Comments on the May 15, 2008
Draft of Part 6210
Routine Maintenance and Testing
of Voting Systems, Operational Procedures, and Standard for Determining Valid
Votes
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/hava/6210Regulations05152008Update.pdf
Comments by Teresa Hommel
www.wheresthepaper.org/6210WithCmtsJune15_08.htm
June 15, 2008
Notes:
a.
Pagination is indicated, and has been copied from the PDF posted at the above
web address.
b. Text
from the draft regulations is in Ariel font, with
line numbers are omitted; indentation
may have been lost, and formerly centered
text is now left-justified.
c.
Comments are numbered, in Times Roman font, and bold. In some comments, new
suggested language is CAPITALIZED.
Overview
a.
These regulations need to consistently and explicitly give the public a role,
and rights
equivalent to parties and candidates, to
observe procedures and obtain information. The
public cannot provide appropriate citizen
oversight of elections without this, and parties are
not a substitute for the public.
b. The regulations treat computers as if they can self-verify, and are
unrealistic about the
imagined powers of computers.
c. The ballot images need to be restored to Section 6210.16.
d.
Insufficient voting equipment is required.
e.
Consideration of Section 6210.18 on the Three-Percent Audit should be delayed
until the
State Board can take advantage of recent
developments in the field of election audits and
bring this section up to date.
May 15,
2008, DRAFT
Part
6210
Routine
Maintenance and
Testing
of Voting Systems,
Operational
Procedures, and
Standards
for Determining Valid Votes
Section
6210.1 Definitions
Except
to the extent set forth below, the definitions contained in section 6209 shall
apply
in this section
1. Pre-qualification test is a test
prescribed by the State Board, conducted
immediately
prior to the voting systems' use in an election in which a
predetermined
set of votes are cast which will ensure that all voting positions for
each
ballot configuration are tested.
Comment
1
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
1.
Pre-qualification test is a test prescribed by the State Board, conducted
immediately
prior to the voting systems' use in an election in which a
predetermined
set of votes are cast which will ensure that all voting positions for
each
ballot configuration are tested. Such votes shall be entered into the voting
system in
the same manner as they will be entered by voters during an election.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
1.
Pre-qualification test is a test prescribed by the State Board, conducted
immediately prior to the voting systems' use in an election; IN SUCH TEST A
predetermined set of votes, WHICH SHALL BE UNIQUE FOR EACH CANDIDATE AND BALLOT
QUESTION CHOICE AND WHICH SHALL BE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS OR MORE THAN 50%
OF THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE REGISTERED VOTERS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO VOTE AT THE
LARGEST POLL SITE IN THE COUNTY, are
cast IN A MANNER THAT will ensure that EACH voting POSITION FOR EACH BALLOT
CONFIGURATION IS TESTED AND IS CONFIRMED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY, SEPARATELY AND
INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER VOTING POSITION ON ITS BALLOT. Such votes shall be
entered into the voting system in the same manner AND AT THE SAME RATE as they
will be entered by voters during an election.
WHY
The
phrase "in which a predetermined set of votes are cast" refers to
"election" and not to "test." The easiest way to make the
meaning clear is to break the long sentence into two shorter phrases, by use of
a semicolon between the parts.
One way
that testing can be distinguished from real elections by malicious software, is
that typically during tests only a small number of votes are entered. Also,
some software errors only show themselves after a large number of entries are
made. Therefore, in any test that purports to confirm the correct functioning
of a voting system, the number of votes entered should be approximately the
same as or more than the number expected to be cast on election day.
Such
test has the purpose of confirming that each voting position functions
properly, separately and independently from each other voting position on the
ballot. In other states voting positions have been inadequately tested by
entering one vote on each. If votes are improperly switched by the machine, the
errors will not be revealed as long as each tally shows one vote. The suggested
change indicates that each position needs to be tested with a different number
of votes.
Another
way that a system can determine that it is being tested rather than used for a
real election is by the date and time. For this reason, testing should be
conducted in Election Mode with the Real-Time clock set to a randomly chosen
time on the date of the election. Test votes and ballots should be cast at a
rate approximately the same as the rate at which voters will cast them.
If a
voting system offers several methods for votes to be entered, such as touch-
screen,
push-button, or other electronic mechanism, a key pad and/or pneumatic
switch
for voters with disabilities, or alternate language displays, then a pre-
determined
set of votes shall be entered separately using each method and
language
display. The results of the casting of
said votes and all voting system
logs
shall be extracted from the system as though during normal use in an
election,
and the results and logs shall be compared to the predetermined results
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of the
test votes and vote totals prepared pursuant to regulations and procedures
of the
State Board.
2. Printout means either the printed copy
of zero totals, candidate names and
offices
and other information produced by the voting equipment prior to the
official
opening of the polls or the printed tabulation report of votes cast for each
candidate
and question, the names of candidates and the offices for each
candidate
and other information provided after the official closing of the polls.
Comment
2
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
2.
Printout means either the printed copy of zero totals, candidate names and
offices
and other information produced by the voting equipment prior to the
official
opening of the polls or the printed tabulation report of votes cast for each
candidate
and question, the names of candidates and the offices for each
candidate
and other information provided after the official closing of the polls.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
2.
PRINTOUT MEANS EITHER THE PRINTED REPORT PRODUCED BY THE VOTING EQUIPMENT PRIOR
TO THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE POLLS, WHICH CONTAINS ZERO TOTALS, CANDIDATES
NAMES AND OFFICES AND OTHER INFORMATION, OR THE PRINTED TABULATION REPORT
PRODUCED BY THE VOTING EQUIPMENT AFTER THE OFFICIAL CLOSING OF POLLS, WHICH
CONTAINS THE MACHINE'S TALLY OF VOTES CAST FOR EACH CANDIDATE OR QUESTION, THE
NAMES OF CANDIDATES AND THE OFFICES FOR EACH CANDIDATE AND OTHER INFORMATION.
WHY
Clearer
statement.
3. Election Mode: An operational setting and/or functional
level of a voting
system
that would allow the user, under the required conditions stated by law, to
make
selections, and/or cast a ballot, and which also uniquely provides the
potential
to have a marked ballot officially accepted for counting at the time of a
defined
election. Note: This mode of operation may also be synonymous with the
term
"live vote mode" or similar.
This mode may also be run at any time, either
for the
running of realistic simulations for testing, and/or after various
maintenance
activities. This mode is specifically required to be run in the conduct
of an
official election.
Comment
3
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
This
mode may also be run at any time, either
for the
running of realistic simulations for testing, and/or after various
maintenance
activities.
PROBLEM
Such
testing creates potential for innocent errors and/or fraud. During the running of
tests with equipment such as the Sequoia ImageCast, large numbers of ballot
images can be produced. Some or all of such ballot images may accidentally
replace some or all of the images of ballots cast on election day.
SOLUTION
a. New
York State needs to clearly require that all post-election recounts and audits
be conducted by counting votes on the voter-marked paper ballots cast on
election day, and not by counting computerized ballot images.
b. At the
completion of testing, copies of all electronic results and ballot images may
be archived but the records inside the voting system must be deleted.
c. All test
ballots must be marked in such a way as to identify them as test ballots, so
that all ballot images that are made during testing will display such marks.
4. Test Mode: An operational setting and/or functional level of a voting system
that
would
allow the user to specify/select, access, and/or test various levels/areas of
the
device, either, for example, during possible upgrades, diagnostic testing,
and/or
specific maintenance activities that may not require full functional
simulation,
or capabilities at that time. Note: This mode of operation is a
separate
option from Election Mode, and is prohibited from being run in the
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conduct
of an official election.
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Section
6210.2 Routine Maintenance and Testing of Voting Systems
A. Testing
of all voting systems shall be conducted by the county board before the
use of
the system in any election and at such other times of the year as
prescribed
by these regulations. Testing procedures
shall be approved by the
State
Board.
Comment
4
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Testing
procedures shall be approved
by the
State Board.
PROBLEM
It
appears that only a small number of different makes and models of new voting systems
will be used in New York State. It is inefficient for each county to replicate
the work of other counties with the same equipment, and devise its own testing
procedures. Most county boards do not have the expertise in-house to devise
such procedures.
SOLUTION
The
State Board should devise testing procedures with the assistance of NYSTEC and
citizen groups and individuals with expertise. John Washburn of Wisconsin is a
citizen expert in this area. The Draft page 8 PDF lines 14-16, which is Section
6210.2 F., indicates that the State Board shall provide sample tests. This
section should make reference to such samples. For example:
Testing
procedures shall make use of sample tests and guidelines provided by the State
Board and county testing procedures shall be approved by the State Board.
The voting system shall
be tested to determine that the system is
functioning
correctly and that all system equipment, including but not limited to
hardware,
memory, and report printers, are properly integrated with the system
and are
capable of properly performing in an election.
Testing, other than pre-
qualification
testing, shall be conducted by casting manual votes and may
include
the casting of simulated votes.
Comment
5
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Testing,
other than pre-
qualification
testing, shall be conducted by casting manual votes and may
include
the casting of simulated votes.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Testing,
other than pre-
qualification
testing, shall be conducted by manually casting votes. The casting of simulated
votes may be used only to confirm the results obtained by manual casting.
WHY
When
computers verify their own work, for example through the use of simulated
votes, this opens many possibilities for innocent errors and fraud.
B. In
addition to vendor-prescribed maintenance tasks and diagnostic tests, tests of
voting
equipment shall be conducted by the county board, on each piece of
equipment
owned by the county board. Such testing
shall be administered
periodically
and be completed during the following periods during each year that
the
equipment is in use:
1) January 15 - April 15
2) April 16 - July 15
3) July 16 - September 15
4) September 16 - November 15
Whenever
a voting system is to be tested for pre-qualification purposes, such
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test
must be conducted while the voting system is in 'election mode'. Votes cast
for
pre-qualification test purposes shall be manually cast using all of the devices
available
to voters on election day (i.e.: audio, key pads and or pneumatic
switches,
and/or alternate language displays).
Comment
6
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Votes
cast
for
pre-qualification test purposes shall be manually cast using all of the devices
available
to voters on election day (ie, audio, key pads and or pneumatic
switches,
and/or alternate language displays).
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Votes
cast
for
pre-qualification test purposes shall be manually cast in the manner in which
votes will be cast by most voters. Additional separate tests shall be conducted
which consist of the casting of the same manual votes using each of the
assistive devices available to voters on election day (ie, audio, key pads
and/or pneumatic switches, and/or alternate language displays).
WHY
The use
of assistive devices and alternate language displays in voting systems has
resulted in errors different from those that occur when votes are cast in the
manner used by most voters. For example, for years some of the votes cast using
a Spanish language display have been lost by Sequoia systems: www.wheresthepaper.org/Limited_Parallel_Testing_Findings.pdf
and www.wheresthepaper.org/WrongTimeForAnEvoteGlitch.htm
C. Testing
shall include the comparison of software installed on the delivered system to
certified
software, via the use a Secure Hash Signature Standard (SHS) validation
program,
as described in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
180-2
issued by the National Institute Standards Technology (This publication is
available
electronically by accessing http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. Alternatively,
copies
of NIST
computer security publications are available from: National Technical
Information
Service
(NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.)
Testing shall consist of the
re-calibration of equipment, as appropriate, pursuant to
recommendations
made in vendor's maintenance documentation, and the casting of
a 'test
deck' by voting the minimum number of ballots, determined pursuant to the
requirements
of Section 6210.8 of these regulations, to ensure that all voting
positions
for each ballot configuration are tested.
Votes cast for the purposes of this
section
shall be cumulative ballots cast on each piece of equipment during each of
the
prescribed periods outlined.
1) If
the system does not accurately count the votes from the test deck cast
manually,
simulated, or both, (aside from those that were deliberately
designed
to fail), or the calibration test, the cause or causes for the error
Comment
7
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
designed
to fail), or the calibration test, the cause or causes for the error
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
designed
to fail), or FAILS the calibration test, the cause or causes for the error
WHY
Clearer
statement.
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or
errors shall be ascertained and corrected.
