

**2004 Presidential General Election Review
Lessons Learned**

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2004 Presidential General Election Review

Lessons Learned

I. VOTER REGISTRATION - ABSENTEE VOTING

Successes:

1. Collaboration among voter registration/absentee sections to complete large scale time-sensitive tasks.
2. Retained key long-term temporary staff delegated as team leaders who monitored quality control of large influx of temporary staff with varying skills.
3. Nursing home absentee services delivered by temporary employees given mandatory training; excellent results. Good Public Relations from National Public Radio.
4. Provisional voting for Election Judges who missed absentee voting deadline.
5. Streamlined voter registration/absentee procedures for timely processing of in person absentee voters.
6. Trained Operations and Security personnel accepted Voter Registration Applications and improved traffic flow at BOE on last day of Voter Registration.

Challenges/Alternatives:

1. BOE facilities, phones and data entry personnel insufficient.
2. Illegible handwriting of voters.
3. Voter Registration Department must develop and implement written procedures and task delegation/assignment for permanent and temporary personnel to meet timely performance goals.
4. Establish work schedules and minimum requirements to complete tasks.
5. Integrate data entry proofing with specific tasks, staff assignments and rotation of duties.
6. Develop and implement alphabetizing test requirement for all new employees.
7. Increase efficient utilization of PCs located in the "Conservatory" and additional label printers; consider shifts.
8. A 21-day Voter Registration deadline (Oct 12) challenges effective voter service, e.g. serving 1,200 walk-ins provided little chance to review Voter Registration Applications and process voters through Absentee and Registration sections, timely, efficiently and error-free.
9. Beginning 2005, send notice to City of Rockville for calendar of sports season in 2006 for events at Twinbrook (BOE) site and request "do not schedule" on last day of voter registration.
10. Improve management and monitoring of HAVA procedures and requirements, including calendar, work plan and mandated mailings.
11. Review handling/holding HAVA ID documentation, i.e. risk of ID theft, unnecessary BOE legal exposure. BAL check with SBE and if approved shred it!

Voter Registration, continued
Challenges/Alternatives

13. In September, SBE informed MCBOE that Voter Registration Applications (VRAs) were in short supply and MCBOE should print needed copies from the internet. After 10,000 were printed in-house on copy machine, an additional 4,000 were printed at the Montgomery County Print Shop to reduce costs, staff time and wear and tear on office equipment. SBE sent an additional 9,000 VRAs the first week of October. MCBOE recommends SBE increase VRAs to Montgomery County prior to general elections based on anticipated volume including supplying polling places, or allow Montgomery County to print card stock; paper, as directed by SBE, does not withstand US Postal Service.
14. MVA/SBE Mailing to 6,000 citizens wasteful and untimely. Voters received mailed notices during the peak VRA processing period, adding demands to voter record changes and HAVA requirement management.
Result: Extending staff hours in all departments created a negative domino affect on the agency's pre-election work plan, increasing staffing costs.
Recommendation: Local board request timely actions, e.g. a minimum of two months prior to VR deadline from SBE, MVA and other stakeholders during the election process.
15. Voter Registration - Deadlines/Continuous Registration/Volunteer Registrar Program
Receiving voter registrations and changes from SBE, other jurisdictions and volunteer registrars late in 2004 Presidential Election preparation cycle imposed tight time/resource demands to produce accurate printing of Voter Authority Cards and legally complete and accurate Precinct Registers. To produce 525,000 Voter Authority Cards, printing must begin 12 days pre-election day; Precinct Registers are printed at the close of 6 business days pre-election day, then prepared for each precinct and BOE office. Inaccurate legal records, confusion for election judges, potential disenfranchisement of voters, and waste of local board resources results when internal calendar timelines are not met.
Recommendation: SBE establish a deadline for Volunteer Registrars and Registrar Groups to turn in VRAs to proper jurisdictions prior to state deadline; review policy for continuous registration information received after deadline; and develop procedures for timely communication between local boards and SBE for voter registration information.
16. Continued challenge of implementation and administrative detail of HAVA for Registration Department staffing. A minimum of two additional staff are required to process HAVA ID requirements, maintain records and mail to "ID Required" voters.
Recommendation: Local Board examines cost-effective measures, discuss processes required to implement HAVA and discuss recommendations with SBE.

Absentee Challenges/Alternatives:

1. Phone volume increased beyond expectations, negatively affecting data entry during business hours. **Recommend:** To manage data entry, explore and implement integration of scanning into absentee process.
2. During peak operating period, October 18 thru 20, 2004, a six-day backlog of absentee requests occurred and recovered by October 22, 2004. Challenges: Proofing large volume of absentee requests with limited time, space and staff
3. First-time faxing of ballots for voters abroad was a challenging process, repetitious, day and night.
4. Limited workspace is a critical problem for absentee operations especially for preparation for US Postal Service and Nursing Home Program.
5. FPCA's, as required, are retained for two election cycles causing all applications to be retained and re-entered for 2006 election cycle. Expect increased costs. Clarification needed.
6. Recommendations:
 - a. Generic ABS application including State's deadline and information required by deadline.
 - b. For General Election absentee envelope label, remove party affiliation.
 - c. Revise absentee canvass procedures to include an envelope checker (staff) who checks envelopes for contents; hire fewer teams and recruit and train canvassers earlier; process changed from two-step to one-step.

Issues/Suggestions/Alternatives

1. Absentee Military ballots were **not received timely** (45 days prior to election) to meet federal guideline. Communication from SBE and DESI for expected delivery of ballots was not effective. While a specific contest (Nader) issue affected ballot delivery for the 2004 General Election, an established pattern of incomplete or lack of information sharing with MCBOE existed for the 2002 and 2004 election cycles. Result: MCBOE Absentee Department checked-in, inventoried and distributed designated ballots for Mailing, Walk-ins and Nursing Homes, a two-day process which delayed initiating distribution to voters. To expedite process, MCBOE printed ballots for APO and FPO voters to insure timely delivery. Ballots were processed then duplicated (onto card stock) for tabulation. Situation was costly, time consuming and wasteful of local resources. Recommendation: Earlier certification process; candidate filing deadlines, ballot questions, etc. to enable earlier printing of ballots resulting in better service to voters. DESI notification to LBEs when ballots are printed.
2. Delivery/receipt of Absentee Envelopes and associated materials untimely which caused a shift of absentee workforce from processing absentee applications to collating thousands of envelope sets resulting in significant unnecessary complications, e.g. delayed service to voters; need to recruit, hire and train additional staff; inefficiencies due to space, handling of current/dated materials and increasing/changing work loads; and placement and handling of staff, secure ballot and mailing materials. Inefficient, costly and time consuming during peak work load period.
Recommend: SBE design, order and deliver absentee mailing materials significantly earlier in the election cycle with no changes in wording or design.

3. Receipt of State Attorney General's untimely notification of opinion regarding Maryland election law affecting "Children of Citizens" who have never resided in the United States occurred after 25% of MCBOE's overseas ballots had been mailed. American citizen applicants should be notified of denial without remedy. Recommend: Amend Maryland Constitution to insure voting rights for all American citizens and establish a federal only ballot or President only ballot for these voters.

Absentee Voting – Nursing Home Program

Thirty-nine nursing homes participated in the program. Nursing homes were contacted a minimum of three months before an election to establish a contact, introduce and define the absentee voting service provided by the Montgomery County Board of Elections for resident voters. Activity Directors were instructed to inform residents of the service, collect and forward names and birthdates to the Board of Elections. Nursing Home Team members were recruited, trained and given location assignments. Absentee Ballot Applications were sent to persons listed and if a person was not registered a Voter Registration Application was included. BOE Absentee Voting Team members picked up applications from August 20th through the first week of September. From October 11th through October 29th, teams provided absentee voting to nursing home residents.

