wing Degree, by Jeff Horwitz, Salon, May 24, 2005.
Put Horwitz's article together with "Vote Centers" and you have an preview of the future.

Unilect decertification in Pennsylvania, source documents that are revealing about the certification process.
Video that got Unilect Decertified in Pennsylvania.
Shamos said in his decert report that he did NOT recommend certifying it the first time! Apparently PA hired Glen Newkirk of Infosentry out of Raleigh NC to pass it.

5-27-05: Optical scan system hacked, Bev Harris reports.
Special Report: Black Box Voting Attempts to Penetrate The Leon County Florida Optical Scan Voting System.
Diebold's removable vote-storage memory cards, contain executables that get called directly by the voting application program. These executables are not encrypted, not validated before being called, and not subject to program length or checksum validation. The executable can alter vote totals and produce perfect "zero" tapes and total sums, can shift an arbitrary number of votes from one candidate to another without any diagnostics detecting the switch, and pass logic and accuracy tests. All these memory cards are supposed to do is hold vote information. Instead, their memory storage format allows code execution. This is improper in voting equipment. All executables should be stored in a single secure location and each executable should protect its data by preventing it from being modified by other executables. In other words, the documented, certified code inside the Opscan firmware is "calling" any available code on the memory card, whatever it may be. This is a deliberate back door, not a security error.
Diebold Optical Scan Voting System Hacked (3 Ways), Scoop, May 31, 2005.

Does ES&S Really Want To Sell Automark Machines?.

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Version 1, Initial Report, May 9, 2005.
Another copy.

How to file a FOIL request.

Attack on Ohio election board whistleblower and leaked Blackwell threats re-fire Ohio's election theft scandal by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman, The Free Press, May 23, 2005.

Thomas R. Wilkey selected as new executive director of Election Assistance Commission, May 20, 2005.

Internal memos from state elections directors, secretaries of state, legal counsel and others, spanning 2001 - 2004. Bev Harris filed FOIA requests, and has posted documents received.

5 New Consumer Reports from Black Box Voting: who owns voting machine companies; who is paying whom; more on powerline communications and voting systems.

misc info from Trusted Logic Voting (TLV) - resource site for using OASIS EML voting specifications to create trusted open public election system solutions. Comments and analysis of electronic voting systems, devices and methods.

Voter Registration Databases:
Steve Carbo of Demos says that "well-designed computerized, statewide voter registries are our best hope for accurate voter rolls that will allow eligible voters to cast a ballot that will be counted." The California Election Protection Network takes a deeper look and foresees potential trouble: "the government has no authority to contract with any Private entity to control data that could impact the public's right to a free and fair election" or "to permit the ... consolidation of personal data in the hands of one private entity, especially ChoicePoint."
Is the notion of computer security a fantasy?
June 20, 2005, Progress Report: PRIVACY -- MASTERCARD BREACH RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT NEED FOR GREATER PROTECTIONS: Coming on the heels of major identity theft scandals (http://www.americanprogressaction.org/site/pp.asp?c=klLWJcP7H&b=730617#3) involving Choicepoint, Lexis-Nexis, and even the Department of Justice's travel agency, MasterCard International (http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2005-06-19-breach-usat_x.htm?csp=34) announced 40 million card holders of all brands might be exposed to fraud due to a security breach. The breach involves 13.9 million MasterCard accounts, 22 million for Visa USA and an unspecified number for American Express and Discover. With security breaches becoming more prevalent, there is also a greater concern that the federal government could be next. Personal information in the hands of strangers is disconcerting enough, but secret intelligence stolen by our enemies would be even more dangerous. The Center for American Progress has recommended a number of measures (http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=651807) that could be taken immediately to secure personal information assembled by government contractors.

Cheney's Betrayal -- Forgotten in the filibuster debate: the vice president's unconstitutional decision not to follow Senate rules. By Bruce Ackerman, Web Exclusive: 05.23.05.

The Biggest Story of Our Lives 05.10.2005, by Jim Lampley.

