www.wheresthepaper.org/S1809withsuggestions.htm
2/9/05
Voting
Machines Modernization Act of 2005
Senate Bill S1809
with comments by Teresa Hommel
www.wheresthepaper.org/ny.html
The bill
text below has not been modified; page and line numbers are the same as on the
Senate web site, http://www.senate.state.ny.us/
In
the bill, text underlined
and bold is
new. Text [in square brackets, bold, with strike-out]is old law to be omitted. For ease
of reading, two blank lines are inserted at the beginning of each of the 9
sections of the bill.
11 comments
have been inserted in the bill text, indented, in italic bold.
This
bill has four great weaknesses. It allows the use of electronic voting systems
without protecting election integrity via professional-quality audits and
open-source software. It would result in privatization of elections because it
does not fund or require the state or county Boards of Election to acquire
appropriate computer expertise before evaluating, contracting for, or using
evote systems. It does not explicitly allow the choice of keeping our
mechanical lever machines augmented by accessible ballot-marking devices for
voters with disabilities and language minorities, nor the choice to use of
paper ballots marked by hand or ballot-marking devices. It does not ban
communications devices in electronic voting and vote tabulating systems.
The
comments here on these topics are brief. More information is at www.nyvv.org
and www.wheresthepaper.org/ny.html.
1.
Professional-quality audits of elections conducted with electronic voting
systems should be mandated. In the professional world of information
technology, all transaction-capturing and transaction-processing computer systems
are 100% audited and discrepancies are 100% investigated and corrected to
produce 100% accuracy. Unless this kind of audit and reconciliation is required
in law, accuracy of computer results cannot be assumed. Indeed inaccuracy can
be assumed, and fraud and errors will be routinely undetected. Open-source
software and correction of errors found by technologists who read it results in
more secure systems and hence fewer discrepancies.
2.
Privatization of elections is the unavoidable result of the use of electronic
voting systems by county Boards of Elections in which personnel are not
required to understand and manage their own systems. Vendor service contracts
to handle electronic voting systems should be banned, and the staff of county
boards of elections should be required to gain expertise in the software, data,
and hardware of their electronic voting systems prior to their use, as well as
thorough knowledge of computer security and auditing. The law that allows the
use of electronic voting systems should require and
fund
the training needed for such staff to gain professional competence. Vendors
must be required to provide all information, documentation, and training
necessary for elections staff to gain such competence.
3.
Respect for election professionals and voters alike requires that the choice of
vote-recording and vote-counting technology remain in local hands. Lever
machine and paper ballot options should be decided at the local level.
BILL TEXT:
STATE OF NEW YORK
________________________________________________________________________
1809
2005-2006 Regular Sessions
IN SENATE
February 2, 2005
___________
Introduced by Sens. FLANAGAN, MORAHAN, ALESI, BRUNO, FARLEY, GOLDEN,
LIBOUS, LITTLE, MALTESE, MARCELLINO, MAZIARZ, McGEE, PADAVAN, RATH,
SALAND, SEWARD, TRUNZO, WINNER -- read twice and ordered printed, and
when printed to be committed to the Committee on Elections
AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation to enacting the "voting
machines modernization act of 2005"; and providing for the repeal of
certain provisions upon expiration thereof
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assem-
bly, do enact as follows:
1 Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as
2 the "voting machines modernization act of 2005".
3 § 2. Subdivision 18 of section 1-104 of the election law is amended to
4 read as follows:
5 18. The word "ballot" when referring to voting machines means that
6 portion of the cardboard or paper or other material or electronic
7 display within the ballot frame containing the name of the candidate and
8 the emblem of the party organization by which he was nominated, of the
9 form of submission of a proposed constitutional amendment, proposition
10 referendum or question as provided in this chapter, with the word "yes"
11 for voting for any question or the word "no" for voting against any
12 question except that where the question or proposition is submitted only
13 to the voters of a territory wholly within a county or city, such form
14 shall be determined by the county board of elections. Such statement and
15 the title shall be printed and/or displayed in the largest [type]
16 display which it is practicable to use in the space provided.