Challenges and/or Alternatives:

1. The number of responses increased and 2 additional Absentee Voting Teams were added. Need to increase number of trained teams.
2. Return visits to facilities were required for new residents who wished to vote but were not on the original list; included were some who required a different ballot style.
3. Activity Directors called daily to add names to original voter list.
4. Activity Directors called after scheduled BOE team visits to facilities providing BOE with names of additional residents wishing to vote. This situation was handled by 1) mail, 2) return visit to facility or 3) a family member acting as agent.
5. Activity Directors directly downloaded Absentee Applications for residents and did not contact the Nursing Home Program causing a negative affect on the efficient absentee ballot delivery to residents and the ballot accounting process. BOE provides written process/procedures to all Activity Directors.
6. Activity Directors invoked the Federal Medical Privacy Act and negatively affected improved service to applicants by:
 - A. Refusing to include necessary Date of Birth on Applications as required. BOE team members then would visit applicant to obtain date of birth.
 - B. Refusing to confirm whether a resident has left the facility.
 - C. Refusing to sign Deceased Voter Notification Card.
7. Many facilities now include rehabilitation facilities and residency is for a limited time. The BOE Attorney requested Legal Opinions for when such a resident applies for an absentee ballot via the Nursing Home Program, what does MCBOE do with the ballot in the event we are not notified of departure in advance and what obligation do we have to the voter?

Registration Statistics – General Elections 2000 and 2004

Pre Election Registration Data Processing/Record Keeping 2000 General Election – 2004 General Election			
Function	2000 Total	2004 Total	Difference 2004
New Registrations	22,903	34,106	+ 11,203
Deletes	3,341	5,439	+ 2,098
Address Changes	7,389	10,378	+ 2,989
Name Changes	590	1,097	+ 507
Affiliation Changes	2,171	4,513	+ 2,342
Voters Inactivated	699	2,389	+ 1,690
Voters Reactivated	1,407	1,289	- 118
Confirmation Responses	974	601	- 373
SBE MVA Mailing	0	6,000	+ 6,000
HAVA ID Voter Records	0	34,150	+ 34,150
Registration E-Mail Requests	0	6,000	+ 6,000
Total Records Processed	39,474	105,962	+ 66,488

ABSENTEE VOTING									
Requested		Returned		Total Counted		Total Uncounted		Federal Write-in	
Domestic Non- Military	Military & Overseas	Domestic Non- Military	Military & Overseas	Domestic Non- Military	Military & Overseas	Domestic Non- Military	Military & Overseas	Received	Counted
36,156	5,306	33,763 (93.3%)	2,055	32,885 (97.3%)	2,391*	878	336	552	336 (60.8%)
41,362		36,154 (87.4%)		34,940 (96.6%)		1,214 (3.3%)			

Rejected Military & Overseas Ballots	
Reason	Number Rejected
No Postmark	0
No Signature	11
Signature not Verifiable	0
No Date of Signature	0
Not Timely	115
Returned as Undeliverable	0
Other (please explain)	
No Application (FWI)	210
Total	336

II. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY – Lessons Learned

Successes:

Testing and System Integrity

1. Montgomery County Board of Elections relied as little as possible on vendor for Logic and Accuracy testing. Permanent election staff and hired temporary employees who were required to submit to background criminal checks and county employees who worked in the past were used for L&A testing. The result was a systematic and consistent testing of units. Policy and procedures have been identified and adopted as a Best Practice by the Election Assistance Commission.
2. Election Day Help desk was operational and very helpful throughout the 2004 General Election Day; phone lines both downstairs and upstairs improved communications.
3. An appropriate number of staff were recruited and assigned to complete tasks including testers for modem lines and Logic and Accuracy extended hours requiring night teams and lifters. IT staff excelled, was productive.
4. SBE met most deadlines; received electronic election timely and was helpful with updated documentation. A delay occurred with receipt of audio ballots which required tweaking the Spanish ballot provided in a wrong dialect. For future, BOE must have complete, proofed ballots, including Spanish ballots received timely before election. For the 2006 Primary Election, difficulties are expected due to numerous (approximately 70) ballot styles. Recommend: SBE provide translations made by local translators.
5. The interface from EMS to GEMS was smooth.
6. Improvements in the absentee process includes expanded use of label printers, optical scan reading of absentee ballots in downstairs computer room gave additional space to canvass room.
7. Modem training piece was successful; in training, Election Judges appreciated opportunity to experience modem transfer procedure.
8. Voters like TS Units which performed successfully. Demonstration units worked well; security patch was unnecessary for demo units.
9. Chain of Custody document was excellent for TS Unit delivery on Election Day.
10. In advance of Election Day, preparing PC Memory cards for possible replacement units for each precinct is a good policy change.

Challenges/Alternatives:

GEMS Preparation: To ensure integrity of election, a Deadline/Lock Down is essential.

Recommend: SBE adhere to a schedule agreed upon by local BOE and SBE. If a patch or modification is made to the voting system, at a minimum, a risk assessment should be conducted and SHARED immediately with Local Boards.

Information Technology Service (Internal) – Lessons Learned

Montgomery County Technology Service and BOE Technology Services DTS and BOE – Collaboration is vital and necessary for successful elections.

Successes:

1. DTS assigned a contact person (Kim), who was successful in recruiting techs, tracking, collaborating with BOE for their training and placement and managing the entire project.
2. Tech and Roamer support was excellent.
3. VIPP System Calendar for data entry was useful to multiple Departments.
4. Absentee Voting data entry and batch job worked well.
5. Voter Communication greatly improved due to improved web site and telecommunications system.
6. Logic & Accuracy testing process ran smoothly.
7. Transmitting data on Election Night was excellent.

Challenges:

1. Maintaining and supporting continual data entry functions and a frequently changing voter registration database throughout the election period extending for a least a month after the election is critical.
2. Planning for availability of system for use including when BOE has requirements including printing jobs from mainframe.
3. Schedule batch jobs by DTS, e.g. reports, generation of voter notification card.
4. Critical timing: Must print Voter Authority Cards 12 days prior to election.
5. Critical timing: Precinct Register printed 8 days pre-election, assembled in 1 day.
6. Critical timing: Polling Place Accessibility Notification produced 6 weeks pre-election.
7. Critical timing: Absentee voting report.
8. Critical timing: Candidate labels.

Post Election:

1. Electronic Audit before Certification is conducted; recorded are persons who voted and number of electronic votes cast.
2. Provisional Ballot Application Verification and Canvass performed before Certification.
3. Precinct Registers are scanned to give voter credit (voter turnout). Scan is reviewed and verified for accuracy including consideration of voted provisional ballots.

Challenges:

1. Improve communications with DTS regarding BOE post-election support needs. Explore DTS suggestion that BOE provide a detailed calendar. Evaluate key Task Force contacts; make changes as necessary. Increase accessibility of calendar to all departments by placing in Outlook.

2. Voter Notification (VN) Card mailing rate issue: To save money, VNs were mailed third class nonprofit rate, resulting in delayed mail service for voters, increased telephone calls and amended BOE procedures during busy cycle. For timely official election mail delivery to voters during election season, first class postage must be used early. Explore option to instruct scheduler, operator and printer to print at nonprofit rate and begin first class automatically at a specific date; detailed election calendar may solve problem. What lead-time is required to change VN form design? Advise DTS as soon as BOE knows a change is necessary.
3. Absentee needs more computers; impacts budget.
4. Several issues remain with printing and processing Precinct Registers and VACs. Not a smooth process; work must be a priority for all stakeholders and control understood by same. Susan said plan to work with DTS is in the works.
5. Tech Training – Consider competency of chiefs (Kim is working on this project plan), separating Refresher and Initial Training sessions, based on knowledge.
6. Help Desk Support requires subject work session. Re-define Night Before Help Desk staffing and support.
7. On going maintenance, pre-election, election day, and post-election, should be solved with calendar.
8. Telephone in polling rooms is a major issue; BOE must have instant communication with polling places. Arrange for a session with John, Paul and other stakeholders.

Critical Issues:

Encoders:

1. IT prepares documents before encoders are sent to polling place supply staging area; for 2 days encoders go back and forth. What was replaced by IT and where are the different encoders, if any?
2. Why did encoders die during Election Day? Are batteries replaced by SBE third party vendors faulty? Is packaging a problem as suggested by SBE? Montgomery County BOE packaged encoders the same in both elections. LBEs should be responsible for quality control to replace encoder batteries supplied by SBE. SBE should not have to hire/pay a third party vendor to replace and test encoders.

GEMS

1. On Election Night, the GEMS system froze several times during heavy m modem transmitting periods requiring the system to be rebooted, which generated delays and prohibited BOE from receiving polling places' transmissions. The problem was temporary and did not affect results.

