Comments on
the New York State Board of Elections’ Draft Voting Systems Standards
by Teresa
Hommel
http://www.wheresthepaper.org/RegsNov4Comment.htm
See also,
Election Reform and Modernization Act (“ERMA”) with comments
http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ERMA_45Comments.htm
Draft regs:
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/hava/machine-cert-6209.pdf
Hearing
schedule:
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/portal/page?_pageid=153,56962&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
Comments
embedded in the regs are in bold Times Roman.
The regs are in Ariel
Plain.
Overall
Comments
To date, the question "how do you know it's
working?" when asked about electronic voting systems, has always been
answered with some version of "I
trust the computer." This draft of regulations for Voting Systems Standards,
both in form and content, is one more version of that answer. This document is
shoddy and unprofessional, and bodes ill for the quality of New York’s future election equipment, especially DREs.
1. The low
starting fee of $5000 and the large amount of required paper documentation
suggest that State qualification will consist primarily of one person spending
a week familiarizing him or herself with the equipment as presented by the
vendor.
2. The
entire process is defined by information presented by the vendor. The starting
assumption is that the machines work and the vendor will explain how. This is
improper.
Arms-length evaluation is needed. This would include a mock
election using a real ballot such as from the November 2004 election; a “stress
test” of the maximum number of voters that the system will ever have to handle
on one election day; entry of all possible vote combinations; use of all
devices including the touch screen or pushbuttons, all accessible devices,
minority language interfaces, and the printer; extraction of the end-of-day
information from the system; and a complete audit of results and logs created
by the DRE.
Arms-length evaluation would include examination of all internal
and external memory of all kinds including all files, programming, operating
system code, and any other memory contents, as well as a "red test"
in which skilled and knowledgeable professionals and activists attempt to
subvert the system.
Evaluation of voting systems can reduce the discovery of
malfunctions on election day but cannot ensure election integrity for two
reasons. First, because New York State statute allows communication capability
in electronic voting systems, no evaluation of systems can ensure that
tampering will not occur via remote access to systems during elections. Second,
no evaluation of any large computer system can guarantee that it is error free
(this has been stated frequently by computer scientists such as Dr. Avi Rubin).
For these reasons, regardless of the process of state approval of
electronic voting systems, all electronic elections need to be fully audited by
hand-to-eye count of 100% of the votes on the VVPAR (voter-verified permanent
audit record) and reconciliation of discrepancies between computer and manual
tallies.
3. The regs
shut out voters and citizens, who are in fact the primary stakeholders in
elections, from observation and participation in voting system evaluation, and
do not even define them as "users" of the system.
4. The
statute and regs appear not to require federal certification as a precondition
of state certification. The language of the regs appears intentionally unclear.
5. The
irregular outline form of this Draft appears to result from a hasty
cut-and-paste effort to piece together parts of documents from other states
(mentioning "wards" as political subdivisions) and other types of
products including central-count paper-ballot vote tabulators.
=========================================================================
Subtitle V of Title 9 of
the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the
State of New York is
hereby amended by adding thereto a new Part, to be Part 6209 and
to read as follows:
SUBTITLE V
Part 6209
Voting Systems Standards
Section 6209.1
Definitions. The terms used in this
part shall have the significance
herein defined unless
another meaning is clearly apparent in language or content.
Section
Comment--Definitions can be political.
--Several
definitions are misleading (see comments embedded in the regs below).
--The following
7 defined terms are not used in these regs, and appear to have been copied from
other documents, such as for central-count optical scanners.
6. Election Management Software (EMS) ….
7. Encrypted copy ….
8. Escrow account ….
11. Operational manual ….
17. Resident vote tabulation programming
….
17a. Resident memory ….
25. VVPAT ….
1. Acceptance test means a test
conducted by the county board of elections and the State
Board of Elections, to
demonstrate that the voting system software as delivered and
installed in the user's
environment, meets all of its functional requirements.
Comment
1--By definition, the "acceptance test" will require that the
software appears to function. By definition "acceptance" will not require
evaluation of security or consideration of voter confidence.
2. Auxiliary components means any
device, materials or equipment which is used to give
assistance or aid to the
actual voting device but is not a permanent or enclosed part of the
voting device.
3. Ballot layout means the
positioning of all political party names and emblems, and names
and emblems of all
independent bodies, office titles, ballot proposals, and candidate
names, in accordance
with the requirements of the Election Law as to order and rotation.
4. DRE means a direct recording
electronic voting system which records votes by means
of ballot display
provided with mechanical or electro-optical components which are
activated by the voter.
Styles include ballot overlay and touch-screen machines.
5. Precinct-based optical scan is a
voting system which uses optical-scan technology and
enables voters to cast
paper ballots at their respective polling places.
6. Election Management Software (EMS)
means the software used by the system to
execute the layout of
the ballots.
7. Encrypted copy means a
scrambling of the programming code in which only the
manufacturer of the
program may determine the sequence of such code.
Comment
2--Nothing in these regs deals with encryption.
8. Escrow account means a third
party who shall be approved by the State Board for the
purpose of taking
custody of all materials required to be put in escrow by statute.
Comment
3--Statute was unclear and delegated to State Board, but these regs do not deal
with escrow.
9. Log of maintenance performance
means a written and/or electronic record which
contains all information
relating to performance of scheduled and non-scheduled
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maintenance requirements
recommended by the vendor or manufacturer of such
equipment and all
service visits performed by vendor or manufacturer.
Comment
4--Definition should include reference to maintenance performed by BOE staff.
10. Modification means any change
in either software, firmware or hardware that directly
affects the operation of
the voting system that will require re-examination of certified
equipment by the State
Board.
Comment
5--Modifications frequently cause "indirect" effects, especially
unexpected effects, which is why ANY modification to software should require
re-examination. This definition is circular, because if the modification is
held by the SBOE to not require re-examination, then by this definition it is
not a modification.
11. Operational manual means (1) a
manual of all procedures used to prepare the
equipment and provide
proper maintenance procedures including the unpacking and
storage procedures to be
utilized by county boards of elections personnel and (2) a manual
of election day setup
and election day operating procedures to be utilized by the
inspectors.
12. Pre-qualification test means a
predetermined set of votes and vote totals prepared by
the State Board. Such
votes shall be entered upon the voting equipment and the results
of the casting of said
votes shall be compared to the predetermined results of the test.
Comment 6--Any test requiring votes to be entered needs to require
the votes to be entered in the same manner as during an election. This means
use of all devices to be used by voters with and without disabilities, and use
of all languages intended for voters with minority languages.
13. Printout means the printed copy
of (1) zero totals, candidate names and offices and
other information
produced by the voting equipment prior to the official opening of the polls
and (2) the votes cast
for each candidate and question, the names of candidates and the
offices for each
candidate and other information provided after the official closing of the
polls.
14. Hardware means the actual
voting or ballot counting device.
15. Software means any and all
codes for the operation of the vote counting system.
Comment
7--Since most software operates in conjunction with numerous data files, the
contents of which affect and control the operation of the software, all data
files in DRE voting systems should be considered part of the software for
purposes of inspection and evaluation. These regs ignore all data files,
directory (folder) structures, system environmental variables, device drivers,
and other non-hardware parts of the voting system which affect the operation of
software of the voting system.
Comment
8--This definition seems to have been copied from a document for a central
tabulator, since it limits "software" to that used in a "vote
counting system." It is unclear whether “vote counting system” is intended
to include DREs and all computerized types of equipment that must be examined
by the State Board.
16. Firmware means computer program
stored in read-only memory devices embedded
in the system and not
capable of being altered during system operation.
Comment
9--This definition is misleading for non-technical persons. A computer program
is only stored in firmware, where the form in which it is stored cannot
be changed.
Before any
computer program can be used during system operation, regardless of
where or how the program is stored (software, firmware, hard disk, floppy, CD,
etc.), the system makes a changeable copy of the program. The copy may be in
RAM (Random Access Memory), the computer's CPU (Central Processing Unit), etc.
The copy can be altered. The copy is used during system operation. Use of a
changeable copy is normal because all programs must be altered during operation
but it is not desirable to change the stored original of the program.
During
system operation, what any computer program does is affected and controlled by
data files, communication from remote sources, the votes entered by the voter,
etc. Therefore it is important for these regs to clearly distinguish between
the storage of a program in firmware, and the use of a changeable copy of the
same program during system operation. Moreover, all votes, ballot images, and
tallies will alterable.
17. Resident vote tabulation
programming means the manufacturer's internal firmware
program which shall
permanently reside on the voting system's central processing unit,
registering,
accumulating, and storing votes and ballot images.
Comment
10--See comment 9. Although programming may be stored as firmware, the copy
used during system operation is always changeable. Moreover, the regs should
recognize that votes, ballot images, and any accumulations will be alterable.