Citizens in the rain, Maybe we can't have election reform without media reform, By ROBERT C. KOEHLER, Tribune Media Services.

Our Kids Are Not Doomed, Stephanie Coontz, Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2005.

The Institute on Money in State Politics has a new study, Money and Diversity in State Legislatures

Daily KOS, The lie that won't die, May 11, 2005.

"I'm here to stop the count" Never Shy, Bolton Brings a Zeal to the Table, By Scott Shane, New York Times, May 1, 2005.

=== April 2005 ===

Lawsuit for counting votes in secret
Lehto and Wells v. Sequoia and Snohomish County, Washington, filed April 7, 2005

Nashville Conference Audio Tapes, from the Nashville Conference, April 8-10, 2005.

The silent scream of numbers, The 2004 election was stolen - will someone please tell the media? By ROBERT C. KOEHLER, Tribune Media Services, 14 Apr 2005.

Silence of the Scams, by Diane Perlman, Newtopia Magazine, April 11, 2005

Questions surface regarding legitimacy of Baker-Carter election reform commission By Larisa Alexandrovna, RAW STORY Staff, Apr. 14, 2005

Carter Gets It -- But Will His Electoral Commission?

How Blackwell and Petro Saved Bush's Brain: And the rise of the right wing juggernaut in Ohio by Bob Fitrakis, Free Press, April 27, 2005.

Failing the [International] Electoral Standards The Nation, by Andrew Gumbel, April 25, 2005.

Analysis of the Nov. 2, 2004 election

Ballot cover invention may help the blind vote. Inventive election workers develop secrecy sleeve now used for the Automark.

Paper Makes a Comeback as Electronic Elections Spur Opposition April 8 (Bloomberg) -- Meet the next big thing in paperless voting: paper.

The California Voter Foundation's new report on voter participation barriers and incentives.

Twisted news from the Wall Street Journal: The Secretaries Revolt First Congress passes HAVA and requires the states to augment or replace easily-observed and verifiable voting equipment with electronic equipment to achieve "accessibility," and creates the EAC to administer the money and provide "assistance." Then, Congress refuses to fund the EAC, and the EAC is appointed nearly a year after HAVA requires. Then John Fund asks, "Can we trust our elections to a body that cannot follow clear federal law and its own rules of procedure?" He's referring to the EAC, not Congress or the Executive Branch! Then he blames Hillary (in advance, for partisan bias should she become president).

=== March 2005 ===

Why Johnny Can't Vote, By Barbara Simons. APS News online, March 2005.

Analysis of the 2004 Presidential Election Exit Poll Discrepancies by the US CountVotes! National Election Data Archive Project March 31, 2005. Executive Summary.

Electionline analysis of the use of provisional ballots in 2004.

Teresa Heinz Kerry - Hacking the "Mother Machine"? by Thom Hartmann, March 10, 2005, CommonDreams.org

New 'Non-Partisan' 'Voting Rights' Org Appears Little More than Republican Front Group! 6-Day Old Tax-Exempt Group Run by High Level GOP Operatives! Blogged by Brad on 3/22/2005. High-Level Republicans from the New 'Non-Partisan' 'American Center for Voting Rights' Explain Themselves... Um...Sort of. Blogged by Brad on 3/23/2005.

A Design for a Genuinely Verifiable Evoting System By Richard C. Hawkins, 3/17/05.

We don't get angry enough By Frank Pitz, Online Journal Contributing Writer, 3/11/05.

=== 2004 ===

Lessons Learned, Maryland
Lessons Learned, Montgomery County, Maryland, 2004 Lessons Learned Report
When the right to vote goes wrong: Maryland Citizens Tell the Story of Election Day 2004. On Tuesday, November 23, 2004 TrueVoteMD released a report and presented findings from nearly 600 pollwatchers who toiled long hours on Election Day documenting hundreds of incidents disenfranchising possibly thousands of voters ranging from denials of provisional ballots to numerous kinds of voting machine failures.