SEE BELOW FOR COMMENTARY ON THESE LETTERS.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/14/opinion/l14vote.html
The New York
Times
March 14,
2005
For Voting
Machines We Can Trust (4 Letters)
To the
Editor:
Re
"Virtues of Optical-Scan Voting" (editorial, March 9):
You are
right to suggest that the heavily lobbied touch-screen voting machines now
under consideration by the New York Legislature should not be used at all.
Optical-scan
voting is far cheaper, faster in the polling place and produces the best kind
of paper trail, a ballot marked by the voter.
While
optical-scan voting is superior, there must be safeguards. Initial scanning
should be done on the precinct level to minimize error before results are sent
to the local board of elections. Results should then be tabulated county by
county and transmitted to the final tabulating location.
There should
not be a central, politically motivated state bureaucracy in charge of the
process. Vote counting should be from the bottom up.
Paper
ballots, after they have been scanned, should be guarded like gold in Fort
Knox. A security system must be in place that will prevent the lifeblood of a
democracy from being lost, strayed or stolen.
Bill Blanck
Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y., March 9, 2005
•
To the
Editor:
A recent
Caltech-M.I.T. study clearly shows that touch-screens are the most accurate and
efficient method of voting. The study recognizes Georgia, which uses
touch-screens across the state, as making the greatest improvement in voting
accuracy throughout the country.
Regarding
the cost advantages of optical-scan machines, you do not mention the long-term
costs related to printing ballots that are inevitably passed on to taxpayers.
These costs, particularly in large cities that require many ballots in several
languages, are one of the primary reasons most election officials prefer
touch-screens to optical scanners.
Additionally,
optical-scan machines are not "far cheaper than touch-screens." Per
unit, the cost of optical scanners is about $1,000 more than a typical
touch-screen machine.
If the bills
in the New York Legislature are more focused on touch-screen voting as opposed
to optical-scan technology, it's because forward-thinking legislators are acutely
aware of the advantages of touch-screen voting.
Thomas W.
Swidarski
President,
Diebold Election Systems
McKinney,
Tex., March 10, 2005
•
To the
Editor:
You urge New
York legislators to favor optical scanners because they are "the best
voting technology now available." They aren't.
Despite the
fact that the voter personally marks the ballot and has the chance to verify
his or her choices, no machine has ever been built that can read a ballot the
way a human eye does, and there is no assurance that the machine will count the
ballot the way it was marked by the voter.
Even if a
manual recount is performed flawlessly (an impossibility considering the
charged atmosphere under which such recounts occur), the mark made by a voter
may not be counted because the states have developed different and obscure
criteria for what constitutes a valid optical vote.
The
fundamental problem is that a ballot offers only a finite number of candidate
choices, but an optical-scan ballot can be marked by a voter in an infinite
number of ways.
There is no
consistent method of determining voter intent from an optical ballot, so some
voters will necessarily be disenfranchised through their use.
Electronic
machines do not suffer from this defect. They offer a finite number of yes-no
choices, so there is no possibility of mistaking voter intent.
Michael I.
Shamos
Pittsburgh,
March 9, 2005
The writer,
a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, is a consultant to the secretary of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on electronic voting.
•
To the
Editor:
We use
optical-scan ballots throughout Minnesota. We don't have long waits at the polls,
and recounts are easier than with other systems.
Optical-scan
ballots are certainly better than electronic voting machines.
Eric Jaffa
Brooklyn
Center, Minn.
March 9,
2005
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2005 The New York Times Company
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Errors
in the letter from Thomas W. Swidarski, President of Diebold Election Systems:
Error A.
"Additionally, optical-scan machines are not 'far cheaper than touch-screens.'
Per unit, the cost of optical scanners is about $1,000 more than a typical
touch-screen machine."
In truth,
New York State will save over $50 million dollars in up-front costs by
purchasing paper-ballot-optical-scan systems (PBOS) rather than touch-screens
(DREs). Mr. Swidarski failed to mention that we would need to purchase fewer
PBOS systems than DREs.