Sample Ballot:

1. Looks like a tax form; redesign and streamline.
2. LBEs should have SBE authorization to do screen shots and/or purchase software to construct Sample Ballot to wean from vendor and reduce delays in obtaining critical screen shots. Timing is especially critical during gubernatorial election preparation with the transmitting and proofing of numerous ballot styles.

Suggestions:

1. Conduct L&A Testing 6 weeks prior to election, using DTS and other trained temporary personnel.
2. DTS assigns techs for Election Day DTS staff; discuss depletion of county staff serving as technicians out in Polling Places.
3. Election Assistance Commission cites as “Best Practices” to not rely on or include vendor in election preparation or conduct of elections. Montgomery County will continue to uphold this goal.
4. Election Results on Election Night require support in Returns Center in basement, help reading PC Memory Cards and putting postings on web.

Challenges and Alternatives:

General Issues:

1. Re-define Help Desk staffing the night before an Election.
2. Map out IVR changes and drill down to date specific with message in two languages completed prior to July 2006.
3. Define responsibility of web site management in next six months.
4. Election Day transport of extra machines to Polling Places is a big challenge of timing and quality control; after testing 30% of the units twice sent 90 units to polls. Reasons: Unit did not boot-up; screens froze. Primary concern at IT Help Desk is to identify who is requesting unit, why and confirm same. Getting machines out is difficult. PC Cards were pre-uploaded and may not have been sent out to Polling Places. BOE expects to respond requests for units to polling places. Election judges need a cue to account for receipt of an extra unit; operations could provide computer room staff with a pouch to add to black leather case when sending additional unit. Confusion on Election Day whether or not to send units; BOE received mixed messages.
5. Machine return problem is a problem when additional machines are delivered on Election Day. Recovery is easier when machines are sent early, e.g. hauler took 10 machines, next day found 10 machines and did not see machine 11 in closet. Ensure hauler receives additional unit/correct total numbers before they begin early Wednesday pickup. Negligible communication to hauler must improve.
6. If machines are continue to have (x) percentage error rate, LBEs must anticipate allocating an extra machine in the polling place in the planning process.
7. Improve election judges’ training for loading units on carts for return. Hauler had to break down machine on Wednesday at 10 or 15 Polling Places and judges put machines on cart in a haphazard manner, which damages units and can increase costs.
8. Goal is return of all PC Memory Cards on election night. Twelve cards were not returned on Election Night and all but two were from Accumulator “0” units.

Information Technology Service (Internal) – Lessons Learned, continued

9. Modem lines testing in polling place still problematic; need better coordination with school system.
10. For BOE computer center, plan to hire additional 5-6 people two weeks before election next time. Susan contact Robin & Phyllis at Prince George's who utilize a company; see if they are available through procurement's contract list.
11. Printing of special forms – accessibility letters, precinct registers (must improve), VACs (missing county seal) , Voter Notification Card (sent out at non-profit status) version and quality control are difficult because process is out of our hands. Recommend explore offer from Print Shop (Rick Taylor) for help with special forms. Explore migration to other method(s), e.g. review “accessibility notice” letter and precinct register.

Information Technology – Election Day Review

Election Day Equipment Review

For Election Day, 2,597 voting units were deployed. An additional 80 voting units were sent to about 65 polling places on Election Day to replace malfunctioning units. A few were sent out to accommodate long lines at polling places.

From Help Desk tickets and GEMS reports, 189 voting units (7%) of units deployed failed on Election Day. An additional 122 voting units (or 5%) were suspect based on number of votes captured.

Of the 189 voting units that failed:

1. On Election morning, 58 voting units failed to boot up, showing a Ballot Exception Error. These units were unusable and were immediately taken out of service. No votes were captured on these units.
2. 106 voting units experienced screen freezes. In staff opinion this is the most serious of errors. Election judges and technical staff reported that many of these units froze when the voter pressed the Cast Ballot button. This leads to great confusion for judges and voters. The voter leaves the polling place with little or no confidence that their vote was counted. In many cases, the election judges are unable to provide substantial confirmation that the vote was, in fact, counted.
3. 25 voting units failed due to a variety of problems including card readers, printers, and power problems.
4. The additional 122 suspect voting units were identified because few votes were captured compared to other units in the same polling place. A unit was considered suspect if it had 25-50 votes captured when all other units in the polling place had over 150 votes.
5. Of the 1,245 encoders deployed, approximately 30 failed and were replaced on Election Day. Preliminary tests indicate that the failures are a result of little or no battery power.

6. Prior election day, we prepared approximately 95 voting units using new touch screen units and new PC memory cards. Of these, 5 failed; 4 with screen freezes and 1 with a ballot exception error. Another 4 units were in the suspect category. What can be done?
 - Currently, the State and Diebold, in conjunction with our County staff, are in the BOE warehouse conducting tests on failed voting units. The test reviews the reported problem using the combination log on the back of the voting booth, printing and examining the audit log for each machine, testing the units to create the problem, and documenting all procedures and test results. At noon today (Dec. 13, 2004), 148 voting units have been tested; of these, 35 have failed. Failed voting units will be returned to Diebold for further testing and repair or replacement. BOE has requested that Diebold formulate and provide us with a testing methodology and capture all results and subsequent repairs. Recommend: For future elections, deploy more voting units on Election Day, beyond the allotted one unit for every 200 voters to offset the higher than expected failure rate.

Recommend: IT Staff Supervisor recommends that Local Boards control replacing encoder batteries. We have been assured that the batteries were replaced during the pre-election upgrade; speculation that the batteries are faulty continues.

Recommend: Task Diebold to provide tools for required testing of DRE battery charges during the Logic and Accuracy process.

Recommend: BOE will reformat all PC memory cards before use in the next election though a lack of confidence exists that reformatting will significantly reduce errors. Reformatting a memory card, which takes just a few minutes, will be time well spent if the number of problems are reduced.

III. ELECTION OPERATIONS – Lessons Learned

Successes:

1. Preparation of supplies was successful, aided by knowledge of supplies needed and ability to prepare early and absorb late delivery from external providers. Upon completion, staff was able to assist Registration and Absentee Departments with large-volume, time sensitive tasks.
2. Polling places functioned well, opening/closing was timely and voters were processed and assisted with excellent results.
3. Election Day had surprise large voter turnout (70% by 3:00 PM) followed by shockingly slow; judges handled AM lines with creativity and innovation.
4. All TS Units recorded votes; placement was adequate (see GEMS report).
5. Fewer DESI workers were used for the General Election, workers attended a mandatory training in the county, which improved services to precincts.
6. Probable improved use of tamper tape; (machines are not yet released).
7. Improved Election Night process for Critical Materials Returns from Asst. Chiefs.
8. Polling place set-up at all county and non-public facilities great; schools are still learning responsibilities, procedures and follow through.
9. Precinct performance “report card” used by poll workers in pre-election meeting.
10. Precinct Register Scanning was timely, efficient and effective, a critical step for Provisional Ballot Canvass research phase to prevent vote fraud, process audit and certify Election.

Challenges and Alternatives:

Timing of receipt of external information/new materials continues to be significant and detrimental to quality and efficient election administration.

1. Requests made to SBE staff for additional equipment began July 1, 2004; BOE experienced delays in receipt of same.
2. Continuous registrations received through November 1, 2004.
Recommend: One week before an election, terminate all voter registration processing; after one week, timing of VAC box sealing and Precinct Register printing are affected and there is no way to add voter names. Freeze activity and provide Provisional voting as the only option.
3. Election Day diagram and guidelines for front line personnel to handle telephone requests from precincts correctly and efficiently and to reduce incorrect delivery of polling place supplies and voting units.
Recommend: Develop and implement process for same.
4. Explore establishing regional supply sites staffed by County Employees who are familiar with precinct locations.
5. Establish Election Day call back procedures, for Operations and IT Departments to Chief Judges, confirming requests before BOE action is taken.
6. **Recommend:** In-service workshops for cross training of all departments and interaction with polling place operations.
7. **Recommend:** Third party proofing of Encoders before deployment.