The voting system shall be
re-tested
until there are two consecutive error-free tests before the system
is
approved for use in the count of actual ballots.
Comment
8
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
voting system shall be
re-tested
until there are two consecutive error-free tests before the system
is
approved for use in the count of actual ballots.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
count
of actual VOTER-CAST ELECTION-DAY ballots
SUGGESTED
ADDITION
A
maximum of 5 tests shall be made, and if 2 consecutive error-free tests are not
produced, the machine shall be taken out of service until the reason for such
failure is diagnosed, logged, reported to the state board, and maintenance and
repair have been made. All other voting systems of the same make and model in
all counties shall be diagnosed to determine whether the same flaw is present
in them, and if so it shall be repaired before the next use of such systems in
any election.
WHY
a.
Clearer statement.
b. There need to be realistic limits on how
often a machine is tested when it repeatedly fails. A failing machine needs to
be taken out of service and other machines of its type need to be examined to
determine if all such machines have the same flaw. The State Board needs to
know when such a problem occurs so other counties using the same equipment can
be notified of a potential problem with their equipment.
a. If 5
tests have to be made before 2 consecutive error-free tests are achieved, this
means the equipment is working poorly, and the reason for failures should be
diagnosed and repaired.
The commissioners of
the
county board or their designees shall certify that they have reviewed
and
verified the results of said testing.
The summary results of all tests,
including
all inaccurate test results, their causes and the actions taken to
correct
them, as well as the results of all errorless counts, shall be entered
upon
the maintenance log. All documentation
and/or test decks,
simulation
cartridges and any test data including but not limited to copies
of
ballot programming used for required maintenance tests shall be
maintained
in secure locked storage for two years after the election,
pursuant
to Election Law Section 3-222.
Comment
9
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
shall
be
maintained
in secure locked storage for two years after the election,
pursuant
to Election Law Section 3-222.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
shall
be
maintained
in secure, locked storage for two years after the election,
pursuant
to Election Law Section 3-222, AND MAY BE VIEWED BY
THE
PUBLIC UPON REQUEST.
WHY
The
public is the major stakeholder in the correct administration of elections, and
should be explicitly given access to such records.
2) Maintenance logs are to be kept as a
permanent record of the county
board.
D. During
the period including July 16 - September 15 (and in years when a
presidential
primary is conducted, during the January 15 - April 15 period), the
test
ballot format for each piece of equipment
shall consist of each primary
ballot
configuration as certified by the county board, if said equipment is to be
utilized
in a primary election. The voting
system shall be cleared of all votes and
a
printed report shall be produced by the system, to verify the correct ballot
configuration
and election configuration, and to confirm that all voting positions
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are at
zero. Ballots cast for the purposes of
this test shall be manually cast and
a
printed tabulation report shall be provided.
Comment
10
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Ballots cast for the
purposes of this test shall be manually cast and
a
printed tabulation report shall be provided.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Ballots cast for the purposes
of this test shall be manually cast and
a
printed tabulation report shall be PRODUCED BY THE SYSTEM.
WHY
a.
Clearer statement.
The system shall again be cleared
of all votes
and a printed report shall be produced by the system to confirm that
all
voting positions are at zero. Each
officer or board charged with the duty of
preparing
voting machines for use in any election shall give written notice, by first
class
mail, to the State Board and to all candidates, except candidates for
member
of the county committee, who are lawfully entitled to have their names
appear
thereon, of the time when, and the place where, they may inspect the
voting
machines to be used for such election.
Comment
11
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
they may inspect the
voting
machines to be used for such election.
PROBLEMS
a.
Inspection by merely "looking at" a computer is meaningless.
Inspection of a computer to confirm that it works means turning the computer on
and using it for the purpose intended, examining the results, and inspecting
all system logs and other documentation.
b.
Candidates are not the only stakeholders in the correct working of voting
machines--the public is the primary stakeholder.
SOLUTIONS
a.
Persons eligible to "inspect" should be invited to observe the
testing of the equipment and to inspect all system logs and other
documentation.
b. The regulations
should explicitly require public notice to be posted a minimum of seven
calendar days prior to testing, and explicitly require that any member of the
public shall be allowed to attend and observe and inspect all system logs and
other documentation.
The candidates or their designated
representatives
may appear at the time and place specified in such notice to
inspect
such machines, provided, however, that the time so specified shall be not
less
than two days prior to the date of the election.
E. For
the period between ballot certification and seven days before the general
election,
the test ballot format for each piece of equipment shall consist of each
general
election ballot configuration as certified by the county board. The voting
system
shall be cleared of all votes and a printed report shall be produced by the
system,
to verify the correct ballot configuration and election configuration, and
to
confirm that all voting positions are at zero.
Ballots cast for the purposes of
this
test shall be manually cast and a printed tabulation report shall be produced.
Comment
12
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Ballots cast for the purposes of
this
test shall be manually cast and a printed tabulation report shall be produced.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Ballots
cast for the purposes of this test shall be manually cast and
a
printed tabulation report shall be PRODUCED BY THE SYSTEM.
WHY
Clearer
statement.
The
system shall again be cleared of all votes and a printed report shall be
produced
by the system to confirm that all voting positions are at zero. Each
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officer
or board charged with the duty of preparing voting machines for use in
any
election shall give written notice pursuant to NYS Election Law Section 7-
128 and
Section 7-207, by first class mail, to the State Board and to all
candidates,
except candidates for member of the county committee, who are
lawfully
entitled to have their names appear thereon, of the time when, and the
place where,
they may inspect the voting machines to be used for such election.
The
candidates or their designated representatives may appear at the time and
place
specified in such notice to inspect such machines,
Comment
13
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
candidates or their designated representatives may appear at the time and
place
specified in such notice to inspect such machines
PROBLEMS
a.
Inspection by merely "looking at" a computer is meaningless.
Inspection of a computer to confirm that it works means turning the computer on
and using it for the purpose intended, examining the results, and inspecting
all system logs and other documentation.
b.
Candidates are not the only stakeholders in the correct working of voting
machines--the public is the primary stakeholder.
SOLUTIONS
a.
Persons eligible to "inspect" should instead be invited to observe
the testing of the equipment and to inspect all system logs and other
documentation.
b. The
regulations should explicitly require public notice to be posted a minimum of
seven calendar days prior to testing, and explicitly require that any member of
the public shall be allowed to attend and observe and inspect all system logs
and other documentation.
provided,
however, that
the
time so specified shall be not less than two days prior to the date of the
election.
F. In
addition to any vendor provided training, the State Board shall provide
training
on
routine maintenance and testing of voting systems to county board personnel
responsible
for voting systems. The State Board
shall provide sample tests to be
utilized
by each county board. The State Board may revise said testing format,
based
upon its audit and review.
G. All
results of each routine maintenance test and/or pre-qualification test,
including
the final errorless test, shall be certified as accurate by the county
board
commissioners or their designees, and such certification shall be entered
upon
the maintenance log for each such piece of equipment, together with any
other
information prescribed in said log by the State Board.
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H. The
county board shall certify to the State Board, the completion of each routine
maintenance
test and/or pre-qualification test. All
documentation and/or test
decks,
simulation cartridges and any test data including but not limited to copies
of
ballot programming used for required maintenance tests shall be maintained
in
secure locked storage for two years after the election, pursuant to Election
Law
Section 3-222. Such certification shall
be on a form prescribed and
furnished
by the State Board, and shall be accompanied by copies of each
maintenance
log.
Comment
14
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Such
certification shall be on a form prescribed and
furnished
by the State Board, and shall be accompanied by copies of each
maintenance
log.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Such
certification shall be on a form prescribed and
furnished
by the State Board, and shall be accompanied by copies of each
maintenance
log. ALL SUCH INFORMATION SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION BY THE PUBLIC UPON
REQUEST AT THE OFFICES OF THE COUNTY BOARD AND AT THE STATE BOARD.
WHY
The
public is the primary stakeholder in the conduct of elections. These
regulations should explicitly recognize that members of the public can have
access to all records upon request.
I. Each
county shall keep a detailed log of maintenance performance and testing
procedures. Such logs shall be in a format provided by
the State Board and the
same
shall have been reviewed by the vendor.
J. Such
logs shall be provided quarterly to or as requested by the State Board, for
their
review and inspection, and shall be made available to the public.
K. The
State Board may, upon review of the maintenance logs, require further
testing
of any such piece of equipment or may remove a piece of equipment
from
use in an election until further examination and testing has been completed,
or may
rescind certification pursuant to Part 6209.8 of the State Board
Regulations.
1) The State Board may reinstate the
certification if the equipment passes
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these
further tests, and a review of the maintenance logs supports such
reinstatement.
2) County boards shall make the system or
equipment available to the State
Board
for any such additional testing and shall provide such assistance as
may be
deemed necessary.
L. During
the initial time period in which such system or equipment is used, to
include
a primary election and a general election, the State Board shall assist in
the
routine maintenance, testing and the operation of the voting machines or
systems. Such assistance shall include but not be
limited to:
1) election configuration and ballot
configuration related to voting system
testing
and use
2) pre-qualification and post-election
tests
3) election day support, via phone, email,
facsimile or on-site, as necessary
4) post-election support, to include
recanvass, challenges, and audit
conducted
pursuant to Election Law Section 9-211
5) staff training
6) defining personnel requirements and
tasks
7) defining procedures for
pre-qualification, post-election, and maintenance
tests
8) defining procedures for canvassing and
recanvassing votes cast in an
election
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M. During successive years, the State
Board, whenever it deems necessary, or at
the
request of a county board, may assist in any or all aspects of the operation of
the
system.
Section
6210.3 Submission of Procedures for Unofficial Tally of Results of
Election
County
boards which adopt procedures pursuant to Election Law Section 9-
126(3)
shall file such procedures with the State Board of Elections.
Section
6210.4 Demonstration Models
A. During
the first five (5) years after purchase, any county which purchases voting
equipment
systems shall provide a model, diagram, video or other electronic
instruction
(example CD ROM) of such voting system's equipment for each
polling
place in its jurisdiction.
Comment
15
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A.
During the first five (5) years after purchase, any county which purchases
voting
equipment
systems shall provide a model, diagram, video or other electronic
instruction
(example CD ROM) of such voting system's equipment for each
polling
place in its jurisdiction.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
A.
During the first five (5) years after purchase, any county which purchases
voting
equipment
systems shall provide a model, diagram, video or other electronic
instruction
(example CD ROM) AND APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT FOR VIEWING AND/OR LISTENING TO SUCH
INSTRUCTION ON such voting system's equipment for each polling place in its
jurisdiction.
WHY
A video
or CD ROM needs equipment to be played.
B. Any
such model, diagram, video or other electronic instruction must be approved
by the
State Board and must meet the following specifications:
1) may not contain the name of any party or
independent body which has
been
continuously used in New York State.
2) display a ballot layout which shall
consist of at least two party rows and
eight
voting positions including at least one multiple-candidate office (vote
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for
two).
3) Demonstrate how a voter can:
a) vote for a candidate, question or
proposition.
b) verify in a private and independent
manner the votes selected by
the
voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.
c) in a private and independent manner to
change the ballot or correct
any
error before the ballot is cast and counted, including the
opportunity
to correct the error through the issuance of a
replacement
ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the
ballot
or correct any error.
d) cast a write-in ballot.
e) cast the ballot.
f) be notified on the effect of the voter
casting multiple votes for an
office
or proposal in excess of the number permitted.
g) be notified on the effects of an
undervote.
h) utilize the accept ballot/reject ballot
feature, if any is available on
such
voting machine or system.
C. If a model is used, each model must:
1) be no less than 11 inches by 14 inches
2) be operated by electricity and/or a
battery power source
D. If a diagram is used it shall be no
smaller than 11 inches by 17 inches.
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12
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section
6210.5 Voting System Operations
A. All
voting systems used in New York State shall be used in a manner consistent
with
New York State Election Law, these Regulations and the United States
Election
Assistance Commission's 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and
any
conditions specified in the State Board's certification of the voting system
for
use in
New York elections.