Comment
11--“central processing unit” may be unnecessarily limiting.
17a. Resident memory means the
internal memory of the voting system that stores
election results and
ballot images.
18. Source code means the assembly
language statements or high level language used
to program the
electronic equipment or vote tabulating system.
Comment
12--This definition contains a reference to "vote tabulating system"
rather than voting system.
19. Specific environmental conditions
mean and shall include the effect of natural
environmental conditions
such as: temperature, humidity, dust and induced environmental
conditions such as
handling, storage or transportation which many affect the operation of
the equipment.
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20. State Board means the New York
State Board of Elections.
21. Testing laboratory means a
certified private or public laboratory used to perform tests
on the voting systems
and related equipment.
Comment
13--Neither the statute nor these regs clearly require voting systems that are
approved by the State Board to be federally certified. This definition reveals
only that testing laboratories may be private or public. Section 6209.6 below (on Examination
Criteria) states in paragraph C. that "All laboratory testing shall be
conducted or verified by independent testing authorities accredited by the
EAC." However, using the federally accredited lab does not mean performing
the federal certification tests. Indeed, paragraph C. continues "Testing
shall be performed in conformity with written procedures adopted by the State
Board" which may be minimal if this document is any indication. Moreover,
paragraph B. of the same section specifies "The State Board may, at its
discretion, waive any part of, or all of, the analysis and test requirements
..."
22. Vendor shall include any
manufacturer, company or individual who seeks to sell voting
systems in New York State.
23. Voting position means an area
or square on the voting equipment used to place the
candidate's name, office
or political party or independent body designation, or the
placement of ballot
amendments and propositions.
24. Voting system means any
electronic or computerized voting equipment and any
ancillary equipment
supporting such system.
Comment
14--ERMA specifically allows the use of DREs and Optical Scan voting systems,
so the regs should name them also and not define "voting system" as
computerized and ancillary equipment.
25. VVPAT means a voter verifiable
paper audit trail.
Comment
15--ERMA uses the terms "voter verifiable audit record" and
"voter verified permanent paper record.”
26. Tactile discernible controls
means a voting feature which allows persons with limited
reach and/or hand
dexterity, the ability to cast their vote.
Comment
16--such controls are also needed by voters who are blind or visually impaired.
27. Audio voting feature means a
device that allows blind or visually-impaired persons, or
persons with limited
reach and/or hand dexterity, the ability to cast their vote.
28. Sip and puff voting attachment
means a device operated by pneumatic switch which
allows persons with
certain disabilities the ability to cast their vote.
29. Election Assistance Commission
is the commission established by Help America Vote
Act of 2002, which
serves as a national clearinghouse of information and reviews of
procedures with respect
to the administration of federal elections.
30. Paper-based Ballot Counting
Equipment means any electronic or computerized ballot
counting system or
equipment which tabulates and reports votes cast on all paper ballots.
Comment
17--there are other types of equipment for counting ballots, such as weighing
scales, that should not be eliminated from consideration or use by these regs.
31. Certification Test Desk means a
pre-audited group of ballots marked with a
predetermined number of
votes cast for each candidate, write-in position and each voting
option which appears on
the ballot.
Comment
18--Test decks should be able to be used with both PBOS and DRE systems,
although the testing personnel would have to manually enter the votes from the
test deck into the DRE touch-screen or pushbuttons, or into the accessible
devices of the DRE.
Section 6209.2 Polling
Place Voting System Requirements
Section
Comment--This section specifies basic functions required for voting systems.
--Systems
will have to comply with the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines which are
scheduled for availability late in 2007 after New York's equipment will have
been purchased.
--The full
face ballot requirement is retained.
--5-year
batteries are required.
--Automated
testing capability is required, foreshadowing its use and the avoidance of
testing by people (see Comment 26).
--Dust and
moisture are mentioned twice.
--Some
accessibility requirements of ERMA are explicitly listed.
--Noise
level and curtains are discussed.
A. In order for a polling place voting
system to be considered by the State Board for
certification, it must
comply with the mandates of New York State Election Law, and the
Election Assistance
Commission's Voting System Guidelines, and meet the following
requirements:
Comment 19--The
EAC's Voting System Guidelines are voluntary in federal law, but this makes
them requirements for New York State. However, these Guidelines are scheduled
to be available in late 2007, after any new equipment acquired by New York will
have been purchased.
(1) Provide a full ballot display on a
single surface.
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(2) Provide a device which produces
and retains a voter-verifiable permanent paper
record, pursuant to
statute, which the voter can review and/or correct prior to the casting
of their vote.
Comment
20--with PBOS, the ballot marked by the voter is also the voter-verifiable
permanent paper record.
(3) Provide a device or means by which the votes cast on the
machine can be
printed or recorded or
visually reviewed after the polls are closed.
Comment
21--with PBOS, ballots marked by voters are the means by which votes cast on
the machine can be visually reviewed after the polls are closed.
Comment
22--It is unclear what purpose is to be served by printing of “votes cast on
the machine” after the polls are closed, since the VVPAR should serve any need
to review the votes cast on DREs. ERMA requires locks that prevent recording
votes after the polls are closed (Page 5, Lines 23-27)
23 G. BE PROVIDED WITH A
LOCK OR LOCKS, OR OTHER DEVICE OR
DEVICES, THE
24 USE OF WHICH,
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE POLLS ARE CLOSED OR THE OPERATION OF
25 THE MACHINE
OR SYSTEM FOR SUCH ELECTION IS
COMPLETED, WILL ABSOLUTELY
26 SECURE THE VOTING OR
REGISTERING MECHANISM AND PREVENT THE RECORDING OF
27 ADDITIONAL VOTES;
Perhaps
paragraph (3) intended to require the printing, recording or visually reviewing
of TALLIES of votes cast?
(4) Provide a battery power source in
the event that the electric supply used to make
the voting system
equipment function if disrupted. Such batteries must be rechargeable
and have minimum
five-year life when used under normal conditions.
Comment
23--typo, “if disrupted” should be “is disrupted”
Comment
24--typo “have a minimum”
Comment
25--More detail is needed here, because few batteries have a 5-year life. Will
this requirement mean that all electronic voting systems must be connected to
an electrical source when they are in storage, thus creating a huge expense for
counties that use them? Or that counties will have to buy rechargers and
regularly have staff go to the storage warehouse and remove, recharge, and
reinsert the batteries?
(5) The system shall contain software
and hardware required to perform a diagnostic
test of system status,
and a means of simulating the random selection of candidates and
casting of ballots in
quantities sufficient to demonstrate that the system is fully operational
and that all voting
positions are operable.
Comment
26--This requirement is self-contradictory. Software cannot simulate votes
entered by humans, which require touch pressure on the touch screen or
pushbuttons, use of accessible devices, use of the printer, and viewing of the
ballot in minority languages. “Fully operational” also requires a person to
extract the memory cartridge which is supposed to contain the votes and tallies
at the end of the election day, and confirm that it contains accurate tallies
and an accurate record of the votes cast. The only way to "demonstrate
that the system is fully operational and that all voting positions are
operable" is to have humans interact with a DRE voting system or an accessible
ballot marking device, feed marked ballots into an optical scanner, etc.
(6) The system shall be designed to
protect against dust and moisture during
storage and
transportation.
B. In addition to the requirements of
subdivision (a) of this section, fully-accessible voting
equipment certified by
the State Board shall meet the following requirements for usability
by voters who are
disabled:
Comment
27--subdivision (a) probably means subdivision A. above.
(1) The equipment shall be equipped with
a voting device with tactile discernable
controls, pursuant to
statute.
(2) Equipment shall be equipped with
an audio voting feature, pursuant to statute.
(3) Equipment must be capable of being
equipped with voting device of a sip and
puff technology nature,
pursuant to statute.
Comment
28--typo, “equipped with a”
Comment
29—Note, tactile and audio must be standard features, sip and puff is not.
C. Standards for noise level
(1) Voting equipment to be certified
by the State Board shall be constructed in a
manner so that noise
levels of the equipment during operation will not interfere with the
duties of the election
inspectors or the voting public.
(2) The noise level of write-in
components of the equipment shall be so minimal that
it will be virtually
impossible under normal conditions for someone at the table used by the
inspectors of elections
to determine that a write-in vote is being cast or has been cast.
Comment
30--This suggests a problem that has not been previously discussed in New York,
that computerized voting equipment is noisy and makes a noise when someone is
entering a write-in.
D. Standards for curtain design
(1) Voting equipment curtains shall be
constructed so that no one within the polling
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site will be able to see
how a voter is casting a vote.
(2) Curtains shall be so designed as
to allow any voter, either electronically or
manually, to open and
close the curtain with ease when entering and exiting the equipment
without obstruction.