Election Operations, continued

8. **Recommend:** Test phones earlier and train judges that phones are plugged into jack the night before and tested. Election Eve phone check for precinct and confirm that phone is operating and the number is correct. (Ability to contact precinct is a safety issue.)
9. Build new TS Unit deployment model for number of units per voter; current is 1 per 200. Add at least one additional unit per Polling Place if problem with unit failures continues unsolved. (Ballot station errors and screen freezes undermines voter and election judge confidence.)
10. Detailed timeline, task definition and personnel responsibilities are required.
11. Continue to build on current working relationships and communications with other Montgomery County Agencies, be considerate of their mission and responsibilities, explore and define how they can contribute most effectively to the election process.
12. Define, improve training and implement greater accountability for Assistant Chief Judges to return PC Memory Cards on Election Night.
13. Improve training for and use of Election Judge feed back documents and post election debriefing sessions as valuable resources for new ideas and identifying potential problems.

Polling Place Election Day Issues

233 Polling Places:

	<u>D-P</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Registered Voters</u>
Smallest	04-27	Twinbrook Library	345
	02-07	Hyattstown Volunteer Fire Department	370
Largest	13-54	Leisure World	6,773
	06-07	Spark Matsunaga Elementary School	4,676
	08-08	Magruder High School	4,496
	04-20	Robert Frost Middle School	4,463
	12-01	Damascus High School	4,307
	09-21	Flower Hill Elementary School	4,092
	04-10	Woodward Center/Tilden Middle School	4,032

Polling Place Turnout:

Ballots Cast on TS Voting Units	374,350
Provisional Ballots Cast	<u>9,510</u>
Total	383,860

Election Operations, continued

Challengers & Watchers:

Precincts with the highest reported number of Challengers & Watchers

<u># C & W</u>	<u>D/P/Location</u>
21	07-13 Westland Middle School, Bethesda 20817
19	13-61 Strathmore Elementary School, Silver Spring 20906
10	13-08 East Silver Spring Elementary School, 20910

Polling Place Turnout by 3:00 PM – Electronic Voting - Sample:

D-P	Turnout	3:00 PM	Per Cent
01-01	1130	623	55.13%
01-04	1130	733	64.86%
02-01	2164	1537	71.02%
02-05	2149	1555	72.36%
03-02	1356	948	69.91%
04-04	1877	1356	72.24%
04-07	1499	948	63.24%
04-12	2188	1573	71.89%
04-28	674	529	78.49%
05-06	2281	1436	62.95%
05-08	1309	1000	76.39%
05-17	2185	1567	71.72%
06-02	2456	1843	75.04%
06-07	3717	2588	69.63%
07-03	1962	1459	74.36%
07-13	2025	1531	75.60%
07-18	1700	1324	77.88%
07-26	2225	1718	77.21%
07-32	916	762	81.19%
08-05	2000	1387	69.35%
08-07	1119	843	75.34%
09-02	1546	1013	65.52%
09-15	1312	812	61.89%
09-24	791	548	69.28%
09-27	1877	1297	69.10%
09-30	1560	1427	91.47%
10-04	1092	823	75.37%
12-01	3155	2248	71.25%
13-07	1640	1197	72.99%
13-12	981	584	59.53%
13-22	1038	712	68.59%
13-23	1750	1289	73.66%
13-33	1311	923	70.40%
13-40	1554	1038	66.80%
13-49	2454	1364	55.58%
13-56	1049	724	69.02%
13-66	508	342	67.32%
Total	62909	45760	72.73%

A. Polling Place Issues:

Unbalanced lines: reported at several polling places.

Comment: Examination of the actual breakdown of registered voters and the breakdown of voters who voted at the polling place has consistently shown the alphabetical breakdowns are not seriously unbalanced.

D/P	3 Check-in Tables											
	A - G				H - O				P - Z			
	Regis	%	Actual	%	Regis	%	Actual	%	Regis	%	Actual	%
01-01	792	33%	539	33%	814	34%	561	35%	792	33%	523	32%
13-05	836	35%	477	36%	803	33%	455	34%	770	32%	401	30%
13-20	693	32%	454	33%	693	32%	451	32%	803	37%	483	35%
13-22	605	31%	362	35%	627	32%	331	32%	704	36%	347	33%
13-33	671	33%	435	34%	682	33%	457	35%	693	34%	401	31%

D/P	4 Check-in Tables															
	A - D				E - K				L - R				S - Z			
	Regis	%	Actual	%	Regis	%	Actual	%	Regis	%	Actual	%	Regis	%	Actual	%
02-01	825	25%	570	26%	770	24%	506	23%	946	29%	625	29%	726	22%	472	22%
02-06	792	24%	567	25%	913	27%	646	28%	902	27%	608	26%	726	22%	481	21%
04-14	814	24%	559	24%	737	22%	576	25%	1012	30%	692	30%	770	23%	460	20%
04-16	825	23%	523	23%	902	25%	560	24%	979	27%	645	28%	891	25%	584	25%
04-31	693	23%	450	25%	781	26%	449	25%	825	27%	516	28%	715	24%	405	22%
05-04	594	24%	399	24%	649	26%	420	25%	660	26%	448	27%	605	24%	389	23%
07-03	571	21%	449	23%	692	25%	637	33%	758	27%	380	19%	758	27%	486	25%
07-08	594	22%	384	22%	748	27%	472	27%	836	31%	528	31%	561	20%	338	20%
09-20	715	22%	445	22%	814	25%	490	25%	891	28%	563	28%	814	25%	481	24%
09-27	649	22%	437	23%	803	28%	502	27%	847	29%	539	29%	594	21%	403	21%
10-09	693	24%	489	26%	770	27%	482	26%	770	27%	472	25%	638	22%	410	22%

Note: 07-03 registered voter numbers are adjusted to reflect actual registered voter total

D/P	5 Check-In Tables																			
	A - C				D - G				H - L				M - R				S - Z			
	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%
02-02	704	18%	495	18%	583	15%	408	15%	792	20%	554	20%	957	24%	655	24%	913	23%	616	23%
05-05	693	19%	481	19%	539	15%	385	15%	726	20%	487	19%	847	23%	613	24%	858	23%	601	23%
05-06	693	20%	463	20%	506	14%	323	14%	660	19%	414	18%	759	22%	511	22%	880	25%	569	25%
06-01	726	18%	494	19%	649	16%	438	17%	759	19%	534	20%	935	24%	625	24%	880	22%	553	21%
06-04	737	19%	509	19%	605	15%	435	16%	814	20%	566	21%	792	20%	524	19%	1034	26%	689	25%
08-02	704	19%	523	20%	539	15%	401	15%	682	19%	501	19%	869	24%	626	24%	825	23%	572	22%

D/P	6 Check-In Tables																							
	A - C				D - G				H - K				L - O				P - S				T - Z			
	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%	Reg	%	Act	%
04-10	759	17	515	18	737	17	507	18	594	14	400	14	748	17	466	16	979	22	601	21	583	13	349	12

Election Operations, continued
Polling Place Election Day Issues

Long lines: reported at several polling places.

Reported Line Problems Summary										
D/P	Facility	Goal	Reg				Turnout			
	3 Check-In Tables									
		%	High	Low	Over	Under	High	Low	Over	Under
01-01	Laytonsville Elementary School	33%	34%	33%	1	0	35%	32%	2	1
13-05	Silver Spring Library	33%	35%	32%	2	1	36%	30%	3	3
13-20	Lee Middle School	33%	37%	32%	4	1	35%	32%	2	1
13-22	Rolling Terrace Elementary School	33%	36%	31%	3	2	35%	32%	2	1
13-33	Kemp Mill Elementary School	33%	34%	33%	1	0	35%	31%	2	2
	4 Check-In Tables									
02-01	Rocky Hill Middle School	25%	29%	22%	4	3	29%	22%	4	3
02-06	Clarksburg Elementary School	25%	27%	22%	2	3	28%	21%	3	4
04-14	College Gardens Elementary School	25%	30%	22%	5	3	30%	20%	5	5
04-16	Wootton High School	25%	27%	23%	2	2	28%	23%	3	2
04-31	Johnson High School	25%	27%	23%	2	2	28%	22%	3	3
05-04	St Mark's Episcopal Anglican Church	25%	26%	24%	1	1	27%	23%	2	2
07-03	Clara Barton Community Center	25%	27%	21%	2	2	33%	19%	8	6
07-08	Christ Lutheran Church	25%	31%	20%	6	5	31%	20%	6	5
09-20	Gaithersburg Middle School	25%	28%	22%	3	3	28%	22%	3	3
09-27	Carson Elementary School	25%	29%	21%	4	4	29%	21%	4	4
10-09	Our Lady of Mercy School	25%	27%	22%	2	3	26%	22%	1	3
	5 Check-In Tables									
02-02	Kingsview Middle School	20%	24%	15%	4	5	24%	15%	4	5
05-05	Springbrook High School	20%	23%	15%	3	5	24%	15%	4	5
05-06	White Oak Middle School	20%	25%	14%	5	6	25%	14%	5	4
06-01	Jones Lane Elementary School	20%	24%	16%	4	4	24%	17%	4	3
06-04	Dufief Elementary School	20%	26%	15%	6	5	25%	16%	5	4
	6 Check-in Tables									
04-10	Woodward Center/Tilden Middle School	17%	22%	13%	5	4	21%	12%	4	5

