Audit Procedure for 6210.18
For
New York State
Board of Elections
40 Steuben Street
Albany, NY 12207
June 22, 2009
Version 8.0
Table of Contents
1.1. Purpose and contents of this document
1.2. New York State Section 9-211 Audit of voter verifiable audit records.
1.3. New York State Election Regulations on Post -
Election Audits
2. Best practices for Preparing for an audit
2.1. Preliminary Organizational Work
How to prepare ballots for auditing
2.2. Ballot Handling Recommendations
2.3. Security in Audit Counting Sites
2.4. Standards of acceptable performance by voting system
2.5. Questionable Votes and Marginal Marks
3. How to Organize your Voting Systems inventory prior
to selecting machines for the audit
4. Preparing for the Audit Drawing by Lot
5. Methods for Random Selection for an audit
5.1. Proposed Option One: Individually Numbered Chips
5.2. Proposed Option Two: Electronic Random Number
Generator
5.3. Proposed Option Three: Using Nine-sided Dice – (This
Option is still under discussion)
5.4. Proposed Option Four: Hybrid Selection Method
7. Appendix 1 – Section 6210.18 Three-Percent (3%) Audit
Regulations
8. Appendix 2 – 9-211 Regulations
9. Appendix 3- Recount Observation Report Form from MN
10. Appendix 4-Recount Observation Code of Conduct from
MN
11. Appendix 5 – Ballot counting table layout example
from NH
12. Appendix 6 - Examples of Hand Count Tally Sheets used
by other states
Revision History
|
Date |
Version |
Description |
Author |
|
12/21/06 |
Version 1 |
Random
Selection Process for Voting Machine Audits Option 1 Cluster |
SBOE |
|
12/22/06 |
Version 2 |
Using Dice
for the Random Selection Process of Voting Machine Audits |
SBOE |
|
1/17/07 |
Version 3 |
Random
Selection Process for Voting Machine Audits Option 1 Cluster |
SBOE |
|
1/24/07 |
Version 4 |
Using Dice
for the Random Selection Process of Voting Machine Audits |
SBOE |
|
2/23/07 |
Version 5 |
The Random
Selection of Voting Machines for Post Election Auditing |
SBOE |
|
6/12/09 |
Version 6 |
Audit
Procedure for 6210 18 draft |
NYSTEC |
|
6/22/09 |
Version 7 |
Audit Procedure
for 6210 18 ver 7 |
NYSTEC/SBOE |
|
6/22/09 |
Version 8 |
Audit
Procedure for 6210 18 ver 8 |
SBOE |
|
|
|
|
|
1.
Background
1.1. Purpose and contents of this document
The
purpose of this document is to provide guidance on preparing for and performing
the audit required by the New York State Election Law Section 9-211 and by new
proposed regulations in Part 6210.18. Section 2 of this document includes
recommendations provided as a result of an analysis of multiple “best
practices” and policies and procedures from a number of other states,
independent industry experts and Federal guidelines.
In
addition to the statutory and proposed regulatory audit requirements, the
amended federal Court Order of June 4, 2009 also provides for a Post Election
Audit to verify the election results. The county board of elections’ required
audit requirements will be as follows:
·
Full compliance with the audit provisions contained in Election Law
§9-211 and the audit provisions contained in the proposed regulation 6210.18.
·
Conduct a 100% hand audit of all ballots in election districts when the
difference in the result of the election between the potential winning and
losing candidates in any contested election on the ballots is 1% or less.
In
addition to “best practices” recommendations, Section 3 contains State Board of
Elections (SBOE) recommended methods for organizing your voting machine
inventory prior to selecting systems for an audit. Section 4 contains three
SBOE-approved methods for the random selection of voting systems for an audit.
Finally
in Section 5, we provide a step by step guide from start to finish, for
accomplishing an audit.
1.2. New York State Section 9-211 Audit of voter verifiable audit records.
Section 9-211 of New York State
Election Law
also contains audit requirements. The text of Section 9-211 is included in
Appendix 2 of this document.
1.3. New York State Election Regulations on Post - Election
Audits
Section
6210.18 of the proposed NYCRR would establish uniform statewide procedures by
which manual hand count audits must be performed of a subset of ballots from
each election. The county boards of elections retain the authority to order
manual counts of a greater number of records in whole or in part under such
other and additional circumstances as they deem warranted. The text of Section 6210.18 is included in
Appendix 1 of this document.
1.4. Purpose of the Audit
It
is important to understand the purpose of the New York State post-election
audit. According to Best Practices and Principles for
Post-Election Audits (http://www.electionaudits.org/principles),
a post-election audit routinely checks voting system performance in contests,
regardless of how close margins of victory appear to be. The post-election audit is designed to
assess how the electronic voting system performed on Election Day using the
actual votes cast by voters. This verifies the accuracy of the voting
system and should not be confused with a recount which is meant to verify the
election results. New York State has specific statutory provisions for
the canvass and re-canvass of election results.
Post-election
auditing helps verify that the complex voting systems, including central-count
systems, in use today are accurately encoding and tallying ballots and that the
winners of each election contest are called correctly. However, effective post-election auditing
can also serve as a tool for:
·
Detecting voting system problems that may
require further investigation;
·
Revealing when escalation of recounts are
necessary to verify election outcomes
·
Finding common errors voters make in
marking ballots that might be avoided in future elections with voter education;
·
Identifying human errors in the tally
process that can be remedied by new procedures in future elections;
·
Deterring fraud;
·
Providing statistical data to improve
future elections or audits;
·
Providing for continuous improvements in
the conduct of elections; and
·
Promoting public confidence in elections.