Comment
31--Curtains are not required, and should not be required unless needed.
E. Environmental Standards
Voting systems shall be capable of
withstanding reasonable levels of exposure to
dust, rain and humidity
during storage, transport and use.
Section 6209.3 Paper-based Voting Systems
Section
Comment—This section’s functional requirements should be applied to DRE systems
also.
--Paragraph
A. (1) is of questionable usefulness and may be inappropriate for paper-based
voting systems unless the Election District is noted on the ballot, and for
primaries, the party of the voter.
--Paragraphs
A. (2) through F, H, and I require prevention of over votes and improper votes,
and require tallies by district. It is not clear why these requirements have
been applied only to paper-based voting systems and not to DREs as well.
--The
meaning of Paragraph G. is unclear.
--Paragraph
J. allows standard PC and peripheral equipment to be used with only functional
testing, which does not ensure that it does not include malicious code or
errors.
--Ballot
specifications for paper ballots are listed under paragraph K. If tallies by
Election District are required, then the requirement that ballots contain
machine and manually readable coding to identify ballot style must also require
identification of the Election District.
A. In addition to voting system
requirements provided for elsewhere in these rules and
regulations, paper-based
systems must
(1) mechanically or electronically
prevent a voter from voting for candidates or ballot
proposals for whom or
which he or she is not entitled to vote.
Comment
32--ERMA, Page 5 lines 5-7, specifies that voting systems shall:
5 C.
BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT A VOTER CANNOT VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE OR ON A
6 BALLOT PROPOSAL FOR WHOM OR ON WHICH HE OR
SHE IS NOT LAWFULLY ENTITLED
7 TO VOTE;
The reg
modifies the law by requiring paper-based voting systems to do this
"mechanically or electronically." Such requirement may not be
appropriate for paper ballot systems because the poll worker or Board of
Elections simply gives the voter the correct ballot. This requirement is appropriate
for DREs where the voter needs a smart card to activate the DRE. For example,
in primary elections, the poll worker provides a smart card encoded with the
voter's party; the DRE then displays the ballot for that party. With paper
ballot systems, however, the poll worker simply gives the voter the correct
paper ballot with the races for the voter's party.
(2) be able to prevent a voter from
(a) Over-voting
(b) Voting for the same person
more than once for the same office or position
(c) Voting for candidates of
another party in a primary election
Comment
33--Repeat comment 32.
B. The system may not count any votes for
an office or ballot proposal which has been
over-voted or otherwise
improperly voted.
C. An over-vote in one or more office or
ballot proposals shall not prevent the counting of
all other offices or
ballot proposals contained on the ballot.
D. In the case of candidates who appear on
one or more party lines, the system must be
capable of correctly
counting the vote according to provisions of Election Law S 9-112. The
system may not count
votes
Comment
34--Missing end of last sentence.
E. In vote counting, the system shall
ignore any mark on a ballot unless that mark is in a:
(1) voting position for a candidate
whose name is on the ballot;
(2) voting position designated for
write-in voting for a write-in candidate; or
(3) voting position for a ballot
proposal.
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F. The system shall provide a method for
write-in voting and shall report the number of
votes cast in each
contest in write-in voting positions.
G. The system shall provide a means by
which the software may be positively verified to
insure that it
corresponds to the format of the ballot face.
Comment
35--"insure" should be "ensure"
Comment
36--Paragraph G. is unclear. Must the software be able to report the lot number
of the ballot face? Or must the software be able to self-test that the ballot
face is correctly programmed? If the latter, correctness must be tested by
people, as described in comment 26.
H. The system shall be capable of
accumulating and reporting a count of the number of
ballots tallied for an
election district and shall be capable of separating and tabulating those
election district totals
to produce a report of the total of ballots tallied by groups of election
districts such as legislative
districts, wards, etc.
Comment
37--Apparently this was copied from another state that has wards.
Comment
38--It should be easily possible to produce tallies of ballots per election
district and various legislative districts if the system knows these districts.
The voter's election district would have to be noted on the ballot for OpScan
systems, and on the smart card for DREs.
I. The system shall be capable of
accumulating and reporting by election district the total
votes cast for each candidate
and the total vote for or against each ballot proposal. The
system shall also be
capable of tabulating and reporting the vote cast for each candidate
and the vote cast for or
against each ballot question by groups of election districts such as
legislative districts,
wards, etc.
Comment 39--Apparently this was copied from another state that has
wards.
J. Qualification tests for paper-based
voting systems shall not be required for the following
types of equipment, and
their suitability for elections use shall be determined by functional
tests which integrate
them with the remainder of the system:
(1) Standard production models of
general purpose data processing equipment
(PC'S, printers, etc.)
shown to be compatible with these requirements and with the paper
ballot voting system.
(2) Production models of special
purpose data processing equipment (scanners, bar
code readers, etc.)
having successfully performed in elections use and having been shown
to be compatible with
the paper ballot voting system.
Comment 40--How would anyone know whether a PC, scanner, bar code
reader, etc. is a standard production model or has been altered? How can anyone
know whether such equipment is compatible, has performed successfully in
elections use? All components of all electronic equipment that is part of an
election system should be examined and tested.
K. Ballot specifications:
(1) All ballots shall meet the
specifications as to form and content required under
section 7-122 of the Election
Law.
(2) Ballots shall be printed in black
ink on white paper or on paper stock of different
colors to identify
different types of ballots (i.e., emergency, affidavit, etc) or in the case of
a primary, to identify
ballots for each political party according to the color assigned to such
party pursuant to law.
(3) Coding which is both machine
readable and manually readable shall be used to
identify different
ballot styles.
Comment
41--All machine readable coding should ALSO be human-readable, to ensure that
the machine readable coding does not contain improper information. Also, since
the same ballot style may be used in many Election Districts, the Election
District needs to be coded on the ballot.
(4) Ballots used in the system shall
be able to be counted by hand as well as be
counted by machine. The
system shall provide an audit trail of all ballots cast, making
possible the
reconstruction of the election, starting with the individual votes of all
eligible
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voters, in the case of a
recount.
Comment
42--For PBOS systems the "audit trail" consists of the original paper
ballots marked by voters. It is unclear what is meant by "reconstruction
of the election." It is unclear why this requirement is being made, since
this is one of the primary advantages of PBOS systems.
(5) The types of ballots used and
their form, type size and arrangement must be
approved by the State
Board of Elections.
L. Where a paper-based system is used for
the central counting of absentee, affidavit,
emergency and special
ballots, the requirements of 6209.2 do not apply.
Section 6209.4 Application Process
Section Comment--Vendors
must complete a "pre-qualification test" consisting of programming
two ballot faces, one each for a general and primary election, and then using
them to accurately count some votes. The application consists of this task,
printouts of tallies, lots of documentation specified in later sections, and
$5000.
A. The Election Operations Unit shall
forward an application form, upon request, to any
vendor, together with a
copy of applicable rules and regulations and a pre-qualification test
format for both a
general and primary election ballot program.
Comment
43--The regs should require that the form, rules and regs, and test formats be
forwarded to the vendor within a specified number of days.
Comment
44--In paragraph B. below the vendor then programs the design into their
equipment.
B. Said vendor shall return completed
ballot layouts based upon the pre-qualification test
format to the Election
Operations Unit. Upon approval of the layouts, the vendor shall
program such equipment
and complete the pre-qualification tests for both ballot programs
provided, and enter the
simulated votes upon said equipment for each election program.
C. The completed application shall be
returned, with a printout of tabulated votes from the
primary and general
election pre-qualification tests as cast on the voting system equipment
which the applicant
requests to have certified. The pre-qualification test programs shall be
retained by the
applicant for use in the certification process.
D. The application and printouts shall be
reviewed to determine if the voting system shall
be considered for
certification and the applicant shall be notified of such determination.
Comment
45--The regs should require that the response to the vendor must occur within a
specified maximum number of days.
E. No application shall be deemed to be
filed until all documentation required by these
rules has been submitted
to the State Board or its designee.
F. A certified or bank check in the amount
of $5,000 shall accompany such application,
and be applied towards
the actual cost of examination.
G. Fees for the examination of a voting
system shall be assessed against the vendor by
the State Board based
upon the cost to the State Board for examination of such voting
system by an outside
contractor, laboratory or other authorized examiner, but the fees
assessed shall not
exceed the amount permitted by statute.
Section 6209.5 Submission of Voting Systems Equipment.
Section
Comment--Vendors must turn in a complete voting system which they must
maintain, which the State Board will retain.
A. Voting systems considered for
certification by the State Board shall be delivered to the
State Board or its
designee. Such equipment shall include auxiliary components and
equipment used to
program ballot layout, and any other additional equipment used in the
operation of said voting
system.
