Public Hearings in
State of
Testimony of Teresa Hommel
Ladies
and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. Because my expertise is in computers, my
comments will deal primarily with issues concerning the use of computerized
voting machines.
My
credentials are:
I
started working as a computer programmer in 1967. I began teaching programming
in 1969. I have taught in schools,
colleges, and universities, including NYU,
I
will briefly address the following topics.
At the end of my testimony there is a list of resources where addition
information on these topics can be found.
1. The need for a voter-verified paper trail.
2. The need for publicly available software.
3. The need for computerized voting machines to
go through at least the same security
procedures and testing that computer systems go through
before they are put into
production in business and industry,
4. The need for adequate time to get computers
to work correctly.
5. The need for remedies when computerized
voting machines do not work properly, and
election results are corrupted.
6. The need for accessibility of voting
machines.
1. The need for a voter-verified paper trail.
All
computers are inherently subject to programming errors, equipment malfunction,
and malicious tampering. Computer
professionals know this, but we aren't the only ones.
Casual
users of computers also know that computers don't work right all the time. Ask yourself, how often does your PC
crash? or
lock? or lose a
document?
The
same kinds of problems have already occurred with voting machines in various
states around our country. We would be
prudent to be forewarned by those experiences, and not duplicate them.
That
is why we need a voter-verified paper trail of each vote. Without a paper trail, there is no way to
count the votes when the computer malfunctions.
Banks
give paper receipts, cash registers do, ATM machines do, even
gas pumps give paper receipts. There are
computer kiosks at train stations to sell you a train ticket on paper, and at
the airports to print your boarding pass.
Printing
a receipt is not a big deal. But without that piece of paper, when election
results are
challenged, a recount is not possible.
Democracy
can't survive if we let a bunch of people count our votes in secret behind
closed doors. A computer is the same as
a bunch of people behind closed doors. American
citizens should not be forced to accept the results of a computer in running
our democracy.
To
bring home what I am talking about, I have turned my laptop into a little
voting machine. The voting software works
two ways, either to "test the machine," or to run a "real
election."
When
you test the machine, you will get an accurate count. But when you run a "real election,"
if any votes are cast, Mary Smith will always win over John Doe.
In
this demonstration, you can see what is going on. But if the individual votes were being cast
in private, in voting booths, how would anyone know that the total counts were
corrupt?
They
wouldn't.
2. The need for publicly-available software.
Some
computerized voting machines use "proprietary" secret programming. If the programming is not publicly available at
all times, it is harder to maintain security.
However,
it is a mistake to think that publicly available software can guarantee
security. Only a voter-verified paper
trail can do that.
The
problem with software is, you never know what software
has been loaded in the machine. Here are
two diskettes, or two CDs. I tell you
they both contain the same program. How
do you know? You don't. I could have made a mistake, accidentally or
intentionally.
3. The need for computerized voting machines to
go through at least the same security
procedures and testing that computer systems go through
before they are put into
production in business and industry.
Purchasing
new computer equipment is a “buyer-beware” situation. That is why in business, companies do
exhaustive testing of computer systems before they "go live" in
production. The old system and the new
one run in parallel for at least one complete accounting cycle, so the results
of the old system and the new one can be compared. Businesses that rely on computers know that
if they get the wrong results, they could go out of business.
But
around our great country, we see voting and elections treated with shocking disrespect. When corruption of the
results occur, the public is supposed to accept the results anyway. This is wrong.
If
we're going to get computerized voting machines, these machines should be
subject to the same security testing as computers that are used in business and
industry. Security means not only that
there are no hackers in the system, but also that the results of normal
operation are correct. Like businesses
that hope to stay in business, we should not rely on new systems until they are
shown to work, and they consistently provide a voter-verified paper trail by
which their accurate operation can be continuously spot-checked and
verified—even when there is no challenge to election results. My bank sends me a statement every month,
even when I don’t challenge their accounting.
4. The need for adequate time to get computers
to work correctly.
It
takes months--or years--to get new computer systems to work correctly. No company expects to take several hundred or
thousand very specialized computers out of their boxes, turn them on, and have
them work correctly.
It
is unreasonable to expect to hold an election using all new, computerized
voting equipment, and get anything other than bedlam. There needs to be a gradual introduction of
these machines over a period of many years.
Voting
machines are used only for short periods of time, so you don't have the
opportunity to correct the problems on a day by day basis over time. That is why these machines need to be
introduced very slowly, and again, that is why they need a voter-verified paper
trail.
5. The need for adequate remedies when
computerized voting machines do not work
properly, and election results are corrupted.
I
hope that we can learn from the experience of other states where computerized voting
machines have malfunctioned, and where election results were challenged but
there was no paper trail to verify the results.
I hope that we don’t have to duplicate those experiences.
As
an American citizen, I am outraged to see our democracy and elections being
treated like worthless formalities.
I
suggest that
Either
the machines work and provide the paper trail to prove it, or we shouldn’t use
them, and the company that gets our money has to take responsibility.
6. The need for accessibility of voting
machines.
The
disabled community has been working for years to get accessible voting machines
so that they can vote in private, without the need for assistance, so they can
have the secret ballot that every eligible voter is supposed to have.
With
the amount of money that the Help Americans Vote Act has allocated, we should
be able to afford voting machines that are accessible as well as secure,
machines that provide BOTH accessibility and a voter-verified physical record
of each vote.
There
shouldn't be any financial or technological excuse for saying it can't be done.
Thank
you.
***********************************************************
----For
NJ Rep. Rush Holt's proposed legislation requiring computerized voting machines
to produce a voter-verified paper trail, see
http://holt.house.gov/issues2.cfm?id=5996
----For
Rebecca Mercuri’s web site, with extensive
information on the use of computers in voting, see http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
----For
Free Speech Radio News' documentary "Hacking Democracy."
by Geoff Brady, see (and listen to) http://www.fsrn.org/news/20030704_news.html
----For
a tutorial on the subject of electronic voting, and the the
Stanford Resolution on Electronic Voting, see http://www.verifiedvoting.org/index.asp
----For
the California Voter Foundation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, see
http://www.calvoter.org
----For
an article by Kim Alexander, president and founder of the California Voter
Foundation, see
http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/8033
----For
info on "How to Rig an American Election," see
http://www.truthout.org/docs_03/voting.shtml
----For
info on Bev Harris's new book "Black Box Voting:
Ballot Tampering In The
21st
Century," see
http://www.blackboxvoting.com
----For
the article, "Bald-Faced Lies About Black Box
Voting Machines," see
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00078.htm#rob
----For
the Petition by Martin Luther King III and Greg Palast
to demand a paper trail,
see
http://www.workingforchange.com/activism/petition.cfm?itemid=14993
----For
the NY State Board of Elections, see http://www.elections.state.ny.us/