2. Best
practices for Preparing for an audit
Detailed
steps for preparing for the selection of which voting systems will be included
in an audit are detailed in section 3. Examples of methods for actually
conducting a random selection of voting systems that will be included in an
audit are explained in section 4. This section provides recommendations for
topics that will need to be discussed and planned, to prepare for and organize
an audit.
2.1. Preliminary Organizational Work
Audit Documents
·
Prepare all possible
audit tally sheets for each voting system that may be subject to an audit and
for each election district and, in the case of a primary election, for each
political party with a contest to be decided at each election.
Staffing
·
Seek a balanced mix.
o
Managers
o
Numbers of auditing personnel
o
Number of auditing teams
·
A poll worker participating in the manual tally should not be assigned
to tally the results from a precinct in which that individual served as a poll
worker on Election Day.
·
It is recommended that an Oath of Office be required for all Audit
Inspectors and any other audit team members. Here is a sample Audit Inspector
oath which can be used for this purpose:
OATH
OF OFFICE
Swear
in Audit Inspector officials as election officials
“I, _____________________________(insert name) the undersigned
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States of America and the State of New York; and that I will faithfully
discharge the duties of the office of Audit Inspector for the County of
_________________ according to the best of my ability, that I am a registered
voter and resident of such county, that I do not hold any public office, am not
a candidate for any office to be voted for by the voters at this election or
the spouse, parent or child of such candidate, that I have not been removed or
otherwise disqualified as an election worker and am able to speak and read the
English language and write it legibly.”
Signature:
__________________ Date:
__________________
How to prepare ballots for
auditing
In
reviewing how other states organize their ballots for the audit process we have
identified the ‘read and mark’ method as the best method to use when conducting
the NYS post election audit. This
method is explained below:
READ AND MARK METHOD
In
the read and mark method, the bipartisan team of Audit Inspectors sort the
ballots secured from the voting system ballot box or other secure container
into that machines election districts,
and ballot style piles. An Audit
Inspector reads aloud the selections made on each ballot from that machine’s
election district for each contest and/or ballot proposal. Observers must listen to different names
read aloud. An audit team member of the
opposite political party than the reader will observe the votes as read aloud
to ensure that they have accurately been announced.
As
the votes are read aloud, an individual of the opposite political party than
the reader will mark the vote on a tally sheet. An individual of the opposite political party than the marker
will observe the marks posted to the tally sheet to ensure that they have
accurately been marked.
Tallying
ballot marks during the audit count shall be completed nearly as practical to
the provisions contained in NYS Election Law Section 9-116.
§
9-116. Tallying ballots; generally.
1.
As each vote for any office or position, or upon any ballot proposal, is
announced, a clerk, or, if there be no clerks, an inspector, under the scrutiny
of a clerk or inspector of opposite political faith immediately shall tally it in
black ink, with a downward stroke from right to left upon the official tally sheet.
Each such clerk or inspector, as he tallies a vote, shall announce clearly the
name of the person for whom he tallies it, or that he tallies the vote blank or
void as the case may be, or, in the case of a ballot proposal, that he tallies the
vote “yes” or “no”. When the name of a person voted for is not printed on the
tally sheet, such clerks or inspectors shall write it in full thereon in ink in
the place provided therefor.
2.
When all the votes upon the same office, position or ballot proposal shall have
been canvassed the tally thereof shall be verified by adding together all the
votes tallied thereupon. Whenever the total number of votes tallied (including
blank and void votes) for any office or party position, divided by the number
of persons to be nominated or elected thereto, or tallied for any ballot proposal,
does not exactly equal the number of ballots cast (including blank and void
ballots), a recanvass must be made immediately in order to correct the error.
In
applying this section to a primary election the term “ballots” means the
ballots of the party whose tallied votes for an office or party position are counted
as provided above . Upon a recanvass the clerks or inspectors must keep the
tally in ink from left to right across the previous tally marks.
3.
When the errors if any have been corrected such clerks or inspectors shall
indicate the last tally opposite each name by forthwith drawing in ink a long
horizontal line immediately after the last tally mark opposite such name. Such
tally sheets having thus been prepared, verified and closed, such clerks or
inspectors shall sign their initials on each sheet, in any blank space thereof.
CHOOSING
NUMBER OF AUDIT INSPECTOR TEAMS
•
The more observers and sets
of eyes on a single ballot, the greater the certainty of the results.
•
Evaluate the audit work
to be completed and assign a number of audit teams and audit team supervisors
to the task, taking into consideration:
o
Total number of voting
systems that may be subject to audit;
o
Total number of
different ballot styles;
o
Total number of
contests for offices, party positions or ballot proposals at the election; and
o
Potential total number
of ballots to be audited.
RULE
OF THUMB FOR AUDIT TEAMS
•
Aim for at least 2-3
sets of eyes on each ballotto be audited, as well as the recording of each vote.
•
Use a 4-person bipartisan
team or teams.
•
At least two bipartisan
team members check the ballot marks and at least two other bipartisan team
members mark the vote on the tally sheet and verify the accuracy of those
entries.
•
All 4 members of the
audit team verify and record and check the sums on the audit tally sheets.
ORGANIZING
FOR THE COUNT
Organize the Audit Site
It is critical that the
decorum of the audit site is conducive to the important work to be conducted in
it. An organized and orderly work
space, and as quiet an atmosphere as possible will help ensure the audit teams
have an appropriate environment in which they can concentrate and accurately
log their findings. Observers will be
better able to hear the incremental decisions of the audit teams, and the
outcome of the audit. Consider the
following as you organize your audit site:
·
Tables should be placed
at distances from each other sufficient to allow for an adequate path of travel
for audit team members and supervisors.