7
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B. If the voting systems equipment is
certified by the State Board, the specific equipment
and components examined
by the State Board shall become the property of the State
Board for as long as the
equipment is in use in the State or for such shorter period as the
State Board shall so
determine. Voting systems not certified shall be disposed of pursuant
to the vendor's
direction.
C. The applicant shall provide service and
normal maintenance of said equipment after
certification and shall
supply to the State Board, at no cost, any modification to the
equipment for upgrading
of any feature during the period that said equipment is offered for
sale and use in the
State.
Section 6209.6 Examination Criteria
Section
Comment--This long section lists documentation that vendors must supply, as
well as manuals for maintenance and repair.
--The State
Board may submit the system for lab analysis, or waive any tests if the vendor
submits "certified test data and reports" which is not defined.
--EAC-accredited
labs will be used, but federal requirements will not have to be met, only NY
State procedures which shall be available for public inspection at an
unspecified time.
--Qualification
will consist of "tests, code analyses, and inspection tests" to
verify that software and hardware meet the vendor's own design requirements for
functionality and physical parts, and that vendor documentation is correct.
--The
"Functional Configuration Audit" verifies that the software is
accurately described by the vendor's documentation. The State Board will do
additional tests to verify NOMINAL system performance and validate a SAMPLE of
the vendor's tests.
--The
"Physical Configuration Audit" examines the software and
documentation associated with the hardware to establish a baseline. The State
Board might decide that some future changes to this baseline of hardware or
software require re-evaluation.
--Please see
especially Comments 52, 53, 54, 55, and 61.
A. The State Board or its designee, as
part of its examination, may at its discretion, submit
the voting system for a
laboratory analysis.
B. The State Board may, at its discretion,
waive any part of, or all of, the analysis and test
requirements contained
in subdivision (e), upon submission by the vendor of certified test
data and reports which
verify system performance in a manner equivalent to the Board's
examination
requirements.
Comment
46--Designation of "subdivision (e)" appears to be a typo, so it is
unclear what requirements may be waived. Due to vagueness, it is unclear what
"certified test data and reports" means.
C. All laboratory testing shall be
conducted or verified by independent testing authorities
accredited by the EAC.
Testing shall be performed in conformity with written procedures
adopted by the State
Board and such procedures shall be available for public inspection.
Comment
47--The regs should require the procedures to be posted on the State Board web
site as soon as they are adopted or available to testing laboratories. The
public should not get them earlier or later than any vendor, laboratory or
other party, nor have to comply with any special process in order to inspect
them.
1. Software and Hardware Qualification
Tests
Qualification of voting system
software and hardware shall consist of a series of tests,
code analyses, and
inspection tests performed at the federal level, to verify that the
software and hardware
meet design requirements and that characteristics are correctly
described in the
documentation items. Qualification shall also include a Functional
Configuration Audit and
a Physical Configuration Audit.
Comment
48--EAC-accredited labs will determine whether the vendor's "design
requirements" are met, and system characteristics correctly documented. In
other words, the State Board may certify systems that have not been
independently tested. The state's "functional and physical configuration
audits" are described below.
A. Functional Configuration Audit
A functional configuration
audit shall be performed to verify that the software complies
with the Software
Specification. Vendor test data may be used in partial fulfillment of this
requirement; however,
the State Board or its designee shall perform or supervise the
performance of additional
tests, or order additional laboratory testing, to verify nominal
system performance in
all operating modes and to validate, on a sampling basis, the
vendor's test data
reports. The Functional Configuration Audit shall be performed in a
facility selected by the
State Board.
Comment
49--The Software Specification is the vendor's design standards and
conventions, environment and interface specifications, functional
specifications, programming architecture specifications, and test and
verification specifications.
Comment
50--Only "nominal" system performance and a sampling of vendor tests
will be validated.
(1) Vendor Support
8
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The vendor shall provide a
list of all documentation and data to be audited and vendor
technical personnel
shall be available to assist in the performance of the Functional
Configuration Audit.
Comment
51--The vendor controls the entire audit by providing the list of documentation
and data to be audited.
(2) Technical Data
The vendor shall provide
the following technical data:
(a) copies of all
procedures used for module or unit testing, integration testing
and system testing;
(b) copies of all test
cases generated for each module and integration test
and sample ballot
formats or other test cases used for system;
(c) records of all tests
performed by the procedures listed above, including
error correction and
retest.
(3) Audit Procedure
The State Board or its
designee shall review the vendor's test procedures and test
results.
This review shall include an
assessment of the adequacy of test cases and input data
to exercise all system
functions and to detect program logic and data processing errors if
such be present.
The review shall also
include an examination of all test data which is to be used as
a basis for
qualification.
Comment
52--The work described here cannot prove that these machines are trustworthy
for unaudited use. First, a functional test does not inspect the entire system
for malicious or insecure parts, or relationships of parts. Second, the process
relies upon vendor-supplied information rather than independent investigation
of the entire system. Third, the "adequacy of test cases" cannot be
determined by functional assessment, but must be based on knowledge of all
programming logic. The enormous number of electronic voting system failures
that occur on election days are in part due to the limitation of federal
certification testing which is also a functionality test, much of it automated.
Fourth, automated tests, as described here, do not test the parts of the system
interacted with by voters on election day; this leaves voters to discover
failures of the touch screens or pushbuttons, printers, the accessible devices,
and the display of the ballot in minority languages. It leaves poll workers to
discover failures of the tallies cartridges that cannot be read to
"extract" the day's tallies.
B. Physical Configuration Audit
(1) The Physical Configuration
Audit is an examination of the software configuration
against its technical
documentation to establish a configuration baseline for approval. The
Physical Configuration
Audit shall include an audit of all drawings, specifications, technical
data and test data
associated with the system hardware and this audit shall establish the
system hardware baseline
associated with the software baseline. All subsequent changes
to the software baseline
configuration shall be subject to re-examination. All changes to
the system hardware
which may result in a change in the operation of the software shall
also be subject to
re-examination.
Comment
53--This audit establishes the "baseline" of functionality and
documentation. Changes can be made without re-examination of the system as long
as the changes aren't reflected in this superficial view of the system which is
entirely under vendor control. In other words, re-examination is not needed if
the software changes as long as its "configuration" doesn't change.
Hardware can change as long as it doesn't change the operation of the software.
Who says? The Vendor. The State Board will not look at parts of the voting
system that the vendor does not present to them.
(2) Vendor Support
The vendor shall provide a
list of all documentation and data to be audited and vendor
technical personnel
shall be available to assist in the performance of the Physical
Configuration Audit.
9
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(3) Technical Data
The vendor shall provide
the following technical data:
(a) identification of all
items which are to be a part of the software release;
(b) identification of all hardware which interfaces with the
software;
(c) configuration baseline
data for all hardware which is unique to the system;
(d) copies of all software
documentation which is intended for distribution to
users, including program
listings, specifications, operator manual, user manual and
software maintenance
manual;
(e) user acceptance test
procedure and acceptance criteria;
(f) an identification of
any changes between the Physical Configuration Audit
and the configuration
submitted for the Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) and a
certification that these
differences do not degrade the functional characteristics.
Comment
54--Both "audits" are vendor-managed and based on trust of the vendor
rather than arms-length evaluation of the system, and are entirely
unprofessional and improper. The regs do not define "a certification"
and specify from whom or what institution.
(4) Audit Procedure
Required data items include
draft and formal documentation of the vendor's software
development program
which are relevant to the design and conduct of Qualification Tests.
The vendor shall
identify all documents, or portions of documents, which contain
proprietary information
not approved for public release. The State Board or its designee
shall agree to use the
information contained therein solely for the purpose of analyzing and
testing the software and
shall refrain from disclosing proprietary information to any other
person or agency without
the prior written consent of the vendor. At the conclusion of the
examination, the State
Board or its designee shall return to the vendor all such
documentation and shall
not retain any copies thereof. The State Board or its designee
shall review the
vendor's source code and documentation to verify that the software
conforms to the
documentation, and that the documentation is sufficient to enable the user
to install, validate,
operate and maintain the voting system. The review shall also include
an inspection of all
records of the baseline version against the vendor's release control
system to establish that
the configuration, being qualified, conforms to the engineering and
test data.
Comment 55--The
procedure is vendor-managed and based on trust of the vendor rather than
arms-length evaluation of the system, and is entirely unprofessional and
improper.
The vendor
decides what is "relevant."
C. Functional Tests
(1) For all equipment,
functional tests should consist of validation of equipment
functional performance
by means of procedures under "Laboratory Environmental Test
Procedures for Hardware
and Software".
