http://www.theithacajournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060106/OPINION02/601060312/1014
theithacajournal.com
Jan 6, 2006
Michael Lane's guest column on Dec. 21 (“Voters cut out of
polling machine choice”) was full of factual errors. I will attempt to correct
them.
There are three types of voting machines under discussion:
# Electronic touch screens with no paper ballot.
These are forbidden by New York State Law (thanks to our
Assemblywoman Barbara Lifton), and it's a good thing they are. The trouble with
these is that almost any fraud, or simple computation error, is undetectable.
Most types of fraud and counting error can be detected only with a careful
recount. With these machines, recounts are impossible, because there are no
actual ballots to recount. The only information available is the output of the
machine, and so if the machine is producing incorrect output, there is no way
at all to tell what the correct output should have been.
Michael Lane wrote “... if anyone criminally tampers with
voting machines, we have district attorneys ...”
But the district attorney can do absolutely nothing if the
election fraud cannot be detected. Statistical analysis by comparison to other
polls indicates that the official results of the recent Ohio referendum were
incredibly unlikely, indicating a high chance of election fraud. But the
election was run on these paperless machines, so there is simply no way to
tell.
In addition, all the existing systems of this type currently
sold in the United States are all quite easy to defraud - undetectably - for
anyone with a little computer programming experience and access to the
machines. These problems were not present for mechanical lever machines,
because it is actually very hard to alter the operation of a mechanical
machine, and it is quite easy to tell that it has been altered.
Computer experts agree that there are only two current ways
to change these machines so their vote counts can be trusted: one involves
abandoning the secret ballot, so it's not a good choice; the other is to add a
voter-verified paper ballot to the machines. Paper ballots are certainly
subject to fraud. But computers make everything faster and allow things to be
done in bulk. With a computer, you can steal an entire precinct in the time it
would take you to falsify one paper ballot. In fact, the movement for paper
ballots is led by computer scientists, who understand this.
Contrary to Lane's assertions, paperless touch screen
machines have proven themselves unreliable in elections throughout the country,
in some cases giving completely absurd results (10 times as many votes as
voters, negative vote totals, etc.) Due to the lack of actual ballots, those
elections had to be completely rerun from scratch at great expense. Despite the
state law prohibiting such machines, the state board of elections is currently
“testing” such a system (the vendor has promised to add a paper ballot
“later”), which is very unfortunate.
# Electronic touch screens with a paper ballot.
These produce a paper ballot which the voter can look at and
verify, which is then stored securely. For a recount, the paper ballots are
used, preserving the secret ballot while making it possible to check whether
the machines counted the votes properly. These are legal in New York because
they have the paper ballot.
These have all the same costs associated with paper ballots
as optical-scan systems. “Bulky paper ballots must be printed for each election
cycle and stored for extended periods afterwards,” as Lane wrote about optical
scan systems. Touch screen systems which are legal in New York do not save any
money on paper ballots. Multiple touch screen machines must be purchased for
each precinct to avoid long lines, because they have been shown to be
relatively slow to use. In addition, they have relatively high yearly
maintenance costs due to the complexity of the electronics and the software.
These are acceptable systems, provided random hand recounts are conducted to
check the machine counts. However, they are unnecessarily expensive and slow.
# Paper ballots with optical scanners.
One optical scanner, one voter assistance device
(“AutoMark,” allowing blind voters to mark the scan cards), and a few privacy
booths are necessary for each precinct.
The total cost of this entire setup is less than the cost of
the multiple touch screen machines needed for one precinct. The maintenance
costs are also much smaller because the technology is simpler and hence more
reliable. In addition, it appears to take most individuals less time to fill
out such a ballot than it does to use a touch screen machine.
The rates of voter error are very small, probably because
most people are used to filling out SAT-like cards (although these are filled
out in pen). Some of the optical scanners can also be altered to miscount the
ballots in the same way as the touchscreens can. However, this is very easy to
detect by running the same stack of ballots through a different optical
scanner; since optical-scan ballots are a fairly standardized technology, this
could even be a scanner from a different vendor. In addition, they can be hand
counted just like all paper ballots, and random hand recounts should be
conducted with any system.
More information about election integrity issues, including
evidence for my claims, is available at the Web sites for the following
non-partisan organizations:
New Yorkers for Verified Voting: http://www.nyvv.org/
Vote Trust USA: http://www.votetrustusa.org/
Verified Voting: http://www.verifiedvoting.org/
Voters Unite: http://www.votersunite.org/
Black Box Voting: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
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