·
Sufficient and
comfortable seating should be provided.
·
Audit team members and
supervisors should wear name tags.
·
Observers should sign
in, and identify whom they represent.
Consider identifying observers with a ‘Guest Pass’ sticker, so that
security can be maintained in a crowded and/or active audit site.
·
Observers should be
able to hear and see the activity of the audit team, but shall not be so close
to the team as to hover over them or distract them.
·
Be sure adequate rest
breaks are taken, to keep the audit team fresh. When breaks are taken, assign a bi-partisan team to guard the
ballots and audit team documents until the audit team returns.
Custom audit supplies:
·
Audit tally sheets:
documents that have been prepared with specific audit-related information such
as machine serial number, audit number drawn, poll site in which the unit was
used, election districts (and in primary elections, political parties) served
by the voting system, etc. A sample of
an audit tally sheet can be found in the Appendix.
·
Additional seals for
securing containers into which audited ballots will be placed.
·
A copy of the audit
procedures and any additional guidance materials provided by the county board
of elections.
·
A copy of the audit
notice sent to candidates.
General supplies needed for
use in the audit:
·
Binder clips, rubber
bands or other reliable binding items, for securing manageable packets of ballots
to be audited.
·
Office supplies such as
red pens, red pencils, highlighters, post-it note pads
·
Two containers (boxes,
bins, etc) of an appropriate size, into which packets of audited and unaudited
ballots can be placed, to keep them secure and separate.
Arrange
the audit counting site for counting
Room
layout for counting
2.2. Ballot Handling Recommendations
·
Throughout the audit, ballots may only
be handled by CBOE commissioners of elections or their sworn designated
representatives. No observer or member
of the public may handle a ballot, nor any official audit or election-related
document.
·
The ballot chain of custody forms for the ballots cast from all of the
randomly selected voting systems must be inspected to ensure proper completion.
If the audit team determines that any of the ballot accounting and
reconciliation chain of custody forms were not properly completed, or that
election officials failed to complete the ballot accounting and reconciliation
chain of custody forms, the voting system may not be audited, and a replacement
machine must be selected. The first extra voting system selected during the
random selection process should be used.
o
When such voting system is deferred, it shall be assigned to the
recanvass team or other designated bipartisan team for resolution.
·
Ballot Marks
o
Valid votes that have been marked by the voter outside the vote targets
or using a marking device that cannot be read by the vote tally system shall
not be included in making the determination whether the voting system has met
the standard of acceptable performance.
§
See 9-211.4 and Part 6210.18 (j)
·
Election Officials in Charge of the Audit
o
Duties of responsible Election Official. The election commissioners or
their designated representatives in charge of elections where an audit is to be
completed pursuant to statute or regulation must:
1.
Be present or personally represented throughout the audit proceedings;
2.
Be responsible for acquiring sufficient facilities and personnel to
ensure timely and lawful auditing of voting systems and their corresponding
ballots;
3.
Be responsible for the proper training of all personnel participating in
audit proceedings and administer oaths to all audit team members who are not
already duly appointed election inspectors;
4.
Maintain actual control over all proceedings and be responsible for the
lawful execution of all proceedings in the audit counting site;
5.
Be responsible for assuring the lawful retention and storage of ballots
audit records and other pertinent documents; and
6.
Arrange for observation of the audit by providing written notice
(Pursuant to NYS Election Law Section 9-211.1 and proposed regulation Part
6210.18(b)), including a copy of audit procedures with the notice to each
candidate, political party or independent body entitled to appoint
watchers. Such notice shall also
include:
a.
the date, time and location that the audit shall commence;
b.
information on the number of audit teams which will conduct such audit;
and
c.
such other information that the County Board deems necessary.
2.3. Security in Audit Counting Sites
Proceedings at the audit
counting site may be open to the public. They are under the direction of the
election commissioners or their designated personnel in county boards of
elections where an audit is to be completed.
Only persons employed and authorized by the CBOE commissioners for the
purpose of conducting an audit may touch any ballot card, ballot container, or
statement of canvass or other official document.
2.4. Standards of acceptable
performance by voting system
A
comparison of the aggregated results complied by the voting system with the
post-election review must show that the results of the voting system are
consistent with the provisions of proposed Part 6210.18 (e) (1) and, if not,
whether further auditing is required.
Only votes that have been marked by the voter inside the vote targets or
using a manual marking device that can be read by the voting system shall be
included in making the determination whether the voting system has met the
standard of acceptable performance for any voting system.
2.5. Questionable Votes and
Marginal Marks
Voting
systems scanners are specifically calibrated to recognize marks made by voters
in sensitive marking areas of the ballot. Scanners will easily recognize
votes that are marked with a density that is within the calibrated
thresholds. In an audit, the human eye may perceive these marks
differently that the scanner, however the audit team members and observers
alike should understand that the scanners, in accordance with Section 7-201.1e provide
each voter with a notification of any mark the system perceives as questionable
and provides each voter with the opportunity to remark their ballot or cast it
'as-is'.
The Brennan
Center provides additional information on how to address this issue, in the
following selection from the Brennan Center Report on Post-Election Audits:
THE CHALLENGE OF MATCHING
PAPER AND ELECTRONIC RECORDS
Counting paper records
presents at least two related problems. The first is that people often miscount.
Consequently, there are going to be many instances where the hand count of paper
records and the electronic tally do not match, not because there was a problem
with the machines, but because the auditors made mistakes counting. There has
been very little research evaluating different methods of hand-counting, but we
discuss directions such research should take in the “Directions for the Future”
section of this paper.