(2) Functional tests of voting
system software which runs on general purpose data
10
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processing equipment
shall include all tests similar to those in procedures which are
necessary to validate
the proper functioning of the software and its ability to control the
hardware environment.
The tests shall also validate the ability of the software to detect
and act correctly upon
any error conditions which may result from hardware malfunctions.
Detection capability may
be contained in the software, the hardware or the operating
system. It shall be
validated by any convenient means up to and including the introduction
of a simulated failure
(power off, disconnect a cable, etc.) in any equipment associated with
vote processing.
Comment
56--Again, functional tests do not test the entire system, and cannot discover
all errors nor most security weaknesses. If the State Board were serious, they
would open the system to public testing, enter a maximum number of ballots, and
examine the results.
2. Software, Hardware, Operating
and Support Documentation
(A) Software Qualification
The following system software and
firmware vendor data items shall be submitted as
a precondition of
certification of acceptability for elections use.
(B) Vendor Documentation
Complete product documentation
shall be provided to the State Board for voting
systems, their
components and all auxiliary devices. This documentation shall be sufficient
to serve the needs of
the voter, the operator and the maintenance technician. It shall be
prepared and published
in accordance with standard industrial practice for electronic and
mechanical equipment
such documentation shall include:
Comment
57--Rather than "complete" the documentation must be merely
“sufficient” for voters, operators, and maintenance technicians.
(1) Software Specification
The Software Specification
shall contain and describe the vendor's design standards
and conventions,
environment and interface specifications, functional specifications,
programming architecture
specifications, and test and verification specifications. Pre-
factory material should
include document identification, an abstract of the specification,
configuration control
status and a table of contents. The body of the specification shall
contain the following
material:
Comment
58--What is “pre-factory material”?
(a) System Overview
The vendor shall
identify the system hardware and the environment in which the
software will operate
and the general design and operational considerations and
constraints which have
influenced the design of the software.
(b) Program Description
The vendor shall provide
descriptions of the software system concept, the array of
hardware in which it
operates, the intended operating environment, the specific software
design objectives and
development methodology and the logical structure and algorithms
used to accomplish the
objectives.
11
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(c) Standards and
Conventions
The vendor shall provide
information which can be used as a partial basis for code
analysis and test
design. It should include a description and discussion of the standards
and conventions used in
the preparation of this specification and in the development of the
software.
(d) Specification Standards
and Conventions
The vendor shall identify
all published and private standards and conventions used
to document software
development and testing. Vendor internal procedures shall be
provided as attachments
to this Software Specification.
(e) Test and Verification
Standards
The vendor shall
identify any standards or other documents which are applicable
to determination of
program correctness and acceptance criteria.
(f) Quality Assurance
Standards
The vendor shall
describe all standards or other documents which are applicable
to the examination and
testing of the software, including standards for flowcharts, program
documentation, test
planning and test data acquisition and reporting.
(g) Operating Environment
The vendor shall
provide a description of the system and subsystem interfaces at
which inputs, outputs
and data transformations occur. It shall contain or make reference
to all operating
environment factors which influence the software design.
(h) Hardware Constraints
The vendor shall identify
and describe the hardware characteristics which influence
the design of the
software, such as:
(1) the logic and
arithmetic capability of the processor,
(2) memory read/write
characteristics,
(3) external memory
device characteristics
(4) peripheral device
interface hardware data I/O device protocols, and
(5) operator controls,
indicators and displays.
12
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(i) Software environment
The vendor shall
identify the compiler or assembler to be used for the generation
of executable code and a
description of the operating system or system monitor. This
section shall also
contain an overview of the compile-time interaction of the voting system
software with library
calls and linking.
(j) Interface
Characteristics
The vendor shall
describe the interfaces between executable code and system
input-output and control
hardware.
(k) Software Functional
Specification
The vendor shall provide a description of the overall
functions which the software
performs in the context
of its mode or modes of operation. The vendor shall also describe
the capabilities and
methods for detecting and handling exceptional conditions, system
failure, data
input/output errors, error logging and audit record generation and security
monitoring and control.
(l) Configurations and
Operating Modes
The vendor shall describe
the various software configurations and operating modes
of the system; such as
preparation for opening of the polling place, vote recording and/or
vote processing, closing
of the polling place and report generation. For each software
function or operating
mode, a definition of the inputs (characteristics, tolerances or
acceptable ranges) to
the function or mode, how the inputs are processed and what
outputs are produced
(characteristics, tolerances or acceptable ranges) shall be provided.
(m) External files
In the event that
external files are used for data input or output, the definition of
information context and
record formats shall be provided. The vendor shall also describe
the procedures for file
maintenance, access privileges and security.
(n) Security
Security requirements and
security provisions of the software shall be identified for
each system function and
operating mode.
(o) Programming
Specifications
The vendor shall provide an overview of the software
design, structure and
implementation
algorithms. Whereas the Functional Specification of the preceding section
provides a description
of what functions the software performs and the various modes in
13
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which it operates, this
section should be prepared so as to facilitate understanding of the
internal functioning of the
individual software modules. Implementation of functions shall
be described in terms of
software architecture, algorithms and data structures and all
procedures or procedure
interfaces which are vulnerable to degradation in data quality or
security penetration
shall be identified.
Comment
59--The regs require a vendor-managed rather than arms-length process.
(p) Test and Verification
Specifications
The vendor shall
describe the procedures used during software development to
verify logical
correctness, data quality and security. This description shall include existing
standard test
procedures, special purpose test procedures, test criteria and experimental
design and validation
criteria. In the event that this documentation is not available, the
Qualification Test
agency shall design test cases and procedures equivalent to those
ordinarily used as a
basis for in-house verification (see below).
(q) Qualification Test
Specification
The vendor shall provide a specification for
verification and validation of overall
software performance,
including acceptance criteria for control and data input/output,
processing accuracy,
data quality assessment and maintenance, exceptional handling and
security. The
specification shall identify specific procedures by means of which the general
suitability of the
software for elections use can be assessed and demonstrated. The
vendor's specification
and procedure shall be used to establish the detailed requirements
of the tests described
in "Laboratory Environmental Test Procedures for Hardware and
Software" of this Standard.
Comment
60--The regs require a vendor-managed rather than arms-length process.
(r) Acceptance Test
Specification
The vendor shall provide a
specification for installations, acceptance and readiness
verification. This
specification shall identify specific procedures by means of which the
capability of the
software to accommodate actual ballot formats and format logic, and pre-
election logic, accuracy
and security test requirements of using jurisdictions may be
assessed and
demonstrated. The vendor's specification shall be used to establish the
detailed requirements of
the tests described in "Laboratory Environmental Test Procedures
for Hardware and
Software" of this standard performed to evaluate the adequacy of the
vendor's procedures and
it shall be suitable for inclusion in the regulations and procedures
of user counties when
preparing for the conduct of actual elections.
Comment
61--This vendor-directed rather than arms-length process will now become the
requirement for counties, instead of than human-entered votes and ballots, etc.
Dangerous!
(s) Appendices
The vendor shall
provide descriptive material and data supplementing the various
sections of the body of
the Software Specification. The content and arrangement of
appendices shall be at
the discretion of the vendor. Topics recommended for amplification
and treatment in
appendix form include:
14
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(1) Glossary: Provide a
listing and brief definition of all software module
names and variable names
with reference to their locations in the software structure.
Include abbreviations,
acronyms and terms which are either not commonly used in data
processing and software
development or which are used in an uncommon semantic
context.
(2) References: Provide
a list of references to all related vendor documents,
data, standards and
technical sources used in software development and testing.
(3) Program Analysis:
Provide the results of software configuration analysis,
algorithm analysis and
selection, timing studies and hardware interface studies reflected
in the final software
design and coding.
(4) Security Analysis:
Provide a detailed description of the penetration
analysis performed to
preclude intrusion by unauthorized persons and fraudulent
manipulation of
elections data. Identify security policies and measures and selection
criteria for audit log
data categories.
Comment 62--Vendor-directed
rather than arms-length process.
(2) Operator Information
This documentation shall
include a physical description of the equipment sufficient
to identify all
features, control and displays. It shall include a complete procedure for
energizing the
equipment, for testing and verifying operational status and for identifying all
abnormal equipment
states. It shall include a complete operating procedure for inserting
ballots to be tabulated,
for controlling the tabulation process, for monitoring the status of
the equipment, for
recovering from error conditions and for preparing output reports.
Comment
63--Instructional information, appears to have been copied from a request for
information about a paper-ballot-reading vote-tabulator
(3) Maintenance Information
(a) This documentation
shall contain a complete physical and functional
description of the
equipment and a theory of operation which fully describes the electrical
and mechanical function
of the equipment, how the processes of ballot handling and
reading are performed,
how data are handled in the processor and memory sections, how
data output is initiated
and controlled, how power is converted or conditioned and how test
and diagnostic
information is acquired and used.