17 § 3. Subdivision 1 of section 7-104 of the election law, as amended by
18 chapter 654 of the laws of 1985, is amended to read as follows:
19 1. All ballots shall be printed and/or displayed in [black ink on
20 clear, white material] a format and arrangement, of such uniform size
21 and style as will fit the ballot frame, and shall be in as plain, clear
22 [type] display as the space will reasonably permit[, capitalizing only
EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD06723-01-5
S. 1809 2
1
the first letters and initials of each name]. Such display
on the
2 ballot shall
satisfy all requirements and standards set forth pursuant
3
to the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002.
4
§ 4. Section 7-121 of the election law, as added by chapter 352 of the
5
laws of 1986, is amended to read as follows:
6
§ 7-121. Ballots which are counted by machine. A board of elections
7
may provide, by resolution adopted
at least two
months before an
8
election at which
voting machines are used, that all ballots cast for
9
such election, other than on the voting machines, shall be counted
by a
10
machine of a type approved by
the state board of elections and that all
11
ballots printed for use at such election may be printed and
arranged in
12
a manner which
would permit them
to be counted by such machine;
13
provided, however that no punch card ballots or punch card ballot
count-
14
ing machines shall be permitted by any board of elections after
November
15
first, two thousand six.
16
§ 5. Section 7-200 of the election law, as amended by chapter 262
of
17
the laws of 1986, subdivision 2 as amended by chapter 356 of the laws of
18
1986, is amended to read as follows:
19
§ 7-200. Adoption and use of voting [machine] machines. 1. [The board
20
of elections of the city of New York and the local legislative
governing
21
body of each other city and of each town shall, and
the board of trus-
22
tees of any village may adopt any kind of voting machine approved
by the
23
state board of elections, or the use of which has
been specifically
24
authorized by law; and
thereupon such voting machine may be used at any
25
or all elections and shall be used at all general or special
elections
26
held in such
city, town or
village and in every contested
primary
27
election in the city of New York and in every contested primary
election
28
outside the city of New York in which there are one
thousand or more
29
enrolled voters qualified
to vote except in a town or city in which the
30
voting machines owned by such town or city do not permit the
primary of
31
more than one party on a single voting machine for
voting, registering
32
and counting votes cast at such elections.
33
2. No city or town may purchase any voting machine of a type approved
34
by the state board of
elections after September first, nineteen hundred
35
eighty-six unless such type of voting machine has been approved
for use
36
in that county by the
county board of elections. No more than two types
37
of voting machines may be used in any city, town or village at
a single
38
election. If a voting machine of a type approved by the
state board of
39
elections after September first, nineteen hundred eighty-six is
used at
40
an election in any
election district, no machine of a type approved for
41
use by the state board of elections before September first,
nineteen
42
hundred eighty-six may be used in such election district at any
subse-
43
quent election. Notwithstanding the other provisions of
this subdivi-
44
sion, any county, city or
town may borrow or lease for use on an exper-
45
imental basis for a period of not more than one year each, machines
of
46
any type approved by the state board of elections after September
first,
47
nineteen hundred eighty-six.
48
3.] The state
board of elections shall adopt
minimum standards for
49
voting machines, which meet the requirements and specifications
of this
50
chapter and other
specifications of such board to be used at all gener-
51
al, special and primary elections conducted pursuant to
this chapter.
52
The state board
of elections must certify that a voting machine meets
53
such minimum standards before it can be used by any county, city,
town
54
or village after November first, two thousand six. All
voting machines
55
certified by the state
board of elections
shall be contracted
for
56
through a competitive
bidding process. Nothing in this subdivision
S. 1809 3
1
shall be deemed to prevent the state board of elections from certifying
2
more than one voting machine in the manner provided by this
section.
Comment
1, on the first two sentences in the provision above.
The
State Board of Elections gets broad powers here. The law
should give greater guidance for
minimum standards for the
secure use of electronic voting
systems.