Several jurisdictions
partially address the problem of miscounting by having at least two people
count the same paper record. For example, San Mateo County, California uses a team
of four people to conduct their post-election audit. One person reads and
announces the contents of a given paper record, another observes that the paper
record has been announced correctly and two people record a running tally of
votes for each contest. The recorders announce the end of each ten-vote
increment, at which point the team checks for errors in the tally. If the team
finds an error, the counting process can be rolled back to the last point of
agreement.
Minnesota provides an
example of how incremental checking during post-election audits works in
practice. Minnesota law requires election judges to count the votes for each
race or ballot question by creating piles of voted ballots for each candidate
in a race and piles for blank or defective responses. Election judges check the
sorted piles of ballots for the particular race or question to ensure that all
ballots have been placed in the correct pile. Ballots may be stacked in groups
of twenty-five crosswise. After the final count for the race or question is
completed, all ballots are returned to a single pile and the process is repeated
for the subsequent race or ballot question.
The second, related problem
is that auditors are likely to want the paper records to match the electronic
records. The problems in Cuyahoga County, Ohio in 2004, where audit supervisors
rigged the ballot selection so that no discrepancies would be found, exemplify the
danger of auditors hoping to find perfect matches and to avoid the difficult
questions and additional work that might result if the records do not match.
To counter the
understandable temptation to make the paper and electronic records match, we
recommend against revealing the unofficial electronic election results to the
individuals performing the manual count. The audit teams should not have access
to the unofficial results; an audit supervisor or election official can serve
as a buffer and inform each team if their audit results match the unofficial
electronic results, without revealing the magnitude or direction of any
deviation. If the manual count does not match the electronic results, the audit
team should conduct additional “blind” recounts of the records of affected
races[1].
This practice need not prevent elections officials from freezing and publishing
unofficial election results prior to conducting the audits; it merely means
that auditors should not be made aware of the vote tallies on the particular
machines they are auditing.
Manual counts may sometimes
reveal different voter intent than machine counts of ballots. Overvotes,
marginal marks, hesitation marks, and other stray markings on manually marked ballots
could cause optical scan voting machines to misinterpret voter intent that a
human reviewer would be able to discern. This may lead to deviations or
explained discrepancies when auditing optical scan paper ballots. Fortunately,
these discrepancies are easy to recognize and account for, so they should not
cause any serious problem; they qualify as an explained discrepancy and need
not trigger any kind of recount or additional audit, except in the case of an
extremely close race.
To see the entire Brennan Center report referenced here, see http://electionaudits.org/node/14 - Brennan Center Report on Post-Election Audits
3.
How
to Organize your Voting Systems inventory prior to selecting machines for the
audit
Organize inventory
To conduct a drawing by lot,
to determine which units shall be audited, several documents must be prepared
in advance of the drawing. For
illustrative purposes, we will assume an inventory of 50 voting systems or when
auditing a central count system, 100 election districts. Samples of the two documents described below
are provided in the Appendix. The first
document to be prepared is a Drawing by Lot Spreadsheet, used to track the
results of your random drawing:
·
On a document or
spreadsheet with two columns on it, number the first column sequentially, from
1 through 50, which will represent each chip drawn, in order.
·
In the second column,
post the number drawn from the chip container.
For example, on the first draw, chip number 33 is pulled. Enter the number 33 in the second column,
next to number 1. On the second draw,
number 15 is drawn; proceed to enter the number 15 in the second column next to
number 2, and so on, until each chip is drawn for every machine in the
inventory.
·
For central-count
systems, number the total Election Districts in the county in sequential,
numeric order: i.e 100 Election Districts
- In order to do a 3%
audit on all of the county’s election districts, one must multiply the
total number of election districts by 3%
- 100 X 3% = 3
election districts to be audited throughout the county
- To determine which
election districts to audit, one must follow steps 1 and 2 and apply
those steps to election districts instead of machines.
·
Upon completion of the
random drawing selection, the CBOE Commissioners or their designees shall sign
and date the Drawing by Lot spreadsheet.
The second document to be
prepared for use in the drawing by lot is an Inventory Assignment
Spreadsheet. Once completed, this
document will identify which specific voting systems will be audited, based
upon the random drawing.
·
On a document or
spreadsheet with five (5) columns on it, number the first column sequentially,
from 1 through 50.
·
In the second column,
next to each sequential number, post each voting system’s serial number.
·
In the third column,
list the poll site in which the unit shall be used
·
In the fourth column,
list the election districts which will be served by the voting system, and in a
primary election, the political party(ies) that constitute those ballots styles. This is especially important if the unit is
to be used in a poll site serving more than a single election district.
·
Using the Drawing by
Lot spreadsheet, post the number drawn first in the fifth column, next to the
corresponding inventory number. For example,
from the Drawing by Lot spreadsheet described above, the first number drawn was
33. Locate number 33 on your Inventory
Assignment Spreadsheet, and post the number 1 in the fifth column. The second number drawn was 15. Locate number 15 on the Inventory Assignment
Spreadsheet, and post the number 2 in the fifth column, and so on, until each
number drawn in order is posted next to a corresponding voting system serial
number.
·
Upon completion of the
transfer of the drawing selection order from the Drawing by Lot Spreadsheet to
the Inventory Assignment Spreadsheet, the CBOE Commissioners or their designees
shall sign and date the Inventory Assignment Spreadsheet.
Both documents shall be time
stamped, copied, as necessary, and the original of each document is to be secured
with other audit documents for archival storage.