Registration-related issues: The number of new registrations during the last two months caused problems in several precincts. Several precincts need to be split as the number of voters exceeds the capacity of the facility in terms of parking and room size.
Recommend: Split Precinct 06-07, with nearly 4,700 voters, voting at Matsunaga Elementary School. Review number of tables and adjust for 2006 as necessary for precincts exceeding the threshold for number of tables.

Equipment problems: Very few brought to my attention to date. (See IT Section)

Voting Units not angled to provide privacy: reported at several sites.
Recommend: Improve training for Chief Judges and Voting Unit Judges.

Election Operations, continued
Polling Place Election Day Issues

Judges: A few complaints about judges being poorly trained, inflexible, or simply incompetent. Several reports of inadequate performance.

Inadequate Performance Reports (to date): Resources - Polling Place Support Program, Election Judge Trainers and Election Operations Staff

Please note: may be added to or deleted from this list as investigations for the evaluation program continues.

- 05** \$ Chief Judge appeared to be overwhelmed.
 \$ Check-in Table Judges were not processing voters efficiently.
 \$ Voting Unit Judges were not expediting voting process effectively.
 \$ The Assistant Chiefs were not assisting effectively.
- 05** \$ Chief Judge was not functioning. (Useless)
 \$ Voting Unit Judges were not organized and or managing the voting process effectively.
 \$ The Polling Room Layout was confusing and inefficient and could not accommodate lines.
- 05** \$ Poor management, jumbled room layout, ineffective provisional voting set-up, and inefficient use of personnel continue to be a problem in this precinct.
 \$ Chief Judge was not functioning.
 \$ Check-in Judges were hindered/slowed by poll watchers at each table keeping track of voters.
 \$ Encoder Judges were unskilled programming Voter Access Cards.
 \$ Encoders and Voter Access Cards were not secured.
 \$ There were numerous other procedural and security infraction in this precinct.
- 07** \$ Precinct in disarray from ineffective leadership from Chief Judge.
 \$ Second Chief Judge was highly stressed with double responsibilities.
 \$ When questioned about 1st Chief's performance, the 2nd Chief reluctantly stated that it was worse than the coordinator thought, but, that the elderly Chief would be devastated without the job of Chief Judge.
- 09** \$ Issues with line management, crowd control and general polling place operation.
 \$ Gayle Gwyn, Election Judge Trainer, sent by Ms. Jurgensen to assess the situation and alleviate, if necessary.
 \$ Ms. Gwyn found a lack of organization, efficiency and underutilization of staff and took steps to correct the situation by creating a third Check-in Table, reassigning and training judges and ordering an additional voting unit. The Chief Judge had advised Op. Mgr. Paul Valette of need for a third table; we failed to provide.

Election Operations, continued
Polling Place Election Day Issues

- 09** \$ Chief Judge designated one Voting Unit Judge to hand-out “I Voted” stickers. Poor utilization of personnel and polling place management.
- \$ The Chief Judge was asking voters standing in line for names, removing VAC cards from VAC File and placing VACs on the table. When ask why he was doing it, his reply was to speed-up the process because the Check-in Judges were so slow. Ms. Gywn informed him that the VACs must stay in the file until the voter came to the table. He continued.
- \$ Chief Judges had set up a table of refreshments for voters near the Check-in Tables. While a nice gesture, Ms. Gywn felt the location was inappropriate and their priorities could have been better placed.
- 10** \$ The Chief Judge sitting at a table knitting with the Polling Place signs scattered about the table. When asked about un-posted signs she r responded that she could not figure out where to place them. She appeared uncooperative and not a team player. She exhibited very poor personal hygiene habits.
- 13** \$ Three factors contributed to the chaos and long lines in this polling place:
1. An extremely large room with a poor layout.
 2. A large number of elderly voters requiring assistance and arriving at the polls (by bus or van) at the same time.
 3. Check-in Judges running out of voter access cards and yelling around the room.
- 13** \$ Lack of organization, line control and efficient voter processing contributed to the general chaos at this precinct as reported by BOE staff Larry Long and Gilberto Zelaya. Linda Kimbrough, Election Judge Trainer, was dispatched to the precinct.
- \$ Polling Room filled with voters in lines “snaked” around room, others milling around not knowing where to go or what to do. Room too small for number of persons allowed into room.
- \$ No voters in line outside. No attempt to control entrance to polling room.
- \$ Elderly Chief Judge on break outside.
- \$ Two voting units were not operating, not turned on; one was designated handicapped; handicapped voter waiting to vote, had to use other unit.
- \$ Elderly Chief did not know how to turn on voting units or how to run reports.
- 13** \$ There was no attempt at crowd control or facilitating the voting process that contributed to general chaos.
- \$ Voters were standing wherever they could in line for Check-in Tables.
- \$ After checking-in, voters had no idea what to do next.

- \$ Voters were extremely upset about the situation and were demanding that something be done.
- \$ PPSP Coordinator called the BOE and reported the problem.

Election Operations, continued
Polling Place Election Day Issues

- 13**
- \$ Lack of planning of limited space to accommodate lines.
 - \$ Two voting units not “booting-up”.
 - \$ Large number of elderly voters arriving at the polling place in groups.
 - \$ One voting unit designated for the physically/visually challenged.
 - \$ This precinct required provisional voters to provide identification, which resulted in the disenfranchisement of several voters.
 - \$ Precinct materials returned on Friday after the election after several attempts of MCBOE to communicate with Chief Judge responsible for return. Documentation missing, inaccurate or incomplete.

Handicapped Voting Unit not set up or not being used for regular voters: Fewer than six reports

Judges and/or Party Workers occupying handicapped parking places: 2 reports.

TrueVoteMD: Published a 20 page report, available on their website. The report contains several anecdotes regarding Montgomery County. Operations is researching the anecdotes. The report claims to have identified 200 + incidents in Montgomery County.

- 90 Machine problems, *e.g.*, missing contests; screens going blank; machines marking a candidate other than the one the voter touched.
- 112 Non-machine problems, *e.g.*, inadequate staffing; inadequate training.
- SBE has indicated they do not plan to request a complete list of TrueVoteMD of Montgomery County findings and has asked Montgomery County not to communicate with TrueVoteMD.