B. Only the county board shall have care,
custody and control over all resources for
the
purposes of conducting elections, including but not limited to vote counting,
preparation
and custody of ballots, system maintenance and all testing. If it
becomes
necessary to transfer control of any equipment to a vendor for repairs,
or to
other political subdivisions for use by them in their elections, such voting
systems
and/or equipment shall not be used in a live election by the county
board
until such time as such equipment is returned to the care, custody and
control
of the county board and acceptance testing of each such system or
equipment
is performed pursuant to Section 6209.10 of the State Board
Regulations.
Comment
16
PROBLEM
1
a.
Acceptance testing, as specified in Section 6209.10 and other relevant
sections, is inadequate to determine whether voting systems have been
improperly modified such that election-related software will work corruptly.
The reason is that only the voting software has to be tested via the Secure
Hash Signature Standard (SHS) validation program. In contemporary computer
systems, software operation is dependent on the operating system environment. If
that environment is modified, software may operate in an unexpected or corrupt
manner.
SOLUTION
1
a. All
files and file system hierarchical structures need to be tested, so that all
changes whatsoever to files and file system hierarchical structures are identified.
Every change needs to be examined to determine whether it is benign, such as a
log file that contains additional entries due to additional use of the system,
or malicious, such as a log file that contains missing or replaced entries. All
aspects of the operating system can affect the operation of election-related
software, so special attention must be paid to all modifications of the
operating system, especially the system’s environment variables and the
modification of file system hierarchical structures.
b.
Alternatives to the checking described in the previous paragraph may be (1) to
reload ALL programming and files, including software, firmware, and file system
hierarchies, as if the system were being newly delivered from the vendor, or
(2) for the county board to perform a complete backup of all files and file
system hierarchies prior to providing a machine for other uses, and to restore
the entire system from this backup upon its return to the county. With these approaches, counters such as the
public counter, would not reflect all use made of the system.
PROBLEM
2
The
regulations need to deal with an additional problem – the transfer of viruses
and malware from polling place voting devices to the Election Management System
and other computers used them. The
suggested language in Solution 2 reflects the requirements devised by California Secretary of State Debra Bowen to solve this problem.
SOLUTION
2 – SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
To prevent
the spread of viruses and malware from polling place voting devices to the
Election Management System (“EMS”) and other computers that support election
activities, three (3) separate, physically isolated EMS computers shall be used
to perform three (3) separate functions. Each of the three EMSs should perform
only its own function and shall not be connected or in communication in any way
to any other EMS or any other computer at any time:
EMS 1:
Election Configuration and Download to Voting Machines or System Memory Cards;
EMS 2:
Post-Election Central Tabulation;
EMS 3:
Erasure of Memory Card Data in Preparation for the Subsequent Election.
Section
6210.6 Personnel
It is
the responsibility of the county board to provide sufficient and appropriate
---Page
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end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
staff
to perform the functions required for successful use of the voting system. All tasks
shall
be defined in written procedures, and personnel assigned shall be thoroughly
trained
to carry out their responsibilities.
Section
6210.7 Ballots
A. For
the production of paper ballots or ballot faces for DRE voting systems, the
county
board shall contract with a printer or use in-house print services that have
Comment
17
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
county
board shall contract with a printer or use in-house print services that have
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
county
board shall contract with a printer or use AN in-house print SERVICE that HAS
WHY
Clearer
statement.
the
requisite expertise, staff, and equipment for printing ballots of the
complexity
and in
the volume required for the conduct of elections in that county, and that
ensures
delivery of finished ballots in time to comply with the relevant provisions
of the
State election law and the election calendar.
B. Detailed
specifications for production of ballots shall be supplied to the county
board
by the voting system vendor. These
shall include but not be limited to
particulars
of the system's ballot such as weight, grain and color of stock;
dimensions
of ballot faces, ballots and ballot cards; corner cuts; perforations,
both
for ballot boundaries and for stub boundaries, when appropriate; ballot
positions,
sensitive areas and voting targets; pre-marks for imprinting of ballot
configuration
information; printing registration and tolerances; ink; use of drying
powder;
and packaging of printed ballots for shipment and for storage until time
of
use. The county board shall transmit
these specifications to the printer
chosen
to produce its ballots.
---Page
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end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. In
the first year that the voting system is in use, a copy of the final form and
arrangement
of each ballot configuration shall be filed with the State Board.
D. Ballots
shall be identified by ballot configuration, using marks which are machine
readable
and human readable text.
Comment
18
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
D.
Ballots shall be identified by ballot configuration, using marks which are
machine
readable
and human readable text.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Ballots
shall be identified by ballot configuration by using only human readable
English text marking which is also machine readable through optical character
recognition or other methods.
WHY
a. The
language of these regulations must be clear that only one set of ballot
configuration marks is to be allowed on the ballot, and that this set of marks must
be human readable. If a separate, second set of machine-readable marks is
allowed to be made on the ballots, errors are inevitable in which the
human-readable and machine-readable marks contain different information.
b. If these regulations allow two sets of marks
to be made, then these regulations must require signed, dated and logged
documentation that such dual marks have been checked to confirm that the marks
provide the same information.
c. The
history of dual marks indicates that errors are inevitable and may be frequent.
E. Ballots
to be used with poll site optical scan voting systems, shall be in a form
consistent
with Election Law Section 7-106. Each
ballot shall have a numbered
stub
which can be separated from it along a perforated boundary. Such ballot
shall
be detached from the numbered stub prior to the election inspector giving
the
ballot to the voter and be retained by the county board in a manner
consistent
with election-related document retention requirements.
1) The ballot stubs shall be sequentially
numbered, and shall include the
date of
the election, the political subdivision in which the ballot is valid,
and in
a primary election, the name of the party conducting the primary,
and
further, stubs may be color coded, to correspond to same.
Comment
19
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
and
further, stubs may be color coded, to correspond to same.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
and
further, stubs may be color coded, to correspond to the color of the ballot.
WHY
Clearer
statement.
2) Ballot stubs shall include spaces for
inspectors to indicate with their
initials,
whether the ballot was used for affidavit or emergency purposes.
3) Ballots shall be bound in booklets of
100, or in such other increments as a
county board
may, by written procedure, deem appropriate.
Binding shall
be by
staples, to help ensure ballot accountability.
---Page
15
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) Ballot booklets shall have a cover, on
which shall be printed the date of
the
election, the political subdivision in which the ballot booklet shall be
valid,
the range of sequential ballot stub
numbers contained therein, and
such
other administrative information as the county board may deem
necessary. In primary elections, booklet covers shall
include the name of
the
party conducting a primary, and may be color coded, to correspond to
same.
Comment
20
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
the
party conducting a primary, and may be color coded, to correspond to
same.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
the
party conducting a primary, and may be color coded, to correspond to
the
color used for such party’s ballots.
WHY
Clearer
statement.
5) When more than one ballot booklet is to
be used in any election district, a
transmittal
sheet shall accompany the booklets, which shall specify how
many
booklets are included in the inspector supply bag, the complete
range
of sequential ballot stub numbers for that district, and shall further
provide
a space or spaces for inspectors to confirm receipt of all ballots.
6) Ballot booklet(s) and any transmittal
sheet, shall be delivered to
inspectors
with other election day supplies, in a separate, secure, sealed
and
labeled envelope or pouch.
7) Only one ballot booklet at a time should
be on the inspector table, and the
remaining
booklets shall be kept in their secure envelope or pouch, in the
inspector
supply case.
8) When all ballots in a booklet have been
used, leaving only the cover and
the
stapled pad of stubs, such booklet shall be returned to the ballot
booklet
envelope/pouch and the next appropriately numbered ballot
booklet
shall be removed for use.
---Page
16
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9) After the close of polls, the
transmittal sheet shall be completed by the
inspectors,
indicating which booklets were completely used, partially used,
or not
used. The ballot booklet envelope/pouch
shall be sealed and
returned
to the county board with all other election day supplies.
F. The county board shall cause its
respective printer(s) to certify to the county
board,
upon delivery of ballots ordered:
1) the actual number of ballots printed
2) the number of ballots delivered, and
3) that all other ballots printed have
been destroyed.
Comment
21
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
F. The
county board shall cause its respective printer(s) to certify to the county
board,
upon delivery of ballots ordered:
1) the
actual number of ballots printed
2) the
number of ballots delivered, and
3) that
all other ballots printed have been destroyed.
SUGGESTED
ADDITION
The
State Board shall cause to be made timely, unannounced inspections of each
printer used by each county no less than once per year to confirm that such
printers' certifications are accurate. The State Board shall report to the New
York State Attorney General any discrepancies found in which a printer’s
certifications are not accurate, and the State Board may prohibit the further
use of such printer by the counties.
WHY
Lack of
inspection, enforcement, and penalties encourages fraud.
The
county board shall inventory all ballots and ensure the security of any and all
ballots
while they are in the possession of the county board.
G. For
Central Count Paper-Based voting systems, ballots printed for absentee
voting,
and those printed for emergency, special and affidavit purposes shall be
tabulated
by batch, and be subject to all appropriate provisions of these
Regulations. The county board shall provide a means by
which affidavit,
emergency,
and special ballots shall be distinguished from absentee ballots.
Section
6210.8 Test Deck Procedures
Each county board shall prepare a
test deck to be used to verify that the voting
---Page
17 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
system's
election configuration and ballot configuration is correct and that the voting
system
will accurately cast and count votes within each individual ballot configuration.
A. The ballots shall be voted with a
pre-determined number of valid votes for each
candidate,
each write-in position, and each voting option on every proposal that
appears
on the ballot as certified by the county board in order to verify that the
vote
system is programmed to correctly count the ballots.
Comment
22
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A. The ballots shall be voted with a
pre-determined number of valid votes for each
candidate,
each write-in position, and each voting option on every proposal that
appears
on the ballot as certified by the county board in order to verify that the
vote
system is programmed to correctly count the ballots.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
A. The ballots shall be voted with a
pre-determined number of valid votes for each
candidate,
each write-in position, and each voting option on every proposal that
appears
on the ballot as certified by the county board. IN ORDER TO VERIFY THAT THE
VOTE
SYSTEM IS PROGRAMMED TO CORRECTLY COUNT THE BALLOTS AND THAT EACH VOTING
POSITION FOR EACH BALLOT CONFIGURATION IS TESTED AND CONFIRMED TO FUNCTION
PROPERLY, SEPARATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER VOTING POSITION ON ITS
BALLOT, SUCH NUMBER OF VALID VOTES SHALL BE UNIQUE FOR EACH SUCH CANDIDATE,
WRITE-IN POSITION, AND VOTING OPTION ON EVERY PROPOSAL, AND SUCH NUMBER OF
VALID VOTES SHALL BE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS OR MORE THAN 50% OF THE NUMBER
OF ACTIVE REGISTERED VOTERS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO VOTE AT THE LARGEST POLL SITE IN
THE COUNTY.
TEST
DECKS SHALL INCLUDE TEST BALLOTS TO CHECK FOR THE PRESENCE OF ELECTION
CONFIGURATIONS THAT ARE ILLEGAL IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, SUCH AS OPEN
PRIMARIES, AS WELL AS TO CHECK FOR THE WRONG BALLOT STYLE.
WHY
a.
Typically during tests only a small number of votes are entered, with the
result that malicious software can use the number of votes entered to
distinguished between tests and real elections.
b. Some
software errors only show themselves after a large number of entries are made.
c. For
these two reasons, in any test that purports to confirm the correct functioning
of a voting system, the number of votes entered should be approximately the
same as, or should be more than, the number expected to be cast on election
day.
d. In
other states, voting positions have been inadequately tested by entering the
same number of votes on each. If votes are improperly switched by the machine,
the errors will not be revealed as long as each tally shows this number of
votes. For this reason the suggested change requires that each position be
tested with a unique (ie, different) number of votes.
The deck includes one
or more
ballots that are intended to fail, have been improperly voted, or which
are
voted in excess of the number allowed by law, and one or more ballots on
which
no votes are cast, in order to test the ability of the system to recognize
and/or
notify of an under or over vote.
Comment
23
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
test
the ability of the system to recognize
and/or
notify of an under or over vote.