4.
Preparing
for the Audit Drawing by Lot
Decide on the method you
will use to conduct your Audit Drawing by Lot.
Practice using that method or tool, to be sure you can conduct the drawing
with confidence. Familiarize yourself
with the official documents to be completed, so that the drawing will be
efficient and accurate.
After notices of the Audit
Drawing by Lot have been sent to candidates, and before the audit is conducted,
review your process and the tools you intend to use to conduct the audit, to be
sure you have the supplies you need and the mechanism you intend to use for the
drawing is in proper working order. For
example:
·
If you intend to use an
on-line, random number generator, access the site you intend to select and
practice generating numbers that will become the basis of your audit selection
process.
·
If you intend to use
chips of some sort, sequentially number them with an indelible marker, equal to
the number of voting systems in your inventory.
·
If you intend to use
dice, be sure you have the correct type of dice described in Section 5.3.
·
If you intend to use
your bingo machine (as used for your ballot drawing purposes), be sure all of
the numbered spheres are accounted for, and that the spinning device works
properly.
Demonstrating the Drawing
Method
Immediately before the Audit
Drawing by Lot, arrange for observers to see that the pieces, parts or other
components of the method you intend to use, are intact:
- If you intend to use
numbered chips of some sort, display the chips in order, so that observers
can see that every sequentially-numbered chip is accounted for.
- If you intend to use
the bingo machine, display all of the numbered spheres in order, so that
observers can see that every sequentially-numbered sphere is accounted
for.
- If you intend to use
an on-line, random number generator, be sure you access the site on a
computer that the observers can see, to ensure transparency in the on-line
process.
- If you intend to use
dice, display them in such a way as to demonstrate to observers the
various sides and colors that will determine the random selections.
5.
Methods
for Random Selection for an audit
5.1.
Proposed Option One: Individually Numbered Chips
Obtain a sufficient quantity of
individually number chips (i.e. bingo balls, Popsicle sticks, poker chips,
etc.). Make sure that they have every number in sequence and that no number is
duplicated.
Step # 1.
At the start of the
random selection process, the number of chips shall equal the total number of
voting systems to be utilized in the election which may be subject to audit.
Number all the machines that will
be part of the audit with a number from 1 to XX, where XX is the last machine
that will be part of the audit. Or,
when auditing a central count voting system, number the election districts from
lowest to highest number. Identify
chips with numbers from 1 to XX (with XX representing the highest number of
voting systems). Secure a box or other
appropriate container with which to conduct the drawing. The container should be smooth and free from
flaps that may trap a chip or chips, and thus impede the random selection.
At the beginning of the random
drawing selection, allow an opportunity for all of the audit observers to see
that the box or container is empty and that you have the requisite number of
chips equal in number to the total number of voting systems utilized in the
election.
Place the required number of
numbered chips into the drawing container and obtain the Drawings by Lot
Spreadsheet to track the results of your random drawing. Select chips one at a time from the drawing
container and read aloud the number. A
drawing clerk of a different political faith than the drawing clerk shall then
record the number on the Drawing by Lot Spreadsheet, also reading aloud the
number as it is being recorded.
Continue in this manner until all of the chips have been selected.
5.2. Proposed Option Two: Electronic Random Number Generator
There
are a number of random number generators available on the internet. One that is
popular is Random.org which can be found at this URL address: http://www.random.org/
Number
all the machines that will be part of the audit with a number from 1 to XX,
where XX is the last machine that will be part of the audit. Use the True Random Number Generator to
select numbers. For example, if you have 100 systems in your audit you would
proceed as follows:
First pick: Min =1, Max =100 Select the Generate button. Note the result.
Second pick: Min=1, Max =100 Select the Generate button. Note the result.
If the number that is randomly selected is a duplicate repeat the process until
you get a number that has not yet been selected.
Third pick: Min=1, Max =100
Select the Generate button. Note the result. If the number that is randomly
selected is a duplicate repeat the process until you get a number that has not
yet been selected.
Continue selecting random numbers until all 100
machines have a corresponding number.
5.3.
Proposed Option Three:
Using Nine-sided Dice – (This Option is still under discussion)
5.4.
Proposed Option Four:
Hybrid Selection Method
The
objective of this proposed method is to define a process that randomly selects
voting machines for auditing after an election, while adhering to the
requirement that the randomly selected machines must encompass all the races
within an election.
Some
machines designated for specific polling places may be set up to process a
single collection of races and ballot proposals constituting a single
“ballot-style”, while others assigned to “election centers” may be setup to
process multiple ballot-styles. Process
2 presented below handles any combination of setups within an election. Process 1, while restricted to elections in
which all machines are dedicated to a single ballot-style, permits a more
intuitive introduction to the components of both processes.
The
requirement that the randomly selected machines must encompass all the races within a county is equivalent to the requirement
that collectively the randomly selected machines must encompass all the ballot-styles within the county. This follows since the collection of all the
ballot-styles in an election will contain all the races within that
election. Working with ballot-styles
rather than the individual races makes the selection process less voluminous
and more easily executed.
Certainly,
if the objective of the process was just randomly selecting voting machines,
with no concern for the inclusion of all ballot styles or races, the process
would be simple. Specifically: (1) Assign each machine a number from 1 to
the number of machines. (2) Then use any
number of methods to randomly select the prescribed number of machines. The easiest and most time-efficient would be
to use an unrelated random number generator service outside the sphere of
political influence - such as those found in the public domain. These services (including internet based
services) are autonomous with no way of sensing the application to which their
selection process is being applied.