Election Operations, continued
 Polling Place Election Day Issues

Collecting the Electronic Vote: Certification Audit

2004 General Polling Place to Gems Report									
D-P	Posted	GEMS	+/-	Blank	Error Distribution				Certification
	Credit	Votes		Cast	0	1	2	3+	11/17/04
01-01	1623	1,623	0	1	1				
01-02	2288	2,288	0	0	1				
01-03	1714	1,715	1	0		1			
01-04	1130	1,131	1	1		1			
01-05	1698	1,697	-1	0		1			
01-06	1122	1,122	0	0	1				
02-01	2164	2,164	0	0	1				
02-02	2708	2,708	0	2	1				
02-03	2021	2,016	-5	0				1	
02-04	1732	1,732	0	0	1				
02-05	2149	2,147	-2	0			1		
02-06	2300	2,300	0	0	1				
02-07	280	280	0	0	1				
03-01	1708	1,708	0	1	1				
03-02	1356	1,356	0	0	1				
04-01	1770	1,772	2	2			1		
04-02	1749	1,747	-2	0			1		
04-03	2280	2,283	3	0				1	
04-04	1877	1,877	0	0	1				
04-05	1765	1,765	0	2	1				
04-06	1370	1,373	3	2				1	
04-07	1499	1,500	1	2		1			
04-08	1254	1,253	-1	0		1			
04-09	1024	1,024	0	1	1				
04-10	2893	2,895	2	0			1		
04-11	593	593	0	0	1				
04-12	2188	2,187	-1	0		1			
04-13	1578	1,581	3	1				1	
04-14	2281	2,282	1	0		1			
04-15	2115	2,116	1	2		1			
04-16	2310	2,312	2	0			1		
04-18	1799	1,799	0	0	1				
04-19	1205	1,205	0	0	1				
04-20	3374	3,373	-1	1		1			
04-21	1896	1,896	0	0	1				
04-22	0	-	0	0					
04-23	1943	1,943	0	0	1				
04-25	1185	1,186	1	0		1			
04-27	238	239	1	0		1			
04-28	674	676	2	0			1		
04-30	888	889	1	0		1			
04-31	1816	1,817	1	0		1			
04-32	815	815	0	0	1				
04-34	1330	1,330	0	1	1				
05-01	2224	2,225	1	0		1			
05-02	1630	1,631	1	0		1			
05-03	1264	1,266	2	1			1		
05-04	1645	1,645	0	1	1				
05-05	2565	2,566	1	1		1			

2004 General Polling Place to Gems Report									
D-P	Posted	GEMS	+/-	Blank	Error Distribution				Certification
	Credit	Votes		Cast	0	1	2	3+	11/17/04
05-06	2281	2,284	3	1				1	
05-07	709	709	0	1	1				
05-08	1309	1,310	1	0		1			
05-09	2606	2,608	2	2			1		
05-10	1102	1,101	-1	2		1			
05-11	2289	2,290	1	1		1			
05-12	2123	2,124	1	0		1			
05-13	2001	2,001	0	0	1				
05-14	1525	1,527	2	1			1		
05-15	2225	2,224	-1	1		1			
05-16	2198	2,196	-2	1			1		
05-17	2185	2,184	-1	0		1			
05-18	839	840	1	0		1			
05-19	2066	2,068	2	1			1		
05-20	2607	2,610	3	1				1	
05-21	1723	1,723	0	1	1				
06-01	2644	2,646	2	0			1		
06-02	2456	2,455	-1	0		1			
06-03	1622	1,622	0	0	1				
06-04	2718	2,718	0	1	1				
06-05	2527	2,528	1	0		1			
06-06	1659	1,659	0	1	1				
06-07	3717	3,720	3	2				1	
06-08	2018	2,020	2	0			1		
06-10	1744	1,741	-3	0				1	
07-01	1103	1,103	0	0	1				
07-02	1421	1,421	0	0	1				
07-03	1962	1,962	0	0	1				
07-04	2323	2,323	0	0	1				
07-05	1474	1,475	1	0		1			
07-06	1559	1,558	-1	0		1			
07-07	1233	1,233	0	0	1				
07-08	1713	1,715	2	1			1		
07-09	1540	1,540	0	0	1				
07-10	1860	1,862	2	1			1		
07-11	2094	2,094	0	0	1				
07-12	1874	1,873	-1	0		1			
07-13	2025	2,028	3	1				1	
07-15	2191	2,191	0	0	1				
07-16	1317	1,318	1	0		1			
07-17	1310	1,311	1	0		1			
07-18	1700	1,700	0	0	1				
07-19	1495	1,496	1	1		1			
07-20	1569	1,569	0	2	1				
07-21	864	866	2	0			1		
07-22	1498	1,497	-1	0		1			
07-23	1987	1,988	1	0		1			
07-24	1629	1,630	1	0		1			
07-25	1433	1,434	1	0		1			
07-26	2225	2,225	0	2	1				
07-27	1243	1,242	-1	1		1			
07-28	1251	1,251	0	0	1				
07-30	703	702	-1	0		1			
07-31	788	787	-1	0		1			
07-32	916	916	0	2	1				
08-01	2326	2,327	1	0		1			
08-02	2626	2,625	-1	0		1			

2004 General Polling Place to Gems Report									
D-P	Posted	GEMS	+/-	Blank	Error Distribution				Certification
	Credit	Votes		Cast	0	1	2	3+	11/17/04
08-03	2140	2,140	0	1	1				
08-04	994	994	0	0	1				
08-05	2000	2,000	0	2	1				
08-06	2334	2,336	2	0			1		
08-07	1119	1,118	-1	0		1			
08-08	3496	3,498	2	0			1		
08-09	2364	2,368	4	0				1	
08-10	1340	1,340	0	0	1				
08-11	2620	2,622	2	0			1		
09-01	1187	1,187	0	1	1				
09-02	1546	1,550	4	5				1	
09-03	1319	1,319	0	1	1				
09-04	2534	2,536	2	0			1		
09-05	857	857	0	0	1				
09-06	1480	1,480	0	0	1				
09-07	1881	1,880	-1	1		1			
09-08	2321	2,320	-1	0		1			
09-09	998	999	1	0		1			
09-10	1065	1,065	0	0	1				
09-11	1685	1,688	3	1				1	
09-12	1874	1,877	3	0				1	
09-13	1598	1,599	1	1		1			
09-14	1438	1,437	-1	1		1			
09-15	1312	1,313	1	0		1			
09-16	1468	1,474	6	1				1	
09-17	923	923	0	0	1				
09-18	1152	1,152	0	1	1				
09-19	1274	1,274	0	0	1				
09-20	1978	1,980	2	1			1		
09-21	2970	2,972	2	0			1		
09-22	1232	1,234	2	1			1		
09-23	901	900	-1	0		1			
09-24	791	791	0	0	1				
09-25	1265	1,265	0	1	1				
09-26	2428	2,428	0	1	1				
09-27	1877	1,877	0	0	1				
09-28	984	985	1	0		1			
09-29	1507	1,507	0	0	1				
09-30	1560	1,562	2	0			1		
09-31	1186	1,188	2	1			1		
09-32	1306	1,306	0	0	1				
09-33	1014	1,015	1	1		1			
09-34	1638	1,640	2	0			1		
09-35	2595	2,597	2	0			1		
10-01	931	930	-1	1		1			
10-02	1639	1,640	1	0		1			
10-03	1066	1,066	0	0	1				
10-04	1092	1,092	0	0	1				
10-05	1741	1,744	3	1				1	
10-06	1730	1,732	2	0			1		
10-07	1888	1,889	1	0		1			
10-08	782	783	1	0		1			
10-09	1843	1,844	1	0		1			
10-10	1932	1,933	1	0		1			
10-11	1149	1,149	0	3	1				
10-12	1490	1,491	1	0		1			
10-13	1202	1,203	1	0		1			

2004 General Polling Place to Gems Report									
D-P	Posted	GEMS	+/-	Blank	Error Distribution				Certification
	Credit	Votes		Cast	0	1	2	3+	11/17/04
11-00	1183	1,185	2	1			1		
12-01	3155	3,156	1	0		1			
12-02	1677	1,678	1	0		1			
12-03	2489	2,489	0	0	1				
12-04	1661	1,662	1	0		1			
13-01	1605	1,607	2	0			1		
13-02	2630	2,631	1	1		1			
13-03	1219	1,220	1	0		1			
13-04	1462	1,463	1	1		1			
13-05	1328	1,327	-1	0		1			
13-06	1000	1,001	1	0		1			
13-07	1640	1,640	0	0	1				
13-08	1361	1,361	0	0	1				
13-09	878	879	1	0		1			
13-10	1057	1,057	0	1	1				
13-11	1993	1,993	0	1	1				
13-12	981	981	0	0	1				
13-13	1529	1,531	2	1			1		
13-14	1393	1,393	0	1	1				
13-15	1498	1,498	0	4	1				
13-16	1288	1,287	-1	1		1			
13-17	672	672	0	1	1				
13-18	1428	1,430	2	1			1		
13-19	1406	1,406	0	2	1				
13-20	1389	1,390	1	0		1			
13-21	1550	1,550	0	3	1				
13-22	1038	1,040	2	1			1		
13-23	1750	1,748	-2	1			1		
13-24	1463	1,463	0	2	1				
13-25	1612	1,609	-3	0				1	
13-26	965	964	-1	0		1			
13-27	1708	1,707	-1	2		1			
13-28	981	983	2	1			1		
13-29	1516	1,516	0	1	1				
13-30	1408	1,409	1	2		1			
13-31	1064	1,064	0	0	1				
13-32	1202	1,201	-1	0		1			
13-33	1311	1,311	0	2	1				
13-34	1414	1,416	2	0			1		
13-35	1464	1,463	-1	0		1			
13-36	1417	1,418	1	1		1			
13-37	1235	1,234	-1	1		1			
13-38	1934	1,938	4	0				1	
13-39	1555	1,556	1	0		1			
13-40	1554	1,555	1	0		1			
13-41	697	697	0	1	1				
13-42	854	855	1	0		1			
13-43	1097	1,096	-1	0		1			
13-44	1564	1,564	0	1	1				
13-45	1149	1,149	0	0	1				
13-46	1437	1,437	0	0	1				
13-47	1231	1,232	1	1		1			
13-48	1141	1,141	0	0	1				
13-49	2454	2,454	0	3	1				
13-50	1278	1,278	0	1	1				
13-51	2042	2,042	0	0	1				
13-52	1547	1,547	0	1	1				