3
2. a. There
is hereby established, within the state
board of
4
elections, a citizen's election modernization advisory
committee. The
5
citizen's election modernization advisory committee shall recommend
6
voting machine selection criteria and specifications.
7
b. Such committee shall be composed of eleven members as follows:
8
(1) four representatives of
boards of elections
appointed by the
9
governor, upon advice and consent of the senate;
10
(2) the director of the office for technology;
11
(3) two members appointed by the temporary president of the
senate;
12
(4) two members appointed by the speaker of the assembly;
13
(5) the state advocate for persons with disabilities; and
14
(6) one individual with disabilities appointed by
the governor, upon
15
advice and consent of the senate.
Comment
2, on the provision 2. above.
The
citizen's committee should be required to include
independent
computer experts as well as financial auditors,
CPAs,
or computer auditors. Otherwise this committee
will
be unable to look behind the accessible face of
the machines to evaluate their
susceptibility to fraud.
The committee should also be
required to have multipartisan
blance, with the same number of
appointees from each of
the major parties.
Comment 3, on paragraph c. below.
The citizen’s committee should also
be mandated or
allowed to consider old voting
technologies.
It is not clear what is envisioned
by the word “how” in
The phrase “how to employ new
voting technologies.”
16
c. Such committee will make a preliminary report of
its recommenda-
17
tions to the state board of elections on or before
June fifteenth, two
18
thousand five to advise the state board of elections how to employ
new
19
voting technologies which
meet the requirements of the federal Help
20
America Vote Act of 2002 and which best serve the needs of
the citizens
21
of this state, and shall
make a final report thereon to the state board
22
of elections on or before July thirty-first, two thousand five.
23
3. The state board of elections shall, pursuant to section one
hundred
24
sixty-three of the state finance law, enter into contracts or
procure-
25
ment arrangements for the
purchase of voting machines and shall provide
26
such voting machines to any county, city or town. Any county,
city or
27
town which takes possession of voting machines from the
state board of
28
elections shall thereafter own such voting machines. Nothing
in this
29
section shall be
construed to require the state board of elections to
30
provide a county, city
or town with
all voting machines
it shall
31
require. The local
board of elections shall select
a single voting
32
machine from the list of voting machines certified by the state
board of
33
elections for use throughout their respective county.
Comment
4, on the sentence above.
The local board of elections should
also be explicitly
allowed to select a voting
technology that does not
require voting machines, such as
paper ballots and optical
scanners.
34
4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
voting machine
35
approved for use
as of the first of January two
thousand five, may
36
continue to be used at elections held pursuant to
this chapter until
37
August thirty-first, two thousand six.
38
5. For five years after any voting machine of a
type approved by the
39
state board of elections after September first, nineteen hundred eight-
40
y-six is first used in any election district, the county,
city or town
41
which purchased such machine
shall provide a
model of such
voting
42 machine for
each polling place in which any
such election district is
43
located. Such models shall meet the standards set forth in
regulations
44
promulgated by the state board of elections.
45
[4.] 6. Whenever
there are more offices to be elected than can be
46
accommodated on the voting machine or more candidates have
been nomi-
47
nated for an office than can be
accommodated on the voting machine, the
48
board of elections may provide for the use of separate paper ballots for
49
such offices, when other offices are voted for on voting machines
by
50
voters of the same election district.
51
7. The state board of elections shall promulgate rules and
regulations
52
as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this section.
53
§ 6. Section 7-202 of
the election law is amended by adding a new
54
subdivision 6 to read as follows:
55
6. All voting machines shall
produce and retain
a voter verified
56
permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity which
shall record
S. 1809 4
1
each vote to be cast and which shall be displayed to the
voter from
2
behind a window or other device before the ballot is cast.
Comment 5, on the paragraph above.
The requirement for a voter
verified permanent
paper record should be specifically
for electronic
voting systems. If mechanical lever
machines are
determined to retained, they should
not be
required to produce voter verified
permanent
paper records.