By
adding the requirement that we need to not only randomly select P percent of
the machines to be used in an election, but that the selected machines must
contain all the races in the county, the process becomes more complex. The number of ballot-styles operational
within a county for a particular election can have a substantial affect on the
number of machines selected.
For
instance, it you considered a county with 100 machines and you wanted to select
3% of the machines to be audited that could mean that 3 machines would be
selected. But, if there were 8
ballot-styles involved in the election, then if all the randomly selected
machines happened to be single ballot-style machines, it would take a selection
of 8, not 3 machines to satisfy both the audit and ballot style
requirements.
If,
on the other hand, if the first 3 machines selected happened to be multi
ballot-style (voting center machines), it is conceivable that they could
collectively satisfy the ballot-style requirement.
The
two processes described below systematically incorporate these influences into
their selection. They each randomly
select the minimal number of machines to be audited in mutual
consideration of the machine selection percentage and ballot-style
requirements.
PROCESS 1 – Each Machine in
the Election Operates One Ballot-Style
This
process assumes the following:
- Each voting machine has been labeled with a number from 0001 to the
number of machines used in the current election designated as NVM.
- Each ballot-style has been labeled with a number from 001 to the
number of ballot-styles required throughout the county utilized in the
election.
- Each machine has been designated with the ballot-style that it
provided on Election Day. (In conjunction with this, 0010-026 will
represent that Machine 10 presented Ballot-Style 26 to the voters on
Election Day.)
- P specifies the (minimum) percentage of voting machines to be
randomly audited. Minimum because
the number of machines finally selected could be larger because of the
ballot-style requirement.
- The hyphenated number MMMM-SSS will represent the
machine/ballot-style combinations (or Combos for brevity) of machine
number MMMM setup with ballot-style SSS
Step 1 – List the machine/ballots combos in machine order
Sequentially list the
voting machine/ballot-type combinations starting with machine 0001 and ending
with NVM.
With 200
machines and 15 ballot-styles the list would look similar to
0001-005
0002-011
0003-004
.
.
0200-013 representing the last
machine (200) operating ballot-style 13.
Step 2 – Select All Combos Containing Ballot-Style 001
Starting with the lowest
number machine, select all Combos ending in 001 and create an indexed list of
these Combos. This list will be
referred to as the “001-List “
The 01-List could appear as
follows:
Index Combo
01
0018-001
02
0036-001
03
0071-001
04
0123-001
05
0142-001
06
0187-001
Step 3 – Determine the Number of machines to be Randomly Selected
Calculate P divided by 100
times the largest index number and round-up this number to the next largest
integer. This result will be designated
as NSELECT indicating the number of Combos to be selected.
With the list shown in Step 2
and P defined as 3%. This calculation
would be 3/100 x 06 = 18/100 = .18 and rounding up to the next integer would
produce 1.
NSELECT = 1
Step 4 – Randomly Select the
Specified Number of 001 Combos from the 001-List
Use a random number
generator to select NSELECT Combos from the 001-List and place these Combos in
a list referred to as the COMBO AUDIT LIST.
In the above example with
NSELECT = 1, any one of the Combos could have been randomly selected and placed
in COMBO AUDIT LIST, e.g. if 0123-001 was selected, then it would produce the following:
COMBO
AUDIT LIST
0123-001
Step 5 - Repeat Steps 2, 3 & 4
for the remaining Ballot Styles
Repeat Steps 2, 3 & 4
for each subsequent ballot-style adding the selected Combos to the COMBO AUDIT
LIST.
Repeating steps 2, 3 & 4 for the 15
ballot-style of this example could result in the following:
COMBO AUDIT LIST
0123-001
0037-002
0043-003
0016-004
0162-005
0086-006
0013-007
0005-008
0057-009
0191-010
0159-011
0007-012
0026-013
0093-014
0122-015
Note: In other examples dependent upon the number
of machines, number of ballot-styles and their assignments, any one the
ballot-styles could have resulted in multiple entries in the COMBO AUDIT LIST,
such as
0005-008
0111-008
0069-008
Step 6 (Final) – Produce
the List of Machines to be Audited
Remove the Ballot-Style
Designation from Each Combo in the COMBO AUDIT LIST and organize/sort the
resultant machine numbers from the smallest to the highest to get a convenient
representation of the MACHINE AUDIT LIST.
For
the above COMBO AUDIT LIST the following machine audit list would result
MACHINE
AUDIT LIST
0005
0007
0013
0016
0026
0037
0043
0057
0086
0093
0122
0123
0159
0162
0191
Sufficiency Test - Test to make sure the number of machines selected matches
or exceeds the mandated percentage of machines to be audited (P).
In
this example, P was set at 3%. 3% X 200
equals 6 machines required to be audited.
This process produced 15 machines and clearly was driven by the
requirement that each ballot-style was to be included.
Note: In the case of one ballot-style per machine, it can
be proven that this process will always, at least, produce the number of
machines mandated by the specified percentage (P).
PROCESS 2 – One or More
Ballot Styles Per Machine
This
is for the case where machines are used in “voting centers” and some or all of
these voting machines were set up to process multiple ballot-styles. PROCESS 2 for randomly selecting the
machines for auditing in this circumstance proceeds along an identical track
with PROCESS 1 except for the following three minor adaptations:
Step 1 – List the machine/ballots combos in machine order
Sequentially list the
voting machine/ballot type starting with machine 0001 and ending with NVM.
The
adaptation here is that if a machine operates multiple ballots each ballot
becomes a separate Combo in the list.