ISSUE
Notification
of undervotes can be a form of harassment or embarassment of voters. The State
Board should work to eliminate the requirement for undervote notification, or
should require the addition of the choice “None of the above” so that voters
can indicate that they do not wish to vote for any choice in a particular
contest.
If there is
more than one ballot
configuration
for an election, a separate test deck is created for each ballot
configuration. In election districts that will utilize a
single voting system for two or
more
ballot configurations, required testing shall consist of a different test deck
for
each ballot configuration to be utilized on such voting system, to ensure that
the
addition of multiple ballot configurations has not affected the accurate
casting
and
counting of votes within individual ballot configurations.
B. Test decks which include sub-decks are
created once election configuration and
Comment
24
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
B. Test
desks which include sub-decks are created once election configuration and
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
B. Test
desks may include sub-decks. A sub-deck is a group of ballots designed to test
a specific ballot configuration when such group is within a test deck designed
to test multiple ballot configurations. Test decks which include sub-decks are
created after election configuration and
WHY
a. The
term "sub-deck should be defined.
b. The
word "after" would be clearer than "once."
ballot
configuration tasks have been completed, and ballot configurations have
been
verified, utilizing detailed procedures for preparation of a test deck
prescribed
to the county board by the State Board.
Using a tool or tools, (ie
Comment
25
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Using a
tool or tools, (ie
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Using a
tool or tools, (such as
WHY
The
abbreviation "ie" means "that is." The abbreviation
"eg" means "for example." Due to the use of "ie"
this sentence requires the use of Excel. There are other tools, and Excel
should not be required.
---Page
18 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excel)
make a test script for each specific ballot within the test deck, such that
Comment
26
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Excel)
make a test script for each specific ballot within the test deck, such that
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Excel)
make a test script for each specific ballot CONFIGURATION TO BE TESTED BY the
test deck, such that
WHY
Clearer
statement.
when
all test ballots within the test deck are completely cast it will accurately
test
all
positions, undervotes, overvotes, write-in positions, propositions and ballots
that
are deliberately designed to fail.
1) To create a test deck on an optical
scan voting system, test ballots must
be
marked, following the pattern determined to sufficiently test the ballot
programming,
logic, and accuracy.
a) For optical scan voting systems, the
test deck includes one or more
ballots
on which two or more votes are cast for a candidate whose
Comment
27
DRAFT,
PDF LINE 9
ballots
on which two or more votes are cast for a candidate whose
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
ballots
on which two or more votes are cast for EACH candidate whose
WHY
Clearer
statement.
name
appears on the ballot more than once for the same office in
order
to test the ability of the system to count only the first of such
votes
for the candidate.
2) To create a test deck for DRE systems,
the creation of a test script is
required,
so that the pattern of votes can be followed, to facilitate the
manual
casting of same.
a) For DRE Systems, the test deck includes
one or more ballots in
which
an attempt is made to cast two or more votes for a candidate
whose
name appears on the ballot more than once for the same
office
in order to test the ability of the system to accurately cast the
voters
choice(s) for such office.
Comment
28
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
a) For
DRE Systems, the test deck includes one or more ballots in
which
an attempt is made to cast two or more votes for a candidate
whose
name appears on the ballot more than once for the same
office
in order to test the ability of the system to accurately cast the
voters
choice(s) for such office.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
a) For
DRE Systems, for any candidate whose name appears on the ballot more than once
for the same office, the test deck shall include one or more ballots in which
an attempt is made to cast two or more votes for such candidate in order to
test the ability of the system to accurately cast the voters choice(s) for such
office.
WHY
Clearer
statement.
3) Assign each ballot in the script a
unique ballot number.
4) Calculate the number of ballots
required to conduct each test. This
---Page
19
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
calculation
is the minimum number of ballots that must be cast on each
voting
machine or system where such ballot configuration is programmed,
pursuant
to Section 6210.2 C of these regulations.
Comment
29
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
4)
Calculate the number of ballots required to conduct each test. This
calculation
is the minimum number of ballots that must be cast on each
voting
machine or system where such ballot configuration is programmed,
pursuant
to Section 6210.2.C of these regulations.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
4)
Calculate the number of ballots required to conduct each test. This
calculation
is the minimum number of ballots that must be cast on each
voting
machine or system where such ballot configuration is programmed,
pursuant
to THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SECTION AND Section 6210.2.C of these regulations.
WHY
Paragraph
4) reads as if the regulations specified a number of ballots required. Section
6210.2.C merely refers to this section, and the requirements are in this
section.
C. Upon creation of a test deck and prior
to use in pre-qualification testing, the test
Comment
30
DRAFT,
PDF LINE 5
C. Upon
creation of a test deck and prior to use in pre-qualification testing, the test
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
C. Upon
creation of a test deck and prior to ITS use in pre-qualification testing, the
test
WHY
Clearer
statement.
deck must
be validated by casting the ballots in the test deck on a voting
machine
or system, printing out the tabulation report and comparing same to the
predetermined
expected results for that test deck to ensure accuracy. Any
corrections
to the test deck must be made prior to its use in pre-qualification
testing.
D. Once a test deck has been validated,
test decks are run by a bi-partisan team on
each
voting system for which that particular ballot configuration is valid. The
team
shall enter at least one ballot from each sub-deck using each feature
intended
for people with disabilities, and enter at least one ballot from each sub-
deck
using each language provided on the unit.
Comment
31
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
team
shall enter at least one ballot from each sub-deck using each feature
intended
for people with disabilities, and enter at least one ballot from each sub-
deck
using each language provided on the unit.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
After
manually entering the test deck in the same manner as will be used by most
voters on election day, the team shall use each feature intended for people
with disabilities to enter the entire test deck again, and shall use each
language provided on the unit to enter the entire test deck again. Such testing
may be observed by any member of the public who makes a prior request to
observe, and may be filmed by county board staff or observers.
WHY
a. One ballot
is not an adequate test of a voting system's assistive features.
b. The
use of assistive devices and alternate language displays in voting systems has
resulted in errors different from those that occur when votes are cast in the
manner used by most voters. For example, for several years, votes cast using a
Spanish language display have been lost by Sequoia systems: www.wheresthepaper.org/Limited_Parallel_Testing_Findings.pdf
and www.wheresthepaper.org/WrongTimeForAnEvoteGlitch.htm
c. One
way that testing can be distinguished from real elections by malicious
software, is that typically during tests only a small number of votes are
entered. Also, some software errors only show themselves after a large number
of entries are made. Therefore, in any test that purports to confirm the
correct functioning of a voting system, the number of votes entered should be
approximately the same as or more than the number expected to be cast on
election day.
d. Such
testing has the purpose of confirming that each voting position functions
properly, separately and independently from each other voting position on the
ballot. In other states voting positions have been inadequately tested by
entering the same number of votes on each. If votes are improperly switched by
the machine, the errors will not be revealed as long as each tally shows the
same number of votes. If the test deck is properly designed with a different
number of votes to be cast in each voting position, then the voting system will
be properly tested by entering the entire deck.
e. The
statement would also be clearer with the suggested change.
f.
Explicit recognition of the right of the public to observe this testing is
crucial for public confidence.
While one team member casts
votes
for the test, the other member shall monitor that votes are cast
correctly.
1) The test shall be documented by the
bi-partisan team, on a log to be
prescribed
by the State Board, and the team shall affix their signatures to
the
log. The log shall include but not be
limited to:
a) The date the test was executed.
b) The names of the persons who performed
the test and recorded
---Page
20
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the
results.
c) The serial number of the machine on
which the test was executed.
d) The protective counter number of the
machine on which the test
was
executed as it appeared both at the beginning and conclusion
of
testing.
e) The name or description of the test performed.
f) The version number of the software
under test.
g) The test result, either 'pass' if the
results match the expected
results
exactly, or 'fail' if there is even one discrepancy.
E. The bi-partisan team shall compare the
accuracy of the results reported by the
Comment
32
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
bi-partisan team shall compare the accuracy of the results reported by the
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
The
bi-partisan team shall compare the results reported by the
WHY
Clearer
statement
voting system
to the expected results and determine if the machine passed or
failed. Any discrepancies indicate a failure and
must be investigated.
1) If a test deck is run on a DRE, and the
pre-determined vote count does
not
compare to the results reported by the voting system, the bi-partisan
team
shall document the problem, and then compare the paper audit trail
transactions
to the unique test ballot scripts, to be sure votes were cast
correctly.
Comment
33
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
1) If a
test deck is run on a DRE, and the pre-determined vote count does
not
compare to the results reported by the voting system, the bi-partisan
team
shall document the problem, and then compare the paper audit trail
transactions
to the unique test ballot scripts, to be sure votes were cast
correctly.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
1) If a
test deck is run on a DRE, and the pre-determined vote count IS NOT THE SAME
AS the
results reported by the voting system, the bi-partisan
team shall
document the problem, and then compare the paper audit trail
RECORDS
to the individual test ballot scripts, to DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT votes were
cast correctly.
WHY
Clearer
statement
Any
corrections to the test deck itself, or to the casting of the
test
deck shall be made, and the test deck shall be re-run until two error-
free
test results are produced, pursuant to Section 6210.2 (C)(1) of these
regulations.
2) If a test deck is run on an optical
scan voting system, and the pre-
---Page
21 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
determined
vote count does not match the computer generated tabulation,
then
the bi-partisan team shall document the problem and compare the
unique
ballot script pattern with the test deck pattern to ensure that the
Comment
34
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
then
the bi-partisan team shall document the problem and compare the
unique
ballot script pattern with the test deck pattern to ensure that the
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
then the
bi-partisan team shall document the problem and compare the
votes
specified on each individual test ballot script with the votes in the
corresponding ballots in the test deck to confirm that the
WHY
Clearer
statement. The term "pattern" is not defined.
test
deck was made correctly and that all ballots were run. Any
corrections
to the test deck itself, or to the casting of the test deck, shall
be made
and the test deck shall be re-run until two error-free test results
are
produced, pursuant to Section 6210.2 (C)(1) of these regulations.
Comment
35
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
be made
and the test deck shall be re-run until two error-free test results
are
produced, pursuant to Section 6210.2 (C)(1) of these regulations.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
be made
and the test deck shall be re-run until two CONSECUTIVE error-free test results
are produced, pursuant to Section 6210.2 (C)(1) of these regulations.
A
MAXIMUM OF 5 TESTS SHALL BE MADE, AND IF 2 CONSECUTIVE ERROR-FREE TESTS ARE NOT
PRODUCED, THE MACHINE SHALL BE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE UNTIL THE REASON FOR SUCH
FAILURE IS DIAGNOSED, LOGGED, REPORTED TO THE STATE BOARD, AND MAINTENANCE AND
REPAIR HAVE BEEN MADE. ALL OTHER VOTING SYSTEMS OF THE SAME MAKE AND MODEL IN
ALL COUNTIES SHALL BE DIAGNOSED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SAME FLAW IS PRESENT
IN THEM, AND IF SO IT SHALL BE REPAIRED BEFORE THE NEXT USE OF SUCH SYSTEMS IN
ANY ELECTION.
WHY
a. The
regulations should specify a maximum number of re-runs, such as 5. If 5 tests
have to be made before 2 consecutive error-free tests are achieved, this means
the equipment is working poorly, and the reason for failures should be
diagnosed and repaired.
b.
Failure of one computer system may indicate that a flaw is present in all
systems of the same make and model. The State Board needs to be notified of
such problems so that it can alert all counties using the same equipment of the
potential flaw in their equipment.
3) If the test deck and voting system fail
to produce two consecutive error-
free
results, the system shall not be used until such time as the problem is
resolved
in a manner consistent with vendor documentation and State
Board
procedure.
F. For DRE systems, the paper audit trail
records with the accumulation report shall
be signed
by the testing team, then bound and placed in secure storage. For
optical
scan voting systems, the results report shall be signed by the bi-partisan
team,
and placed in secure storage. After all
voting systems upon which a
particular
ballot configuration is valid have been tested, the test deck shall be
stored
with all corresponding reports, audit trails, log sheets and system logs
required
to be produced and reviewed pursuant to Party 6210.8(E)(3).