2004 General Polling Place to Gems Report									
D-P	Posted	GEMS	+/-	Blank	Error Distribution				Certification
	Credit	Votes		Cast	0	1	2	3+	11/17/04
13-53	1051	1,053	2	1			1		
13-54	4751	4,760	9	10				1	
13-55	820	821	1	0		1			
13-56	1049	1,048	-1	0		1			
13-57	749	751	2	1			1		
13-58	1588	1,589	1	0		1			
13-59	951	953	2	1			1		
13-60	0	-	0	0					
13-61	1429	1,429	0	0	1				
13-63	738	738	0	1	1				
13-64	1512	1,513	1	0		1			
13-65	886	887	1	0		1			
13-66	508	508	0	0	1				
13-67	1247	1,250	3	2				1	
13-68	1167	1,169	2	1			1		
Total	374211	374350	139	135	88	86	40	19	
		Error rate = .037		.036%	37.70%	36.90%	17.10%	8.15%	

Note: The Electronic Vote Audit continues to date (12/29/04) and present figures appear below:

Persons Appearing **Votes Cast** **Error Rate= .006%**
374,324 **374,350**

Possible Changes

Polling Places:

06-06 and **06-08** currently Stone Mill Elementary and University of Maryland at Shady Grove (voters who live around Stone Mill go to Shady Grove, while another precinct comes in and uses Stone Mill)

02-06 currently Clarksburg Elementary with 3,035 registered voters. Parking at school proved inadequate

Precincts:

04-16 Wootton High School currently 3,313 registered voters but includes Fallsgrrove development, which is growing very rapidly

05-04 & 05-12: Precinct boundaries will be redrawn.

All Precincts with 4,000+ registered voters will be reviewed for splits.

IV. ELECTION JUDGES

A. Recruitment – Training

Successes:

1. Judge positions filled and trained; no vacancies; 100 standby substitutes.
2. Signed Security Document and Election Judge Oath in place before training.
3. Montgomery County Precinct Teams had error rate of 0.014% for number of persons appearing to vote and number of votes cast.
4. Recruiters used Team approach –set aside Democrat & Republican designations and got the job done.
5. Off site training facility.
6. Flexible training schedule with ability to add classes at training site and MCBOE.
7. All polling places opened on time.
8. Election Judge Training Workbook was well received and utilized by judges.

Challenges & Alternatives:

1. Reformat Election Judge Questionnaire to include citizenship question.
2. Reformat Election Judge Commitment Document (SBE - Rules of Security. Behavior) to comply with latest Attorney General & SBE security requirements.
3. Stress timely changes from SBE for construction of Election Judge Manual and local Election Judge Training schedule.
4. Election Judge Training focuses on basic procedures and “hands on”; hands-on experience for election judges is necessary.
5. Build precinct team spirit and participation-time blocks for judges’ duties.
6. Develop better interview techniques for screening judges.
7. Check-in Judges must turn on and test Encoders by 6:15AM on Election Day.
8. More emphasis placed on Provisional Voting training.

2004 GENERAL ELECTION JUDGE SUMMARY REPORT

Election Judge recruiting was successful hiring more than 3,236 required judges.

- Democrats had more applicants than they could comfortably manage attributed to interest in the election and response to newspaper ads. Dozens of applications and phone calls were received daily. Many applicants were disappointed.
- Republicans were able to fill all required positions. Success can be attributed, in part, to the 5% response to a 6,000 piece direct mailing. In addition, there was a small Republican response to newspaper ads.
- On Election Morning, 12 election judges quit during the night or did not show up.
- For the first time, Stand-by judges were hired early in the process and trained according to position. This approach allowed immediate placement of trained personnel to fill vacancies as soon as they occurred throughout pre-election recruitment process and provided trained personnel to fill last minute vacancies.
- While Republicans depleted standbys, Democrats continued to add. These standbys were used by both Democrats and Republicans on Election Day to fill no-show positions.

Election Judge Summary Report, continued
Election Judge Recruiting

- Hiring and training stand-bys early in the process created an unanticipated problem of trained standbys assuming that they would be placed. On Election Day, many standbys were placed but 109 remained unplaced.
Recommend: Improve situation for 2006.

Election Judge Training went well.

- Training Schedule set before training began and judges assigned to classes when hired.
- Trainers were knowledgeable and dedicated.
- A training syllabus was constructed for each position.
- Each class convened on time and material covered in a timely manner.
- A workbook was a complement to the Election Judge Guide; was well received.
- Many judges commented on how changes improved the process and the content of classes.
- Attendees suggested classes be expanded to include more “hands on” and practical experience and expressed willingness to attend all day classes.
- Off-site training facility was a success. However, there were some complaints about location of the site (safety and convenience) and the size of the training room.

Challenge 2006

- “Retiring” many faithful election judges.
- A performance evaluation survey is scheduled for mailing to Chief and Assistant Chief Judges for evaluation of each judge assigned to the precinct.
- Because of this survey and the precinct performance investigation based on implementing mandated procedures and accurately completing required documentation, several judges will not be asked to return in 2006. A final analysis of each precincts and individual’s performance and recommended action is scheduled for completion in the next few months.
- Information gathered will influence layout and design of the Election Judge Guide, construction and content of the Election Judge Training Program and additional criteria for staffing polling places.
- Develop and produce new training video with defined and correct response to problem voters.

JUDGE RECRUITMENT REQUIREMENTS

11/2/2004

		<u>Total Req</u>	<u>Assig 01-08</u>	<u>Assign 09-13</u>	<u>To Date Total Hired</u>	<u>Needed</u>
D E M S	Chiefs	236	114	122	236	0
	Asst Chiefs	256	124	132	256	0
	Check-In	827	432	391	823	4
	Voting Unit	<u>299</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>299</u>	<u>0</u>

Party Total	1618					
Current Total		832	782	1614	4	
Stand-bys	162					

		<u>Total Req</u>	<u>Assig 01-08</u>	<u>Assign 09-13</u>	<u>To Date Total Hired</u>	<u>Needed</u>
R E P S	Chiefs	236	114	122	236	0
	Asst Chiefs	256	123	132	255	1
	Check-In	827	432	390	822	5
	Voting Unit	299	160	137	297	2

Party Total	1618					
Current Total		829	781	1610	8	
Stand-bys	0					

*Total Election Day Vacancies 12

Cumulative Election Day Results	Election Judge Payroll	
Required Positions	3236	Judges Worked 3256
No Shows	-33	Do Not wish to be paid -8
Filled with Stand-bys	21	Standby Judges not used 109
Required Positions Filled	3224	Non-County Technicians 3
Standbys used as Crowd Control	32	
Total Judges Worked	3256	Total Election Judge Payroll 3360

VI. SECURITY

BOE internal security worked very well with new security system in place; staff training, front desk sign-in for visitors, lock-down for upstairs and downstairs warehouses and background checks for employees working with electronic voting equipment.

Security for voting units at Polling Place facilities after hauler delivery before Election Day and until pick-up after Election Day must be reviewed by facility.

Election Day security lapses by election judges are documented and will be addressed in the Election Judge Training Guide and in Election Judge Training.