Comment 6, on the section below.
This
section on escrow will give a false sense of
security
to people who are not computer-savvy.
Imagine
that you cannot read numbers or count.
You
have money in your hand. Someone offers to keep
it
for you. He offers to count it for you, and later
before
he returns the money to you he will count
it
again and assure you that the amount is the same.
You
have no way of confirming what he tells you.
Do you feel secure? That arrangement is more
secure
than
the escrow requirements in this bill.
This
bill’s escrow design requires privatization—it
Delegates the entire procedure to
manufacturers or
vendors. The bill should instead
require training of
election personnel to make a
complete disk image copy,
to
know the purpose of each file, and to examine
each
file to confirm its correct size and content.
This
bill should require a complete disk image copy
to
be made, including all files. This should be done
for
two reasons. First, data files can contain
malicious
programming which can be executed
automatically
when the file is used, such as
font
files. Second, a complete disk image copy
is
needed in order to determine whether additional
programming
is (or was) present in the system.
The
bill should specify that the escrow copy
must
be made after the setup and checkout of the
system
for each election, just prior to securing the
computer
in preparation for the election.
The
bill should require that the making of the
complete
disk image copy and its evaluation prior
to
escrow storage should be done before observers from
all
parties with candidates in the election, after
proper
notification. Copies of the complete
disk
image
copy should be available to such parties.
The
bill should require routine evaluation of the
voting
system immediately after the election,
and
routine comparison to the escrow copy of the
system.
Board of Election personnel should know how
to
perform these technical tasks, and should perform
them
before observers from all parties with candidates
in
the election.
As
written, the bill mandates secret systems and
places
the burden on candidates and parties to sue in
court
for the right to verify the integrity of the
equipment
(hardware, software, and data) used in
each
election.
The
bill also mandates the retention of insufficient
information to verify equipment
integrity.
3
§ 7. The election law is amended by adding a new section 7-208 to read
4
as follows:
5
§ 7-208. Escrow
requirements. Prior to
the use of any electronic
6
voting machine or ballot counting
equipment in any
election in the
7
state, on or
after August thirty-first, two thousand six, the state
8
board of elections and the local board of elections using such
electron-
9
ic machine or ballot counting equipment shall:
10
1. require that the manufacturer and/or vendor of such equipment
shall
11
place into escrow with the state board of elections a
complete copy of
12
all programming, source coding and software employed by the
electronic
13
voting machine or ballot counting equipment.
14
2. require that the manufacturer and/or vendor of such
equipment file
15
with the state
board of elections and the appropriate local boards of
16
elections a waiver, prepared by the state board of
elections, which
17
shall waive all rights of the vendor or manufacturer to assert
intellec-
18
tual property or trade secret rights in any court of competent
jurisdic-
19
tion hearing a challenge to the results of any election.
20
3. require that the manufacturer
and/or vendor of such equipment file
21
with the state board of elections and the appropriate local
boards of
22
elections a consent
to having and cooperating in the testing of any
23
programming, source coding, firmware, or software, pursuant to
an order
24
of any board of elections or court of competent jurisdiction.
25
4. promulgate rules
and regulations prohibiting
the use in any
26
election in the state of any software, firmware, or source coding which
27
has not been certified or for which required filings are not made.
28
§ 8. The election law is amended by adding a new section 9-211 to read
29
as follows:
30
§ 9-211. Audit of voter verifiable audit records. 1. Within fifteen
31
days after each general, special or primary election, and within
seven
32
days after every village election conducted by the
board of elections,
33
the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such
board
34
shall manually audit the
voter verifiable audit
records from three
35
percent of voting machines within the jurisdiction of such board.
Voting
36
machines shall be selected for audit through a random,
manual process.
37
At least five days prior to the time fixed for such selection
process,
38
the board of
elections shall send notice by
first class mail to each
39
candidate, political party and independent body entitled
to have had
40
watchers present at the polls in any election district in
such board's
41
jurisdiction. Such notice shall state the time and place fixed
for such
42
random selection process.