Comment
36
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
stored
with all corresponding reports, audit trails, log sheets and system logs
required
to be produced and reviewed pursuant to Party 6210.8(E)(3).
PROBLEMS
a. The
word "Party" should be "Part".
b. Part
6210.8(E)(3) does not require any reports, audit trails, log sheets and system
logs to be produced and reviewed.
SOLUTION
Provide
a reference to a different part.
G. For
Central Count Paper-Based systems, after entering all election ballot codes
and
creating header cards, if required by the software, the following verification
---Page
22
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
procedures
shall be performed:
1) place one ballot from the
appropriate ballot configuration behind each
header
card.
2) process the complete set of
header cards containing the single ballots
against
the absentee counting system and ballot counting program.
3) if the software rejects a
header or ballot card, the cause of the error shall
be
ascertained and corrected.
4) re-process
all cards which generated errors to verify correction.
5) At the discretion of and mutual
agreement of a county board's
commissioners,
a resolution may be adopted for a specific election, which
may
provide that ballots be canvassed manually, rather than by using the
Central
Count Paper-Based voting system. Such
resolution shall be filed
with
the county board's official minutes, and notice of the resolution and
decision
shall be provided in writing, to the State Board and to all party
chairs
and candidates, whose names appear on the ballots to be counted
manually. The county board shall give written notice,
by first class mail,
to the
State Board and to all party chairs and candidates who are lawfully
entitled
to have their names appear on the ballots, of such resolution.
Comment
37
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Such resolution shall be filed
with
the county board's official minutes, and notice of the resolution and
decision
shall be provided in writing, to the State Board and to all party
chairs
and candidates, whose names appear on the ballots to be counted
manually. The county board shall give written notice,
by first class mail,
to the
State Board and to all party chairs and candidates who are lawfully
entitled
to have their names appear on the ballots, of such resolution.
PROBLEMS
a.
There is no requirement for when the notice must be provided.
b. There
is no requirement that notice must be posted in public to notify the public of
the county board’s decision.
SOLUTION
Include
requirements for the minimum required advance notice, and for public notice.
Section
6210.9 Vote Tabulation
A. Preparation
of ballots for tabulation by Central Count Paper-Based Systems.
1) Ballots shall be reviewed
pursuant to the provisions of Section 6210.13 of
---Page
23
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
these
regulations, to determine if the ballot is machine-readable or if the
ballot
requires that it be manually counted, then recorded in the official
canvass
of the votes for the election.
2) Ballots shall be assembled
in separate batches by election district unless
otherwise
directed by the county board to preserve the secrecy of the
ballot.
Comment
38
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
2)
Ballots shall be assembled in separate batches by election district unless
otherwise
directed by the county board to preserve the secrecy of the
ballot.
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Eliminate
the phrase “unless otherwise directed by the county board to preserve the
secrecy of the ballot” or provide specific guidance to describe specifically
what circumstances call for such preservation of the secrecy of the ballot.
WHY
Failure
to separate batches by election district will hamper discovery of auditing
problems and their resolution.
a. Each batch shall be identified by a
header card and at the end of
all batches
there shall be an end- or trailer- card, if required by the
software. Header and trailer cards shall be visually
distinct from
ballots. Such distinction may be made, for example,
by using a
different
color card stock, or different edge marking, or by other
appropriate
means.
b. The bi-partisan team of county board
personnel shall place header
cards,
in order that the votes recorded on each ballot shall be
attributed
to the correct election district. When
placing header
cards,
as each is placed by one person, the other person shall
verify
that the header card is the correct one for the batch of ballots
which
follows it and that it is correctly oriented in the batch.
3) Ballots shall then be fed into the
Central Count Paper-Based voting
system. Following the counting of all ballots, a
tabulation report shall be
printed. Two back-up copies of the tabulation report
shall be locked in
secure
storage.
---Page
24 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) Where the number of ballots to be
canvassed is small, the county board
may
provide for canvassing of the ballots by larger units of representation.
B. Testing
During Ballot Tabulation by Central Count Paper-Based Systems.
The
system shall be so designed and constructed that, at the discretion of the
county
board, it shall be possible to halt the ballot tabulation at a point when a
portion
of the election districts have been counted, and run the test deck to
demonstrate,
as in the tests listed in Section 6210.2 of these regulations, the
accuracy
and dependability of the count without interrupting or affecting any
official
tabulation of results that may be on the equipment at that time.
C. Testing Following the Machine Tabulation
of Ballots by Central Count Systems.
Immediately
following the machine tabulation of the ballots from all the election
districts
and the production of the county-wide totals of votes, the pre-count tests
listed
in Section 6210.2, shall be run so as to demonstrate the accuracy and
dependability
of the count.
Section
6210.10 Ballot Accounting
A. Following the counting of all votes in
an election, a full accounting of paper
ballots
shall be made, and shall be reported on a form to be provided by the
State
Board, which shall include:
---Page
25
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) For each entire election and for each
ballot configuration used in it, the
number
of paper ballots shall equal the sum of paper ballots issued to
voters
and paper ballots not issued to voters, returned but not sent for
tabulation
because the voter voted at the polls, ballots spoiled, and paper
ballots
not returned. In each category of
ballots issued, the report shall
specify
how many, if any, and in what category any emergency or affidavit
ballots
were used.
2) For each entire election and for each
ballot configuration used in it, the
number
of paper ballots not issued to voters shall equal the sum of the
number
of paper ballots used for testing/sample purposes and paper
ballots
remaining unissued and unused.
B. The ballot accounting report shall be
attested to by the county board
commissioners
and shall be retained in accordance with Election Law Section 3-
222.
Section
6210.11 Voting Systems Security
County board election officials
shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the
voting
systems and election processes entrusted to them are protected against errors,
accidents
and malicious or fraudulent manipulation, consistent with voting system
security
procedures developed by the State Board
---Page
26
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. The county board shall establish
procedures and policies which protect the
voting
system facility itself, the voting systems stored therein, and servers and
computer
systems used therein. The county board
shall also ensure that any
security
features or processes recommended by the vendor, such as virus
protections,
shall be implemented. The county board
shall further provide within
the
facility, locked, secure storage for all ballots, system test materials, copies
of
software,
copies of ballot programming, programming devices, memory devices,
disability
access devices, voting system keys, key cards, and all ancillary devices
or
voting system components and materials.
B. County boards shall adopt security
procedures which restrict and document all
access
to voting systems, computer systems, software, firmware, system
components,
programming, test materials and any other ballot creation, counting
or
other system components. All
programming, maintenance testing, pre-
qualification
and post-election testing and canvassing/recanvassing, shall be
conducted
by bi-partisan teams and be performed in secure, restricted-access
space,
and logs shall be maintained indicating task/staff assignments, time in
and out,
security password change dates and other such pertinent data.
C. Internal security procedures shall
require the frequent changing of passwords at
established
intervals, including prior to setup for use in any election.
1) If at any time the county board
discovers that any password has been
---Page
27
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lost,
shared or otherwise compromised, all passwords shall be changed.
2) If persons with administrative passwords
are assisting in the performance
of
election tasks not related to the administration of the voting system,
they
shall perform such work using their staff password, and not their
administrative
password.
D. The county board shall maintain a log,
in a manner prescribed by the State
Board,
which clearly tracks a chain of custody for each voting system.
1) A log shall be maintained for each
voting system, identifying the
placement
of and serial number on each tamper-evident seal used to
secure
the voting system and its devices while in the custody of the
county
board, used to secure the device for delivery to poll sites, and for
the
securing and return of same, after the close of polls.
a) At any stage of the administration,
programming or conduct of an
election,
if a tamper-evident seal is found to have been
compromised,
or if serial numbers as logged do not match those on
the
device, the matter shall be immediately documented and
investigated.
Comment
39
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
a) At any
stage of the administration, programming or conduct of an
election,
if a tamper-evident seal is found to have been
compromised,
or if serial numbers as logged do not match those on
the
device, the matter shall be immediately documented and
investigated.
PROBLEM
"Immediately,"
"documented" and "investigated" are vague.
SOLUTION
a. A specific time period should be specified.
b. The
State Board should provide a form for documentation of such problems.
c. The
regulations should provide guidance for the investigation, including the time
frame within which the matter must be brought to the attention of the State
Board, law enforcement and the public.
b) The county board shall adopt procedures
which direct their actions
in such
investigations, and which identify methods for the resolution
or
amelioration of such breaches of security.
2) A copy of county board security
procedures and policies shall be filed with
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28
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the
State Board upon adoption.
E. The Voting System Supporting Software,
the Election Management Software
(EMS)
and the specific election configuration and ballot configuration for each
election
shall be maintained under control of the county board and placed in
secure
locked storage at all times when not in use.
Master copies of all election
configuration
and ballot configuration shall be retained in secured locked storage
as designated
by the county commissioners and separate from the location of
working
copies, from the time of completion of pre-qualification demonstration
testing
and for as long after the election as required by law, these regulations, as
ordered
by a court, or as directed by the State Board.
Comment
40
PROBLEM
The
regulations do not explicitly recognize the right of the public to view the
election configuration and ballot configuration copies.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Such
election configuration and ballot configuration copies shall be made available
to be viewed by any member of the public upon request.
F. The county board shall enforce the
provisions of the Election Law which relate to
canvassing
and recanvassing of votes cast in an election, as well as these
Regulations
and directives of the State Board.
G. The voting system and any computers or
other peripheral devices shall be
dedicated
solely to election configuration, ballot configuration (layout) and vote
counting
functions, including tests conducted pursuant to Section 6210.2. The
system
shall not be capable of being networked: no modem, telecommunications
nor
wireless communications devices may be components of a voting system,
and no
other unapproved software or hardware may run at any time.
Comment
41
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
system
shall not be capable of being networked: no modem, telecommunications
nor wireless
communications devices may be components of a voting system,
and no
other unapproved software or hardware may run at any time.
PROBLEM
The
sentence specifies a list of examples of prohibited communications components
but fails to specify “nor any other networking or communications components of
any kind that may be developed after these regulations are adopted.”
SOLUTION
Add the
phrase "nor any other networking or communications components of any
kind that may be developed after these
regulations are adopted."
---Page
29
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Audit records shall be prepared for all
phases of election configuration and ballot
configuration
using devices under the care, custody and control of the county
board.
Comment
42
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
H.
Audit records shall be prepared for all phases of election configuration and
ballot
configuration
using devices under the care, custody and control of the county
board.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT LANGUAGE
H. Both
manually written and computerized records that log all activities performed
with each voting system, including but not limited to all phases of election
configuration and ballot configuration, service, maintenance and testing, shall
be created at the time each activity is performed by using devices under the
care, custody and control of the county board, so that reviews and audits of
all activities can be performed. Such
audit records shall be made available to be viewed by any member of the public
upon request.
WHY
a. The
phrase “Audit records” is vague.
b. The
regulations do not explicitly recognize the right of the public to view such
records.
Such audit records shall address
the election configuration and ballot
configuration
phase, pre-qualification tests, and voting and ballot-counting
operations. The Voting System Supporting Software shall
log and report audit
data
such that:
1) Systems shall provide the capability to
create and maintain a real-time
audit
record to record and provide the operator or election inspector with
continuous
updates on voting system status.
2) All systems shall include a real-time
clock as part of the system's
hardware. The system shall maintain an absolute record
of the time and
date or
a record relative to some event whose time and data are known
and
recorded.
Comment
43
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
system shall maintain an absolute record of the time and
date or
a record relative to some event whose time and data are known
and
recorded.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT
date or
a record relative to some event whose time and DATE are known
SUGGESTED
ADDITION
All
manually written records should include the date and time, as well as the
signatures of bi-partisan personnel who performed or observed the activity with
the voting system.
WHY
a. The
word “data” is a typo.
b.
Computer systems clocks, as well as computerized records of the time and date
when an event occurred, can be easily changed.
3) All audit record entries shall include
the time-and-date stamp.