Comment
64--Instructional information, appears to have been copied from a request for
information about a paper-ballot-reading vote-tabulator
(b) A complete parts and
materials list shall be provided which contains
sufficient descriptive
information to identify all parts by type, size, value or range and
manufacturer's
designation.
Comment
65--Appears to have been copied from a request for information about a
different type of device.
(c) Technical illustrations
and schematic representations of electronic circuits
shall be provided with
indications of all test and adjustment points and the nominal value
and tolerance or
waveform to be measured. Fault detection, isolation and correction
procedures or logic
diagrams shall be prepared for all operational abnormalities identified
by design analysis and
operating experiences.
Comment
66--Appears to have been copied from a request for information about a
different type of device.
15
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(4) Logistics, Facilities
and Training
The vendor shall identify
all operating and support requirements of the system or
component. These
requirements include material, facilities and personnel, including
furnishings, fixtures,
and utilities which will be required to support system operation,
maintenance and storage.
(5) Maintenance Training and
Supply
(a) The vendor shall
identify all corrective and preventive maintenance tasks
and the level at which
they shall be performed. Levels of maintenance shall include
operator tasks,
maintenance personnel tasks and factory repair.
(b) Operator tasks shall be
limited to the activation of controls to identify
irrecoverable error
conditions and to the replenishment of consumables such as printer
ribbons, paper and the
like.
(c) Maintenance personnel tasks shall include all field
maintenance actions
which require access to
internal portions of the equipment. They shall include the conduct
of tests to localize the
source of a malfunction; the adjustment, repair or replacement of
malfunctioning circuits
or components and the conduct of tests to verify restoration to
service.
Comment
67--appears to be copied from regulations for other kinds of equipment such as
desk top computers. One can hardly imagine maintenance personnel in the middle
of an election taking apart the voting equipment and replacing circuits.
(d) Factory repair tasks
shall be minimized. They shall only include complex
and infrequent
maintenance functions which require access to proprietary or to specialized
facilities and equipment
which cannot be obtained by using agency. They shall not
number more than two
percent of all maintenance tasks and their frequency shall not
exceed five percent of
the total frequency for all corrective maintenance tasks.
Comment
68--appears to be copied from regulations for other kinds of equipment,
especially the references to an "agency" and the 2% and 5% limits.
(e) The vendor shall
identify by function all personnel required to operate and
support the system. For
each functional category, the number of personnel and their skills
and skill levels shall
be specified.
(f) The vendor shall
specify requirements for the training of each category
of operating and support
personnel. The vendor shall prepare all materials required in the
training activity and
shall provide or otherwise arrange for the provision of qualified
instructors.
Comment 69--appears to be copied from regulations for other kinds
of equipment, since the "operating personnel" will be voters, poll
workers, and Elections staff.
(g) The vendor shall
recommend a standard complement of supplies, spares
and repair parts which
will be required to support system operation. This list shall include
the identification of
these materials and their individual quantities and sources from which
they may be obtained.
The vendor shall supply, at vendor's expense, any special tools
required to repair or
maintain the equipment.
Comment
70--appears to be copied from regulations for other kinds of equipment that
require spares, repair parts, and tools.
Section 6209.7
Modifications and Re-examination
Section
Comment--Read in isolation, this section seems to require modifications to be
submitted, approved, reviewed, etc. However, when read in light of the previous
section and the description of the baseline, modifications that do not change
the baseline of functionality would not have to be submitted, etc.
ERMA
requires re-examination when the "operation or material" of any
"feature or component" is changed. If the material of a component is
the software or hardware of the component, then any change to a voting system
would require re-examination. In these regs, the term "material" is used
in several paragraphs to describe documentation materials.
ERMA Page 4
lines 9-14:
9
2. When any change is made in the operation or material of any feature
10 or component of any machine OR SYSTEM which
has been approved pursuant
11 to
the provisions of
this section, such
machine OR SYSTEM must be
12 submitted
for such re-examination and reapproval pursuant
to the
13 provisions
of subdivision one
of this section as the state
board of
14 elections deems necessary.
16
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A. Any prospective modification to a
previously certified voting system shall be submitted
to the State Board.
B. No modification of previously certified
voting systems equipment shall be used in any
election until such
modification has been approved by the State Board.
C. Prospective modification shall be
reviewed by the State Board or by an examiner or
laboratory of the
Board's choice in accordance with the fee schedule established by section
7-201 of the Election
Law.
D. Upon completion of a review of such
prospective modification, the State Board may
cause a re-examination
of the entire voting system, or within its discretion, grant
continuation of
certification pursuant to the provisions of section 7-201 of the Election Law.
Section 6209.8
Rescission of Certification
Section
Comment--This section fails to elaborate on ERMA by listing criteria for
rescission, specifying procedures for notifying the State Board of problems,
who would pay for re-examinations, etc.
ERMA, Page
4, Lines 15-30:
15 3. If at any time after any machine OR
SYSTEM has been approved pursu-
16 ant to the provisions of subdivision one or
two of
this section, the
17 state
board of elections has any reason to believe that such machine OR
18 SYSTEM does not meet all the requirements
for voting machines OR SYSTEMS
19 set forth in this article, it shall forthwith
cause such machine
OR
20 SYSTEM
to be examined again in the manner prescribed by subdivision one
21 of this section. If the opinions in the
report of such examinations do
22 not state that such machine OR SYSTEM can
safely and properly be used by
23 voters at elections under the conditions
prescribed by this article, the
24 state
board of elections shall forthwith rescind its
approval of such
25 machine OR SYSTEM. After the date on which the approval of any machine
26 OR
SYSTEM is rescinded,
no machines OR SYSTEMS of such type may be
27 purchased for use in this state. The state
board of elections
shall
28 examine
all machines OR
SYSTEMS of such type which were previously
29 purchased, to determine if they may continue
to be used in elections in
30 this state.
ERMA's
"any reason to believe" standard (line 17) is subjective and can mean
anything. After an election in which some 40% of systems failed, one election
official proclaimed that nothing could make him lose faith in the computerized
voting systems. A voter or poll worker might have reason to believe upon the
first system failure, upon seeing a vote switched by the computer to a
different candidate on the screen, upon finding that not all races are
displayed, etc. A worker counting the votes on the VVPAT might have reason to
believe when the electronic count does not match the VVPAT count.
ERMA says
that after approval is rescinded, no further purchase is allowed and the State
BOE must examine all such machines that were previously purchased (lines
25-30). It is unlikely that the State Board will rescind any machine approval
if they then have to examine, for example, a thousand machines. Please see also
Comment 71.
A. If at any time subsequent to the State
Board's approval of a voting system, the State
Board determines that
the voting system fails to fulfill the criteria prescribed by statute and
these rules, the Board
shall notify any users and vendors of that particular voting system
that the State Board's
approval or certification of that system for future sale of that system
in New York State is to
be withdrawn.
Comment 71--It does not seem appropriate that systems can continue
to be used by voters after their approval has been rescinded. In requiring
notification to "users," the regs should explicitly mention the
notification of all voters who have used such system in the previous two
elections, and all poll workers who have worked at elections using them. These
users would have the most direct experience and can report first-hand details
of problems if any occurred. In addition, all candidates and parties who were
on the ballots that were voted using the equipment are important stakeholders
and users, and the regs should explicitly require them to be notified.
B. Such notice shall be in writing and
shall specify the reasons why the approval or
certification of the
system is being rescinded. Such notice shall also specify the date on
which the rescission is
to become effective.
C. Any vendor or user of such voting
system may request in writing that the State Board
reconsider its decision
to rescind approval or certification of the voting system.
D. Upon receipt of such request to reconsider,
the State Board shall hold a hearing for the
purpose of reconsidering
the decision to rescind the approval or certification. Any
interested party shall
be given the opportunity to submit testimony or documentation in
support of or in
opposition to the Board's decision to rescind approval or certification.
Comment
72--The regs should require publication of notice of such rescission, the
reasons for it, publication of the date, time and place of any hearings a
minimum of two weeks in advance, and notification by mail to all parties who
have requested notification of such State Board activities.
E. The State Board may affirm or reverse
its decision.
Section 6209.9 Contracts
Section
Comment--This section deals with training, maintenance, evaluation of poll
sites, requirements for delivery time, and acceptance testing by counties.
Acceptance testing is elaborated in the next section. Delivery deadlines are
short, reflecting the short deadlines for compliance with HAVA and the desire
to keep HAVA money, but such short deadlines also force the use of equipment
that counties may not be prepared for.