VII. PROVISIONAL VOTING

Training

Assistant Chief Election Judges were specifically trained on the provisional voting procedure.

Election Day

Voters who did not appear on the precinct register were permitted to vote provisional ballots, which were placed in a secure Provisional Ballot Bag for return with critical materials on Election Night.

Election Judges provided provisional ballot materials and guided voter through process.

Return of Critical Materials on election night; Operations staff checked in, sorted and transmitted to Voter Registration staff for research and preparing for canvass. Physical space and security are necessary throughout.

Pre-Canvass Voter Registration Research and Report

Voter Registration staff, following SBE Guidelines, checked registration and identification for mail-in voters to assess status, valid or invalid registered voters, then recommended, *Accept in Full/Accept in Part/Reject* status for each of the 9,480 provisional ballot applications 4,142 - Accept In Full; 2,655 - Accept In Part; 2,713 – Reject. Ballot applications were sorted into recommended status groups. The application verification process is time consuming and lengthy for large numbers of provisional voters. Thus, it presents a serious timely certification challenge for the 2006 election cycle with its numerous ballot styles that will further extend the time to process each application.

Canvass:

MC Board, supervisor, teams (15), staff (carriers/sorters, duplicators, tabulators, transporters, data/report handler) convened on 2nd Friday after election (10 days). After staff recommendations & signing-off on Provisional Application/Ballot Envelopes, Applications/Envelopes were brought for Board action in three groups: 1) Accept In Full; 2) Accept in Part; 3) Reject. Accept Full Application/Envelopes were distributed to teams to open, review for suitable scanning or refer to duplicating team, as necessary (then Provisional Ballots to sort bins for *originals/scanning*). Accept In Full status ballots were recorded, transported to counting center for scan/tabulation, and then stored. Rejected applications were recorded and stored. Accept In Part applications were distributed to teams to open, teams instructed to duplicate according to ballot style with marks according to voter intent of elected contests, and then collected, kept in sort for scanning/tabulating/storing and storing original ballot if duplicated. Data entered as necessary. Accept In Part ballots were transported to counting center for tabulation, then stored

Report to State: Data timely reported to SBE for posting on web site.

Notes: Additional supplies were needed. Rather than the 3 ballot styles for 2004 elections, nearly 80 ballot styles will be necessary for 2006 including sufficient supplies for ballot duplication for Accept in Part (AIPs).

Sufficient staff for pre canvass processing: Develop a two (combine the following 1 and 2) or 3-stage process:

1. Initial input (trained temporary workers) - enter data
2. Initial research (experienced staff) - review State screen and/or VIPP s screen for voter registration status and marking Accept in Full (AIF) of PB
3. Additional research (senior experienced staff) - thorough research, pull cards, various spellings/listings for Accept in Part (AIP) or Reject (R).

Challenges:

1. Balance requirement of notification of “out-of-precinct” voters that part of the ballot will not count with offering the provisional ballot.
2. Obtain electronic/paper file of streets, number ranges and Congressional Districts for Maryland jurisdictions.
3. Develop instructions how to evaluate and mark recommendations on Provisional Ballot Applications.
4. Develop a proofing process to ensure that the correct disposition has been made, data entered.
5. Review/clarify documentation requirement for provisional and voter IDs; incorporate in EJ and staff training.
6. Clarify voter history regarding signatures appearing on precinct register and Provisional Ballot Applications.
7. Review Provisional election judge training, emphasis on accurately, completed PB forms.
8. Train teams of canvassers regarding ballot styles, which contests and proof of same.
9. Include envelope and provisional bag checkers for contents.

Canvass/Issues/Recommendations

1. SBE Change of Provisional Voting standards for in-county voters from Congressional District based to Precinct based resulted in voters being disenfranchised on important local issues and candidates.

Recommendation: SBE advises the political parties of this decision and its impact on voters’ ability to be heard on local issues and contests.

2. Currently no process in place for voter verification for local boards to MVA during pre-canvass investigation.

Recommendation: SBE design/develop verification process between local boards and MVA or assumes responsibility.

Aberrations:

A few loose Provisional Ballot Applications had no name, some Provisional Ballots voided, some Ballot Envelopes ripped. How is this happening?

Provisional Voting Statistics

Provisional Ballot Applications Received	9480
Accept in Full	4142
Accept in Part	2655
Reject:	2713

VII. TELEPHONE SYSTEM

1. New phone system installed with improved monitoring of response, phones calls answered on Election Day = 6,136. IVR system shifted callers to automated Polling Place Locator and Web Site.
2. Explore alternative IVR phone system customer service model system and/or absentee phone bank during office hours.
3. Additional telephone operators in place and trained during critical time period to answer basic election related questions; separate from data entry personnel; voters complaints that phones were not answered.
4. Improve training to move voter calls thru system efficiently but courteously. Callers are impatient and do not remain in the queue but hang- up.
5. Queue problem – calls require dedicated/trained staff to answer phones; possible shift schedule.
6. Answering phone prevents accurate and efficient data entry.
7. Phone system installed later than planned
8. Communications – coordinator about 90 days prior to election - On E-Day 6026 calls, 10% were before 5 am
 - A. Voter to department – IVR – options 24 lines revamped calls that come out of IVR; voter can insert address and DOB and gets Polling Place; maintained by outside vendor; PP locator developed by DTS; must update each month; links to other sites;
 - B. Voice Mail must be shut off on one day before Election Day; no Voice Mail Election Day
 - C. Telephone system worked well on Election Day; phones were answered and Chiefs calls were in front of line. Absentee phone were set up; with touch a button personnel could take themselves in and out of the loop; great flexibility - (Suggest that in 2006 that an additional 4 lines are dedicated to Chiefs – and have trainers handle the calls throughout day.)

VIII. MEDIA/VISITORS

Successes:

1. Improved/better media release packet.
 - \$ Media spots for TV/Radio.
 - \$ Coordinator of media on location at MCBOE www.vote.org shared with Dept of Defense and State (Military/Overseas Voters).

Challenges and/or Alternatives:

1. Set up media (Demonstration) polling place with Demo Units at COB Media center for “visitors” and media for Election Day to lessen distraction of Chief Judges.
2. Public concern expressed over foreign nationals observing election process in polling places. The first time such concern was expressed in history of county.
3. Provide BOE Media Spokesperson standard Q & A format to answer FA Questions.
4. Post media release packet on website on day before election. Media releases shared with Public Information in March to prevent delays experienced by re-writes by PIO. Provide edited copy for translation into Spanish.

IX. COMMENTS

Mary Carter-Williams, Ph.D., Montgomery County Board of Elections – Substitute Member

- Only judges with the facility to actively observe, direct, and monitor polling place operations, including outside activity, as needed, should serve as chief judges. Judges who face special challenges that may impede election procedures should be given other assignments. The intent here is not to be discriminatory but realistic.
 - A fast lane procedure may need to be introduced for seniors with limited mobility. I know that we have a fine nursing home program, but it may be that we need to think about retirement facilities, too (if we don't already). At one precinct, a large number of seniors showed up from Asbury that could have been better served with absentee ballots, since the lines were so long, too few chairs were available, and some were just confused. To get through it, a fast lane was created on the spot.
 - A posted listing of official polling staff and "unofficial" (assigned by chief judges as opposed to by BOE) volunteers would be helpful to board members and the public. All polling staff, whether official or unofficial, should wear a badge. At one precinct, an unidentified volunteer vociferously worked at cross purposes with a community volunteer asked to help monitor the lines.
 - A one-page exercise, which requests chief judges to create an election checklist, based on a polling place scenario would be a reasonable inclusion in the supplementary manual. It seems that we all agree that the location and character of the polling place have important implications for set-up, the special skill sets required, and control issues.
- § Use of the current BOE media program as the core of a strategic media plan identifying all critical election activities/ events may help the public to better understand BOE's roles, responsibilities, and accomplishments, as well as emergent election issues. For example, at an appropriate time the lessons learned milestone could be turned into an important news story.
- As we have mentioned in passing before, it may not be too early to start thinking about using one precinct register that is accessible to all check-in judges, one line, and, ultimately fully automating the check-in procedures. The BOE could probably get a grant to support a special pilot study. Of course, elimination of VACs would be key.