The audit shall
be conducted in the same
43
manner, to the extent applicable, as a canvass of paper
ballots. Each
44
candidate, political party
or independent body
entitled to appoint
45
watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to
appoint such
46
number of watchers to observe the audit.
Comment
7, on the paragraph above.
Notice
of the selection process should also
be
posted in public in the office of the
county
Board of Elections.
Comment
8, on the paragraph above.
The
audit should be explicitly allowed to
determine the obvious intent of the
voter and
to count all votes.
No audit should be limited to being
conducted
in any specific manner, because to
determine the
cause and source of discrepancies
or fraud may
require various means.
47
2. The manual audit
tallies for each voting machine shall be compared
48
to the tallies recorded by such voting machine, and a report
shall be
49
made of such comparison
which shall be filed in the office of the state
50
board of elections.
Comment 9, on the paragraph above.
All
reports of manual audit tallies and their
comparison
to machine tallies should be required
to
be posted immediately in public in the office of
the
county Board of Elections, and should be provided
without
charge to the candidates, parties or
independent
bodies entitled to appoint watchers.
The
law should not force the public to file
FOIL
requests to view this information.
These
reports must be made, distributed, and posted
in
a timely manner before certification of election
results,
so that candidates, parties, and independent
bodies
have sufficient time to sue for further or
complete
audits. No election should be certified
if
audits are required but not completed.
51
3. The state board of elections shall promulgate, by regulation,
a
52
uniform statewide standard to be used by boards of elections
to deter-
53
mine when a discrepancy between the manual audit tallies and
the voting
54
machine tallies shall require a further voter verifiable record
audit of
55
additional voting machines
or a complete manual audit of all machines
56
within the jurisdiction of a board of elections.
Comment 10, on the paragraph above.
The
problem of discrepancies in vote counts
is
difficult to solve but crucial to election
integrity
and the legitimacy of representative
government.
Because
of the ease of falsification of computer
results,
the law should require complete 100%
audits of all computerized voting
systems, with
100% reconciliation of
discrepancies, and 100%
accuracy required.
(Because of the ease of falsifying
all computers
of the same type within the state,
if there are
errors in the vote counts in one
county, similar
errors may be found in all
counties.)
S. 1809 5
1
4. If a complete audit shall be conducted, the results of such
audit
2
shall be used by the canvassing board in making the statement of
canvass
3
and determinations of
persons elected and
propositions rejected or
4
approved. The results of a partial voter verifiable record audit
shall
5
not be used in lieu of voting machine tallies.
6
5. Notwithstanding subdivision
three of this section, if a voting
7
machine is found to have failed to record votes in a manner
indicating
8
electronic
operational failure, the board of canvassers shall use the
9
voter verifiable audit records to
determine the votes
cast on such
10
machine, provided such
records were not also impaired by the electronic
11
operational failure of the voting machine.
Comment 11, on the paragraph above.
The
law should give guidance as to what
operational
failure might consist of, in the form
of
a non-exclusive list. Suggestions are:
a.
A voter sees his or her vote switched to a different
candidate on the electronic screen.
b.
A voter touches a touchscreen "button" for a
candidate, but the screen does not register
the vote.
c.
The screen when it first appears contains votes
already registered that the voter did not
enter.
d.
One or more candidates or questions are missing
from the ballot displayed.
e.
The wrong ballot is displayed on the screen.
f.
The final summary display does not accurately
contain the voting choices made by the
voter.
g.
The voter cannot change a vote displayed on the
screen.
h.
The voter-verifiable printout does not contain the
same choices that the voter entered on the
screen.
12
§ 9. This act shall take effect immediately, provided, however, that:
13
(a) sections six and eight of this act shall take effect
August 31,
14
2006; and
15
(b) subdivision 2 of
section 7-200 of the election law, as added by
16
section five of this act, shall expire and be deemed repealed
August 1,
17 2006.