4) The generation of audit record entries
shall not be able to be terminated
or
altered by program control, hardware control or by the intervention of
any
person.
Comment
44
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
4) The
generation of audit record entries shall not be able to be terminated
or
altered by program control, hardware control or by the intervention of
any
person.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT
Computerized
audit records from each system shall be written to a write-once medium on an
hourly basis, and shall be printed on paper daily during the period of time
from when such system begins to be
prepared for use in an election until the final results of all contests
in such election are certified. Such write-once medium and such paper printouts
shall become part of the permanent record associated with such systems, and
shall be kept for two years. Such printouts shall be made available to be
viewed by any member of the public upon request.
WHY
a. The
capability described in paragraph 4) does not exist in any computer system. The
inclusion of this requirement in the regulations discredits the state.
b. A
modest increase in security can be achieved by writing to write-once media and
by printing the audit logs on a regular frequent basis and examining such media
and printouts to discover missing or changed portions.
The physical security and
integrity of the record shall be
maintained
at all times.
5) The system shall be capable of printing
a copy of the audit record.
6) Any and all reports produced by the
printer shall be retained by the county
board
in accordance with Election Law and these Regulations.
Comment
45
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
6) Any
and all reports produced by the printer shall be retained by the county
board
in accordance with Election Law and these Regulations.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Such
reports shall be made available to be viewed by any member of the public upon
request.
WHY
The public
is the primary stakeholder in the conduct of elections and should have the
explicit right to view all records.
---Page
30
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. All vote counting programs, including
the voting system supporting software and
the
specific election configuration and ballot configuration coding for each
election,
shall be available for inspection by the State Board.
Comment
46
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
shall
be available for inspection by the State Board.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Add the
phrase "AND SHALL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO BE VIEWED BY ANY MEMBER OF THE
PUBLIC UPON REQUEST."
WHY
The
public's rights to oversight of election administration should be explicitly
mentioned.
J. The county board shall adopt a
contingency plan, which addresses how an
election
shall be configured, tested, conducted, and tabulated, in the event of an
unanticipated
or unavoidable event. Such plan shall,
at a minimum, identify an
alternate
site within the county, from which election management, administrative
or
canvassing tasks can be conducted, in the event their own facility is
unavailable
to them or otherwise compromised.
K. Following voting and ballot accounting,
the ballots for each election district shall
be
reassembled, packaged, sealed and labeled.
1) The county board shall develop a
written plan for the retention and
storage
of the foregoing, and any other data processing materials related
to the
vote counting, and of all documentation of the election.
2) All such ballots, materials and
documents shall be placed in locked
storage
in a secure location and shall remain there until the expiration of
the
period for challenging elections and for as long as required by law,
State
Board Regulations, or unless a court orders their release.
L. Voting systems and election management
systems shall be implemented such
---Page
31
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
that
the county board's voting system will only accept election configuration and
ballot
configuration from that board's election management system and an
election
management system will only accept results from that board's voting
systems,
unless two or more county boards enter into a mutually-acceptable
written
agreement to share election configuration and ballot configuration
programming
services. A copy of such written
agreement shall be filed with the
State
Board.
Comment
47
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A copy
of such written agreement shall be filed with the
State
Board.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Add the
phrase "AND SHALL BE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE COUNTY BOARD AND THE STATE
BOARD TO BE VIEWED BY ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC UPON REQUEST."
WHY
The
public's rights to oversight of election administration should be explicitly
mentioned.
Section
6210.12 Procedures
The
county board shall adopt written procedures to further implement those
provisions
of the Election Law, the State Board Regulations and the United States
Election
Assistance Commission's 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and any
conditions
specified in the State Board's certification of the voting system for use in
New
York elections. Such procedures shall
include, but not be limited to, ballot
security,
ballot distribution and counting, the challenge process and systems evaluation.
Such procedures shall also include security
provisions covering the physical protection
of
facilities, data and communications access control, internal procedural
security,
contingency
plans, and standards for programming, acceptance testing, audit trails and
documentation. The State Board shall develop guidelines for
the development of
security
procedures. All procedures shall be submitted
to and approved by the State
Board
prior to the first use of these systems in an election.
Comment
48
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
All
procedures shall be submitted to and approved by the State
Board
prior to the first use of these systems in an election.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Add the
phrase "and shall be made available by the county board and the state
board to be viewed by any member of the public upon request."
WHY
The public's
rights to oversight of election administration should be explicitly mentioned.
---Page
32
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section
6210.13 Standards for Determining Valid
Votes
The State Board hereby adopts the
following regulations to provide for uniform,
non
discriminatory standards for establishing what constitutes a vote and what
shall be
counted
as a vote for all categories of voting systems and voting procedures used in
New York.
The following standards shall apply
in determining whether a ballot has been
properly
voted and whether a vote should be counted for any office or ballot question.
A. The following general standards shall
apply in the counting of all ballots and
votes,
regardless of the voting system used:
1) A ballot that is marked or signed by
the voter in such a way that it can be
identified
from other ballots must be voided and none of its votes counted.
Examples of such markings include, but are
not limited to:
Comment
49
PROBLEM
Pictures
of ballot markings are useful and should be included, but the section with
graphic Ballot Examples was deleted.
SOLUTION
The
section with Ballot Examples should be restored.
voter
signature,
initials, voter name and address, voter identification number,
messages
or text, or unusual markings not related to indication of the vote
choice
for a contest. If there are distinctly
identifiable markings on one
page of
a multiple-page ballot, the entire ballot must be voided.
2) A vote for any candidate or ballot
measure shall not be rejected solely
because
the voter failed to follow instructions for marking the ballot. If, for
any
reason, it is impossible to determine the choice of the voter for any
candidate
or ballot question, the vote for that candidate or ballot question
shall
be considered void.
3) A mark is considered valid when it is
clear that it represents the voter's
---Page
33
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
choice
and is the technique consistently used by the voter to indicate his
or her
selections. Such marks may include, but
are not limited to, properly
filled
in voting position targets, cross mark "X", a checkmark
"?", circles,
completed
open arrow "?", or any other clear indication of the voter's
choice.
a) A mark crossed out by the voter, an
erasure, or words such as 'no'
next to
a candidate's name or a voting position target area for a
ballot
question shall not be considered to be a valid vote but will,
instead,
be deemed an indication that the voter did not choose to
cast a
vote for that candidate or measure and the vote for that
candidate
or proposition shall be considered void.
4) In determining the validity of a
partially filled-in voting position target area,
the
consistency of a voter's marks on the entire ballot shall be taken into
consideration. A 'hesitation mark' such as a dot in the
voting position
target
area shall not be considered a valid mark unless it is demonstrated
that
the voter consistently marked his or her ballot in such a manner.
5) Overvote. If a contest is marked with a greater number of choices of
different
candidates or ballot questions than the number for which he or
she is
lawfully entitled to vote, the vote shall not be counted for that
contest,
but shall be counted in all other contests in which there are no
overvotes
and the voter's choice can be clearly determined.
6) Undervote. If a contest is marked with a lesser number of choices of
---Page
34
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
candidates
or ballot questions than the number for which he or she is
lawfully
entitled to vote, the votes cast for all otherwise properly marked
candidates
or ballot questions shall be counted.
7) If a ballot is marked in each of two or
more target areas or sensitive areas
for a
candidate whose name appears on the ballot more than once for the
same
office, and the total number of votes cast for such race for different
candidates
does not exceed the number for which he or she is lawfully
entitled
to vote, only the first vote for such candidate with multiple
markings
shall be counted for such candidate.
8) Ballots that are damaged, torn by the
Board of Elections or its agents, or
otherwise
non-machine processable as submitted by the voter, shall be
manually
counted by a bipartisan team of election inspectors and such
vote
totals shall be added to the canvass of such other valid ballots for the
respective
office(s) and ballot questions.
9) Unintended machine marks placed on a
ballot by the voting system that
are not
made at the direction of the voter shall not invalidate the ballot.
10) If two or more persons are to be
nominated or elected to the same office
or
position, a voter may vote for one or more persons whose names do
appear
on the ballot and one or more persons whose names do not
appear on
the ballot, provided that the total number of votes cast by the
voter
for that office or position does not exceed the number of persons to
be
elected or nominated to such office or position.
---Page
35 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11) Abandoned Ballot.
a) If a voter leaves the voting machine or
system without casting their
ballot,
a bipartisan team of election inspectors shall cause the
ballot
to be cast as the voter left it, without examining the ballot.
b) If a voter leaves their paper ballot in
a privacy booth and leaves the
polling
place without first casting that ballot on the voting device,
such
ballot shall be marked 'spoiled' and retained by the election
inspectors,
accounted for in the Statement of Canvass, and
returned
in secure storage with such other spoiled ballots to the
county
board.
12) Write-in votes are votes cast for a
person or persons whose name(s) do
not
appear on the official ballot.
a) Write-in votes for persons whose names
appear on the official
ballot
for that office or party position shall not be counted.
b) A write-in vote may be cast by the use
of a name stamp
c) A write-in vote must be cast in the
appropriate place on the
machine,
or it shall be void and not counted.
d) A voter need not write in the first and
last name of a candidate in
every
situation; the standard is whether the election inspectors can
reasonably
determine the intent of the voter when they cast their
ballot.
13) If a ballot is received that is a federal
write-in absentee ballot (pursuant to
---Page
36
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42 USC
Section 1973ff-2), the county board shall canvass the ballot as
follows:
a) If the overseas voter designated a
candidate by writing in the name
of the
candidate or writing in the name of a political party, the vote
is
counted for the candidate of that party.
b) If the overseas voter wrote in only the
last name of a candidate
whose
name appears on the ballot, the vote is counted for that
candidate.
c) If the voter wrote in the name of only
a candidate for President or
only a
candidate for Vice-President whose name appears on the
ballot,
the vote is counted for the electors of that candidate. The
name is
entered into the canvass as the official ballot name of the
presidential
candidate.
d) Abbreviations, misspellings or other
minor variations in the form of
the
name of a candidate or political party shall be disregarded if the
intention
of the voter can be ascertained. The
name is entered into
the
canvass so that its spelling matches the spelling of the
candidate's
official ballot name. If it is
impossible to determine the
voter's
choice of a candidate or candidates for an office upon the
official
ballot, such vote shall not be counted, but shall be returned
as a
blank vote.
---Page
37
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6210.14 Standards for Determining
Valid Votes on Direct Recording
Electronic
(DRE) Equipment.
A. A vote cast on a DRE voting device
shall be the choice made by a voter, not to
exceed
the maximum allowable votes per race or question than the number for
which the
voter is eligible to vote, by pressing the appropriate sensitive area, or
using
an approved accessibility device to cast a vote on the DRE voting device in
a
manner to cause an "X", highlight or similar designation to display
in the voting
target
position of the name of the candidate or ballot question for which the voter
desires
to vote, followed by the voter activating the cast vote indicator.
B. To select a candidate or vote on a
ballot question, the voter shall:
1) Press the appropriate sensitive area on
the touchscreen, press the button,
target
area, or use an approved accessibility device to choose a candidate
or vote
on a ballot question for which the voter desires to vote;
2) Type on the touchscreen, or use the
scrolling device to select on the
screen,
the letters for the name of a write-in candidate in accordance with
the
instructions for voting on the DRE voting system and press the
appropriate
place on the touchscreen or press the button to record the
write-in
vote in the designated write-in space;
3) Press the appropriate place on the
official ballot to designate a write-in
candidate
and write the name of a candidate on the paper provided in the
write-in
candidate window; or
---Page
38 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) Use an approved accessibility device on
an accessible voting unit to
signify
the voter's selection of a particular candidate or to vote on a ballot
question
for which the voter desires to vote.
C. To Verify Selections.
1) Allow the voter in a private and
independent manner to review and verify
the
votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and
counted,
including the opportunity to change the ballot or correct any error
before the
ballot is cast and counted, including the opportunity to correct
the
error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was
otherwise
unable to change the ballot or correct the error.
D. To cast a ballot, the voter shall:
1) Press the place on the touchscreen or
press the button to activate the
cast
ballot indicator, or
2) Use an approved accessibility device
for the accessible voting unit to
signify
the voter's desire to cast the ballot.