A. In addition to complying with all
statutory requirements, all contracts for the purchase
of voting systems shall
include the following requirements:
(1) Training
Vendors of voting systems shall
provide for training of boards of elections personnel
in the following:
17
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(a) training prior to delivery of
voting systems equipment on procedures for
unpacking, assembling
and acceptance testing of such equipment;
(b) training for proper use of
such equipment including maintenance, storage
and transportation
procedures;
(c) the vendor shall provide
complete operations manuals (including
operations manuals for
any auxiliary features, programming, hardware,
telecommunications
systems and central vote tabulating systems) upon delivery of voting
systems equipment to a
jurisdiction. Such manuals shall include one copy of procedures
to be followed by
inspectors at polling places. The vendor shall permit this copy to be
reproduced and
distributed by the county board of elections at its training school for
election inspectors or
the vendor shall supply enough copies of the procedures for such
distribution;
Comment
73--Although ERMA allows telecommunications in voting systems, all current and
future communications capability should be banned, since it opens the election
to tampering by individuals in remote locations, and such tampering cannot be
detected by election staff or observers.
(d) the vendor shall assist in the
training of all elections personnel (including
election inspectors)
during the first two elections, to include a general election, in which
the equipment is used.
Such assistance relating to the number of people and the hours
of assistance shall be
identified in the executed contract.
(e) training county boards of
elections personnel in the procedures to be used
to accomplish ballot
face layout and ballot programming.
(2) Service provisions
(a) The contract shall identify
the obligations of the vendor to rectify any
problems identified
through testing any or all of the voting systems equipment delivered to
the purchaser.
Comment
74--Given the superficiality of state certification testing and the experience
of other states with failures of equipment during elections, it is likely that
problems with equipment will first be detected during elections. For this
reason, the regs should explicitly create a formal mechanism and procedures for
voters, poll workers, candidates, and parties to report operational failures of
equipment during elections. The regs should require such reports to be dealt
with in a timely manner before candidates' rights to request counts of the
VVPAT expire, and prior to certification of the election results.
Jurisdictions
must be required to acknowledge receipt of such reports, post them in public if
the reporting person or party so requests, and investigate and resolve issues
related to the reported failures prior to certification of the election. If
operational failure of equipment is verified, proper remedies must be listed in
the regs -- including the conduct of a new election paid for by the vendor if
lesser actions cannot remedy the failures that occurred.
(b) The vendor shall, without
additional cost, provide to the purchaser a five-
year guarantee of parts
and service, that such voting systems equipment shall be kept in
good working order and
that other statutory requirements are met.
(c) The vendor shall provide to
the purchaser of said equipment a detailed
listing of proper maintenance,
storage and transportation procedures to be carried out by
each purchaser.
(d) The vendor and the purchaser
shall agree in writing as to the proper
maintenance procedures
to be implemented on each piece of equipment and shall further
agree in writing as to
the obligations of each party for servicing and maintenance
procedures.
(e) An agreement as to the time
period in which the vendor must correct any
problems or defect in
the voting equipment or voting systems.
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(f) The vendor shall provide the
purchaser with the criteria necessary for the
proper operation of the
voting equipment at a polling place.
(3) Polling site survey
(a) The vendor, together with the
purchaser, shall survey the present polling
places in a jurisdiction
to which its voting equipment has been sold, to determine whether
or not such polling
places meet environmental conditions for the proper operation of the
voting equipment. This
provision shall apply to those polling places which are in use at the
time of the proposed
sale.
(b) If any polling places are not
compatible, the vendor shall advise the
jurisdiction purchasing
the voting equipment on the methods or procedures that the said
jurisdiction may use to
remedy any such problem.
(4) Additional Requirements
(a) delivery deadline shall be not
less than three months prior to the first
election in which said
units shall be used or, if the contract is for ten or less units, not less
than one month prior to
such election;
Comment
75--Three months or one month doesn't leave enough time for training elections
staff, ballot programming, Logic and Accuracy testing performed by humans who
enter votes and test all parts of the system as described in Comment 26, voter
and pollworker training, etc.
(b) acceptance testing
requirements;
(c) storage and maintenance
responsibilities; and
(d) shipping delivery guidelines
and requirements.
Comment
76--Draft standards are not filled in above, but are in the next section.
B. For purposes of the initial purchases
of voting machines and systems, pursuant to the
federal Help America
Vote Act of 2002, and the state Election Reform and Modernization
Act of 2005, all
contracts entered by the State Board of Elections, or local boards of
elections, with vendors,
must comply with Office of General Services (OGS) regulations on
Purchasing Procedures
and Purchases from Preferred Sources, found in NYCRR Title 9,
Subtitle G, Subchapter
A, Part 250, section 250.0 through and including section 250.11.
Section 6209.10
Acceptance Testing
Section Comment--Acceptance
testing will be hasty and superficial.
A. County boards of elections, under the
supervision of the State Board, shall conduct an
acceptance test on each
unit of any voting system purchased by such county. Such
acceptance testing shall
begin within seventy-two hours of delivery of the equipment from
the vendor to the
purchaser.
Comment
77--With 62 counties, what supervision is possible by the State Board?
B. Such testing shall be conducted under
the supervision of the State Board in accordance
with the testing
requirements and formats provided by the State Board. This test may
19
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consist in part, of the
original certification test deck as utilized by the State Board in the
certification of the
system.
Comment
78--The original certification test deck ought to work, since the vendor will
have had plenty of time to make sure of that. If no other tests are performed
this is inadequate. We have yet to see a requirement for a test election with
maximum numbers of voters and votes, and a complete audit including inspection
of the audit logs and other printouts from the system, as described in Comment
26.
C. The results of acceptance testing shall
be certified to the State Board and entered into
the maintenance log for
each piece of equipment.
D. If the acceptance test reveals any
improper or faulty absentee ballot counting systems
equipment, the vendor
must make corrections to such improper or faulty equipment within
30 days from the date of
such acceptance testing.
Comment
79--Here is another cut-and-paste error from central-count optical scanner
document.
Comment 80--Timing problems are foreseeable in small counties --
the equipment need not be delivered until one month prior to the election, but
if the equipment does not work, the vendor has 30 days to make corrections.
Assuming that a percentage of the corrections lead to other problems which also
require correction, some counties may have to resort to the use of emergency
paper ballots for all voters.
E. The State Board, upon its review of the
acceptance testing of such equipment may, at
its discretion, suspend
certification of said equipment for future sales in the State of New
York in accordance with
the provisions of these regulations.
Comment
81--It would be more efficient to have more rigorous up-front testing than to
discover that testing was inadequate after the equipment is purchased and
delivered. If acceptance testing shows many problems, such as in Georgia 2002
where approximately one third of 30,000 units did not boot-up upon delivery,
then the units should not be used in an election.
Section 6209.11 Routine
Maintenance Test of DRE Voting Equipment
Section
Comment--Periodic testing is good, but the number of ballots (minimum 200) is
not enough to "stress test" the equipment. Many computer errors do
not show up until many items of data (ballots) are entered, and malicious code
can be programmed to kick in after a large number of ballots have been entered.
It is not
clear from these regs whether the entering of the ballots must be done using
the same hardware and software that will be used during an election.
"Automated testing" which consists of running a program to
"test" the machine leaves many parts of the election system untested,
with the result that voters discover errors on election day. In contrast, the
regs below for Paper-based systems specify that "complete testing"
shall be conducted.
A. In addition to vendor-prescribed
maintenance tasks and diagnostic tests, a test of DRE
voting equipment shall
be conducted on each piece of equipment owned by a county board
of elections.
B. Such testing shall be administered periodically
and be completed during the following
periods:
(1) January 15-April 15
(2) April 16-July 15
(3) July 16-September 15
(4) September 16-November 15
C. Such testing shall consist of the
casting of a minimum of 200 ballots on each piece of
equipment during each of
the prescribed periods outlined.
D. Such tests shall be developed by the
State Board, utilizing a ballot format prepared and
programmed by each
county board. Each such test shall be approved by the State Board
prior to the first
periodic test. The State Board shall reserve the right to revise said testing
format, based upon its
audit and review.
E. The test ballot format during the
period including July 16 - September 15 shall consist
of the primary ballot as
it has been certified by the board of elections, if said equipment is
to be utilized in a
primary election.
F. The test ballot format for the period
between ballot certification and seven days before
election shall consist
of the general election ballot as it has been certified by the board of
elections.
G. The result of each periodic test shall
be entered upon the maintenance log for each
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such piece of equipment,
together with any other information prescribed in said log by the
State Board.
H. The county board of elections shall
certify to the State Board, the completion of each
periodic maintenance
test. Such certification shall be on a form prescribed by and
furnished by the State
Board, and shall be accompanied by copies of each maintenance
log.
