United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
By Fax: 202-228-3027
I am your constituent! I oppose S1487, the election reform bill introduced by Sen. Dianne Feinstein that is now in the Senate Rules and Administration Committee. Please do not sponsor or vote for S1487. Please carefully evaluate the details of this bill.
Do you want:
I hope you will read the legislative analysis of S1487:
Here are links detailing the EAC’s past dysfunction:
a. GAO Report: All Levels of Government Need to Address E-Voting Challenges
b. EAC has failed its mission, Testimony of Ellen Theisen, March 13, 2007
c. EAC: political, secretive, unresponsive to citizen concerns, protective of vendor and
ITA interests. www.votersunite.org/info/EACFailedMission.asp
d. EAC, past dysfunction: www.wheresthepaper.org/HR811.html#EAC
S1487 touches on important topics but in trivial or harmful ways. Many requirements carry burdensome administrative overhead with minimal benefit. For example, the section on “election observers” requires maximum state paperwork and administration including an appeal procedure, but the observers are mandated only to watch 3 procedures typically not performed in poll sites.
S1487 bans paperless touchscreen voting machines (“DREs”), but assumes that America’s future election equipment will consist of DREs with a paper trail. Most citizens knowledgeable about voting equipment now oppose DREs. We want real voter-marked paper ballots (whether counted by hand or optical scanner), and observation from election day until the election is certified.
Just when surveillance cameras could open our poll sites to continuous observation and prevent fraud, DREs establish a new barrier to citizen oversight. Citizens are shut out. And under S1487 states, candidates and parties are also shut out. No one can understand the procedures conducted inside DREs. No one can observe in a meaningful way sufficient to attest that procedures and counting were proper and honest. Voters can’t even observe their own votes.
Courts today are playing the same role with DREs that courts of yesterday played with wooden ballot boxes that never were opened. Our courts are protecting the secret software and any other secrets inside, such as log files showing communications intrusions, alterations of tally files, and other evidence of fraud. This is the reason we sometimes hear “there’s no evidence that DREs have ever been subject to fraud.” Despite talk about outside hackers, DREs make insider control of election outcomes easier than ever--just point and click, and after changing the tallies, remember to “save” before you “exit”.
S1487 is a mistake! We can do better!