E.g. If voting machine 16 were to be used
to process ballots 6, 7 & 31, then the list would contain the following 3
entries:
-
-
0016-006
0016-007
0016-031
-
-
Step 6 – Produce the List of
Machines to be Audited
Remove the ballot-style
designation from each combo in the COMBO AUDIT LIST and organize/sort the
resultant machine numbers from the smallest to the highest to get a convenient
representation of the MACHINE AUDIT LIST.
The
only adaptation here is if one machine is included multiple times in the
MACHINE AUDIT LIST then the redundant entries can be eliminated since any
voting center machine, if selected, must be audited for all the ballot-types it
provided on Election Day.
E.g. - -
- -
0026 0026
0043 0043
0043
would be reduced to 0087
0043 0113
0087 -
0113 -
- -
- -
Sufficiency Test - Test to make sure the number of machines selected matches
or exceeds the mandated percentage of machines to be audited (P).
It
may be possible to prove the list of machines selected for auditing by PROCESS
2 will never fail the Sufficiency Test.
But, if we allow for the possibility of PROCESS 2 working with multi
ballot-style machines not to pass the sufficiency test by being N machines
short (no matter how unlikely), then all that would be necessary to complete
the process would be to randomly select N machine from the population of
machines that did not make it into the MACHINE AUDIT LIST. Note that the requirement to include each
ballot-style would have already been achieved by the process through Step 6.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
(1) Using Machine Serial
Numbers: The above processes
start out by labeling the population of voting machines from 0001 to the number
representing the count of machines (NVM).
If a county kept their file of machines by their serial numbers and
wanted the final Machine Audit List to be in terms of these serial numbers,
this could be achieved by the county first making a numbered list of their
machines as a cross-listing (Step 0) and then translating the machine numbers
in the Machine Audit List back to the serial numbers utilizing the cross
listing as Step 7.
(2) Easier Random Number
Selection: The way the above
processes work by considering only those machines (i.e. combos) associated with
one ballot-style at a time, the resultant quantity of numbers to be randomly
selected from is smaller. With random
number generators this doesn’t make a difference, but if manual methods are
required, it makes the random selection process much less burdensome to
conduct.
6. Audit
Process Checklist
This checklist is modeled on a
sample prepared by the New Hampshire Department of State Election Procedure
Manual and has been altered to reflect NY requirements.
Step #1 - Arrange the audit site for counting. The counting area should be segregated from the observer gallery. All counting, however, must occur where it is visible to all legally present observers.
Step #2 - Identify all those who will be serving as audit team inspectors, audit team supervisors or any other audit team members.
Step #3 - Administer oaths and obtain signatures on the oath documents for all audit team members. Retain completed and signed oath documents with other audit materials for archive storage.
Step #4 - Review audit instructions with all audit team members and any observers present.
Step #5 - The bipartisan team of Audit Inspectors shall verify and record on the chain of custody report the ballot box seal.
Step #6 - Open the ballot box(es) in view of the observers, remove all ballots from the container and place the ballots onto the audit table.
Step #7 - Reveal the empty ballot box.
Step #8 - Sort the ballots by election district and, in a primary election, by political party.
Step #9 - Have the audit inspector teams count the ballots, and if necessary for manageability, further sort the ballots into piles of a known size (10, 25, 50 or 100 ballots).
Step #10 - Wrap each pile with a rubber band, clip it with a large binder clip, or other similar fastener.
Step #11 - Locate each audit inspector team’s prepared audit tally sheets. The sheet(s) should be organized in the same order as the ballot, with sections for each office and question and the name of each candidate listed in the same order as they are listed on the ballot. There should be a space following each name/question for one of the counters to put a hash mark for each vote for that candidate/question.
Step #12 - Overview of the counting process:
12 a) Each audit team will count all races and questions in one bound pile of ballots at a time. Note: for the following overview we will assume that 50 ballots are contained in each bound pile of ballots.
12 b) A mark must be made on the tally sheet for each vote cast on each ballot. Make a vertical line (hash mark) for the first four votes for any given candidate and then cross a horizontal line over the vertical lines for the fifth vote for that candidate. If the voter wrote in a candidate, that vote shall be represented by a hash mark in the field designated on the audit tally sheet for write-in votes for that contest.
12 c) If the voter skipped a race or question, that is they did not vote for any candidate or did not make the total number of selections for the contest, or did not mark either yes or no on a ballot proposal, put a hash mark in the “Undervote” line for that office or proposal on the audit tally sheet.
12 d) If the voter overvoted, that is they voted for more candidates than are permitted for that contest, put a hash mark in the “Overvote” line for that office or ballot proposal on the audit tally sheet, EXCEPT THAT;
12 e) In the case of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot more than once for the same office, the voter marked the ballot more than once for the same candidate for the same office, the audit team shall enter a single hash mark on the audit tally sheet where the first vote appears for the candidate in that contest.
12 f) The audit team will then total the votes for all candidates for each office, write-in, or all the “yes,” “no,” votes a ballot proposal, undervotes and overvotes for each question. The total number of hash marks votes for a ‘vote for one’ office must equal the number of ballots in the bound pile (i.e. 50) votes for that office (including the votes for each candidate, write-in, undervote and overvote).
12 g) For offices where the voter may vote to fill two positions the total votes counted should total 100. For offices where the voter may vote to fill three positions the total votes counted should total 150, and so on.
12 h) If the total does not equal 50 the team should check their hash marks for that office/question and correct any errors. The team is done auditing a 50 ballot pile at the point when the office/question totals equal 50.
12 i) As the teams audit, if there is any question regarding how a vote should be recorded, call the audit team supervisors to your table and seek their instructions on how the ballot should be audited.