6210.15 Standards for Determining
Valid Votes on Optical Scan Voting
Systems
and/or Paper Ballots
A. Standards Indicating a Valid Vote. A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be the
choice
made by a voter, not to exceed the maximum allowable votes per race or
question
than the number for which the voter is eligible to vote, by: (the
---Page
39
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
examples
below in this section apply to all types of voting position target areas
on
ballots, regardless of what form they may take e.g. rectangle, oval, circle,
square,
open arrow):
1) Voter indicates vote choice by
consistently filling inside the entire voting
position
target;
2) Voter indicates choice by consistently
filling in less than the entire voting
position
target for all vote choices on the ballot and the ballot is processed
in a
manner consistent with the use procedures provided and approved
for the
voting system;
3) Voter indicates vote choice by
consistently placing a distinctive mark, such
as properly
filled in voting position targets, a cross mark "X", a checkmark
"?",
a circle, or complete an open arrow "?" inside the associated voting
position
target area for a candidate choice or ballot question;
4) Voter marks vote choices by circling the
entire voting position target area
for a
candidate or ballot question;
5) Voter writes in or stamps the name of a
candidate in the designated write-
in
space for that race, even if the write-in square, oval or arrow is not
marked;
6) A write-in vote in addition to a vote
for another candidate for the office,
with a
greater number of choices of different candidates than the number
for
which he or she is lawfully entitled to vote, the vote shall not be
---Page
40 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
counted
for that contest, but shall be counted in all other contests in which
there
are not overvotes and the voter's choices can be clearly determined;
7) Any ballot which has any other mark or
marks in the target area or
sensitive
area including circling the target area and/or candidate's name
or
making a mark through the target area, provided that the votes do not
exceed
the maximum allowable votes per race or question than the
number
for which the voter is eligible to vote, shall be counted as a vote
for
such candidate(s) or ballot question(s);
8) Any ballot which has a mark or marks in
the target area or sensitive area
for one
candidate, which extended partially into one or more other target
areas
or sensitive areas, shall be counted as a vote for the candidate so
marked
only if it is readily apparent that at least 3/4th of the mark is in that
candidate's
area or target area, and no other candidate is similarly
marked;
9) Any ballot which has a mark that is
clearly next to (either before or after) a
candidate's
name, or across the name, shall be recognized as a mark and
shall
be counted as a vote for the candidate or question so marked; or
10) Writings or remarks which appear to be
ranking the candidates (e.g.
letters,
numbers ) shall not be considered valid marks unless the
number
of such marks does not exceed the maximum allowable votes per
race
than the number for which the voter is eligible to vote.
---Page
41 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Standards Indicating an Invalid
Vote. A voter's choice shall be
considered an
invalid
vote, if the:
1) Voter uses random markings and there is
no distinctive and consistent
voting
pattern to clearly indicate voter choice(s).
2) A mark that is between or across more
than one candidate's name, target
areas
or sensitive areas shall not be recognized as a mark and no vote
shall
be counted.
C. Whenever paper ballots are to be counted
manually, the county board of
elections
shall use the accompanying "Ballot Examples for Counting Paper
Ballots"
as guidance for such counts.
---Page
42
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6210.16 Ballot Examples for Counting Paper
Ballots
Comment
50
PROBLEM
Ballot
Examples were deleted from Section 6210.16.
SOLUTION
Ballot
Examples should be restored to Section 6210.16.
---Page
43 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6210.17 Standards for Determining Valid Votes
on Lever Type Voting Machines
A vote cast on a lever-type voting
machine, as specified by the legally valid ballot
instructions,
shall be the choice made by a voter, not to exceed the maximum allowable
votes
per race or question than the number for which the voter is eligible to vote,
by
either
operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or ballot question or
by
writing
or stamping the name of a write-in candidate whose name does not otherwise
appear
on the ballot for that office, in or upon the proper receptacle or device
provided,
followed
by the voter activating the cast vote mechanism.
Section
6210.18 Three-Percent (3%) Audit
Comment
51
PROBLEMS
a. Many
individuals and groups have notified the State Board that this section is
inadequate and could be greatly improved. Because auditing as specified in this
section will not need to be done for more than a year, the State Board does not
need to rush to approve this section at this time.
b. The
regulations do not provide a means for a losing candidate or member of the
public to request and obtain a recount of ballots cast in a contest, or in
specific Election Districts or by specific machines.
SOLUTION
a. The
State Board should delay consideration of approval of Section 6210.18 until
further study. Comments 52 through 61 are offered for the improvement of this
section, even though the section may be revised so that these comments become
no longer relevant.
b.
Losing candidates and members of the public should be explicitly given a method
by which they may select specific contests, Election Districts, or machines or
systems to be audited non-randomly. Any miscounted votes discovered due to
recounts requested in this way should be combined with errors found in the
random audit, and used in any calculations to determine whether criteria for
expanding the audit have been met.
A. As required by Election Law Section
9-211, the board of elections or a bipartisan
Comment
52
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A. As
required by Election Law Section 9-211, the board of elections or a bipartisan
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
A. As required
by Election Law Section 9-211, the COUNTY board of elections or a bipartisan
WHY
The
word "county" was omitted.
team
appointed by such board shall manually count all votes of the voter
verifiable
paper audit trail (VVPAT) from no less than 3% of each type of voting
machine
or system used within the county, provided, however, that there shall be
a
manual count of at least one of each type of voting machine or system used
therein
for each public office and any questions or proposals appearing on the
ballot. The conduct of such random audit shall be in
a manner consistent with
procedures
prescribed by the State Board of Elections.
B. The voting machines or systems to be
audited to meet the county-wide minimum
requirement
set forth in Section A herein shall be selected by lot through a
transparent,
random, manual process where all selections of machines or
---Page
44
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
systems
used in the county are equally probable.
The voting machines or
systems
to be audited to meet the requirements for a specific contest set forth in
Section
A herein shall be selected by lot through a transparent, random, manual
process
where all selections of machines or systems used in the contest within
each
county are equally probable. The county
boards shall adopt one of the
random,
manual selection methods prescribed by the State Board of Elections or
such
county board may submit for approval by the State Board a proposed
alternative
random, manual selection method. County
Board adoption of the
prescribed
random, manual selection method shall take place not later than 45
days
after the purchase of a voting system and notice by the County Board of
the
adoption of such random, manual selection method shall be filed with the
State
Board.
1) As required by Election Law Section
9-211, not less than five days prior to
the
time fixed for the random selection process, the board of elections
shall
send notice by first class mail to each candidate, political party and
independent
body entitled to have had watchers present at the polls in
any
election district in such board's jurisdiction and to the State Board.
Comment
53
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
shall
send notice by first class mail to each candidate, political party and
independent
body entitled to have had watchers present at the polls in
any
election district in such board's jurisdiction and to the State Board.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
, and
such notice shall be posted in public at the offices of the county board of
elections.
WHY
The
public's right to information about the activities of its county board of
elections and election administration should be explicitly mentioned.
Such
notice shall state the time and place fixed for such random selection
process. Such random selection process shall not
occur until after
election
day. Each candidate, political party or
independent body entitled
to appoint
watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to appoint
---Page
45
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
such
number of watchers to observe the random selection process and
the subsequent
audit.
Comment
54
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
Each
candidate, political party or independent body entitled
to
appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall be entitled to appoint
such
number of watchers to observe the random selection process and
the
subsequent audit.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
At the
end of line 2 add the phrase "and any member of the public, upon request,
shall be allowed to observe.
WHY
The
public's rights to oversight of election administration should be explicitly
mentioned.
2) Such notice shall also announce the
date, time, and location that the
audit
shall commence, information on the number of audit teams which
will
conduct such audit, and such other information that the County Board
deems
necessary.
3) The county board shall at a single
session randomly select from all
machines
and systems used within the county in the election so that no
further
drawings are required if anomalies are encountered during the
manual
audit. The audit shall commence on the
same day as the
random,
manual selection process.
Comment
55
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The
audit shall commence on the same day as the
random,
manual selection process.
SUGGSTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
ALL
SYSTEMS SHALL BE UNDER OBSERVATION BY WATCHERS REPRESENTING EACH CANDIDATE,
POLITICAL PARTY OR INDEPENDENT BODY ENTITLED TO APPOINT WATCHERS TO ATTEND AT
A POLLING PLACE, AS WELL AS ANY MEMBER
OF THE PUBLIC WHO REQUESTS TO OBSERVE THEM, FROM THE CLOSE OF VOTING ON ELECTION
DAY UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF THE AUDIT AND CERTIFICATION OF THE RESULTS.
WHY
a.
"on the same day" is vague and could allow many hours delay between
selection of systems to be audited and beginning of the audit. Systems are
vulnerable to tampering at all times, but during such time between selection of
systems to be audited and beginning of the audit, systems are especially
vulnerable.
b. The
public should have explicit right to observe systems at all times.
4) Prior to auditing the audit records,
the county board shall distribute to
those in
attendance at the audit session, copies of the a list showing the
Comment
56
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
those
in attendance at the audit session, copies of the a list showing the
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT
those in
attendance at the audit session, copies of the list showing the
WHY
Correct
a typo.
number
of machines and systems needed to meet the audit requirement
for
each contest and any questions or proposals, and the unofficial vote
results
per voting machine or system selected for audit.
C. For each voting machine or system
subject to be audited, the manual audit shall
consist
of a manual tabulation of the voter verifiable paper audit trail records and
Comment
57
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
consist
of a manual tabulation of the voter verifiable paper audit trail records and
SOLUTION
Append
an additional sentence to paragraph C. to the define the term “voter verifiable
paper audit trail records.” THE TERM “VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER AUDIT TRAIL
RECORDS” MEANS, FOR DRE VOTING SYSTEMS, THE PAPER PRINTOUT WITH THE LIST OF
EACH VOTER’S CHOICES VERIFIABLE BY EACH VOTER PRIOR TO CASTING HIS OR HER
ELECTRONIC BALLOT; AND FOR OPTICAL SCAN SYSTEMS, THE TERM MEANS THE
VOTER-MARKED PAPER BALLOT.
WHY
The
term "voter verifiable paper audit trail records" is undefined.
a
comparison of such count, with respect to all candidates and any questions or
proposals
appearing on the ballot, with the electronic vote tabulation reported for
such
election district.
---Page
46 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) A reconciliation report, on a form
prescribed by the State Board of
Elections,
that reports and compares the manual and electronic vote
tabulations
for each audited candidate for each contest and any question
or
proposal from each machine or system subject to the audit by election
district,
including tallies of overvotes, undervotes, blank ballots, spoiled
ballots
and rejections recorded on the VVPAT, along with any
discrepancies,
shall be prepared by the board of elections or a bipartisan
Comment
58
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
discrepancies,
shall be prepared by the board of elections or a bipartisan
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL WORD
discrepancies,
shall be prepared by the COUNTY board of elections or a bipartisan
WHY
The
word "county" is omitted.
team
appointed by such board and signed by such members of the audit
team.
2) Any discrepancies between the
corresponding audit results and initial
electronic
vote counts shall be duly noted, along with a description of the
actions
taken by the county board of elections for resolution of
discrepancies. The number and type of any damaged or
missing paper
records
shall be duly noted.
3) If any unresolved discrepancy is
detected between the manual count
described
in Section C above and the machine or system electronic count,
even an
unresolved discrepancy of a single vote, the manual count shall
be
conducted a second time on such machine or system to confirm the
discrepancy.
D. The
reconciliation report required in Section C above shall be transmitted to the
County
Board commissioners or their designees upon completion of the initial
---Page
47 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
phase
of the audit for determination on the expansion of the audit conducted
pursuant
to Sections E through G herein.