I. The State Board may, upon review of the
maintenance logs, require further testing of
any such piece of
equipment or may, for sufficient cause, remove a piece of equipment
from use in an election
until further examination and testing has been completed.
Comment
82--The regs should give examples of what "sufficient cause" might
consist of.
J. County boards shall make the equipment
available to the State Board for any such
additional testing and
shall provide such assistance as may be deemed necessary.
Comment
83--This periodic testing is good, but the number of ballots (minimum 200) is
not enough to "stress test" the equipment. Many computer errors do
not show up until many items of data (ballots) are entered.
Comment
84--It is not clear from these regs whether the entering of the ballots must be
done using the same hardware and software that will be used during an election.
"Automated testing" in which only a program is run to
"test" the machine leaves many parts of the election system untested,
with the result that voters discover errors on election day. In contrast, the
regs below for Paper-based systems specify that "complete testing"
shall be conducted.
Section 6209.12
Operational and Testing Procedures for Paper-based Voting
Systems
Section
Comment--"Complete testing" is not defined, and it is unclear why are
DREs do not have to be "completely" tested. This section appears to
contain procedures for central-count optical scanners that are used after
election day to count absentee ballots, not precinct-based optical scanners
that are used on election day.
A. Complete testing of the paper-based
voting system shall be conducted before the use
of the system in any
election.
Comment
85--"Complete" is not defined, and it is not specified why DREs are
not to be "completely" tested.
B. Pre-election Test Deck
Not more than 20 days before the day
designated by the county board for the
counting of paper
ballots, the board shall test the system to ascertain that it will properly
count the votes cast for
all offices and all questions. The test shall be conducted by
processing a test deck
for each ballot style. If the system does not accurately count the
test deck, the cause for
the error or errors shall be ascertained and corrected and an
errorless count shall be
made before the system is approved for use in the count of actual
ballots. The
commissioners of the county board shall certify that they have reviewed and
verified the results of
said testing.
Comment
86--Paragraph seems to be cut-and-pasted from material for central-count
optical scanners.
C. Public Demonstration
In addition to the pre-election test, the county board shall
conduct a public
demonstration of the
test utilizing all or a portion of the test deck. Appropriate written
notice of the public
demonstration shall be sent to the chair of the county committee of
each political party and
to each candidate whose name appears on the ballot. One
representative of each
political party and one representative of each candidate whose
name appears on the
ballot shall be entitled to be present at the test.
Comment 87--Consistently
these regs omit voters, pollworkers, and good government groups as stakeholders
in the conduct of elections. There should be provision for their inclusion.
Comment
88--Comparable public testing should be required for DREs.
The commissioners of the county board
shall certify that they have reviewed and
verified the results of
the public demonstration testing.
D. Storage of Test Deck
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Following the pre-election testing and
public demonstration testing, the test deck
shall be locked in
secure storage until immediately preceding the official tabulation of paper
ballots. All copies of
test data, including copies of ballot programming, shall be stored with
the test deck, in locked
secured storage.
E. Testing Immediately Preceding Official
Tabulation of Paper Ballots
Immediately preceding the official
tabulation of paper ballots, the following testing
shall be completed:
(1) The paper ballot counting system
shall be cleared of all votes and a printed
report shall be produced
by the system to confirm that all voting positions are at zero.
(2) The test deck shall be run through
the system to demonstrate that the system
can accurately count
votes and the results shall be compared to the pre-election test data.
The commissioners of the
county board shall certify that they have reviewed and verified
the comparison of the
test data before the official tabulation of ballots is conducted.
(3) The system shall again be cleared
of all votes and a printed report shall be
produced by the system
to confirm that all voting positions are at zero.
F. Testing During Ballot Tabulation
The system shall be so designed and
constructed that, at the discretion of the
county board, it shall
be possible to halt the ballot tabulation at a point when a portion of
the election districts
have been counted, and run the test deck to demonstrate, as in the
pre-count tests listed
in section (E) above, the accuracy and dependability of the count
without jeopardizing any
official tabulation of results that may be on the equipment at that
time.
G. Testing Following the Machine
Tabulation of Ballots
Immediately following the machine
tabulation of the ballots from all the election
districts and the
production of the county-wide totals of votes, the pre-count tests listed in
section (E) above, shall
be run so as to demonstrate the accuracy and dependability of the
count.
H. System Management
(1) The county board of elections shall
have management control over all resources
employed during the
tabulation process, including the processing of ballots and the testing
of equipment.
(2) If it becomes necessary to transfer
control of any equipment back to the vendor
for repairs, operational
tabulation activities may not be carried out on the equipment while
22
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it is solely under the
vendor's control.
Comment
89--These procedures appear to be cut-and-pasted from a document for a
central-count optical scanner.
Comparable
requirements should apply to DRE equipment. Moreover, the testing of DRE
equipment must consist of votes entered in the same manner as votes are to be
entered during an election, including use of all accessible devices and
minority language interfaces, inspection of the VVPAT as it is generated,
second-chance voting, attempted entry of overvotes and undervotes, extraction
of vote tallies after votes have been entered, and inspection of all audit logs
produced by the DRE equipment.
I. State Board Support During First Year
of Operation
(1) During the first two elections in
which such equipment is used, including a
general election, the
State Board shall assist and supervise the operation of the paper-
based voting system.
Such supervision shall include but not be limited to:
(a) preparation of test deck
(b) supervision of pre-election,
public demonstration and pre-tabulation tests
(c) supervision of official
tabulation of ballots on the day to be designated by
the county board of
elections
(2) During successive years, the State
Board, whenever it deems necessary, or at
the request of a county
board of elections, shall assist in the operation of the system.
Section 6209.13
Submission of Procedures for Unofficial Tally of Results of Election
County boards of elections which adopt
procedures pursuant to section 9-126(3) of
the Election Law shall
submit such procedures to the State Board of Elections.
Section 6209.14 Routine
Maintenance for Paper-based Voting Equipment
Section
Comment--It is unclear why these regs are applied only to paper-based systems
and not to DREs.
A. Each county which purchases a
paper-based voting system shall keep a detailed log
of maintenance
performance and testing procedures.
B. Such logs shall be in a format provided
by the State Board and same shall have been
reviewed by the vendor.
C. Such logs shall be provided regularly
to the State Board, for their review and inspection.
D. The State Board, upon written request
of a vendor or any other interested or
aggrieved party, may,
after a hearing, suspend the use of any paper-based voting system
in any county in which
proper maintenance procedures or proper servicing by the
manufacturer have not
been fully implemented resulting in malfunction of such equipment.
Comment
90--Why is this limited to Paper-based voting equipment, and not applicable to
DREs also?
Comment
91--The county boards of elections are supposed to be trained to maintain their
own systems, so why does this reg cover only servicing by the manufacturer?
(And does “manufacturer” here also mean the “vendor?”)
E. The State Board may reinstate the
certification based upon review of these procedures
and a review of the
maintenance logs.
Comment 92--
It is unreasonable that these provisions are applied only to paper-based
systems and not to DREs also.
Section 6209.15
Demonstration Models
Section
Comment--ERMA, Page 2, Lines 46-54
46 {3.} 2. For five years after any voting
machine OR SYSTEM of a
type
47 approved
by the state board of elections
{after September first, nine-
48 teen hundred eighty-six} PURSUANT TO THE
ELECTION REFORM AND MODERNIZA-
49 TION
ACT OF 2005 is first used in any election district, the {city or
50 town which purchased such machine} LOCAL
BOARD OF ELECTIONS WHICH OWNS
51 SUCH
MACHINE OR SYSTEM shall provide
a model OR DIAGRAM of such voting
52 machine OR SYSTEM for each polling
place in which any such
election
53 district
is located. Such models OR DIAGRAMS shall meet the
standards
54 set forth in regulations promulgated by the
state board of elections.
A. During the first five (5) years after
purchase, any county which purchases voting
23
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equipment systems shall
provide a model or diagram of such voting system's equipment
for each polling place
in its jurisdiction.
B. If a model or diagram is used, such
model or diagram must meet the following
specifications:
(1) be approved by the State Board
(2) may not contain the name of any
party or independent body which has been
continuously used in New
York State.
(3) display a ballot layout which
shall consist of at least two party rows and eight
voting positions
including at least one multiple-candidate office (vote for two).
C. If a model is used, each model must
(1) be no less than 11 inches by 14
inches
(2) be operated by electricity and/or
a battery power source
(3) enable the voter to vote for a
candidate
(4) enable the voter to negate or
change a vote
(5) enable the voter to cast the
ballot.
(6) specify how and where to cast a
write-in ballot.
D.
If a diagram is used,
(1) shall specify how to mark or cast
a ballot
(2) shall specify how and where to
mark or cast a write-in ballot
(3) shall be no smaller than 11 inches
by 17 inches