12 j) If after receiving supervisor instructions, the audit team is still unable to determine whether or not to record the vote in question, the audit team members will then follow the Resolution Procedure found in Step 13.
12 k) If there are many questioned ballots that need to be decided, it is recommended that the audit team hold these ballots aside, complete the remaining ballots in that bound pile and then resolve all questioned ballots within the bundle being audited, at one time. If this is done, however, it is further recommended that all questionable ballots be resolved before the audit team totals are tallied for each bundle. This ensures that the election officials do not know whether the vote on a particular ballot will affect the outcome of the audit. This process reinforces the neutrality and enhances the legitimacy of the audit process.
Step #13 - Audit Resolution Process: [This section is still under Discussion]
Step #14 - Starting with the first contest on the ballot:
14 b) Another audit team member of the opposite political faith than the reader shall observe the ballot to ensure that the vote has accurately been announced.
14 c) As the votes are read aloud, another audit team member (the marker) of the opposite political faith than the reader shall make a hash mark beside that name on the audit tally sheet, and as he or she tallies a vote, shall announce clearly the name of the person for whom he or she tallies it (or in the case of a write-in, undervote, overvote or yes or no vote for a ballot proposal, as the case may be).
14 d) Another audit team member of the opposite political faith than the marker shall observe the marks being posted to the audit tally sheet to ensure that they have been accurately marked.
Step #15 - Continue this process until the votes cast on the entire ballot have been marked on the tally sheet. Then proceed to the next ballot. If a voter has not voted for any candidate for a particular office the reader should state “undervote” and the marker should mark the “undervote” row for that office on the tally sheet.
Step #16 - If the voter voted for two or more candidates for an office where the ballot instructs to vote for one, the reader should read off “overvote” and the marker should mark the “overvote” row on the tally sheet. If the instructions are that a voter should vote for two and the voter voted for three or more follow these same instructions.
Step #17 - When all ballots from the bound pile of ballots (i.e. 50) have been marked on the tally sheet the hash marks should first be totaled for each candidate including the “undervote” and “overvote” rows and the write-in row and then for each office. The total votes for each office/question should equal 50. If they do not, go back through the pile and correct any counting/marking errors.
Step #18 - Upon completion of the audit count for each respective bound pile, each member of the bipartisan audit team of inspectors shall sign and date the audit tally sheet, and bind the pile of ballots with the audit tally sheet on top with a rubber band or clip. The then set that pile aside on the audit table until it can be aggregated into the final reconciliation audit tally report from all of the respective bound piles from the same voting machine.
Step #19 - Continue the audit process with the next pile of ballots.
Step #20 - Upon completion of the audit counting when all of the bound piles contained within the voting machine ballot box for a particular election district, and in the case of a primary election further sorted by party, have been counted, the bipartisan audit team shall tally the piles and aggregate their numbers on a multi-part reconciliation audit tally report. Each member of the bipartisan audit team of inspectors shall sign and date the reconciliation audit tally report and secure all of the bound pile of ballots with one copy of the reconciliation report on top.
Step #21 - The audit team inspectors shall then place all ballots from a single voting machine into a secure container (i.e. banker storage box) labeled with identification information showing the election date and type and the voting machine serial number.
Step #22 - The audit team supervisors should ensure that the audit counting site maintains an orderly and appropriate atmosphere in which audit teams can complete the tallies. The tallying must occur in a manner that provides an opportunity for all legally-present observers to view the audit process. Be mindful however, that when all the audit team inspectors and any other audit team members gather at the audit tallying table and watch the final calculations, everyone conducts themselves in a way that puts no pressure on those making the final calculations, so that the opportunity for disruption and error is diminished. The tallying team should tally the results for all elections. The use of a printing calculator allows the team to check the printed calculator tape as a means of ensuring the accuracy of the tally. The final tallies should be written down on the reconciliation audit tally report, signed and dated by each member of the audit team.
Step #23 - The audit supervisors shall then retrieve the vote tabulation printout produced by the voting system being audited as completed and attested to at the close of polls by the voting system’s primary election inspectors and compare the respective tabulation of votes from such tape to the respective election district/contest reconciliation audit tally report
23 a) The audit supervisors shall then record in the
space provided in the reconciliation audit tally report for the supervisors’
official use, the respective machine totals (tape) numbers.
23 b) They shall then compare the audit vote totals
with the machine totals and note any discrepancies between the totals. If any discrepancies are found, the audit
supervisors and the audit inspector team(s) shall attempt to resolve the
discrepancy. See proposed Part 6210.18
(c) (2).
23 c) If any unresolved discrepancy is detected
between the manual count and the machine totals (tape), even an unresolved
discrepancy of a single vote, the manual count shall be conducted a second time
on such machine or system to confirm the discrepancy.
23 d) If such voting system is required to be
re-audited, to the extent possible, the re-audit should be conducted by a
different audit inspector team.
Step #24 - The audit team members shall then cause
the ballot box or other secure ballot container to be sealed and shall record
such seal(s) on the chain of custody report.
Step #25 - Upon completion of the initial phase of the
audit, the reconciliation audit report shall be submitted to the election
commissioners or their designees for determination on whether or not an expansion
of the audit is required. The election commissioners or their designees
shall date and affix their signatures to the reconciliation audit report on
which their determination has been indicated.
Step
#26 - Announce the results of the
initial phase of the audit.
Step #27 - If an escalation of the audit is required,
the audit teams shall next audit the ballots from the next group of voting
machines or systems identified in the original random drawing of machines to be
audited.