E. The
county board shall aggregate the audit results reported pursuant to Section
C (2)
herein that are applicable to any contests, questions or proposals. The
aggregated
results for each contest, question or proposal shall be used to
determine
whether further auditing is required as follows:
1) For any contest, question or proposal,
an expanded audit will be required
if
either or both of the following criteria apply to the aggregated audit
results:
a) Any one or more discrepancies between
the confirming manual
counts
described in section C-3 herein and the original machine or
system
electronic counts, which taken together, would alter the
vote
share of any candidate, question or proposal by one tenth of
one
percent (0.1%) or more of the hand counted votes for
respective
contests, questions or proposals in the entire sample; or
b) If discrepancies of any amount are
detected between the
confirming
manual count described in Section C-3 herein and the
original
machine or system electronic count from at least 10% of
the
machines or systems initially audited then the board or
bipartisan
team appointed by such board shall manually count the
votes
recorded on all the voter verifiable paper audit trail records
---Page
48
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
from no
less than an additional 5% of each type of the same type
of
voting machine or system which contains any such discrepancy
or
discrepancies.
c) When determining whether discrepancies
warrant expanding the
audit,
the percentage-based thresholds in this section shall be
rounded
down by truncating the decimal portion (with a minimum of
1).
F) A further expansion of the audit will
be required if either or both of the following
criteria
apply to the audit results:
1) For each contest, question or proposal,
the county board shall aggregate
the
results from the initial audit as required in Section A above and the
expanded
5% audit. If, such aggregated results
of unresolved
discrepancies
satisfy the criteria in Section E(1a) above, a further
expansion
of the audit will be required.
2) For each contest, question or proposal,
the county board shall take the
results
of the 5% expanded audit under Section E above, and, if such
results
of unresolved discrepancies satisfy the criteria n Section E(1b)
above,
a further expansion of the audit will be required.
3) When an expanded audit is required for
a contest pursuant to this section,
each
county board or bipartisan team appointed by such board, shall
manually
count all voter verifiable paper audit trail records from no
---Page
49
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
less
than an additional 12% of each type of the same type of voting machine
or system
which contains any such discrepancy or discrepancies.
4) When determining whether discrepancies
warrant expanding the audit, all
percentage-based
thresholds in this section shall be rounded down by
truncating
the decimal portion (with a minimum of 1).
G) A further expansion of the audit will be
required if either or both of the following
criteria
apply to the audit results:
1) For each contest, question or proposal,
the county board shall aggregate
the
results from the initial audit as required in Section A above and the
expanded
17% audit. If, such aggregated results
of unresolved
discrepancies
satisfy the criteria in Section E(1a) above, a further
expansion
of the audit will be required.
2) For each contest, question or proposal,
the county board shall take the
results
of the 12% expanded audit under Section F above, and, if such
results
of unresolved discrepancies satisfy the criteria n Section E(1b)
above,
a further expansion of the audit will be required.
3) When an expanded audit is required for
a contest pursuant to this section,
each
county board shall manually count all voter verifiable paper
---Page
50
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
audit
trail records from all the remaining unaudited machines and systems where
the
contest appeared on the ballot.
4) When determining whether discrepancies
warrant expanding the audit, all
percentage-based
thresholds in this section shall be rounded down by
truncating
the decimal portion (with a minimum of 1).
H. The standards set forth in Sections A-G
above are not intended to describe the
only
circumstances for a partial or full manual count of the voter verifiable paper
audit record,
but instead are designed to set a uniform statewide standard under
which
such hand counts must be performed. The
county boards of elections, as
well as
the courts, retain the authority to order manual counts of those records in
whole
or in part under such other and additional circumstances as they deem
warranted. In doing so, they should take into
consideration: 1) whether the
discrepancies
were exclusively or predominantly found on one type of voting
machine
or system; 2) the size of the discrepancies; 3) the number of
discrepancies;
4) the percentage of machines or systems with discrepancies; 5)
the
number and distribution of unusable voter-verified paper audit trail records as
described
in Section J below; 6) the number of cancellations recorded on the
voter-verified
paper audit trail records reported pursuant to Section C(1) herein;
and 7)
whether, when projected to a full audit, the discrepancies detected (no
matter
how small) might alter the outcome of the contest, question or proposal
result.
---Page
51
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. If
the audit officials are unable to reconcile the manual count with the
electronic
vote
tabulation on a voting machine or system, then the board of elections shall
conduct
such further investigation of the discrepancies as may be necessary for
the
purpose of determining whether or not to certify the election results, expand
the
audit, or prohibit that voting machine or system's use in such jurisdiction.
J. If
a complete audit is conducted, the results of such audit shall be used by the
canvassing
board in making the statement of canvass and determinations of
persons
elected and propositions approved or rejected.
The results of a partial
audit
shall not be used in lieu of voting machine or system tabulations, unless a
voting
machine or system is found to have failed to record votes in a manner
indicating
an operational failure.
Comment
59
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
operational
failure
SUGGESTED
CHANGE
Define
this term and provide a list of examples. Any error made by a computer
indicates operational failure.
WHY
The
term "operational failure" is vague and should be defined. In other
states, obvious computer failures have been blamed on voters and poll workers,
which has lowered public confidence.
When such
operational failure is found, the
board
of county canvassers shall use the voter verifiable audit records to
determine
the votes cast on such machine or system, provided such records
were
not also impaired by the operational failure of the voting machine or
system. If the voter verified paper audit trail
records in any machine or system
selected
for an audit are found to be unusable for an audit for any reason
whatsoever,
another machine or system used in the same contest shall be
selected
at random by the county board to replace the original machine or
system
in the audit sample. All such
selections shall be made randomly in the
presence
of those observing the audit. The
County Board shall inquire in an
---Page
52
end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
effort
to determine the reason the voter verified paper audit trail records were
compromised
and unusable and such inquiry shall begin as soon as practicable.
The
results of the inquiry shall be made public upon completion.
Comment
60
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
The County Board shall
inquire in an
effort
to determine the reason the voter verified paper audit trail records were
compromised
and unusable and such inquiry shall begin as soon as practicable.
The
results of the inquiry shall be made public upon completion.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT
Upon
determining that operational failure of a voting machine or system has
occurred, or that the voter verified paper audit trail records in any machine
or system are unusable for an audit, the County Board shall immediately inform
the public, the office of the State Attorney General, and the State Board of
this determination. Upon completion of all investigations of the matter, the
County Board shall inform all notified parties of what changes the County Board
will make in procedures and voting systems to remedy the problem. In the case
of an election contest the outcome of which cannot be verified, another
election shall be held.
WHY
a.
Because the term "voter verified paper audit trail records" is
undefined in these regulations, it is unclear whether the term refers to both
voter-marked paper ballots as well as DRE paper trails. This should be
clarified.
b. If
such election records are unusable, this is an indication that severe problems
and/or irregularities have occurred. The county board should immediately notify
all interested parties and stakeholders in the election, including the public,
the State Board and law enforcement.
K. Any anomaly in the manual audit shall
be reported to and be on a form
prescribed
by the State Board and shall accompany the certified election results.
Comment
61
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
K. Any
anomaly in the manual audit shall be reported to and be on a form
prescribed
by the State Board and shall accompany the certified election results.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT LANGUAGE
K. Any
anomaly in the manual audit shall, within 24 hours, be reported to the State
Board and posted in public at the offices of the county board. Such anomaly
shall be described in detail on a form prescribed by the State Board. Such
reports may be viewed by members of the public upon request at the offices of
the State Board. Examples of anomalies are [[list]].
WHY
a.
Clearer language.
b. The
term “anomaly” is vague, and examples of what an "anomaly" is should be
provided.
c. The
regulations should explicitly recognize the right of the public to all
information about the conduct of elections.
d.
Anomalies should be reported immediately.
Section
6210.19 Minimum Number of Voting Machines
A. The purpose of these determinations is
to establish the minimum number of
required
voting machines and privacy booths needed for each polling place
Comment
62
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A. The
purpose of these determinations is to establish the minimum number of
required
voting machines and privacy booths needed for each polling place
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT LANGUAGE
A. THE
MINIMUM NUMBER OF
REQUIRED
VOTING MACHINES AND PRIVACY BOOTHS NEEDED FOR EACH POLLING PLACE SHALL BE
WHY
Clearer
sentence
based
upon the type of voting system and the number of registered voters
(excluding
voters in inactive status) assigned to use that specific voting device in
accordance
with Election Law sections 7-200 and 7-203.
B. Determinations by Type of Voting System
1) Direct Recording Electronic Voting
Systems
a) There shall be at least one direct
recording electronic voting device
for
every 550 registered voters (excluding voters in inactive status)
at the
polling place.
Comment
63
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
a) There
shall be at least one direct recording electronic voting device
for
every 550 registered voters (excluding voters in inactive status)
at the
polling place.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT LANGUAGE
a)
There shall be at least one direct recording electronic voting device
for
every 200 registered voters (excluding voters in inactive status)
at the
polling place.
WHY
550
voters per DRE would result in long wait times for many voters. The experience
of all other states using DREs indicates that approximately 200 registered
voters may be served by one DRE. www.nyvv.org/newdoc/StateTimingData.pdf
and www.nyvv.org/voterlines.shtml
and www.wheresthepaper.org/PeakHoursWaitTimeReport.pdf Although the State Board commissioned a
study by AIR, the public has raised questions about this study that were never
answered, and the study itself was never published in final form.
2) Precinct Based Optical Scan Voting
Systems
A. There shall be at least one scanning
device for every 4000
registered
voters (excluding voters in inactive status) at the polling
place.
Comment
64
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
A.
There shall be at least one scanning device for every 4000 registered voters
(excluding voters in inactive status) at the polling place.
SUGGESTED
REPLACEMENT LANGUAGE
A. If scanning
devices provide undervote notification to voters at the time voters insert
their marked ballot into the scanning device, there shall be at least one
scanning device for every 1500 registered voters (excluding voters in inactive
status). If scanning devices do not provide such undervote notification to
voters, there shall be at least one scanning device for every 4000 registered
voters (excluding voters in inactive status).
WHY
Undervote
notification will be confusing and embarassing to voters, and in many cases
will result in long conversations between voters and poll workers in front of
the scanner.
B. Privacy Booths:
(i) There shall be at least one privacy
booth for every 300
---Page
53 end----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
registered
voters (excluding voters in inactive status), except
that in
a general election for governor, or at elections at
which
electors for President of the United States are
selected
there shall be at least one privacy booth for every
250
registered voters (excluding voters in inactive status).
(ii) At polling places that accommodate more
than 6000
registered
voters (excluding voters in inactive status), there
shall
be one privacy booth for every 350 registered voters
(excluding
voters in inactive status) in a general election for
governor,
or at elections at which electors for President of
the
United States shall be selected; and one privacy booth
for
every 400 active voters in all other elections.
(iii) A sufficient number of the privacy booths
must be accessible
to
voters with disabilities.
C. Obligations of the County Boards of
Elections
1) County boards shall deploy sufficient
voting equipment, election workers
and other
resources so that voter waiting time at a poll site does not
exceed
thirty minutes.
Comment
65
PROBLEM
LANGUAGE
1)
County boards shall deploy sufficient voting equipment, election workers
and
other resources so that voter waiting time at a poll site does not
exceed
thirty minutes.
SUGGESTED
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
Door
clerks at each poll site shall provide each voter with a card that is
time-stamped when the voter arrives, and shall retrieve such card and stamp it
again when the voter leaves. County Boards shall select the two busiest poll
sites in their jurisdiction and tabulate the minimum, maximum and average wait
times by the use of such cards and file a report of such times with the State
Board within one month after each election. Such reports shall be posted in
public at the offices of the county board, and may be viewed by any member of
the public upon request at the offices of the State Board.
WHY
There
is no requirement for county boards to keep track of voter wait time.
Each county board of elections may
increase in a
non-discriminatory
manner, the number of voting devices used in any
specific
polling place.
2) The inspectors in each election
district shall record the number of persons
using
audio, tactile or pneumatic switch ballot devices. The county board
of
elections shall furnish additional voting machines equipped with audio,
tactile
or pneumatic switch ballot devices when it appears that the number
of
persons historically using such devices warrant additional devices.
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D. The State Board of Elections may
authorize a reduction in the number of voting
devices
provided in these regulations upon application of a county board of
elections
which demonstrates that such a reduction will not create excessive
waiting
time by voters.
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