One or more
DREs would be needed to replace each lever machine. Meanwhile, one optical
scanner can replace several lever machines. Small polling places can use one
PBOS for several election districts. Only polling places with a very large
number of election districts may require two or more PBOS systems.
Mr.
Swidarski claims that a DRE is less expensive than an optical scanner, but this
is true only for ATM-style DREs that are made by Diebold. Due to New York's
full-face ballot requirement, we cannot use ATM-style DREs. The full-face DREs
we will purchase are MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE per unit: a scanner is around $5500; a
full-face DRE is around $8000!
Error B.
"Regarding the cost advantages of optical-scan machines, you do not
mention the long-term costs related to printing ballots that are inevitably
passed on to taxpayers".
In truth,
the long term costs of DREs are far higher, even considering the cost of
ballots for the PBOS systems. Not only do DREs require substantially higher
storage and transportation costs, but they have a lifespan of about 5
years. Optical scan systems have a
lifespan of 12-15 years. Counties will need to buy completely new equipment in
5 years with DRES! Also, paper ballots must still be printed with DRE systems
for absentee, affidavit, and emergency ballots. A cost comparison of two
Florida Counties using DRES and PBOS respectively showed that the county using
DREs spent over a million dollars more per year
(http://www.votersunite.org/info/costcomparison.asp).
Error C.
"A recent Caltech-M.I.T. study clearly shows that touch-screens are the
most accurate and efficient method of voting. The study recognizes Georgia, which
uses touch-screens across the state, as making the greatest improvement in
voting accuracy throughout the country."
In truth, no
study has ever shown the accuracy of touch-screen systems, since there has
NEVER been an independent audit of these systems. The CalTech-M.I.T. study used
unverified and unverifiable numbers provided by the states, which simply made
various assumptions about their equipment.
Moreover, when
studies such as the one from Cal-Tech-MIT compare "undervotes" we
need to know specifically what was counted for each system. It has been alleged
that when Diebold reports "undervotes" they are reporting only races
in which multiple candidates are elected to fill multiple offices, and the voter
has selected fewer than the maximum number of candidates allowed. Diebold’s
count of undervotes would not include a race for President, where only one
choice is allowed, but no choice is recorded; Diebold would call this a
"blank vote," not an "undervote."
Misleading statements in the letter from Michael Shamos
Misleading
statement A. "an optical-scan ballot can be marked by a voter in an
infinite number of ways."
In truth,
almost all wrongly-marked paper ballots will be detected as invalid ballots by
the optical scanner, and the voter would be allowed to correct the ballot
BEFORE it is cast. Scanners detect over-votes, under-votes, and stray marks.
Misleading
statement B. "no machine has ever been built that can read a ballot the
way a human eye does, and there is no assurance that the machine will count the
ballot the way it was marked by the voter."
In truth,
machines work differently than the human eye, but machines can read much faster
and more accurately. Optical scanners used by our post office read scribbled
addresses on envelops, and optical scanners used by our banking system read
billions of checks daily (with an error rate that is close to zero).
A machine
might count the votes on a ballot incorrectly because the machine might be
programmed wrong. This problem is not related to how the machine reads. This
problem is related to human errors in programming, and has to be detected by
routine logic and accuracy testing before the election, and manual recounts of
ballots after the election.
Misleading
statement C. "the mark made by a voter may not be counted because the
states have developed different and obscure criteria for what constitutes a
valid optical vote." "There
is no consistent method of determining voter intent from an optical
ballot"
In truth,
there is much corruption in the laws, regulations, and practices of various
states, and the solution is to reform the laws, regulations, and practices so
that the obvious intent of the voter is counted. Problems can be hidden but not
corrected by using electronic voting equipment that cannot or will not be
audited so that errors cannot be detected.
Misleading
statement D. "Electronic machines ... offer a finite number of yes-no
choices, so there is no possibility of mistaking voter intent."
In truth,
electronic machines are dependent on their programming, which can make any mistake
imaginable. Electronic machines offer infinite possibilities for undetected
loss and change of the voter's intent via hacking, corrupt insiders, and
innocent errors in programming.